Tag: #wp

  • Vietnam: How Powerful Is The Prime Minister?

    Vietnam: How Powerful Is The Prime Minister?

    Among the “four pillars,” the position of prime minister possesses both power and prestige.


    In the spring of 2021, Vietnam has a new leader: Pham Minh Chinh, a former police intelligence officer and former head of the Vietnamese Communist Party’s Central Organization Commission. On July 26, 2021, Pham Minh Chinh, once again, takes his oath to be the prime minister of Vietnam for the next 5 years.

    One amongst “four pillars of the imperial court”

    In the article “A few things you should know about Vietnam’s National Assembly chairmanship,” we wrote about the formation of the institutional division of power known as the “four pillars,” which includes the general secretary, the state president, the prime minister, and the chairman of the National Assembly.

    If the state president and the chairman of the National Assembly, two among four of the most powerful positions in the Vietnamese Communist Party hierarchy, serve as primarily ceremonial positions, then the prime minister has both pomp and power, possessing broad authority in the governing system.

    The prime ministership was once a position without any notable power. Before Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet’s term (1991-1997), previous prime ministers left a very little mark, except for Ho Chi Minh – who served as both state president and prime minister from 1946-1955.

    Prime ministers after him, such as Pham Van Dong (1955-1987), Pham Hung (1987-1988), and Do Muoi (1988-1991), all served during periods where the government functioned according to the direction and management of the Party, rather than with tools of the executive branch. The same could be said during periods where Ho Chi Minh and Le Duan had overwhelming individual influence over the Party, causing other institutions and positions, including the prime ministership, to be subservient.

    In the 1980 Constitution, the government was called the Council of Ministers, with the prime minister position changed to the chairman of the Council of Ministers. This was an institution of collective leadership, with the powers of the chairman being minimal. With the 1992 Constitution, Vietnam reverted to the government mechanism in which the prime minister was head, concentrating greater power in his hands rather than practicing collective decision-making as in the past. Vo Van Kiet was the first prime minister to enjoy the new system under the 1992 Constitution.

    With the depth and broadness of economic reform, the government’s role in managing national affairs grew by the day to more quickly, effectively, and dynamically respond to domestic and international developments. This increase in authority also served to more adequately address the increasing importance of foreign affairs in the age of globalization. The position of prime minister, thus, became extremely powerful. Nguyen Tan Dung (2006-2016) is seen as the most powerful prime minister ever and once competed fiercely for the position of general secretary.

    Who elects the prime minister?

    Vietnam’s central government is modeled on the parliamentary system, with the central role (theoretically) held by the National Assembly. Constituents elect members of the National Assembly, and the National Assembly elects the government’s leadership figures, including the prime minister. (Obviously, everyone knows who actually “elects” the members of the National Assembly and the prime minister). The prime minister must be a member of the National Assembly.

    Normally, electing the prime minister occurs during the first session of the new National Assembly term, after the general election, which occurs after the Party congress. In 2016, the procedure took an unusual turn: the National Assembly elected the new prime minister in the last meeting of its term in April, preceding the general election by more than a month. After the general election, the new National Assembly then repeated the election of the prime minister one more time. Nguyen Xuan Phuc was sworn into office twice in 2016. Pham Minh Chinh also had the same experience in 2021.

    How powerful is the prime minister?

    The prime minister’s powers are stipulated in Article 98 of the Constitution and Article 28 of the Law on Government Organization (ratified in 2015 and amended in 2019).

    As head of state administration, this position has broad authority, from enforcing laws and organizing personnel to proposing and distributing the budget.

    As a unitary state, the central government has overarching authority, with the prime minister’s power extending from the center all the way to the provinces and cities.

    Outside his separate authority, the prime minister also has general authority over the collective decisions and resolutions of the cabinet.

    For more details, please see the two documents described above. Here, we would like to list a few of the prime minister’s decision-making powers to demonstrate just how influential this position is in the economic sphere:

    ·      Regarding land: has the power to establish a council to assess land usage programs and plans at the national level; approves changes in land usage purposes on rice cultivation fields 10 hectares and above, protected and special-use forest land 20 hectares and above; decides the policy framework for compensation, support, and resettlement in special cases; decides price tables for province-level land in many cases; decides on several cases in which the usage rights for land the state allocates or leases are not auctioned.

    ·      Regarding investment: has the power to approve investment plans on the scale of airports, ports, oil and gas rigs, large urban areas, industrial zones, and export processing zones; approves investment plans overseas in banking, insurance, stocks, and telecommunications…from 400 billion dong and above, along with other projects involving capital of 800 billion dong and above.

    Is prime minister the highest attainable position?

    No. In the party power hierarchy, the general secretary remains at the top and is the most powerful position overall.

    There has never been a prime minister who has risen to become general secretary, except for Do Muoi, who was the chairman of the Council of Ministers. Nearly all served only one or two terms before retiring, except Nguyen Xuan Phuc, who served as prime minister and then stepped down to become state president, a much less powerful position.

    This article describes the power of the prime minister, but in actuality, we have only spoken of it in legal terms and in relation to the order of power in the party. The position’s power is also dependent on the individual’s level of influence within the party.

    To put it another way, a leader’s power is the sum of his or her institutional power and individual sway. If the system bestows power but the individual leader doesn’t have the ability to wield it properly, then he does not have much power at all. Conversely, the system can bestow limited power, but an individual can exercise influence beyond his institutional limits.


    This article was written in Vietnamese by Trinh Huu Long and was previously published in Luat Khoa Magazine on April 6, 2021. The English translation was done by Will Nguyen.

  • Vietnam Briefing: COVID-19 Crisis Deepening While The National Assembly Convened To Elect State Leadership

    Vietnam Briefing: COVID-19 Crisis Deepening While The National Assembly Convened To Elect State Leadership

    The Vietnam Briefing, which is released every Monday morning Vietnam time, looks at Vietnam’s political developments of the past week.


    COVID-19

    • Last week witnessed the daily COVID-19 tally reach an all-time high on Saturday, with 7,968 cases reported. The total number of cases surpassed 100,000 on Sunday, July 25.
    • According to data from Johns Hopkins University, only more than 4.5 million doses have been administered, which is equivalent to 4.6 percent of the population, with only 0.39 percent of the population having been fully vaccinated.
    • Hanoi, the capital city, started a 15-day social distancing period on Saturday, July 24.
    • Ho Chi Minh city started to impose a night curfew from Monday, July 26, prohibiting residents from leaving their homes after 6 PM without a legitimate reason.

    Vaccination scandals

    Vietnam’s public always speculates that government officials, their relatives, and big corporations have unfair access to vaccines. Last week, two scandals gave them legitimate reasons to believe that.

    • A woman announced on her Facebook page that she received a COVID-19 vaccine shot last week with help from her “grandfather.” The hospital that administered the shot explained that her father registered for her. The father happens to be a lecturer at the Academy of Military Medicine who taught one of the doctors administering vaccines. It’s a popular practice in Vietnamese culture for a woman who has children to call her own father “ông ngoại” (maternal grandfather), following the way her children call him.
    • The Ho Chi Minh City government “lent” 5,000 COVID-19 vaccine doses to the giant corporation Vingroup, city officials said on Saturday. They explained that this was done due to Vingroup’s large assistance to the government’s pandemic response and that they would do so again for other enterprises for the same purpose.
    • The two above-mentioned vaccination scandals angered the public as people questioned the fairness of the government’s vaccine rollout policy. Some public members were enraged at the Vingroup “lending agreement” because they believed the government did not have the authority to lend these vaccines since they were donated to Vietnam under the COVAX program.

    Meanwhile, the National Assembly convened to rubber-stamp the Communist Party’s decisions on personnel

    The pandemic is usually not a reason for a national legislative body to stop working. But while online meeting procedures have not been introduced yet, the National Assembly convened its first session of the new term on July 20 after the election in May to largely rubber-stamp the Communist Party’s major decisions on personnel.

    • The National Assembly always convenes shortly after the general elections to elect state leadership, including its own. On July 20, members elected Vuong Dinh Hue as chairperson of the body and 17 other top positions.
    • As expected, the National Assembly  Standing Committee has nominated Nguyen Xuan Phuc as state chairman (a.k.a state president).
    • On July 26, the National Assembly is expected to elect the state chairperson, the prime minister, the vice state chairperson, the chief justice of the Supreme People’s Court, and the prosecutor general of the Supreme People’s Procuracy. These people are expected to be the same officials who were elected to the same positions in April.
    • The National Assembly on July 23 voted to pass a resolution to maintain the current 22 ministry-level departments of the administration.
    • The National Assembly has also decided to shorten its first session due to the COVID-19 pandemic and end the session on July 28 instead of July 31.

    Facebook users sentenced to years of imprisonment

    Nguyen Van Lam, 51, was sentenced by Nghe An’s People’s Provincial Court to nine years in prison and three years of probation for “making, storing, spreading information, materials, items for the purpose of opposing the State” under Article 117 of the Penal Code. He was accused of using Facebook to spread information that is deemed to be anti-state.

    More cases:

    • Tran Hoang Minh, a Facebook user, was sentenced to five years of imprisonment allegedly for “abusing democratic freedoms” under Article 331 of the Penal Code, according to RFA. The Hanoi People’s Court convicted him based on the accusation of publishing 51 pieces of content on Facebook concerning the Dong Tam incident. Minh had no defense lawyer nor relatives present during his trial. It’s unclear whether or not he will file an appeal.
    • A former attorney in Hanoi, Nguyen Thi Thuy, was convicted of the same crime on July 21 and sentenced to 20 months of imprisonment: “In the process of protecting rights of Ngu, Thuy said he was wrongly accused and illegally arrested. She later wrote two documents that hurt the prestige and honor of several Party and State leaders and sent them to ministries and agencies, thus exerting pressure on them to follow her proposal.”
    • Nguyen Van Son, a relative of the detained blogger Le Dung Vova, was charged with concealment of crimes, Hanoi Police announced on July 22. He is accused of assisting Dung while he was in hiding before his arrest on June 30.

    Former mayor of Hanoi prosecuted for illegally interfering in bidding activities

    From VietnamPlus:

    “The Investigation Police Agency under the Ministry of Public Security on July 24 executed a decision on commencing legal proceedings against Nguyen Duc Chung, former chairman of the Hanoi People’s Committee, for the charge of “abusing position and power while performing duties” in the case related to the municipal Department of Planning and Investment and relevant units.”


    U.S. trade agency drops tariff threat against Vietnam over currency practices

    From Reuters:

    “The U.S. Trade Representative’s office on Friday said it had determined that no tariff action against Vietnam was warranted after its central bank agreed with the U.S. Treasury not to manipulate its currency for an export advantage.”


    US Defense Secretary to visit Vietnam

    From VietnamPlus:

    “US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin will pay an official visit to Vietnam on July 28 and 29 at the invitation of Vietnamese Minister of National Defence Gen. Phan Van Giang.”

    From VnExpress:

    “A former U.S. vessel donated to Vietnam Coast Guard arrived in the country earlier this month, according to the U.S. Embassy in Hanoi.”


    Learn more about Vietnam:

    In Vietnam, the Party’s Rolling Crackdown on Dissent Continues

    Stewart Rees/The Diplomat/July 23

    “Proponents of an EU trade pact said it would nudge one-party Vietnam towards greater respect for human rights. The evidence so far points in the other direction.”

    Vietnam Still Trolling Donald Trump With Economic Successes

    William Pesek/Forbes/July 22

    “Vietnam just made a deal with the U.S. Treasury Department: we won’t weaken the dong if you take us off the dreaded “currency manipulator” list. It’s actually a bigger victory for Hanoi than Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính’s government may realize.”

    New research: “The Growing Salience of Online Vietnamese Nationalism”

    Luong Nguyen An Dien/ISEAS/2021

    “The growing salience of online Vietnamese nationalism has posed serious challenges and dilemmas for the regime. The authorities have had to encourage nationalistic patriotism without letting Sinophobia spiral out of control or turn against the regime.”

  • Vietnam’s State President: The Captain But Not Really A Captain

    Vietnam’s State President: The Captain But Not Really A Captain

    In Vietnam, the position of state president is like that of a ship captain who completely got separated from the helm.


    During his single term as the prime minister, Nguyen Xuan Phuc became popular in the news for his words and promises to transform many provinces and cities in Vietnam into “captains,” from “economic captain” to “developmental captain.” Now, he himself has become the captain of Vietnam, as he accepted the position of state president – the legal head of state.

    But like many other captains of years past, his position as the “captain” of Vietnam is not what it appears. Yes, he will work from No. 2 Hung Vuong Street in Hanoi’s old French palace that dates more than 100 years, where French governors-general and President Ho Chi Minh once sat, but he won’t have much real power.

    “The four pillars” and the parliamentary system

    The state president is normally drawn from the Politburo of the Vietnamese Communist Party-normally, but not always. The exception is Ton Duc Thang, who succeeded Ho Chi Minh and served from 1969 to 1981. Ton Duc Thang was only a Party Central Committee member.

    In history, the most powerful state president of Vietnam was undoubtedly Ho Chi Minh, who held the position for more than 23 years, from 1946 until he died in 1969. During his years of greatest power, Ho Chi Minh also held the highest leadership position in the Communist Party and the position of prime minister until 1955. Between 1955 and 1960, Ho resigned as prime minister but held onto two other positions within the Party: party chairman and general secretary.

    From 1960 onwards, Ho remained the party chairman and state president, but with the rise of Le Duan and his ascension to power, Ho Chi Minh was no longer the center of Vietnam’s political life. From then onwards, the role of state president slowly became largely ceremonial.

    Ton Duc Thang, who was not elected into the Politburo, of course, held the position of state president, but he did not have much influence. His successor, Vo Chi Cong, on the other hand, was a member of the Politburo. But at the time, people didn’t call the position “State President,” but rather, “State Council President,” the council being an institution of collective leadership similar to the collective leadership structure of the Council of Ministers; this structure was originally borrowed from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and was incorporated wholesale into Vietnam’s 1980 Constitution.

    It was perhaps the next president, Le Duc Anh (1992-1997), who carved out a noteworthy role for the position of state president when he turned the role into an individual leadership position rather than a collective one. With his powerful influence derived from his time as defense minister, Le Duc Anh, along with General Secretary Do Muoi and Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet, formed what journalist Huy Duc calls the “tripartite division of power.” At the time, the “four pillars” had yet to take shape clearly; it was not until the leadership transition in 1997 that this was established.

    In actuality, the designation “four pillars” refers to the order of power within the Party. At the same time, the position of the state president in a parliamentary system such as Vietnam’s is a formality that only carries ceremonial value rather than any real power.

    What does it mean to be ceremonial?

    The parliamentary system is special in that the person who leads the state (head of state) is not the head of the cabinet. For example, in nearly all European countries, the head of the cabinet is the prime minister, who is simultaneously the majority leader in parliament; the head of state is either the president or the king/queen. We can see that Germany, Belgium, Denmark, and the United Kingdom all have prime ministers as their central political leaders rather than presidents or kings/queens.

    Vietnam is similar. The state president is the head of state, which according to its Constitution is “the person who leads the state, who represents the Socialist Republic of Vietnam domestically and in foreign affairs.” However, the person who leads the state administration is the prime minister, who possesses far-reaching power, as we have analyzed in the article “Vietnam: How powerful is the prime minister?”

    The Constitution grants the state president a number of limited powers that do not appear lacking, but in practice, are quite lacking. These powers include promulgating the Constitution, laws, and decrees, abilities that very much resemble veto power over decrees; numerous powers that relate to proposals to the National Assembly to elect or remove individuals from the highest positions in government; and above all, power as commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

    “Commander-in-chief”sounds enormously powerful. But the command of Vietnam’s armed forces has never laid with the state president; it actually lies with the Politburo and the Central Military Commission (CMC). In recent times, the secretary of the Central Military Committee has always been the Party general secretary, while the deputy minister of the CMC has been the minister of defense. The state president is simply a standing member of the CMC. Nguyen Phu Trong has been the only individual to hold both Party general secretary and state president positions while concurrently serving as the secretary of the CMC.

    Thus, the state president does not actually hold any guns. He doesn’t hold the purse strings either, because control of the treasury is held by the prime minister. The authority of the state president, then, lies in approving military promotions, bestowing awards and honors, and deciding on issues related to citizenship, reprieves, and diplomatic protocols, etc.

    With limited powers, Vietnamese presidents after Ho Chi Minh have never fully exercised their powers on thorny issues, such as dismissing a number of high-ranking positions in the government and the military or vetoing an ordinance from the National Assembly’s Standing Committee.

    Though it has transitioned from a collective leadership role (in the State Council) to an individualized one, the position of state president still represents the collective in announcing decisions and lacks the broad, active powers of the prime minister.

    The real power of the state president perhaps lies in the fact that he has his feet in both the Politburo and the CMC. If it weren’t for this straddling, the state president would be merely a puppet. Thus, when examining the actual power of a Vietnamese political leader, it is not enough to look to the law; one must also look at his or her power within the Party and the individual influence he or she has.

    Nguyen Xuan Phuc has bestowed the title of “captain” on many provinces and cities as his way to encourage them to develop and prosper, though perhaps these provincial and municipal leaders have yet to understand how they were called “captains.” Nguyen Xuan Phuc now has also assumed the position of head of the ship, but he is also no captain.


    This article was written in Vietnamese by Trinh Huu Long and was previously published in Luat Khoa Magazine on April 7, 2021. The English translation was done by Will Nguyen.

  • July 24, 2012: China Establishes Sansha City, Intensifying The Maritime Conflict With Vietnam

    July 24, 2012: China Establishes Sansha City, Intensifying The Maritime Conflict With Vietnam

    What happened?

    On July 24, 2012, China established a prefecture-level city called Sansha City (in Vietnamese: Thành phố Tam Sa) under Hainan Province, the most important strategic location for China to push territorial claims in the South China Sea [1].

    Sansha City covers 800,000 square miles of China’s nine-dash line map of claimed territories in the South China Sea, and it is 1,700 times the size of New York City, even though it mostly covers seawater. [2] According to China analyst Zachary Haver in a US Naval War College report: “through Sansha’s system of normalized administrative control, China is gradually transforming contested areas of the South China Sea into de facto Chinese territory.” [3] In other words, through the establishment of Sansha City, China is signaling that it is here to stay.

    The establishment of Sansha City has been extremely controversial in Vietnam because the city includes the Paracel and Spratly Islands, which Vietnam also contests as its rightful territory, along with other countries such as Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.

    What did Vietnam say?

    As expected, Vietnam did not take the news lightly. In 2020, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman said that Vietnam wholeheartedly rejected the “so-called Sansha City” as it violates the sovereignty of Vietnam. [4]

    The presidents of the People’s Committees in Khanh Hoa and Da Nang provinces, which Vietnam claims govern the Spratly and Paracel Islands, respectively, also had the same talking point. [5] They further affirmed that the two islands are under the administration of Khanh Hoa and Da Nang provinces and not the Sansha City of Hainan Province.

    Territorial conflicts and rising anti-China nationalism

    This event was just one among many others that intensified maritime conflict between China and Vietnam. Both countries have tried to establish both legal and historical claims to the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Because of the fierce conflict, many people in Vietnam have developed a unique version of nationalism: anti-China nationalism.

    Such nationalism is rooted in the reality of many Vietnamese who have held a deep-seated Sinophobic resentment towards a millennium of Chinese domination [6]. Still, this nationalism has proved to be more than about China’s military aggression. In fact, anti-China nationalism in Vietnam has been useful in anti-authoritarian mobilizations and call for better governance and democracy. Read more about the nuances around anti-China nationalism in Vietnam here.

    Bibliography

    [1] Li, M. (2019). Hainan Province in China’s South China Sea Policy: What Role Does the Local Government Play? Asian Politics & Policy, 11(4), 623–642. https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12495

    [2] Coy, P. (2021, February 19). China Has An 800,000-Square-Mile ‘City’ in the South China Sea. Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-19/china-has-an-800-000-square-mile-city-in-the-south-china-sea

    [3] Haver, Z. (2021, January). China Maritime Report No. 12: Sansha City in China’s South China Sea Strategy: Building a System of Administrative Control. U.S. Naval War College. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1011&context=cmsi-maritime-reports

    [4] M.Q. (2020, October 15). Việt Nam phản đối Trung Quốc mở rộng hoạt động tại cái gọi là “thành phố Tam Sa.” Báo Thế giới và Việt Nam. https://baoquocte.vn/viet-nam-phan-doi-trung-quoc-mo-rong-hoat-dong-tai-cai-goi-la-thanh-pho-tam-sa-126319.html

    [5] Phản đối Trung Quốc lập cái gọi là “thành phố Tam Sa.” (2012, June 24). Tạp Chí Xây Dựng Đảng. http://xaydungdang.org.vn/Home/vankientulieu/Bien-dao-Viet-Nam/2012/5207/Phan-doi-Trung-Quoc-lap-cai-goi-la-thanh-pho-Tam-Sa.aspx

    [6] Lam, V. (2018, June 29). Vietnam: A month of mass protests. Lowy Institute. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/vietnam-month-mass-protests

  • The Intertwining Of Science, Politics, And Ideology In Vietnam’s COVID-19 Crisis

    The Intertwining Of Science, Politics, And Ideology In Vietnam’s COVID-19 Crisis

    Amidst the COVID-19 crisis, a moment for science

    The escalation of COVID-19 in Vietnam, especially in Saigon (officially known as Ho Chi Minh City), is sending millions of people into crisis. They have struggled on multiple fronts, from healthcare and making sense of varying isolation requirements to obtaining food and necessities amidst strict yet incoherent travel bans and supply shortages.

    The double target of trying to contain COVID-19 while simultaneously continuing economic activities that the government persistently defended and adhered to since the start of the pandemic has been abandoned. This is indicative of how serious the situation has become. Over the past few weeks, Saigonese have experienced life in a way they could never have imagined.

    In this grim picture, Tuoi Tre Online reported on July 10, 2021, that Ho Chi Minh City’s Party Committee Secretary Nguyen Van Nen is now looking to scientists for advice.[1] The secretary’s words were quoted widely in the news:

    I feel that we need to consult the scientists…. At any time, I want specialists and scientists to see flaws in our strategy to fight the pandemic and contact me; I will consider their advice and respond timely.

    A Facebook influencer reacted to this news with a sense of irony and bitterness:[2]

    So what expertise have you relied on to fight the pandemic? Anything but science? Have you been kidding your citizens all along? For one and a half years now, have you been playing with the life and death of millions of people? So, after all, is it true that the tools you have taken to fight a pandemic are simply government decrees and [the manpower of] the Communist Youth League? I feel so ashamed of being led by national leaders who are both blind and arrogant.

    It is rather apparent that in a pandemic, one had better look to the scientists. So, why is a government official only bringing them to the table now? The next question is, how critical can scientists be, with a government that does not like criticism? At the highest level, one must wonder where science and scientists are in the decision-making concerning public matters in non-democratic Vietnam? A look into the Vietnamese Communist Party’s (VCP) ideology that it has followed and its practices could explain this conundrum.

    In ideology: the suppression of civil society and communicative rationality

    In the United Kingdom, at the start of the pandemic, the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies was activated. Since then, it has been working closely with the government as an external body to advise on making appropriate decisions regarding COVID-19 in the country. The importance and weight of scientific advice cannot be underestimated; UK scientists successfully convinced Prime Minister Boris Johnson and his cabinet to abandon their herd immunity strategy and adopt a nationwide lockdown in March 2020.

    Without this lockdown, the United Kingdom could have seen 80 percent of its people infected and 500,000 deaths.[3] On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, the physician-scientist and immunologist Anthony Fauci, in his role as the chief medical advisor to the US president, has been a pillar in handling COVID-19 in the United States.

    Liberal democracy entails the practice of taking advice from scientists and not restraining those who deliver honest yet uncomfortable truths to people in positions of power. The two hallmarks of liberal democracy that shape this practice are civil society and communicative rationality.[4]

    Civil society in a liberal democracy comprises actors and institutions that are supposed to be independent of the state and who act to balance state power. Therefore, universities and the myriad of civil associations in democratic countries are autonomous and can freely critique the conduct of the government or oppose laws and policies they view as problematic without fear of punishment.

    On the other hand, communicative rationality, an ideal of liberal democracy, means that people arrive at a collective agreement about something via genuine, intelligible conversations. Thus parliamentary debate and rebuttal in classroom discussions are part and parcel of a healthy democratic life and politics.

    Nowhere in the ideological textbook of the VCP can one find any sign of friendliness towards the idea of an autonomous, independent civil society, nor communicative rationality in the way the state relates to other estates in society. The Vietnamese government condemns independent civil society as a strategy of ‘hostile forces’ to undermine political stability.[5] Following the Marxist-Leninist ideology, the Communist leaders control civil society and use civil society organizations, such as the press, schools, and mass associations, to garner consent from the people for its rule.[6] Likewise, the Party believes in ‘self-criticism,’ rather than opposition or open, genuine debate in the National Assembly or in other venues where the state and citizens can talk to each other.[7]

    In practice: the strategic mobilization of scientists while confining them within governable spaces

    Since 1975, the Vietnamese State could be described as developmental. In the pursuit of economic growth and technological and social development, the state needs the expertise of scientists and intellectuals. This is evidenced by the existence of a wide range of research and scientific centers and institutions funded by the State that operate within the scope prescribed for them by the government. However, the system ensures that scientists and intellectuals employed in these research centres do not threaten the state.[8]

    Despite these state-employed scientists and intellectuals, the Vietnamese government rarely describes its style of governance as “evidence/science-based.” This suggests that the VCP still aspires to be a good disciple of Marxism-Leninism when it comes to organizing the political system and governance. “The Party knows best” is apparently its motto. In other words, the Party sees itself as the supreme source of authority and expertise. This also makes Vietnam’s developmentalism different from, for example, Japan’s.  Japan’s developmentalism is based on rationality, whereas Vietnam’s is based on ideology.[9]

    Speaking of rationality, communicative rationality still has no place in Vietnam’s politics nor in the civil sphere. The National Assembly has shown little sign of becoming a place for open, genuine debate about public matters. Critical thinking is still lacking in the way students are educated. The free press is still a wild dream for Vietnam.

    I interviewed the head of Luat Khoa Tap Chi not long ago. He described the prominent culture in Vietnam as a “culture of obedience and singular thinking” rather than critical thinking and genuine, intelligible debate. Last but not least, we shall not forget that in 2007, when the Institute of Development Studies was established by renowned intellectuals and scientists of the country to speak truth to power, it went into so much trouble with the government and was eventually disbanded.[10]

    Prospects of the VCP democratizing itself?

    Not so much. In Saigon, what the Party Committee Secretary Nguyen Van Nen said about consulting scientists is most likely just a moment of him forgetting the Party’s line he should be toeing. Indeed, just a week after his statement, a Facebook influencer reposted on his Facebook page a VNExpress interview with Vu Thanh Tu Anh of Fulbright University Vietnam, which reportedly was removed from VNExpress’s website immediately after it was posted.[11] In this interview, Tu Anh discusses some failures in the government’s strategy to contain COVID-19.[12]

    In conclusion, for scientists to speak truth to power, or at least to save Vietnam from this deadly pandemic, they require a change in both ideology and politics, which the VCP seems to be neither willing nor ready to take.

    Bibliography:

    1. Bí thư Thành ủy TP.HCM gặp gỡ các chuyên gia, nhà khoa học cùng bàn cách chống dịch COVID-19, 10 July 2021. Tuổi Trẻ Online. Available at: https://tuoitre.vn/bi-thu-thanh-uy-tp-hcm-gap-go-cac-chuyen-gia-nha-khoa-hoc-cung-ban-cach-chong-dich-covid-19-20210710120636333.htm
    2. Thai Hao’s Facebook page, 10 July 2021. The full post is available at: https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=1029231357886052&id=100023975920044
    3. Grey, Stephen & MacAskill, Andrew, 7 April 2020. Special Report: Johnson listened to his scientists about coronavirus – but they were slow to sound the alarm. Reuters. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-britain-path-speci-idUSKBN21P1VF
    4. The background of my understanding of liberal democracy in this paragraph comes from Alexis de Tocqueville (on civil society) and Jurgen Habermas (on communicative rationality).
    5. See, for example, an article in Cong an Nhan dan, available at: http://cand.com.vn/Chong-dien-bien-hoa-binh/Canh-giac-thu-doan-loi-dung-xa-hoi-dan-su-de-chong-pha-che-do-581991/; another one in Nhan dan, available at: https://nhandan.vn/tin-tuc-su-kien/xa-hoi-dan-su-mot-thu-doan-cua-dien-bien-hoa-binh-392081/
    6. The reality of ‘state-led civil society’ in Vietnam, most prominent before the late 1980s, is discussed widely in the academic literature. For example, I suggest Landau, I. (2008). Law and civil society in Cambodia and Vietnam: A Gramscian perspective. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 38(2), 244–258; and Salemink, O. (2006). Translating, interpreting, and practicing civil society in Vietnam: A tale of calculated misunderstanding. In D. Lewis & D. Mosse (Eds.), Development Brokers and Translators: The Ethnography of Aid and Agencies (pp. 101–126). Kumarian Press.
    7. See, for example, a discussion session organized by a mass organization, in Tortosa, A. (2012). Grassroots democracy in rural Vietnam: A Gramscian analysis. Socialism and Democracy, 26(1), 103–126. https://doi.org/10.1080/08854300.2011.645661
    8. See Morris-Jung, J. (2017). Reflections on governable spaces of activism and expertise in Vietnam. Critical Asian Studies, 49(3), 441–443. https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2017.1339448
    9. For more on developmentalism and plan-rationality versus plan-ideology, see Johnson, C. (1993). The Japanese miracle. In MITI and the Japanese miracle: The growth of industrial policy, 1925-1975 (pp. 1–34). Stanford University Press; and Woo-Cumings, M. (Ed.). (1999). Introduction: Chalmers Johnson and the politics of nationalism and development. In The developmental state (pp. 1–31). Cornell University Press.
    10. Morris-Jung, J. (2015). The Vietnamese bauxite controversy: Towards a more oppositional politics. Journal of Vietnamese Studies, 10(1), 63–109.
    11. Thanh Nguyen’s Facebook post, 17 July 2021. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/paulothanhnguyen/posts/4395856270458582
    12. On 20 July 2021, another scientist, Vu Hong Nguyen, also shared on his Facebook page that his contribution to a TV program in Vietnam about COVID-19 vaccines was abruptly removed. He explains that his skeptical view of the Chinese vaccine Sinopharm, which he planned to talk about in the TV program, was not welcome. He titles this post on his Facebook page as ‘Do not let politics interfere with science’. Nguyen’s Facebook post is available at: https://www.facebook.com/vu.nguyen.758/posts/4726456800701987
  • How The Latest Outbreak Reveals The Darker Side Of Vietnam’s Anti-Coronavirus Strategy

    How The Latest Outbreak Reveals The Darker Side Of Vietnam’s Anti-Coronavirus Strategy

    Last year, when the novel coronavirus Covid-19 ravaged the healthcare system and economy of even the most developed countries in the world, Vietnam’s early success in containing infections and keeping the death toll low drew praise and even admiration from the international media and community.

    “Fighting the pandemic as if we are fighting an enemy,” the country’s anti-coronavirus slogan declared.

    Vietnam’s early successful anti-coronavirus protocols primarily focused on isolating infected areas, facilitating rapid contact tracing, mandatory hospitalization of infected patients and their close contacts, as well as imposing fines on those who broke the social distancing rules.

    Though efficient as these protocols might seem, as experts point out [1], only a few countries possess control structures that Vietnam has in order to deal with the pandemic, let alone being willing to carry them out under actual circumstances.

    Since the control playbook helped the country get through the very first waves of Covid-19 infections, the most recent outbreak has revealed the darker sides of how Vietnam handles the pandemic in its rigid and yet abusive nature.

    When “collective benefits” dwarf human rights

    In Vietnam, the need to curb the pandemic seems to have outmatched other substantial matters, such as upholding certain human rights [2] and looking after people’s livelihoods.

    As the Southeast Asian country witnessed [3] its highest surge of Covid-19 cases in recent days, more measures, including strict lockdown and movement restrictions, have been put in place. Ho Chi Minh City [4] and the entire southern region [5] remain under lockdown while adopting Directive 16 of the government, an anti-coronavirus protocol, to curb the spread of Covid-19.

    Directive 16 [6] requires all citizens to follow disease control guidelines and stay at home, except for “necessary duties,” while restricting gatherings of more than two people in public places, halting all means of transportation, and so on.

    Although not legally binding [7], the new ordinance raises public concerns about whether the authorities’ policies for “curbing the pandemic” interfere with fundamental human rights, such as the freedom of movement and speech.

    People can be coerced into compliance or fined if they go outside without a “reasonable purpose”[8] or post content deemed to be “false information”[9] on social media.

    These terms, “reasonable,” “necessary,” or “false,” of course, are arbitrarily defined by local authorities.

    Barbed wire fences were set up in a quarantine area in District 3, Ho Chi Minh City (July 2021). Photo: Sy Dong/ Thanh Nien Online.

    Since Ho Chi Minh City has undergone a citywide lockdown, there have been over 12,000 cases [10] in which people were fined for “violating anti-coronavirus regulations.” That would include more than 2,000 cases [11] where people were fined for going outside, despite reports that they were properly wearing masks and keeping a safe distance. More ironically, the authorities even set a daily quota [12] for how many people to be fined.

    Besides its legal ambiguity, Directive 16 is also being abused [13] by police officers and security forces to serve their interests in the name of containing the coronavirus. Petty corruption and alleged misconduct are commonplace.

    Multiple personal experiences, videos, and short clips circulating on social media show the truth behind the curtain of the “ideal anti-coronavirus model,” [14] about which Vietnamese authorities brag so enthusiastically.

    In one video, policemen and security guards were seen entering a house and grappling with a local family, allegedly accusing them of violating social distancing measures for selling essential produce. The security forces later confiscated all the produce, and they then dragged the homeowner into their vehicle.

    This woman was seen being dragged to a police car by security forces. Photo: Screenshot/Thanh Nien Online.

    The lack of independent oversight of the power of law enforcement, along with the absence of transparency on Covid-19 stimulus and relief policies, is nurturing an environment where abuse of power [15] and corruption [16] flourish.

    Other similar videos and Facebook posts showing police taking advantage of anti-coronavirus measures to harass passers-by, arbitrarily fine people, penalize street vendors, or implicitly ask for bribes are not difficult to find on social media.

    Behind the successful anti-coronavirus model

    The “effective” methods that helped Vietnam overcome the first three waves of Covid-19 infections, in reality, are not immune to shortcomings and inefficiency.

    “Tracing, mapping and quelling the virus,”[17] the strategy which operates on the principle of tracing infected patients, isolating residential areas, and administering treatment, although appearing to be successful at first, comes at the cost of hurting the Vietnamese economy and causing many to be unemployed. Furthermore, the procedure of providing financial assistance to affected families is often long and bureaucratic.

    Meanwhile, the effectiveness of centralized quarantine camps, where Covid-19 patients and their direct contacts are compulsorily held while awaiting testing and treatment, remains still a big question.

    The so-called quarantine camps were hailed by state media [18] as “effectively functioning” to curb the coronavirus outbreaks, and therefore should remain “a top priority method.”

    Young children were isolated inside a quarantine camp in Phu Yen Province. Photo courtesy: Soha.vn

    Nevertheless, the surge in cases in recent weeks, which overloaded the capacity [19] of those camps, coupled with their poor and unsanitary conditions, put both asymptomatic patients and healthy people at risk of being mutually infected. Also, since the quarantine requirements are applied to everyone regardless of age, children were subject to isolation and staying away from their parents, whereas home quarantine could be a more feasible option.

    While too focused on the idea of “fighting the virus,” Vietnam also trails behind [20] other neighboring Southeast Asian countries in securing a vaccination supply, as well as ramping up inoculation programs. As of now, only above 0.3 percent [21] of Vietnam’s population is fully vaccinated.

    Only around 0.3 percent of Vietnam’s population is fully vaccinated (July 19th). Source: Our World in Data/screenshot.

    Meanwhile, as the government asks its citizens [22] to donate to the ‘vaccine fund’ as cases spike, questions [23] regarding the transparency of the fund, along with promises of equal access to Covid-19 vaccines [24] for all citizens, remain unanswered.


    Last June, the New York Times published an article [25] warning Vietnam to brace itself for a fresh wave of Covid-19 infections while suggesting the country’s luck in containing the disease might be “running out” this time.

    The Vietnamese government, facing the shortcomings and challenges of its anti-coronavirus strategy, rather than admitting the faults, consulting experts’ advice, and making appropriate adjustments to improve the situation, continues to defend its mistakes. The government has perpetually shifted the blame to “reactionary forces” for spreading “distorted information”[26] or the New York Times for a “biased evaluation” [27] in claiming that the country’s success in containing previous infections was based on luck.

    Whether Vietnam was lucky in its past Covid-19 handling is still unclear; however, we can ostensibly see the secret behind the success of the Communist regime’s strategy: its anti-coronavirus playbook only works at the expense of the well-being of ordinary citizens.

    Bibliography:

    1. Bill Hayton, Tro Ly Ngheo. (2020, May 12). Vietnam’s Coronavirus Success Is Built on Repression. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/12/vietnam-coronavirus-pandemic-success-repression/
    2. H.R.W. (2020, March 19). Human Rights Dimensions of COVID-19 Response. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/19/human-rights-dimensions-covid-19-response
    3. Reuters. (2021, July 9). Vietnam sees record coronavirus cases as curbs tighten. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/vietnam-sets-covid-19-vaccination-targets-new-curbs-unrolled-2021-07-09/
    4. BBC. (2021, July 7). TP HCM giãn cách xã hội “quyết liệt” theo Chỉ thị 16 từ 0h 9/7. BBC Tiếng Việt. https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/vietnam-57750819
    5. Associated Press. (2021, July 18). Vietnam puts southern region in lockdown as surge grows. AP News. https://apnews.com/article/asia-pacific-world-news-health-coronavirus-pandemic-vietnam-958c8f737c497b2330f1af69c84bae18
    6. Cong, H. (2021, July 7). TP HCM giãn cách xã hội theo Chỉ thị 16. VnExpress. https://vnexpress.net/tp-hcm-gian-cach-xa-hoi-theo-chi-thi-16-4296651.html
    7. Percy, N. (2020, April 4). Chỉ thị 16 có giá trị pháp lý không? – Không. Luật Khoa Tạp Chí. https://www.luatkhoa.org/2020/04/chi-thi-16-co-gia-tri-phap-ly-khong-khong/
    8. Son, T. (2021, July 14). Xử phạt dân ra đường: vừa không hợp tình vừa thiếu cơ sở pháp lý! Đài Á Châu Tự Do. https://www.rfa.org/vietnamese/in_depth/punishing-people-leaving-their-houses-in-lockdown-time-is-ruthless-and-lack-of-legal-base-07142021094348.html
    9. RFA. (2021c, July 2). Lâm Đồng phạt 30 triệu đồng ba người đưa tin sai về dịch COVID-19 trên mạng xã hội. Đài Á Châu Tự Do. https://www.rfa.org/vietnamese/news/vietnamnews/lam-dong-fined-three-people-vnd-30-million-for-spreading-false-information-about-covid-19-07022021082827.html
    10. An, D. (2021, March 17). TPHCM: Phạt hơn 12.000 vụ vi phạm Chỉ thị 16 với số tiền 3,3 tỷ đồng. Công an TP.Hồ Chí Minh. https://congan.com.vn/doi-song/tphcm-phat-hon-12000-vu-vi-pham-chi-thi-16-voi-so-tien-33-ty-dong_116102.html
    11. Ibid., [8]
    12. Phuong, V. (2021, July 13). Phường ở TP.HCM giao chỉ tiêu phạt người vi phạm Chỉ thị 16: Quận chấn chỉnh ngay. Thanh Niên Online. https://thanhnien.vn/doi-song/phuong-o-tphcm-giao-chi-tieu-phat-nguoi-vi-pham-chi-thi-16-quan-chan-chinh-ngay-1413746.html
    13. Chan, Y. (2021, July 15). Con virus không gây ra bệnh lộng quyền, nó chỉ làm lộ rõ bản chất của các “đầy tớ.” Luật Khoa Tạp Chí. https://www.luatkhoa.org/2021/07/con-virus-khong-gay-ra-benh-long-quyen-no-chi-lam-lo-ro-ban-chat-cua-cac-day-to/
    14. Van, N. (2021, July 6). Việt Nam – mô hình lý tưởng trong phòng chống dịch COVID-19. Sức Khỏe & Đời Sống. https://suckhoedoisong.vn/viet-nam-mo-hinh-ly-tuong-trong-phong-chong-dich-covid-19-n196626.html
    15. RFA. (2021d, July 19). Giám đốc Hợp tác xã cấp khống giấy thông hành cho con gái bị phạt 7,5 triệu đồng. Đài Á Châu Tự Do. https://www.rfa.org/vietnamese/news/vietnamnews/director-of-cooperation-determine-control-travel-warrants-granted-to-his-daughter-received-a-7-million-07192021090444.html
    16. Hoang, T. (2020, December 10). Xét xử cựu giám đốc CDC Hà Nội và đồng phạm nâng giá máy xét nghiệm COVID-19. Tuổi Trẻ Online. https://tuoitre.vn/xet-xu-cuu-giam-doc-cdc-ha-noi-va-dong-pham-nang-gia-may-xet-nghiem-covid-19-2020120922563448.htm
    17. Hai, S. (2021, June 11). Khẩn trương truy vết, khoanh vùng dập dịch triệt để nhằm khống chế các chuỗi lây bệnh. Trang Tin Điện Tử Đảng Bộ Thành Phố Hồ Chí Minh. https://www.hcmcpv.org.vn/tin-tuc/khan-truong-truy-vet-khoanh-vung-dap-dich-triet-de-nham-khong-che-cac-chuoi-lay-benh-1491879154
    18. Yen, N. (2021, June 2). Cách ly tập trung vẫn là biện pháp quan trọng hàng đầu. Báo Công an Nhân Dân. http://cand.com.vn/Su-kien-Binh-luan-thoi-su/Cach-ly-tap-trung-van-la-bien-phap-quan-trong-hang-dau-644093/
    19. Tien, V. (2021, June 27). Tình hình Covid-19 hôm nay 27.6: Khu cách ly quá tải, TP.HCM sắp cho “tự quản” F1 tại nhà. Thanh Niên Online. https://thanhnien.vn/thoi-su/tinh-hinh-covid-19-hom-nay-276-khu-cach-ly-qua-tai-tphcm-sap-cho-tu-quan-f1-tai-nha-1405218.html
    20. Tomoya Onishi. (2021, June 25). Vietnam backpedals on COVID-19 vaccination targets. Nikkei Asia. https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Coronavirus/COVID-vaccines/Vietnam-backpedals-on-COVID-19-vaccination-targets2
    21. Share of people vaccinated against COVID-19, Jul 19, 2021. (n.d.). Our World in Data. https://ourworldindata.org/covid-vaccinations?country=VNM
    22. AFP. (2021, June 8). Vietnam begs public for “vaccine fund” donations after virus surge. Yahoo News. https://sg.news.yahoo.com/vietnam-begs-public-vaccine-fund-091017383.html
    23. Chinh, Y. K. (2021, July 13). 4 câu hỏi về chiến dịch tiêm vaccine COVID-19 của Việt Nam. Luật Khoa Tạp Chí. https://www.luatkhoa.org/2021/07/4-cau-hoi-ve-chien-dich-tiem-vaccine-covid-19-cua-viet-nam/
    24. Tuan, V. (2021, July 10). Thủ tướng: “Mọi người bình đẳng trong tiếp cận vaccine.” VnExpress. https://vnexpress.net/thu-tuong-moi-nguoi-binh-dang-trong-tiep-can-vaccine-4307457.html
    25. Richard C. Paddock, Chau Doan. (2021, June 2). Spared for Months, Vietnam Faces a Wave of New Infections. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/02/world/asia/vietnam-covid-ho-chi-minh.html
    26. Department Of News. (2021, July 19). Bác bỏ luận điệu xuyên tạc về công cuộc chống dịch COVID-19 của Việt Nam. VTV. https://vtv.vn/xa-hoi/bac-bo-luan-dieu-xuyen-tac-ve-cong-cuoc-chong-dich-covid-19-cua-viet-nam-20210719192125814.htm
    27. Quan, M. (2021, June 24). Nói Việt Nam ‘may mắn’ trong chống dịch Covid-19 là thiếu khách quan. Báo Thế Giới và Việt Nam. https://baoquocte.vn/noi-viet-nam-may-man-trong-chong-dich-covid-19-la-thieu-khach-quan-149357.html
  • A Few Things You Should Know About Vietnam’s National Assembly Chairpersonship

    A Few Things You Should Know About Vietnam’s National Assembly Chairpersonship

    Though it is one of the “four pillars” of the Vietnamese government, the National Assembly chairpersonship remains the weakest position.


    Vietnam’s National Assembly has been preparing to change its window dressing in late March 2021. No need to wait until the general election wraps up in May 2021; the National Assembly chairmanship had a new occupant in the final days of March. To reaffirm that the election in May did not change Vietnam’s political situation, July 20, 2021 would mark Vuong Dinh Hue’s continuation to serve the same leadership position as the National Assembly chairman for the next 5 years when it re-elected him.

    One amongst the “four pillars of the imperial court”

    Beginning in the mid-1980s, Vietnamese politics slowly moved beyond the individual leadership model and the overpowering influence of Ho Chi Minh and his successor Le Duan. This, in combination with the economic reform process, led to the gradual development of a new institutional division of power. Over time, supreme power was divided among four positions: the general secretary, state president, prime minister, and chairperson of the National Assembly.

    Today, as war has receded into the distance and demands to join the international community grow, the political system functions have begun trending towards laws of the state rather than the directives of the Vietnamese Communist Party. As such, the National Assembly increasingly plays a larger and more dynamic role in the political system.

    However, it wasn’t until 1992, when Nong Duc Manh was elected as National Assembly chairman, that a member of the Politburo occupied the position. Before that, Truong Chinh – a Politburo member – served as chairman of the National Assembly Standing Committee from 1960 to 1981. Still, as stated above, the National Assembly did not play a large role during that time, though it’s hard to say that its role today is large either.

    The National Assembly chairmen after Truong Chinh all worked their way up to become members of the Party Central Committee (such as Le Quang Dạo) or outside the Party Central Committee altogether (e.g., Nguyen Huu Tho).

    All National Assembly chairmen from Nong Duc Manh onwards were members of the Politburo. Though its numbers are among the “four pillars,” the National Assembly chairmanship remains the weakest position and must abide by party decisions.

    Launchpad to power

    Of the five National Assembly chairmen since 1992, two have become general secretary of the VCP’s Central Committee – the highest position in the entire political system: Nong Duc Manh (2001 – 2011) and Nguyen Phu Trong (2011- present).

    In stark contrast, the prime minister’s office has been unable to propel its occupant any further. One after the other, Vo Van Kiet, Phan Van Khai, and Nguyen Tan Dung became prime ministers and then retired, failing to make it to the general secretary. The exception is Nguyen Xuan Phuc, who, rather than retiring after serving as prime minister, is set to become state president; that is, he is taking one step down the ladder of party power.

    Is the National Assembly chairman the “boss” of the National Assembly representatives?

    No.

    In principle, the National Assembly chairman is simply a member of the National Assembly, with all members being equal and everyone retaining one vote. No representative can force another representative to do his or her bidding. The National Assembly chairperson cannot issue any order to a representative, except for limited powers during work assignments with vice National Assembly chairpersons.

    Then what does the National Assembly chairman do?

    He or she mainly coordinates the activities of the National Assembly and the National Assembly’s Standing Committee, presiding over meetings and sessions and ratifying adopted constitutions, laws, resolutions, and ordinances.

    For more details, please see Vietnam’s Constitution and the Law on National Assembly Organization.

    The National Assembly chairman also usually acts as head of the National Electoral Council. This arrangement contains a conflict of interest when a representative (and often also a candidate) organizes elections. In democratic countries, the council must, in principle, be independent of the National Assembly.

    A position almost always reserved for men

    Of the 11 National Assembly chairpersons in Vietnam’s modern history, the only woman to serve in this position was Nguyen Thi Kim Ngan, who held the position from 2016 to 2021. But truth be told, Ngan is the only woman to have ever served as one of the “four pillars.”

    Her predicted successor, Vuong Dinh Hue, will carry on the near-exclusive tradition of men being at the helm of the National Assembly.

    Hue has served as minister of finance (2011-2012), head of the Central Economic Committee (2012-2016), deputy prime minister (2016-2020), and secretary of the Hanoi party committee (2020-current). He has been a member of the Politburo since 2016.


    This article was written in Vietnamese by Trinh Huu Long and was previously published in Luat Khoa Magazine on March 30, 2021. The English translation was done by Will Nguyen.

  • Vietnam Briefing: COVID-19 Nationwide Crisis; Country’s Map May Be Redrawn

    Vietnam Briefing: COVID-19 Nationwide Crisis; Country’s Map May Be Redrawn

    The Vietnam Briefing, which is released every Monday morning Vietnam time, looks at Vietnam’s political developments of the past week.


    COVID-19 in Vietnam

    • Movement restrictions across Vietnam amidst outbreaks: Sixteen southern provinces are expected to undergo two-week movement restrictions as three-quarters of new cases were in the south, particularly in Saigon. In the north, Hanoi is also entertaining more restrictions. People are advised to stay at home, and non-essential establishments are closed.
    • The Vietnamese government said Pfizer would provide the country with 20 million more doses of the COVID-19 vaccine, which would be used primarily for children of 12-18 years old, and Pfizer may consider transferring the vaccine technology to Vietnam. Vietnam also said that the Pfizer dose would be offered to people vaccinated with AstraZeneca in the first dose.
    • Vietnam is imprisoning people on COVID-19 related charges: Last week, on July 16, a man was charged with 18 months in prison for “breaking strict Covid-19 quarantine rules, spreading the virus to others and causing financial damage to the authorities.” However, this was not the first time a Vietnam Airline flight attendant also received similar charges and was sentenced to a two-year suspended jail time in late March.

    Vietnamese hospital cremates body of Korean virus patient without notice

    From Korea Times:

    • A hospital in Ho Chi Minh city, Vietnam, has cremated the body of a Korean national who died from COVID-19 there, without giving prior notice to the bereaved family members in Korea, provoking protests from them and the Korean Consulate General in the city. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sunday, a Korean man in his 50s died in the hospital after undergoing medical treatment for about 10 days following him testing positive for the virus in early July.

    The Vietnamese government is tightening free speech

    • According to Nikkei Asia, the government proposes a new draft decree that contains new regulations specifically targeting live-streaming activities on social media platforms, including Facebook, Youtube, and Tiktok.
    • This new draft decree is forcing international social media platforms to hand over to the government the information of popular individuals who live streaming with more than 10,000 followers or subscribers. The government also wants to tax those making money from these platforms.
    • Meanwhile, concern has been raised over Vietnam’s purchase of Israeli company Cellebrite’s phone-hacking technology. Attorney Eitay Mack, who conducted the investigation into the Israeli company, protested the company’s and the Israeli Defense Ministry’s decision to sell such technology to Vietnam’s Ministry of Public Security, citing concerns over crackdowns on journalists and pro-democracy and human rights activists.

    Incoming National Assembly’s first meeting since the 2021 election

    • Next week, on July 20, the 15th National Assembly will hold its first meeting session after the 2021 election ended in late May.
    • Originally, the first session was held from July 20 to August 5, but the session was shortened to end on July 31 due to complications of COVID-19 outbreaks in Vietnam.
    • In this first session, the representatives in the National Assembly will confirm 50 important officials who will hold the positions over the next five years, such as the chairperson of the Assembly, the president, the prime minister and his deputies, chief justice, chief of the Procuracy, etc. The identity of these leaders is already known at this point, and confirmation is largely just procedural. Vietnam conducted a similar event in April to elect the same individuals to the same positions. It has made the whole process of election, nomination, and confirmation started in May highly confusing to even the Vietnamese public, not to mention international observers.
    • The first session will also discuss financial and economic issues related to public investment for the next term.
    • It is also reported that 435 out of 499 National Assembly representatives have been vaccinated against COVID-19. It is unclear whether they have been fully vaccinated or only vaccinated with one dose. It is also unclear which types of vaccines were used for the National Assembly representatives.

    EU Domestic Advisory Group (DAG) denounces Vietnam’s arrest of civil society leaders

    • Two weeks ago, journalist Mai Phan Loi and lawyer Dang Dinh Bach were arrested for alleged tax evasion. They were both involved in registered civil society organizations in Vietnam and were both board members of the VNGO-EVFTA Network, which aims to raise awareness about civil society’s involvement in the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement.
    • Last week, on July 15, the EU DAG denounced the arrests of the two individuals, citing concerns that the Vietnamese government is actively silencing those who try to raise human rights concerns.
    • Earlier this year in January, the EU DAG already affirmed that “civil society engagement and scrutiny of the EVFTA is not an optional element of the agreement,” and urged the European Commission to ensure that this element is fully implemented.

    US ambassador to Vietnam nominee promises to press Vietnam on human rights

    From Reuters:

    • In a US Senate hearing on July 13, Marc Knapper, the Biden administration’s nominee to become the new US ambassador to Vietnam, vowed to press the Vietnamese government “to respect the freedoms of expression, association, peaceful assembly, and religion or belief.”

    South Korea requests Vietnam’s involvement in North Korean dialogue

    From United Press International:

    • Last week, on July 15, during a phone call with the Vietnamese Communist Party’s Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong, South Korean President Moon Jae-in asked Vietnam to “play a role in promptly resuming dialogue with North Korea,” according to South Korea’s Blue House.
    • In response to Moon’s request, Trong reportedly said that Vietnam “supports the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and dialogues for peaceful consultations.”
    • Moon also asked for Vietnam’s opinion on the situation of pro-democracy crackdowns in Myanmar, to which Trong replied that Vietnam will “continue to work for the restoration of peace and stability in Myanmar.”

    Will the Vietnam map be redrawn?

    • According to the state-controlled Tuoi Tre News, 20 Vietnamese provinces might be merged into other provinces due to their limited population or acreage.
    • Some of the provinces include Da Nang, Ha Nam, Vinh Phuc, Hung Yen, Nam Dinh, Bac Kan, Cao Bang, Kon Tum, Ninh Thuan, and Lao Cai, among a list of twentieth provinces.
    • Vietnam’s administrative provincial boundaries have been adjusted repeatedly over the past 50 years. By the end of the Vietnam War in April 1975, the country had 72 provincial units. A massive merging process was implemented shortly after that and the number of provincial units reduced to 38 in 1976. However, many provinces have started to be split since 1978 while a few others have been merged to other entities, making the number of provinces 63 in 2008.

    Learn more about Vietnam

    New research: The South Vietnamese Flag and Shifting Representations of the Vietnamese American Experience

    Tuan Hoang/Rising Asia Journal/July 13, 2021

    “The sight of the South Vietnamese flag in Washington, DC on January 6, 2021, has aroused curiosity and criticism. Missing in the commentaries, however, is the multiplicity of its symbolism to Vietnamese Americans who had come to the United States as refugees or immigrants. Although its visual symbolism is forever tied to the history of the former Republic of Vietnam, its underlying meaning has changed to reflect the experience of Vietnamese after the fall of Saigon, not before.”

    New research: A Multi-level Approach to Vietnam Foreign Policy: From Security Preoccupation to Middle Power Role

    Le Dinh Tinh/Strategic Analysis/June 13, 2021

    “Prior to 1995 when Vietnam joined ASEAN and normalized relationship with the United States, the overriding concern was security as could be well explained by realism. Vietnam has made several critical, strategic moves since 1995 and by 2030 the country may be able to act internationally as an emerging middle power. Taking a multi-level approach and empirical evidences of 35 years of Doi Moi (renovation), this article attempts to clarify as to how Vietnam has been in a better position to ensure the security goal by embarking on an ambitious development strategy and expanding its international role.”

    New research: Vietnam’s Foreign Policy in an Era of Rising Sino-US Competition and Increasing Domestic Political Influence

    Carlyle A. Thayer/Asian Security/July 31, 2017

    “This article examines the dramatic shifts that Vietnam’s foreign policy has undergone over time, from a country tightly allied with Socialist partners like China and the Soviet Union to one that has diversified its strategic partners and forsworn alliances in order to protect its strategic autonomy…. As public opinion and elite factionalism play an increasing role in Vietnam’s foreign policy, managing Vietnam’s external ties has become increasingly difficult. This article concludes that public opinion regarding relations with China has become so toxic that it poses a serious challenge to the political legitimacy of Vietnam’s one-party regime should it fail to deter Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea.”

    Bittersweet: Vietnam’s Mixed Progress on E-Government During COVID-19

    Truong Thuy Quynh and Pham Thi Thuy Duong/The Diplomat/July 16, 2021

    “The government is in fact taking steps to remedy the system’s shortcomings, from timely adoption of more advanced technologies to smoothing the way for government-private sector collaboration.

    On July 11, Ho Chi Minh City introduced a new system that allows facial recognition and location tracking via smartphones to supervise self-quarantine, hoping to ease the pressure on centralized quarantine venues. The city is also using STAYHOME and HCMCovidSafe, smart wristbands produced collaboratively by governmental agencies, tech corporations, and scientists. Such cooperation has sparked the hope for a synergy in ICT capacity building in Vietnam in the near future.

    Nevertheless, problems like a lack of coordination within the governmental apparatus, digital inequality, an immature digital culture, and a dearth of ICT-qualified personnel within the public sector may remain pressing in the aftermath of COVID-19. All the experts we spoke to agreed that these issues should now rise to the top of the policy agenda, alongside infrastructure building and technological upgrades.”

    Vietnam to pilot virtual currency as crypto thrives in gray zone

    Lien Hoang/Nikkei Asia/July 12, 2021

    “After years of warning its citizens not to “gamble” on virtual money, the Vietnamese government has decided to explore creating its own digital currency.

    The surprise policy move came buried near the bottom of Prime Minister Decision 942, which lays out a strategy for digitizing the government by 2030. Released last month, it directs the State Bank of Vietnam to research, “develop, and pilot the use of virtual currency based on blockchain technology.”

    Why we should care about fate of the Mekong

    An Pich Hatda/Nikkei Asia/ July 12, 2021

    “More than 70 million people rely on the river, partly or entirely, for their livelihood, and its central role in the economies of the Lower Basin countries cannot be understated. Taken together, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam represent around half the Mekong region’s entire production of rice and fish, a third of tourism, and a large percentage of the region’s energy demands, according to a recent study by the Mekong River Commission (MRC).

    But the Mekong’s enduring role as a source of life and livelihoods is facing multiple threats. These threats have been compounded by the COVID pandemic that has created unprecedented economic hardship and worsened environmental degradation.”

  • Q&A: What You Should Know About The Human Trafficking Situation In Vietnam

    Q&A: What You Should Know About The Human Trafficking Situation In Vietnam

    On July 1, 2021, the U.S. Department of State released its annual global report on human trafficking. The 2021 Trafficking in Persons report ranked Vietnam as a “Tier 2 Watch List” [1] for the third consecutive year.

    According to the placement guiding [2], governments that fully meet the Trafficking Victims Protection Act’s (TVPA) minimum standards to eliminate human trafficking are placed on “Tier 1.” In contrast, countries that fail to meet minimum standards but make a significant effort to comply are ranked as “Tier 2.”

    However, these Tier 2 countries also risk being placed on a “Tier 3 Watch List” if they do not take “concrete actions” to combat the increasing number of human trafficking victims or if they fail “to provide evidence of increasing efforts to combat severe forms of trafficking in persons from the previous year.”

    Without a further genuine effort to improve the current situation, Vietnam could be downgraded to “Tier 3,” which might lead [3] to restrictions on financial assistance from the United States, the freezing of officials’ assets, and restrictions on immigration.

    Human trafficking map, East Asia & Pacific region. Source: U.S. Department of State.

    What is Vietnam’s current situation?

    In Vietnam’s case, the State Department declares that the Vietnamese government “does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so.”

    The report acknowledges considerable efforts taken by Vietnam to eliminate human trafficking, including ramping up prosecutions against human traffickers, passing legal revisions to terminate hefty brokerage fees. Brokerage fees will make workers fall victim to debt bondage, and later they would be susceptible to forced labor.

    It also notices that Vietnam has enhanced worker protections, strengthened law enforcement, increased financial budgets to assist victims of trafficking, provided protection services for identified victims, and implemented extensive awareness programs in vulnerable ethnic communities.

    Nevertheless, the country has not demonstrated sufficient effort regarding its anti-trafficking protocols, given the impact of Covid-19 on the overall capacity to combat illegal human trading activities, compared to the previous period. Furthermore, the report states that Vietnam has also fallen short on systematically identifying victims of trafficking, which results in “some victims [being] penalized for unlawful acts [that] traffickers [compel] them to commit.”

    Who are the primary victims and offenders of trafficking activities?

    The Blue Dragon Children’s Foundation, a non-profit charity that rescues and helps the victims of human trafficking in Vietnam, stated in a study [4] that over 60 percent of victims and traffickers come from ethnic minority groups, such as Hmong or Thai. Some of Vietnam’s northern border provinces, in which diverse groups of ethnic people dominate, witness the highest rates of illegal trafficking and border crossings.

    According to the charity’s latest analysis [5], between 2012 and 2020, Hmong people accounted for over 32 percent of the total victims and 33 percent of the total traffickers, while only making up 1.4 percent of the country’s population.

    Also, the traffickers, as well as their victims, share poor economic and educational backgrounds. Most of the prosecuted traffickers, around 80 percent, are illiterate or did not finish high school.

    The lack of general knowledge about laws and human rights, coupled with grinding poverty, proves to be the main reason these people take up [6] trafficking or recruitment to generate extra income and “escaping” poverty.

    At the same time, people between 19 to 25 years old are the most vulnerable to these illicit activities, while children under 16 account for 42 percent of the total number of trafficked victims. Based on gender, all of the 199 trafficked victims recorded by Blue Dragon were females. Meanwhile, male traffickers comprise nearly 60 percent of total prosecuted offenders.

    In a majority of cases, the traffickers have close relationships with the victims. They could be their friends, family members, relatives, neighbors, or acquaintances.

    Source: Blue Dragon Children’s Foundation. Graphic by South China Morning Post.

    What are the common forms of trafficking?

    Following the data compiled by the Blue Dragon Foundation, forced marriage and domestic servitude accounted for the majority of all prosecuted cases. The victims, mostly women, are often lured and misled by false promises of well-paid job opportunities in foreign countries, but they are eventually forced into marriage with Chinese men.

    Other forms of human trafficking, which include [7] forced labor and commercial sex, are also ubiquitous.

    Vietnamese workers, especially under labor export programs, are subject to forced labor when they cannot pay off their debts to their recruitment company. Meanwhile, some Vietnamese female workers travel to other Asian countries for brokered jobs [8] as hostesses in massage parlors, karaoke bars, or restaurants.

    What are Vietnam’s prosecution laws against trafficking?

    Overall, the Vietnamese government has displayed visible efforts in reinforcing its existing legal framework against human trafficking. The current anti-trafficking legislation [9] of Vietnam includes:

    • Article 150 of the Penal Code, which criminalizes labor trafficking and sex trafficking of adults. Offenders face up to 10 years of imprisonment and up to 100 million dong (US$4,330) in fines.
    • Article 151 of the Penal Code, which criminalizes labor trafficking and sex trafficking of children under 16. Offenders face up to 12 years of imprisonment and up to 200 million dong fines.

    Despite being regarded as “sufficiently stringent” in the State Department’s report, current prosecution laws against trafficking in Vietnam still contain certain loopholes.

    For example, the application of Article 150 to cases involving children between the ages of 16 and 17 remains ambiguous, leading them to be treated as adults. Therefore, the article does not fully constitute all forms of child trafficking.

    Other notable shortcomings include the lack of law enforcement regarding domestic trafficking and forced labor, especially with male victims, and the insufficient training of law enforcement officers in handling such cases. These are some limitations that could hinder the country’s progress towards eliminating labor exploitation and the illegal activities of human trafficking.

    What improvements could be made by Vietnam?

    The State Department’s report proposed prioritized recommendations that the Vietnamese government could implement to improve the situation.

    These recommendations focus on:

    1. Bolstering collaboration with NGOs and civil society;
    2. Amending existing loopholes;
    3. Training law enforcement officials in domestic trafficking cases;
    4. Implementing policies;
    5. Increasing national funding for provincial-level authorities to assist victims of trafficking; and
    6. Inviting independent bodies to verify the government has terminated forced labor in rehabilitation centers.

    Bibliography:

    1. Office To Monitor And Combat Trafficking In Persons. (2021, July 1). 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report: Vietnam. United States Department of State. https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-trafficking-in-persons-report/vietnam/
    2. Office To Monitor And Combat Trafficking In Persons. (2021a, July 1). 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report. United States Department of State. https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-trafficking-in-persons-report/
    3. Nguyen Dinh Thang. (2021, July 4). Buôn người: Việt Nam ở sát bờ vực chế tài theo luật Hoa Kỳ. Mach Song Media. https://machsongmedia.org/vietnam/chong-buon-nguoi/1727-buon-nguoi-viet-nam-o-sat-bo-vuc-che-tai-theo-luat-hoa-ky.html
    4. Sen, N. (2021, July 8). Young members of ethnic minority groups most at risk in Vietnam-China human trafficking trade: report. SCMP. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3140227/young-members-ethnic-minority-groups-most-risk-vietnam-china
    5. Blue Dragon Children’s Foundation. (2021, July). Human Trafficking & Traffickers in Vietnam. Blue Dragon Children’s Foundation. https://www.bluedragon.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Profile-of-trafficking-in-Vietnam.pdf
    6. Ibid., [4]
    7. Ibid., [1]
    8. RFA. (2021b, July 1). Việt Nam tiếp tục nằm trong danh sách cần phải theo dõi về tình trạng buôn người trong báo cáo của Bộ Ngoại giao Mỹ. Đài Á Châu Tự Do. https://www.rfa.org/vietnamese/news/vietnamnews/human-trafficking-report-vn-stay-in-watch-list-tier-2-07012021203901.html
    9. Ibid., [1]
  • Vietnam Briefing: More Writers And Activists Silenced While The Country Struggles With Record COVID-19 Cases

    Vietnam Briefing: More Writers And Activists Silenced While The Country Struggles With Record COVID-19 Cases

    The Vietnam Briefing, which is released every Monday morning Vietnam time, looks at Vietnam’s political developments of the past week.


    Pro-democracy writers and activists persecuted

    Last week, multiple pro-democracy writers and activists were charged, and some were also convicted under Article 117 of the 2015 Penal Code, which prohibits “anti-state” writings, and Article 331, which criminalizes “abusing social media in order to erode the state’s rights.” The list includes the conviction of Pham Chi Thanh, a satirical writer, the arrest of Do Nam Trung, a human rights activist, and the charge filed against Le The Thang, a member of an independent journalism platform called Bao Sach (Clean Newspaper).

    Who are these writers and activists?
    • Pham Chi Thanh is a satirical writer who frequently criticizes Vietnamese political leaders through his online medium, a blog and a Facebook page, and books. He used to be the deputy editor of the state-controlled platform Voice for Vietnam but lost this position in 2007 when he wrote an article criticizing China. Human Rights Watch reports that he has been in a bad health condition since his arrest in 2020. On July 9, he was sentenced to five years and 6 months in prison, and five years of probation.
    • Do Nam Trung is a frontline human rights activist who focuses on democracy advocacy. In 2014, he was arrested and sentenced to 14 months in prison for anti-China and anti-authoritarian activism. Upon his release in 2015, Trung continued his activism, which led to harassment and serious threats from the government. In the early morning of July 6, he was arrested again. Under Article 117, which is “making, storing, distributing or disseminating information, documents and items against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,” one can be sentenced to between five to 20 years in prison.
    • Le The Thang is a photographer and a filmmaker of the independent journalism platform Bao Sach. He was charged along with four other members of Bao Sach, Truong Chau Huu Danh, Nguyen Thanh Nha, Nguyen Phuoc Trung Bao, and Doan Kien Giang under Article 331 of the 2015 Penal Code. Article 331, which prohibits “abusing democratic freedoms to infringe the interests of the State,” stipulates prison sentences between six months to three years or probation of up to three years.
    What are the writers and activists’ lawyers saying?
    • So far, only Ha Huy Son, Pham Chi Thanh’s lawyer, has talked to the press.
    • The lawyer argues that Article 117 cannot be applied to Pham Chi Thanh as he was only criticizing Nguyen Phu Trong, the then-president and secretary-general of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), while Article 117 covers “anti-state” writings.
    • The lawyer further argues that law enforcement cannot equate an individual with the state, even if such individual is the president or secretary-general of the VCP.

    Meanwhile, Vietnam continues to deny any violations of press freedom. Last week, Vietnam Plus, a state-controlled media platform, said that press freedom in Vietnam is an “undeniable objective reality” in response to Reporters Without Borders (RSF) ‘s ranking on freedom of the press.

    • In its 2021 ranking, RSF ranks Vietnam 175 out of 180 countries, only ahead of a few countries, like China and North Korea.
    • The state-controlled media is calling RSF’s classification “biased, unobjective, and completely groundless.”
    • The state-controlled media defends Vietnam’s press freedom by citing “diverse types and content of the press,” the fact that international media outlets can operate within the country, as well as the fact that Vietnam has widespread internet usage.
    • However, they completely ignored the fact that independent journalists and writers are being arrested and have been charged almost every week since late last year with questionable charges, that there are no independent journalists and journalism platforms allowed to operate in Vietnam, and that non-state platforms such as BBC Vietnamese or our own Luat Khoa Magazine and The Vietnamese Magazine are largely blocked out of internet access in Vietnam.

    New draft regulations on the Internet awaiting public consultation

    According to Baker Mckenzie, Vietnam’s Ministry of Information and Communications just released a draft amendment of the well-known Decree 72, which is the main set of regulations concerning the internet, social networks, and gaming services.

    The Ministry is awaiting public recommendations before officially enacting the decree amendment. This period of public consultation lasts for two months, with a deadline of September 9, 2021.

    Here are some important points about Decree 72, according to Baker Mckenzie:

    • The new set of obligations specifically for offshore social network services;
    • Broader scopes of illegal content under Article 5.1 that are subject to content takedown mechanism;
    • New regulations on the provision of data center service and cloud service;
    • New regulations on live-streaming services; and
    • New obligations for social network providers regarding child protection (e.g., age verification, content filter, and takedown).”

    COVID-19 in Vietnam

    • In total, as of last week, the country has 28,470 confirmed cases and 112 deaths, according to Johns Hopkins University. While the number seems modest, Vietnam has only fully vaccinated 0.28 percent of the population.
    • Vietnam received 2 million doses of COVID-19 vaccine Moderna from the United States under the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (COVAX), an initiative of the World Health Organization to ensure access to vaccines for every country in the world. The Moderna doses that Vietnam just received reportedly came from the United States as a part of 80 million vaccine doses being sent out to foreign countries under the Biden administration.
    • So far, Vietnam possesses four types of COVID-19 vaccine: AstraZeneca (5.8 million doses), Sputnik V (2000 doses), Sinopharm (500 thousand doses), and Pfizer (90 thousand doses). Moderna would be the fifth vaccine to be administered after the government approved Moderna two weeks ago.

    Learn more about Vietnam

    Important date: It has been 26 years since Vietnam and the United States normalized their relations on July 12, 1995 (Vietnam time).

    The US Military Should Return to Vietnam

    Charles K. Djou and Matthew B.Powell/Defense One/July 08, 2021

    “As a part of the Vietnam War effort, the United States built several major military facilities in Vietnam in the 1960s; all are strategically positioned to deter China’s aggression in the South China Sea and assure regional U.S. allies. The U.S. and Vietnam should consider the return of American military forces to these facilities in the next 5 to 10 years; such a move would also bolster Vietnam’s ability to resist coercion from China. After a series of high level diplomatic overtures in the last decade, the U.S. and Vietnam should now engage in more active and detailed staff level discussions about a return of U.S. forces to Vietnam.”

    How Vietnam’s ‘influencer’ army wages information warfare on Facebook

    James Pearson/Reuters/July 09, 2021

    “Force 47, as the Vietnamese army’s online information warfare unit is known, consists of thousands of soldiers who, in addition to their normal duties, are tasked with setting up, moderating and posting on pro-state Facebook groups, to correct “wrong views” online.

    According to a Reuters review of provincial-level state media reports and broadcasts by the army’s official television station, Force 47 has since its inception in 2016 set up hundreds of Facebook groups and pages, and published thousands of pro-government articles and posts.”

    Vietnam learns to exploit nationalist rage over Chinese maps

    Dien Luong/Nikkei Asia/July 09, 2021

    “Over the years, Vietnamese authorities have become well aware that any move to repress nationalism, anti-China sentiment in particular, only alienates the very audience whose support they need to shore up. In that context, Vietnamese authorities have displayed an acute sensitivity to nationalist sentiments expressed online, often using them to serve their own agenda.”

    U.S. Considers Whether to Take Step Toward Tariffs on Vietnam

    Eric Martin, John Boudreau, and Saleha Mohsin/ Bloomberg/ July 07, 2021

    “During the closing days of President Donald Trump’s administration in January, the U.S. labeled Vietnam’s currency actions unreasonable and restrictive to American businesses, but refrained from hitting the nation with punitive tariffs.

    The trade investigation remains open, however, and if the U.S. decides to formally propose levies on goods imported from Vietnam, it would need to allow time for public comments and hearings. That means that the initial step of publishing a proposed product list would need to happen in the next several weeks, according to trade experts.”

    Do Cambodia’s Human Rights Groups Ignore Ethnic Vietnamese?

    David Hutt/The Diplomat/July 06, 2021

    “The issue of ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia is complex. For more than a century, Vietnam has been the bete noire of Cambodian nationalists (of which more later). According to official census data from 2013, there are around 63,000 ethnic-Vietnamese people in Cambodia, but the true number may be much higher. One organization puts it between 400,000 and 700,000. While some ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia today are new migrants, many have lived in the country for generations. Yet official discrimination means that a significant number are unable to claim citizenship or proper legal documents – around 90 percent, according to the Phnom Penh-based Minority Rights Organisation. This means they are denied the rights of voting, land ownership, and even access to schools, and so are essentially stateless.”