Tag: Human Rights

  • Statement On The First Anniversary Of The Arrest Of Journalist Pham Doan Trang

    Statement On The First Anniversary Of The Arrest Of Journalist Pham Doan Trang

    October 7, 2021 marks the first anniversary of the arrest of journalist Pham Doan Trang by the Vietnamese authorities. She was taken into custody that day and was subsequently charged with “conducting propaganda against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam” under Article 88 of 1999 Penal Code and “making, storing, spreading information, materials, items for the purpose of opposing the State of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam” under Article 117 of 2015 Penal Code.

    (Previous reports say she was arrested near midnight of October 6, 2020.)

    Since then, she has been held incommunicado. Neither family visitation nor legal representation is granted, her family and lawyer confirmed with LIV. In late August 2021, Hanoi’s Bureau of Security Investigation informed Doan Trang’s lawyer that the state’s investigation against her had concluded and that they had recommended a formal indictment based on Article 88, indicating that the Article 117 charge had been dropped. She now faces a possible 20-year prison sentence.

    As a journalist, Pham Doan Trang has dedicated her career to documenting and shedding light on the many atrocities and human rights violations committed by the Vietnamese government, despite the constant threat to her life and safety. Her work has been appreciated by Vietnamese people inside and outside of Vietnam, and has granted her international acclaim. She has also helped bring the attention of the global community towards the abuses of the Vietnamese Communist Party.

    Legal Initiatives for Vietnam, Luat Khoa Magazine, and The Vietnamese Magazine stand firm on our condemnation of the actions committed by the Vietnamese government against our co-founder, Pham Doan Trang. The constant harassment she faced from the state, coupled with her arrest and detention, are clear and blatant violations of her right to free speech. Likewise, they constitute a direct attack against the free press and independent unbiased journalism. In the words of our Co-director and Editor-in-Chief of The Vietnamese Magazine, Tran Quynh Vi, “A journalist should be allowed to report and a writer must be able to publish her books in every corner of this world. Journalism is not a crime and journalists should not be treated as criminals. The suppression of these basic human rights should be treated as a crime.”

    We once again call on our friends and colleagues to demand the unconditional and immediate release of Pham Doan Trang, as well as the dropping of all bogus criminal charges lobbed against her. We will continue to push for what is right and just until she is given her freedom.

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    Legal Initiatives for Vietnam

    Luat Khoa Magazine

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  • Vietnam Briefing: Vietnamese Public Outrage Over A Woman Being Coerced Into COVID-19 Testing; Migrant Workers Rush To Flee Ho Chi Minh City After Travel Restrictions Are Lifted

    Vietnam Briefing: Vietnamese Public Outrage Over A Woman Being Coerced Into COVID-19 Testing; Migrant Workers Rush To Flee Ho Chi Minh City After Travel Restrictions Are Lifted

    A Vietnamese woman coerced into COVID-19 testing infuriates the public

    • On September 28 video footage showing Vietnamese police and security forces breaking into a woman’s apartment in Vinh Phu Ward, Binh Duong Province to force her to get tested for COVID-19. As the video began to spread on social media in Vietnam it caused outrage among the public.
    • The woman, Hoang Thi Phuong Lan, was seen being forcibly escorted to the COVID-19 testing venue by two police officers who pinned her arms behind her; her child was heard crying in the background as the police led her away. According to Lan, she was teaching an online class at that time and had already tested negative for COVID-19 at home. Lan added that she did not want to take the test again in a crowded area, expressing concerns about potential virus transmission. Also in the video, an officer was heard criticizing her for her “lack of discipline” and threatening to fine her. She later tested negative for COVID-19.
    • On September 29 at a meeting with Lan, authorities of the ward where she lives made an apology for their inappropriate actions, citing “a sense of urgency” while they were “on a mission.” She rejected the apology, saying that the apprehension “harmed” her health and “offended” her dignity. Previously, Lan had posted the video of her coercion on Facebook, consulting the public for legal procedures to sue the alleged officers.
    • On the same day, an article regarding the incident was posted on Tuoi Tre Online, a state-owned news outlet, quoting a lawyer as saying that the local authorities’ actions were “in violation of human rights.” The article was briefly online before being removed from its webpage, with no official reason given for the removal.

    COVID-19 situation in Vietnam

    • As of October 3, 2021, Vietnam has recorded over 800,000 confirmed COVID-19 cases and more than 19,000 fatalities. Meanwhile, the country has seen a significant drop in coronavirus cases and related deaths with an average number of daily cases standing at around 7,400 for the past week, while the national average daily fatality rate has been 105. More than 10 percent of the Vietnamese population has been fully vaccinated.
    • Vietnam’s COVID-19 hotspot Ho Chi Minh City could have around 40 percent unrecorded cases of its official tally, reports Reuters. In an official report, positive rapid tests of around 150,000 people have not been accounted for in the tally of total confirmed cases in the city. Ho Chi Minh City has so far recorded over 370,000 coronavirus cases; if 150,000 more cases were included in the official number, it would reduce the city’s death rate from over 3.8 percent to 2.75 percent.
    • Ho Chi Minh City ends citywide virus lockdown after 3 months of restrictions on movements, reports Associated Press. Beginning on October 1, the city’s residents will be able to leave their homes, while restaurants will be allowed to offer takeaway services and other essential businesses can reopen. However, social distancing measures will still be enforced, schools and public transport remain closed, and gatherings of more than 10 people outside are banned.
    • At the same time, thousands of migrant workers were seen fleeing Ho Chi Minh City after COVID-19 lockdown in the city was lifted, reports Nikkei Asia. Long and harsh lockdown measures have taken a toll on Vietnamese migrant workers’ health and their livelihoods. Many of the laborers were required to sleep in factories to maintain production output while others were left jobless and forced to live off their savings. Relaxed restrictions allow factories in industrial parks, export processing zones and high-tech parks to resume their operations, on the condition that all workers must be fully vaccinated.
    • As migrant workers rushed to leave Ho Chi Minh City for home, scenes of heavy congestion and clashes between laborers and police had been seen at several checkpoints in the city’s suburbs, reports RFA. Multiple videos circulated on social media showing that many workers broke through barricades and fought with police, while others knelt in the street and pleaded with the police to let them through as they had run out of money to stay in the city. State-run media in Vietnam has largely ignored the disturbing situation of migrant workers; on the other hand, they have been reporting on the local authorities’ timely assistance in helping people return to their hometowns.
    • Vietnam to miss GDP target this year as COVID-19 squeezes its economy, writes Nikkei Asia: “The growth figure for the third quarter, anticipated by the end of this month, is being widely projected at under 2% — worse than the same quarter of 2020. A wave of infections and a strict COVID-19 lockdown squeezed the southern commercial hub of Ho Chi Minh City, and experts warn the impact could weigh on the economy beyond the third quarter unless the country manages to accelerate vaccinations.”
    • Vietnam received an additional 1.5 million COVID-19 vaccine doses from the United States, reports VnExpress: “A batch of 1,499,940 million Pfizer-BioNTech Covid-19 vaccine doses has been delivered to Vietnam by the U.S. through global vaccine access mechanism Covax. The new batch followed three previous vaccine donations from the U.S. to Vietnam through Covax, totalling to 7.5 million doses so far, according to a Saturday press release by the U.S. Embassy in Hanoi.”
    • Vietnam and Russia reached an agreement on COVID-19 Sputnik V vaccine supplies, according to the Vietnamese ambassador to Moscow. Previously, Vietnam had domestically produced a test batch of Russia’s Sputnik V and expected to receive another 20 million doses from Russia this year.
    • On September 29, one million doses of the Chinese-made Hayat-Vax COVID-19 vaccine also arrived in Hanoi, reports VnExpress. The vaccines’ arrival, which marks the first Hayat-Vax doses to land in Vietnam, belongs to a commercial contract of 30 million doses signed by Vietnamese pharmaceutical firm Vimedimex.

    British warship stops in Vietnam after transiting through the Taiwan Strait

    RFA reports:

    • British Royal Navy frigate HMS Richmond has arrived in Vietnam on a four-day friendly visit after transiting through the Taiwan Strait, which angered China. On September 27, China condemned the frigate’s passage through the Taiwan Strait, saying the United Kingdom is “carrying out a meaningless display of presence with an insidious intention.”
    • The British Royal Navy posted a picture of the frigate docked in Cam Ranh Bay on Friday, followed by a video on its Twitter page saying in Vietnamese: “Hello Vietnam! So proud for Richmond to have an opportunity to visit your beautiful country.”
    • A statement from the British Embassy in Hanoi said, “the ship’s presence underlines the U.K.’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific region, at the heart of which lies the U.K.’s partnership with Vietnam.” It also said the HMS Richmond and Vietnamese partners will conduct “bilateral cooperation activities,” without giving further details.

    Sea rises due to human-made climate crisis threaten Vietnam’s low lying areas

    The Guardian reports:

    “Like much of the region, Vietnam is threatened by flooding and sea rises caused by the human-made climate crisis. More than 15% of the country is below five metres above sea level – compared with just 4.2% in the UK. Of the world’s larger mainland nations, only the Netherlands has more low-lying land.”


    Vietnam Insight: Learn more about Vietnam

    Trans-Pacific Partner Membership And The Love Triangle Of Vietnam – Taiwan – China

    The Vietnamese Magazine/ Tan Trung Nguyen Quoc/ September 30

    “A couple of days after China’s and Taiwan’s announcements on the CPTPP, President Xi Jinping had a phone call with General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong. This action raised some questions on whether Vietnam would act as an agent of China inside the CPTPP to prevent the accession effort of Taiwan.

    If it has to, the Vietnamese government is very unlikely to side with Taiwan; no country has ever dared to, including the United States.

    But upon understanding the socioeconomic situation between Vietnam, Taiwan, and China, it is also reasonable to argue that Vietnam gains nothing by explicitly objecting to Taiwan’s membership in the CPTPP. The economic ties between Taiwan and Vietnam are too significant to be sacrificed.”

    In Rare Three-Party Conclave, Vietnam Pushes Back Against Growing Chinese Influence

    The Diplomat/ Sebastian Strangio/ September 28

    “The unusual meeting of party heads speaks to the rising concern in Hanoi that its two erstwhile clients are being drawn slowly into China’s widening orbit. In recent years, Laos and Cambodia have become magnets for Chinese capital and business people of varying degrees of probity, who have established interlocking relationships with the two countries’ respective ruling elites. This has been franked by increasingly close ties with the Chinese government, which have lavished Cambodia and Laos with “no-strings” financing and infrastructure developments.”

    What Vietnam’s President Sought to Achieve at the 76th UNGA

    The Diplomat/ Le Dinh Tinh/ September 28

    “Phuc goes to New York this time to set the stage for the wrapping up of Vietnam’s 2020-2021 tenure as a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. Vietnam’s membership will be remembered for its heightened focus on critical topics such as protection of civilians and essential infrastructure works in conflict areas, the safeguarding of women and children during armed conflicts, the settlement of bombs and mines left by war, U.N. peacekeeping operations, climate change, and peace and security challenges.”

    Vietnam bids to woo Cambodia, Laos from China

    Asia Times/ David Hutt/ September 27

    “Most Southeast Asian countries are now well-rehearsed in the art of geopolitical hedging, particularly by trying to play the United States and China off against one another and never taking sides in order to extract ever greater economic and political benefits from both.

    In a similar fashion, Laos and Cambodia are now also hedging between their historic ally Vietnam and their new superpower partner China.”

    Webinar: Reviewing the First Six Months of Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh

    ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute

    Date: October 06 2021

    Time (GMT+8): 10:00 am – 11:15 am

    Perspectives: Thinking the unthinkable about China’s CPTPP application

    VnExpress/ Pham Quang Vinh/ September 26

    “As for CPTPP members, they need to carefully re-examine their goals and interests in the pact’s original give-and-take package, in return for having accepted the high standards insisted on by the U.S. They should also consider what their likely benefits will be in terms of competitive advantages, market diversification and reducing dependency on one source.

    This is a very critical issue for Vietnam as a member of the CPTPP and RCEP. It requires the nation to be very cautious in reviewing its relationships with all partners to ensure its interest, independence and autonomy.”

    Perspectives: Vietnam should walk the talk in climate actions

    VnExpress/ Nguyen Dang Anh Thi/ September 30

    “The Vietnamese people have already been experiencing pain from climate change impacts. Cutting GHG emissions in the country must be achieved through practical and responsible climate actions using the best available resources.

    There is no hope of international support for Vietnam to deal with climate change if its policymakers don’t walk the talk of sustainability.”

  • Internet Freedom In Vietnam: Prospects And Setbacks

    Internet Freedom In Vietnam: Prospects And Setbacks

    On September 21, Freedom House, a non-profit organization based in Washington D.C., released its annual “Freedom on the Net” report, classifying[1] Vietnam as “not free” in its annual 2021 ranking.

    A Freedom House chart evaluates the state of internet freedom in 70 countries[2] this year, based on their performance in three different criteria: Obstacles to Access, Limits on Content, and Violation of User Rights. Trinh Huu Long, a co-founder of Legal Initiatives for Vietnam and an editor at The Vietnamese Magazine, is the author of this report’s Vietnam chapter.

    According to Freedom House, the scores are based on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free). Overall, Vietnam totalled 22 on the 100-point measuring scale, remaining the same as last year’s score and falling two points from the 2019 report.

    Vietnam has been ranked “not free” on the Freedom House report this year. Photo: screenshot/ Freedom House.

    There could be several reasons, and one of them includes the Vietnamese government’s threats to shut down services of foreign social networks, such as Facebook and Google. If those companies refuse to comply with its censorship demands on critical content, the government will shut them down. Meanwhile, the Freedom House report also cites a Vietnamese draft decree on personal data protection released for public comments earlier this year. If passed, this law would require internet providers and technology companies to locally store Vietnamese users’ data in the country and hand it over to the government upon demand.

    Vietnam has also been ranked [3] “not free” in Freedom House’s annual “Freedom in the World” chart. For many local activists, these results are hardly surprising.

    Vietnam has experienced steady economic growth in the past decades, with its youth becoming increasingly active on social media. By the end of 2020, over 70 percent [4] of the country’s population, equal to around 60 million people, had access to the internet. These statistics brought about the development of a new civic space. However, as the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) perpetually controls almost every aspect of social life with an iron fist, this rapidly expanding cyberspace, which extends beyond the Party’s reach, is considered an underlying threat to the regime.

    To assert its control over this novel avenue of free speech and dissent, the VCP has employed multiple tactics. Some of their methods include deploying an army of “public opinion shapers” tasked with disseminating propaganda, punishing local dissidents, and applying pressure on foreign companies to aid in its censorship demands.

    Yet, the bigger picture is not as grim as it might look. Despite censorship, online threats, and other hindrances, there are still several bright prospects for the future of internet freedom in Vietnam.

    Opportunities for a More Liberated Internet in Vietnam

    Despite its poor record in limiting online content and history of violating user rights, Vietnam has achieved significant improvements in assuring equal internet access to its citizens, as clarified in the “Obstacles to Access” section.

    Improved internet infrastructure, which leads to faster connection speeds, decreased subscription costs, and high smartphone penetration, has played an essential role in making the internet more affordable and accessible to most people. Given that around two-thirds of the population currently lives in the countryside, social media platforms have become an alternate source of information for specific Vietnamese audiences who stand in opposition to highly propagandized and more traditional forms of media.

    Recent statistics [5] show that television viewership in rural areas fell to 86% while internet penetration reached 91%. Still, Freedom House emphasizes that “connectivity remains out of reach for those living in extreme poverty, which is found in many communities of [ethnic minorities] in mountainous areas.”

    As young Vietnamese become more educated and skilled in technological know-how, they are “increasingly turning to blogs, social media platforms, and other online news sources for information, rather than state television and radio [broadcasts],” Freedom House reported.

    These young tech-savvy internet users also actively acquire new tools, which are “well-known” and “can be found with a simple Google search, for circumventing censorship and bypassing firewalls.”

    Vietnamese people spend more time [6] on social media than their Asian peers, with Facebook and Google services (Youtube and Instagram) among the most popular platforms [7] in the country. As of January 2021, there were about 68 million [8] Facebook users in Vietnam; seven in every 10 Vietnamese people have an account on Facebook.

    While many of its authoritarian counterparts, most notably China, have constructed solid and massive firewalls fencing themselves off international internet services, Vietnamese internet users can still chat with their Facebook friends or watch videos on Youtube. Despite periodic blockages and slowdowns during “sensitive events,” full and comprehensive censorship currently remains impossible for the Vietnamese authorities to implement.

    Dien Nguyen An Luong, a well-known op-ed contributor to The New York Times, provides [9] some reasons to explain why it is too late for Vietnam to control social media.

    First of all, he states that this can be attributed to the country’s lack of financial and technological resources to build domestic social networking services that could challenge those coming from big tech companies in Silicon Valley like China has been doing. Dien adds that Vietnam’s “mild approach to keep internet business and e-commerce growing” has also helped create a “hybrid infrastructure that thrives on developing and adapting faster than the government’s ability to regulate and control.” And finally, he concludes that Vietnamese internet users “have always been able to find workarounds” to the restrictions imposed by their government.

    The Government’s Iron Fist

    Yet, Vietnam still faces several hurdles that hinder the country’s momentum towards a more liberal internet environment. Censorship is perhaps one of the most severe threats.

    As the Vietnamese government is intolerant and fearful of dissent, various methods have been deployed to silence critics and keep online discussions under control. Among these tactics are blocking “toxic” webpages, censoring sensitive content, and forcing social media companies to comply with the state’s censorship demands.

    Vietnam has scored poorly in most criteria in the “Limits on Content” section of the Freedom House’s report. Unlike China, the authoritarian Vietnamese government commonly uses methods to suppress the civic internet space while remaining seemingly “free” on the surface.

    For example, Facebook and Google are still accessible in Vietnam, but their users are always under constant surveillance from cyber security forces. Furthermore, the passing of the controversial and opaque Cybersecurity Law in 2019 has granted Vietnamese authorities more power to request social networking sites to remove and delete content deemed as “anti-state,” “malicious,” or “illegal.”

    Besides these “official” practices under the Cybersecurity Law, the VCP has also deployed “unofficial” methods, such as throttling the connection to local servers in order to coerce foreign companies to carry out censorship, harassing activists and journalists, restricting access to blogs or online newspapers which criticize the state, and mobilizing the Force 47 Cyber Unit [10]. Force 47 is an army of online “public opinion shapers” whose job is to steer online discussions in accordance with Party guidelines.

    Screenshot of a Facebook page called ‘Firmly believing in the Party,’ identified by Vietnamese state media as being controlled by ‘Force 47 Cyber Units.’ The photo was taken on July 6, 2021, by Reuters.

    Meanwhile, online speech and freedom of expression have continued to be suppressed, as reported in the “Violations of User Rights” category.

    In theory, the right to freedom of expression and access to information is enshrined in the Vietnamese Constitution. However, Vietnam fell short of its commitment to securing such rights for its citizens. The VCP continues to maintain control of all levels of cyberspace.

    Vietnamese authorities also warned high school and university students not to[11] share, comment on the country’s historical and political disinformation in cyberspace. An article from Luat Khoa Magazine in 2019 states [12] that the reason why there has not been a youth movement in Vietnam compares to other places, such as Hong Kong, is because students have been encouraged not to “read unauthorized posts, [and] circulate unregulated information on social media.” Otherwise, they might risk getting expelled.

    The watchful eye of the government constantly scrutinizes local activists, bloggers, and independent journalists. They can be penalized for simply engaging in online activities such as writing posts, live streaming newsworthy events, or publicizing any information that the government considers “sensitive” or “inappropriate.”

    Legislation [13] is being used to punish and silence online critics, such as Article 109 of the Penal Code, which penalizes citizens “carrying out activities aiming to overthrow the people’s administration,” and Article 117 for those “making, storing, disseminating or propagandizing materials and products that aim to oppose the State of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.” According to Freedom House, since the legal terms found in these laws are vaguely defined and easily manipulated, the trials and proceedings related to online speech are “often brief, and predetermined.” If found guilty, offenders could also face “years-long prison sentences.”

    To further expand its total control over cyberspace in Vietnam, the VCP has compelled Facebook and Google to become its tools for censorship and harassment of citizens [14]. In a 78-page report, “Let us Breathe!”: Censorship and criminalization of online expression in Viet Nam,”[15] Amnesty International (AI) documents and exposes the current situation of social media users in Vietnam, along with how the repression of online speech is aided by world’s tech giants such as Facebook and Google.

    The AI report illustrates that Vietnamese social media users “face the constant threat of arbitrary arrest, prosecution, and other forms of harassment in retaliation for exercising their right of freedom of expression online.” At the same time, they could also get blocked on social media and have their posts deleted; their personal data could also be handed to the state’s security department if demanded.

    The Vietnamese Ministry of Information and Communications recently introduced a code of conduct [16] to direct the online behavior of social media users, state organizations, and social media providers alike. The new code encourages internet users to “post positive content” about the country while prohibiting those which “affect the interests of the state” and requires social networking sites to “deal with users in accordance with Vietnamese law” by deleting content upon the government’s request.

    The new code, while it is not legally binding [17], has sparked considerable concerns for local internet users and social activists. Many of them fear that the new regulation is a warning sign from the government and will lead to further encroachments in the country’s already restrictive cyberspace.

    Building upon its insatiable desire to shape online discussions, censor “sensitive information,” and harass activists, the VCP wants to further infringe on the personal freedom of more than 60 million internet users in Vietnam by telling them what to think, do, or express on the internet.

    But what is truly disheartening is that Vietnam has all the conditions needed to make internet freedom thrive and prosper; it has the infrastructure in place, and cyberspace has never been more accessible. Yet, it will never reach this ideal if the government continues to maintain and strengthen its grip on freedom while refusing to let its people speak.

    References:

    1. Freedom on the Net 2021 (Vietnam). (2021, September). Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/country/vietnam/freedom-net/2021
    2. Internet Freedom Scores. (2021, September). Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-net/scores
    3. Global Freedom Scores. (2021). Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores
    4. Nguyen, M. N. (2021, July 23). Internet usage in Vietnam – statistics & facts. Statista. https://www.statista.com/topics/6231/internet-usage-in-vietnam/
    5. Lien, H. (2021, June 9). In rural Vietnam, Facebook finds a new approach to growth. Nikkei Asia. https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Technology/In-rural-Vietnam-Facebook-finds-a-new-approach-to-growth
    6. Quy, N. (2021, February 6). Vietnamese spend more time on internet, social media than Asian peers: report. VnExpress. https://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/vietnamese-spend-more-time-on-internet-social-media-than-asian-peers-report-4232155.html
    7. Nguyen, M. N. (2021b, August 9). Leading social media apps in Vietnam in Q2 2021. Statista. https://www.statista.com/statistics/941843/vietnam-leading-social-media-platforms/
    8. Statista Research Department. (2021, September 10). Countries with the most Facebook users 2021. Statista. https://www.statista.com/statistics/268136/top-15-countries-based-on-number-of-facebook-users/
    9. Luong, D. (2017, November 30). Vietnam Wants to Control Social Media? Too Late.The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/30/opinion/vietnam-social-media-china.html
    10. Reuters Staff. (2017, December 26). Vietnam unveils 10,000-strong cyber unit to combat “wrong views.” Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-security-cyber/vietnam-unveils-10000-strong-cyber-unit-to-combat-wrong-views-idUSKBN1EK0XN
    11. Tuan, D. (2021, April 29). Nâng cao ý thức pháp luật trên không gian mạng cho học sinh. An Ninh Thủ Đô. https://anninhthudo.vn/nang-cao-y-thuc-phap-luat-tren-khong-gian-mang-cho-hoc-sinh-post464936.antd
    12. Bao, V. (2019, June 23). Vì sao sinh viên Việt Nam không thể biểu tình như sinh viên Hong Kong? Luật Khoa Tạp Chí. https://www.luatkhoa.org/2019/06/vi-sao-sinh-vien-viet-nam-khong-the-bieu-tinh-nhu-sinh-vien-hong-kong/
    13. Vietnam’s Proposed Revisions to National Security Laws. (2015, November 19). Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/19/vietnams-proposed-revisions-national-security-laws
    14. Viet Nam: Tech giants complicit in industrial-scale repression. (2020, December 1). Amnesty International. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2020/12/viet-nam-tech-giants-complicit/
    15. Viet Nam: Let us breathe! Censorship and criminalization of online expression in Viet Nam (ASA 41/3243/2020). (2020, December). Amnesty International.
    16. Phuong Nguyen, James Pearson. (2021, June 18). Vietnam introduces nationwide code of conduct for social media. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/vietnam-introduces-nationwide-code-conduct-social-media-2021-06-18/
    17. Long, T. H. (2021, June 19). Vietnam: The New Code Of Conduct On Social Media Is Not Legally Binding. The Vietnamese Magazine. https://www.thevietnamese.org/2021/06/vietnam-the-new-code-of-conduct-on-social-media-is-not-legally-binding/
  • The Threat Of A Free And Open Internet In Vietnam

    The Threat Of A Free And Open Internet In Vietnam

    We now live in the Age of Information, where we can access facts, data, or statistics with a simple touch of a button through our phones or computers. With enough time, commitment, and motivation, anyone can attain baseline theoretical knowledge in various fields with access to the internet.

    And if a private individual wants to share what they know, they can easily do so using the many avenues to spread information now available on the World Wide Web. Yet, this ease of access carries with it several caveats, one of which is the rampant spread of misinformation.

    Fake news, bogus statistics, and false narratives have sadly become common as we try to navigate our way through the internet. While trusted news outlets, publishers, and independent journalists are doing their part to weed out disinformation, their efforts are not enough to realistically stop, or at the very least, stifle the spread of these lies.

    And while these experts continue to research and learn about how best to deal with this issue, for now, the challenge falls on private citizens to exercise their judgment and recognize their biases to discern the truth from what is merely a constructed or false reality. Even though humans are far from rational beings touted by various thinkers and philosophers from the past, this should hopefully be enough to slow down misinformation coming from isolated sources.

    Yet, what if campaigns of disinformation were more focused? What if they were run not only by an individual or a small group but by an entire ecosystem that pushes a questionable goal or agenda? And what if this hive mind had enough power, money, and resources to censor alternate sources of information or silence anyone, or anything, that would compromise its meticulously constructed version of the world?

    The U.S Department of State’s 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Vietnam tackles several issues plaguing the country: internet freedom. The report states that the Vietnamese government “restricted and disrupted access to the internet, censored online content, imposed criminal sentences for online expression, and monitored private online communications without legal authority.”

    Also mentioned are several restrictions on local internet service providers in the country, which the government controls. Those few that are allowed to operate are either in part or wholly owned by the state, which can actively monitor the online activities of the subscribers of these internet services.

    The report also states that websites that the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) considers “politically or culturally inappropriate” are also blocked on the Vietnamese internet and cannot be accessed directly. This group includes international sites owned and operated by Vietnamese people residing overseas and several credible news outlets such as Radio Free Asia, Voice of America, and the BBC Vietnamese news service.

    The meddling of the Vietnamese government does not end there. The report adds the situation of websites and social media networks – such as Facebook and Google – where Vietnam already gives the privilege to operate in the country. Yet, these companies are still being compelled to fully cooperate with the Ministry of Information and Communications to weed out and identify news and information that the government considers “bad” or “toxic.”

    They added that companies and organizations that operate social network sites, host blogs, or provide information about politics, economics, culture, or society must give comprehensive details about their plans and set up their servers within Vietnam. It is done for the convenience of the Vietnamese government so that when it requests the personal information of the account holders, it will undoubtedly have them. Hence, all information collected by these companies is stored for 90 days, with specific metadata being held for up to two years.

    The report highlights the government’s crackdown against private citizens, journalists, and bloggers who use their platforms to criticize and complain about the actions of the VCP or expose the many allegations and manifestations of corruption that plagues the Vietnamese government. These brave men and women, with our co-founder and co-editor, Pham Doan Trang, being one of them, bear the brunt of the government’s ire and often face the possibility of “arrest, short-term detentions, surveillance, intimidation, and the illegal confiscation of [their or their family’s] computers and cell phones.”

    Despite the severity of the restrictions on the Vietnamese internet, this is not something new; it is just another manifestation of the Vietnamese government’s ever-tightening noose around the neck of free speech and press freedom.

    The careful monitoring of websites, internet service providers, social media programs, and bloggers is the latest in a long line of the party’s transgressions against outlets that challenge the narrative the VCP tries so hard to instil as truth. And with the passage of the controversial Cyber Security Law in 2018, it is evident that the government is trying to replicate its success in controlling all forms of printed media in a more modern context, according to an article written in January 2019 by Thoi Nguyen in The Diplomat.

    Yet, with all their control and propaganda, what is this elusive narrative that the VCP is trying so hard to maintain? What is the story they want every one of their citizens to accept as gospel and as the absolute truth?

    The Party is perfect, and that the Party only has the people’s best interests at heart?

    The VCP’s version of reality has itself at the helm of Vietnam; it paints the Party as the almighty saviour of the country from the hands of the West. It construes itself as the central, and perhaps, the sole reason for Vietnam’s miraculous rebirth from conflict and civil war to its current state. The Party believes the VCP, guided by the spirit of Ho Chi Minh, should continue to carry the nation towards progress for all eternity.

    Such is the display of bravado, arrogance, and delusion of the Vietnamese government.

    Hence, it continues its charade, striving to censor masterfully, control, and monitor what occurs in Vietnam’s corner of the internet, a tactic not too different from what China practices. At the same time,  it continues to peddle its story to its citizens and the rest of the world,

    All this leads to a peculiar reversal of roles where misinformation comes not from the flawed thought process of the ill-informed or the writings of misguided conspiracy theorists. Instead, it comes from the precise calculations and machinations of the state, which can control most of what people consume in mainstream media. And if the people are constantly bombarded with lies and misdirection, they will eventually accept these falsehoods as fact and gospel.

    As such, the task of revealing new truths to the Vietnamese people and raising awareness about what is going on outside the government’s online information bubble lies in the hands of individuals. It falls on independent journalists, writers, bloggers, and small online publications to crack open the Vietnamese firewall, despite the risks, to make citizens question what they hold to be true. The threat to the free and open internet in Vietnam is genuine to the government as it exposes their lies and renders them obsolete.

    For when the state fails to provide the truth, it becomes our duty to do it ourselves.

  • New Research: Vietnam Remains “Not Free” On Internet Freedom, Freedom House Says

    New Research: Vietnam Remains “Not Free” On Internet Freedom, Freedom House Says

    Internet freedom in Vietnam has always been at the mercy of state censorship and strict government control. Journalists, bloggers, and activists face the genuine risk of harassment by state forces and even imprisonment. On September 21, 2021, Freedom House, a US-based organization founded to support and defend democracy worldwide, released its annual report titled Freedom on the Net 2021. Disappointingly, Vietnam continues to fare poorly in its metrics and analysis as the situation surrounding Vietnam’s internet freedom continues to worsen year after year.

    Freedom House’s Methodology

    In its annual report, Freedom House rates each country on a scale of 100 to 0, with a score of 100 representing the freest conditions and with 0 signifying the least free. The highest possible score of 100 is then divided into three categories, namely: Obstacles to Access (25 pts.), Limits on Content (35 pts.), and Violations of User Rights (40 pts.). These three categories are then further split into several specific questions, which are then used by Freedom House to determine a country’s appropriate standing.

    Countries that attain a grade between 70-100 are classified as Free, those with scores between 40-69 are noted as being Partly Free, and nations with a score from 0-39 are considered to be Not Free.

    Freedom House’s full methodology can be found here.

    Key Events

    Vietnam’s rating for 2021 in Freedom House’s report is 22, which classifies it as being Not Free. This score is 2 points lower than its rating of 24 in 2019 but is equal to its 2020 score, which was also 22. However, just because Vietnam’s rating is the same in last year’s report does not mean that the situation in the country has remained unchanged. For instance, in 2020, Freedom House reported a temporary connectivity disruption in Đồng Tâm coupled with Facebook’s servers in the country were taken offline in February 2020, which led to a lower accessibility score for that year. No similar issue has happened so far in 2021, which leads to Vietnam having a higher rating in this category. In the same vein, several issues in the past may no longer be present, and several issues today may not have been problematic one or two years prior.

    Freedom on the Net 2021 report begins by listing several key events that affect Vietnam’s overall score.

    Firstly, the report states that the Vietnamese government had threatened to shut down Facebook’s activities in the country if the company refuses to comply with the government’s requests to restrict content it deems to be “sensitive” or “critical.”

    Secondly, the report discusses the prior elections and the Vietnamese government’s censorship, arrests, and smear campaigns related to several independent candidates. Related to this are the long-running and ongoing arrests of activists and bloggers.

    Lastly, the report mentions the draft decree regarding personal data protection, which was released in February 2021; if passed, this would require online platforms to collect and store the personal data of Vietnamese users for the purposes of providing it to the government upon request.

    These events give us much-needed context into how Freedom House came to its rate for Vietnam in its 2021 report.

    Internet Freedom in Vietnam

    Regarding Obstacles to Access, Vietnam scores 12 out of a maximum of 25 points, or around 48 percent of the total. The report states that internet penetration in the country is at around 68.70 percent of the population and that smartphone penetration is at around 61.37 percent. Internet prices have also become more affordable, even to those in rural areas. Despite these positives, connectivity remains an issue for those in extreme poverty and for ethnic minorities who live in remote mountainous regions.

    Any business or firm is allowed to operate as an internet service provider in Vietnam; however, some informal barriers prevent many from doing so. Currently, the Vietnam Posts and Telecommunications Group (VNPT) and Viettel dominate the industry, with these companies controlling 40 percent and 38 percent of the market respectively. The mobile sector is no different, with Viettel accounting for 50.5 percent, VinaPhone 24.6 percent, and MobiFone 21.1 percent, comprising the lion’s share of all subscriptions. As such, smaller companies in both the internet and mobile sectors cannot hope to compete with these already established businesses.

    The Vietnamese government still retains the ability to restrict connectivity on a whim. Various government agencies tasked with regulating and overseeing digital technology remain secretive and operate without public oversight.

    Regarding Limits on Content, Vietnam scores 6 out of a maximum of 35 points, or roughly around 17 percent of the total.

    The Vietnamese government actively and continuously blocks or filters any form of content that, from their point of view, challenges the ruling Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP). High-profile blogs, individuals with many followers, content which promotes religious organizations, and local and international news websites which are critical of the regime are often the targets of government censorship. This 2021 Freedom House report states that Vietnam’s Department of Cybersecurity and High-Tech Crime Prevention has “monitored and blocked almost 3,400 overseas websites that have ‘published harmful and toxic information’ in 2020.” The regime has also threatened to shut down Facebook, and so, even this social media giant was forced to comply and agree to remove content that the VCP deems “anti-state.”

    The passing of the controversial Cyber Security Law in January 2019 has also led to the expeditious removal of content. State authorities have “imposed heavy fines and suspended online publications” for having comments that criticize the regime on their platforms. In addition, mounting government pressure has made social media platforms subservient to the government’s wishes, and in effect, they restrict content that the VCP deems inappropriate.

    The social media accounts of activists and dissidents are also under the constant threat of being suspended for “violating the platform’s community standards.” Even normal internet users, commentators, and journalists have to practice some degree of self-censorship or risk being detained or questioned by the authorities.

    This situation of mass censorship and control gives the Vietnamese government the perfect setting to be able to influence, sway, and dictate public opinion. The report quotes the Oxford Internet Institute (OII) which claims, “Vietnam employs a network of approximately 10,000 people that manipulates information on Facebook and YouTube [, and at] least one government agency is involved.”

    Regarding Violations of User Rights, Vietnam scores 4 out of a maximum of 40 points, or roughly 10 percent of the total.

    Even if the Vietnamese Constitution affirms the rights of freedom of expression, access to information, press freedom, and the like, these are not actually protected by the Vietnamese state. Freedom on the Net 2021 report states that “police routinely flout due process, arresting bloggers and online activists without a warrant or retaining them in custody beyond the maximum period allowed by law.” And it says further that the Cybersecurity Law also “prohibits a wide range of activities conducted online” in addition to putting additional pressure on internet users and social media platforms.

    As of June 2021, according to the report, 235 activists are being held in detention for practicing their freedom of expression. Several journalists, activists, and even ordinary everyday users were also given outrageous prison terms or made to pay hefty fines for their online activities for allegedly violating several provisions under Articles 117 and 331 of the Penal Code. Prominent journalist Pham Thi Doan Trang, a co-founder and editor of The Vietnamese Magazine, has been detained since October 2020 and charged with “creating, storing, and disseminating information, documents, items, and publications opposing the Socialist Republic of Vietnam” under Article 117.

    Also mentioned in the report is the controversy surrounding Bluezone, a COVID-19 tracing app. People were unaware that this application disclosed private user information to the government; in June 2021, the state announced that it would sanction people who did not have this app installed on their mobile phones when they entered certain public areas. This is a blatant infringement of a person’s right to privacy.

    Cases of intimidation and physical violence by the authorities are also noted in the Freedom House report and the names of prominent bloggers and activists who were put under surveillance and de facto house arrest. A notable case cited is the situation of Le Anh Hung, a blogger and democracy activist. Hung was arrested in July 2018 for criticizing Vietnam’s one-party communist state in online posts. He was “beaten with a metal folding chair, tied to his bed, and forcibly medicated while being held in a psychiatric hospital without his consent” in July 2020.

    Conclusion

    The state of internet freedom in Vietnam continues to remain abysmal and disheartening, with no improvement in terms of the protection of the rights of individual users. The state maintains its tight grip on the flow of information by pressuring or outright censoring social media platforms, journalists, and media outlets and by stifling any discussion by everyday people through the internet. It’s business as usual for the VCP even during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic in the country.

    Yet, the report points out that “young, educated Vietnamese people are increasingly turning to blogs, social media platforms, and other online news sources for information, rather than state television and radio broadcasters” and that “tools for circumventing censorship” exist and can be easily found. Hence, while the state may continue on its crusade to monopolize the flow of information, its efforts are failing; the truth is still being spread, and the Vietnamese people are always looking for ways to circumvent the walls being built by the regime.


    Trinh Huu Long, an editor of The Vietnamese Magazine and co-director of Legal Initiatives for Vietnam, is the author of the Vietnam chapter of Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net 2021.

  • A Vietnamese Sentenced To Five Years In Jail For “Spreading Coronavirus”: Rules For The People But Not For The Government

    A Vietnamese Sentenced To Five Years In Jail For “Spreading Coronavirus”: Rules For The People But Not For The Government

    Last week, on September 6, when the news of a Vietnamese man being sentenced to five years in prison for “transmitting coronavirus” by a court in Ca Mau Province made international headlines, it vehemently startled a substantial number of foreign readers.

    One day later, in the country’s southernmost province of Ca Mau, a local doctor was officially prosecuted for having “irresponsible manners which cause serious consequences.” More specifically, he was accused [1] of spreading coronavirus by deliberately administering treatment to an ill patient without properly testing him for coronavirus and informing local authorities of the case. The patient later tested positive for COVID-19.

    Looking back a little further, in June, a Protestant church in Ho Chi Minh City, Revival Ekklesia Mission, became [2] an unlikely scapegoat for a wave of criticisms targeting them for hosting religious events, which are believed to have eventually led to a significant coronavirus outbreak in the city. The church’s founding pastors, a husband, and a wife were then officially charged under criminal prosecution for “transmitting dangerous infectious diseases to other people.” The wife, nonetheless, firmly believed that her church was not the source of the new cluster since they always correctly followed health guidelines from local authorities.

    In reality, these are just a few examples among dozens of similar cases where individuals have been targeted, fined, or charged under causes of “deliberately spreading disease” or “flouting anti-coronavirus measures” since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic in Vietnam. In most cases, the defendants are working-class citizens struggling to make ends meet day by day. Now, they are facing pending criminal prosecutions and harsh criticisms from state media for their alleged “recklessness and indiscipline.”

    Setting aside all legal grounds for imprisoning or penalizing citizens on charges of “spreading disease,” it is utterly unfair how criminal prosecutions are deployed to punish ordinary people. At the same time, the Vietnamese government is given a free pass, despite being responsible for mishandling the coronavirus through controversial policies and their fault in hosting mass gathering events that could have been the original cluster of the current COVID-19 outbreaks.

    Who is responsible for the current wave of infections?

    Not long before the current wave of COVID-19 infections in Vietnam, which has had a catastrophic effect on the country’s economy and healthcare system, the Vietnamese government was confident that it had put coronavirus under its heel through the conventional methods of isolation and contact tracing.

    The complacent attitudes caused by the nation’s initial success in containing the virus, according to Major General Vu Quoc Binh [3], a former military medical director, have led to a “perplexing” situation where the authorities made mistakes in allowing large crowds to gather before the ongoing outbreak, being assured that the situation was still controllable. Meanwhile, the government did not prioritize vaccination when case numbers were still low, he added.

    In late April, when the Delta variant was believed to have arrived in Vietnam[4], people were still allowed to freely travel across the country during a long holiday without being given any preventive measures. Only around 0,01 percent [5] of the country’s population was fully vaccinated at that time.

    On May 23, the country’s general election day, Vietnamese citizens were encouraged to directly go to voting polls to elect their National Assembly representatives in a large rubber-stamp legislative council; at the same time, COVID-19 infections started to break out in several northern provinces. On the other hand, the government vowed to “successfully organize” the political event at the cost of potential coronavirus transmission due to mass gatherings at the polls.

    A voting poll in Ho Chi Minh City. Photo: hcmcpv.org.vn.

    About one month later, in late June, the Vietnamese Ministry of Education still proceeded with [6] a plan to hold the national graduation examinations on July 7 and 8, which would take place in all of the country’s 63 provinces and municipalities. For instance, in Ho Chi Minh City, it was estimated [7] that nearly 90,000 students, along with 15,000 examiners, would be gathering in around 160 locations in the city to take part in the exams. At the time, daily coronavirus infections in Ho Chi Minh City stood at a 3-digit number; in late July, the city started to record [8] thousands of new confirmed cases every day.

    The examples mentioned above have not considered other significant missteps by the government, including an identity card registration program, where local residents were asked to replace their old identity cards with electronic ones at police stations, which nurtured an environment for disease transmission.

    In addition, there were the chaotic scenes of cramped vaccination venues [9] and congestion roadblocks [10] where people were crowded together to show their “travel permits,” a scheme used to limit the number of commuters on the streets. Overall, they exposed that the Vietnamese authorities’ mismanagement and inefficient plans harm more than good in improving the pandemic.

    Scapegoating the vulnerables

    From those experiences, it is conceivable that the current spread of virus infections is possibly the consequence of the Vietnamese government’s mishandling of the disease. However, none of the officials responsible for such failure has been held accountable, punished, or voluntarily resigned in the same way that other ordinary citizens have been fined, prosecuted, and jailed for “spreading infectious diseases.”

    Those indictments and the imprisonment of people for allegedly violating anti-coronavirus protocols are not only unfair, but they also do not effectively fix the root cause of the ongoing problem.

    In its purest form, the punishments applied have not necessarily been aimed at controlling or preventing the spread of the disease but rather to intimidate the public and shift blame to more vulnerable subjects through a scapegoating strategy [11].

    Most of the time, violators of pandemic regulations have been blamed for their “lack of discipline” for flouting COVID-19 laws, such as avoiding complying with compulsory isolation rules or declaring health conditions. However, these indications are invincibly reflecting the true feelings of local residents during this tumultuous time: scared, hopeless and angry.

    COVID-19 patients protested in a quarantine camp in Binh Duong Province over the shortage of food and necessities. Photo: Tin Tuc Viet Nam.

    Most Vietnamese people have been in dire straits since the country went into periodic lockdowns earlier this year. They are scared of being taken to poor and unclean quarantine facilities if tested positive while no one can take care of their sick parents or young children. Some people face financial strains and have lost hope that they will not return to their hometowns due to strict lockdown measures. At the same time, many others become angry that high-level government officials were somehow immune to punishment for breaking social distancing rules [12] while ordinary people would receive heavy fines [13] for doing so. These stories provide us a more authentic picture of the ongoing anti-coronavirus scheme in Vietnam.

    If the “war against COVID-19 [14],” an ostentatious metaphor commonly used by the Communist Party, does exist, the ordinary Vietnamese people are the losers of this battle.

    References:

    1. Duc, V. (2021, September 7). Khởi tố bác sỹ làm lây lan dịch bệnh. Báo Công An Nhân Dân. https://cand.com.vn/Phap-luat/khoi-to-bac-sy-lam-lay-lan-dich-benh–i627297/
    2. Richard C. Paddock, Chau Doan. (2021, June 2). Spared for Months, Vietnam Faces a Wave of New Infections. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/02/world/asia/vietnam-covid-ho-chi-minh.html
    3. Bac Pham, Bennett Murray. (2021, September 14). Counting the cost of Vietnam’s Covid meltdown. Asia Times. https://asiatimes.com/2021/09/counting-the-cost-of-vietnams-covid-meltdown/
    4. Huong, L. T. (2021, August 11). Delta variant outbreak challenges Vietnam’s COVID-19 response strategy. The Brookings Institution. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/08/11/delta-variant-outbreak-challenges-vietnams-covid-19-response-strategy/
    5. Coronavirus (COVID-19) Vaccinations. (n.d.). Our World in Data. https://ourworldindata.org/covid-vaccinations
    6. Huynh, T. (2021, June 26). Bộ GD-ĐT: 63 tỉnh, thành tổ chức thi tốt nghiệp THPT đợt 1 cùng ngày. Tuoi Tre Online. https://tuoitre.vn/bo-gd-dt-63-tinh-thanh-to-chuc-thi-tot-nghiep-thpt-dot-1-cung-ngay-20210626200317418.htm
    7. L.Đ.O. (2021, June 30). TPHCM “mạo hiểm” khi tổ chức thi tốt nghiệp THPT đợt 1?Lao Dong Online. https://laodong.vn/giao-duc/tphcm-mao-hiem-khi-to-chuc-thi-tot-nghiep-thpt-dot-1-925514.ldo
    8. Hang, T. (2021, July 24). 3.991 ca mắc COVID-19 sáng 24/7, nhiều nhất vẫn là TP Hồ Chí Minh. Báo Công An Nhân Dân. https://cand.com.vn/y-te/Sang-24-7-them-3-991-ca-mac-COVID-19-Long-An-bo-sung-them-1-288-ca-benh-i621409/
    9. Huong, T. (2021, June 25). TP.HCM: Hàng ngàn người xếp hàng chờ tiêm vắc xin Covid-19 ở Nhà thi đấu Phú Thọ. Thanh Nien Online. https://thanhnien.vn/thoi-su/tphcm-hang-ngan-nguoi-xep-hang-cho-tiem-vac-xin-covid-19-o-nha-thi-dau-phu-tho-1404282.html
    10. LĐO. (2021, September 6). Chốt kiểm soát “vùng đỏ” Hà Nội lại đông đúc: Có lúng túng, dễ lây nhiễm. Lao Dong Online. https://laodong.vn/y-te/chot-kiem-soat-vung-do-ha-noi-lai-dong-duc-co-lung-tung-de-lay-nhiem-950298.ldo
    11. Minh, H. (2021, June 4). Đại dịch, bản năng đổ lỗi, và những cuộc săn dê tế thần. Luật Khoa Tạp Chí. https://www.luatkhoa.org/2021/06/dai-dich-ban-nang-do-loi-va-nhung-cuoc-san-de-te-than/
    12. Chinh, Y. K. (2021, September 16). Ý thức chống dịch: dân trí thấp hay quan trí lỏng? Luật Khoa Tạp Chí. https://www.luatkhoa.org/2021/09/y-thuc-chong-dich-dan-tri-thap-hay-quan-tri-long/
    13. Thiet, K. (2021, August 10). Thêm 16 trường hợp bị xử phạt vì ra đường tập thể dục, bất chấp quy định phòng chống dịch. Báo Đồng Nai Điện Tử. http://www.baodongnai.com.vn/tintuc/202108/them-16-truong-hop-bi-xu-phat-vi-ra-duong-tap-the-duc-bat-chap-quy-dinh-phong-chong-dich-3072372/
    14. Jason, N. (2021, September 12). Why Did The Vietnamese Communist Party Militarize Its Fight Against COVID-19? The Vietnamese Magazine. https://www.thevietnamese.org/2021/09/why-did-the-vietnamese-communist-party-militarize-its-fight-against-covid-19/
  • Why Did The Vietnamese Communist Party Militarize Its Fight Against COVID-19?

    Why Did The Vietnamese Communist Party Militarize Its Fight Against COVID-19?

    When the Ho Chi Minh City authorities decided to deploy troops to enforce an antivirus lockdown during the last week of August 2021, they caught local people off guard.

    The move, which came amid the rise in both Covid-19 infections and deaths in the city, has been seen as the last strategic card adopted by the Vietnamese government in its arduous and yet controversial battle to “defeat the virus.”

    According to state media, military troops will help enforce the lockdown until September 15, taking on the duty of barring people from going outside and providing necessities to quarantined residents.

    However, this has brought little peace of mind to local communities.

    Despite firm reassurances from the local government that military troops would take on the duty of buying and delivering food during the quarantine period, panic buying broke out even before the lockdown, while several opinions circulated on social media cast doubt that the preliminary action was to quell potential riots.

    Since the beginning of Covid-19, military-style rhetoric against the disease has appeared frequently in Vietnam’s state-run media and newspapers.

    Some might argue that these grandiose war-like bombasts and military mobilizations are not exclusively confined to Vietnam. Still, given the country’s authoritarian political landscape where speech is often suppressed and orders arbitrarily passed, these have been abused by the Communist government to spread propaganda and shirk off the responsibilities for its failure to handle Covid-19.

    Military rhetoric

    Vietnam has used military rhetoric since the early phase of the pandemic, with the flashy anti-coronavirus slogan of “fighting the virus as if we are fighting an enemy.” Depicting coronavirus as “an invader,” Vietnamese officials announced a war on the disease, vowing to “defeat” it through drastic operations and comprehensive “tactics.” [1]

    In Vietnam’s epidemiological “war,” each person is portrayed [2] as “a soldier.” Each family is “a fortress” in fighting “an invisible enemy,” [3] namely Covid-19. Healthcare workers have been zealously described as “superheroes,” [4] while infected patients are “subjects” [5] who need to be “swept out” [6] of the community.

    Last year, in June, when the Communist country successfully contained the first wave of infections and maintained a zero death toll, its leaders declared “a victory” [7] in the battle against Covid-19. Its success, said [8] the deputy prime minister, was primarily thanks to “the leadership of the Party, the state and the entire political system.”

    “Fighting the virus as if we are fighting an enemy,” a street board displaying Vietnam’s anti-coronavirus slogan. Photo: AFP.

    Looking from the historical perspective, the Vietnamese Communist Party has since boasted about its significant role in defending its independence from French colonialism and American imperialism.

    Likewise, the warlike discourse on the coronavirus disease is nothing but a manipulative tactic utilized by the Communist Party to spread propaganda and reinforce its “legitimate” reign on every aspect of Vietnamese society. By intertwining the use of military rhetoric and the country’s previous military victories, the propaganda department has maneuvered the public into believing that the war against Covid will prevail under the Party’s leadership, just as has happened in the past.

    The battleground

    While the political rhetoric has dominated Vietnam’s state-run newspapers, a military mobilization is simultaneously taking place in real life.

    Since August 23, military troops carrying rifles have been present at roadblocks in Ho Chi Minh City. These soldiers have been tasked with checking commuting permissions or delivering food and medicine to local households. The government called in the military to enforce the policy adopted by the city authorities to limit unnecessary movement to help curb the spread of the infection. Meanwhile, a comprehensive propaganda campaign [9] has been implemented to sway public opinion into supporting this strategy.

    Almost a week later, as many expected, the army mobilization program began to expose its incompetence and proved ineffective in relieving the burdens of maintaining a stable food supply delivery to Ho Chi Minh City’s citizens. In reality, substantial shopping demands from customers overloaded the capacity of the army’s workforce, causing essential goods to be congested and accumulated at the supply center; at the same time, Vietnam’s daily Covid-19 confirmed cases continue to reach new milestones [10], nearly every passing week.

    The failure of this policy eventually compelled local authorities to discontinue the program, allowing [11] delivery drivers to carry out their everyday operations.

    Soldiers with rifles and batons guarding roadblocks in Ho Chi Minh City. Photo: Doc Lap/ Thanh Nien Online.

    So why did the Vietnamese authorities still proceed to implement this strategy, as, from the beginning, it had been proved to be inefficient?

    The idea of utilizing military force to solve the problem by enforcing stringent lockdowns is also widely supported by pro-government critics on social media. In explaining the failures of Vietnam’s anti-coronavirus strategy, they argue, it is due to the lack of city residents’ discipline in complying with health guidelines, not from the state’s inefficient policies in handling the pandemic. And imposing stricter measures, such as conducting a martial-style intervention, could help improve the ongoing situation.

    According to Huynh Cong Duong, [12] a writer for Luat Khoa Magazine, this tumultuous circumstance represents an underlying effort by the Vietnamese government to shift the blame to citizens. The consequence of this blame-shifting mindset, Huynh Cong Duong concludes, might “pose a significant threat” to civilian efforts on public issues, such as health and social security and the future of policy building in the country.


    As the aggressive hyperbole and military approach appear to be of little help, the Vietnamese Communist Party has to adopt more practical methods to get ahead in the fight against the coronavirus. There are two options that the Party might consider.

    Firstly, the government needs to admit the loopholes and mistakes in its anti-coronavirus policies and make human rights matters more inclusive in the epidemiological protocols.

    Secondly, when the public’s trust in the government and state media is severely eroding, the Communist authorities should recognize and promote the critical role of Vietnam’s civil society organizations and religious groups in picking up the slack where they struggle. [13] Not only do civil society and religions help alleviate the effects of Covid-19 on local communities, but they also become a beacon of reassurance and hope [14] for Vietnamese people during these challenging times, an important mission that none of the Party mouthpieces or army units could ever accomplish.

    It is time for the Communist Party to adjust its approach towards the Covid-19 pandemic.

    References:

    1. Những chiến thuật của Việt Nam trước “giặc” COVID-19. (2020, April 20). VietnamPlus. https://special.vietnamplus.vn/2020/04/20/chien-thuat-chong-covid-19-viet-nam/
    2. TP.HCM: Phát huy tinh thần “mỗi người dân là một chiến sĩ; mỗi gia đình, tổ dân phố, khu phố là một pháo đài chống dịch.” (2021, May 27). HCDC. https://hcdc.vn/category/thong-tin/viem-phoi-cap-do-virus-ncov/tphcm-phat-huy-tinh-than-moi-nguoi-dan-la-mot-chien-si-moi-gia-dinh-to-dan-pho-khu-pho-la-mot-phao-dai-chong-dich-67931aad42e0787f04c62ab852e6c0d2.html
    3. Hoa, Q. (2021, August 8). Quyết liệt hành động để sớm đẩy lùi “kẻ thù vô hình” COVID-19. VietnamPlus. https://www.vietnamplus.vn/quyet-liet-hanh-dong-de-som-day-lui-ke-thu-vo-hinh-covid19/732256.vnp
    4. Khuong, T. (2021, June 26). Hàng ngàn bức thư tay sưởi ấm các ‘siêu anh hùng’ chống dịch Covid-19 ở TP.HCM. Thanh Nien Online. https://thanhnien.vn/doi-song/hang-ngan-buc-thu-tay-suoi-am-cac-sieu-anh-hung-chong-dich-covid-19-o-tphcm-1400833.html
    5. L.Đ.O. (2021, August 8). Thông tin mới nhất về những đối tượng F0 COVID-19 được cách ly tại nhà. Lao Dong Online. https://laodong.vn/suc-khoe/thong-tin-moi-nhat-ve-nhung-doi-tuong-f0-covid-19-duoc-cach-ly-tai-nha-939623.ldo
    6. Not, T. (2021, August 17). Chủ tịch tỉnh An Giang kêu gọi chung tay quét sạch F0. Lao Dong Online. https://nld.com.vn/thoi-su/chu-tich-tinh-an-giang-keu-goi-chung-tay-quet-sach-f0-20210817114001702.htm
    7. D. Hai & D. Linh, D. H. D. L. (2020, June 14). Tại sao Việt Nam chiến thắng dịch COVID-19? Vietnam Ministry of Health. https://ncov.moh.gov.vn/en/-/tai-sao-viet-nam-chien-thang-dich-covid-19-
    8. Ibid., [7]
    9. Quan, V. V. (2021, August 31). Quân đội “lo từ A đến Z” và những kỹ thuật tuyên truyền chính trị kinh điển. Luật Khoa Tạp Chí. https://www.luatkhoa.org/2021/08/quan-doi-lo-tu-a-den-z-va-nhung-ky-thuat-tuyen-truyen-chinh-tri-kinh-dien/
    10. Nga, L. (2021, August 30). Vietnam confirms 14,219 new Covid-19 cases. VnExpress. https://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/vietnam-confirms-14-219-new-covid-19-cases-4348606.html
    11. Đi chợ hộ tại TP HCM: Quân đội “chào thua”, shipper trở lại. (2021, August 30). BBC Vietnamese. https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/vietnam-58381909
    12. Duong, H. C. (2021, August 25). Cảm tình quân phiệt trên đường phố Sài Gòn. Luật Khoa Tạp Chí. https://www.luatkhoa.org/2021/08/cam-tinh-quan-phiet-tren-duong-pho-sai-gon/
    13. Luke Hunt. (2021, July 28). In Vietnam, Civil Society Is Picking up the Slack Where Authorities Struggle. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2021/07/in-vietnam-civil-society-is-picking-up-the-slack-where-authorities-struggle/
    14. Thanh, T. (2021, August 22). Trong hoảng loạn, tôn giáo đang giúp trấn an – việc mà nhà nước không làm được. Luật Khoa Tạp Chí. https://www.luatkhoa.org/2021/08/trong-hoang-loan-ton-giao-dang-giup-tran-an-viec-ma-nha-nuoc-khong-lam-duoc/
  • Journalist Pham Doan Trang Can Still Be Freed In Vietnam. And The US Could Help Win Her Release.

    Journalist Pham Doan Trang Can Still Be Freed In Vietnam. And The US Could Help Win Her Release.

    While in Vietnam, Vice President Kamala Harris has significant leverage to make a change: free one of the most prominent journalists and democracy activists in the country.

    For the Vietnamese Communist Party, political prisoners are bargaining chips in international negotiations. They sell their own citizens to gain a trade deal or a more favorable security treaty. That’s because they know human rights are the soft spot of major powers, such as the United States and the European Union.

    Thus, they release political prisoners in exchange for economic and political gains. The problem is the prisoners are released conditionally: they are expelled from the country. Most of them settle in the United States.

    But journalist Pham Doan Trang, one of Vietnam’s most respected journalists, is a different case. Unlike other political prisoners, she has not been indicted or convicted yet; she is a detainee under investigation and still has a chance to be released in Vietnam.

    Once the police have determined that an accused person did commit a crime, there is absolutely no way that person can avoid conviction and sentencing. The only option left is to negotiate a settlement in another country, as had happened with some other political prisoners.

    Of course, the investigators have now gathered more than enough evidence to make a case against Trang and put her away for up to 20 years. Chances are, the Communist Party has not decided yet on how to move forward with her case to maximize its own interests. All options are still on the table.

    Doan Trang has insisted that she doesn’t want to leave the country until it becomes a democracy. As a close friend and colleague of hers for over a decade, I know how painful it is for her to be forced out of her only home, her beloved Vietnam.

    As one of the most prominent and talented journalists and democracy activists in Vietnam since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, she has always aimed at breaking down the censorship curtain that puts the country at the bottom of Reporters Without Borders’ Press Freedom Index. Her writings and activism include various samizdat political books, two independent magazines (Luat Khoa and The Vietnamese), many protest movements, and international advocacy campaigns.

    As a result, she was awarded the Homo Homini Prize from People in Need (Czech Republic) in 2017 and the Press Freedom Award by Reporters Without Borders (France) in 2019. But more importantly, Doan Trang’s way of working and living inspires other Vietnamese to stand up for their rights and a better, kinder country.

    No authoritarian regime would tolerate her. After years of cat-and-mouse games with the authorities, and many physical assaults, the police have detained Doan Trang since October 7, 2020, charging her with spreading propaganda against the state. The criminal provision has been widely condemned by human rights groups as a way the government silences critics – a clear violation of free speech protected by the Constitution and legally binding international treaties.

    Doan Trang was on her way to meet then-president Barack Obama in May 2016 in Hanoi before the police kidnapped her and detained her for the rest of the day. Vice President Harris may not be able to meet Trang in the detention center, but she can surely do a lot to free her in Vietnam.

    The trade relations, especially the semiconductor supply chain and strategic partnership are believed to be the reasons Vice President Harris is paying a visit to Vietnam.

    In such circumstances, I believe that the United States, and Vice President Harris, in particular, have an excellent chance to push for Doan Trang’s release right in Vietnam while the case is still undecided. And there is a precedent for that.

    In June 2007, Vietnam released attorney and democracy advocate Le Quoc Quan after three months of temporary detention and two days before Chairman Nguyen Minh Triet visited the United States. Attorney Le Quoc Quan had not been indicted yet, and a major reason he was freed was a mountain of pressure from the United States government and civil society, such as the National Endowment for Democracy, where Quan did a fellowship before his return to Vietnam.

    It is now urgent to push for Doan Trang’s release, before it’s too late.

  • Venerable Thich Quang Do: A Lifetime Of Struggle

    Venerable Thich Quang Do: A Lifetime Of Struggle

    Thich Quang Do

    Thich Quang Do’s birth name is Dang Phuc Tue. He was born in Thanh Chau Commune, Tien Hai Suburban District, Thai Binh Province, on November 27, 1928, into a family with three other siblings.

    He left his home in 1942 at 14 years of age to become a monk at Thanh Lam Village Pagoda in Ha Dong Province, which is today a part of Hanoi.

    He passed away on the night of February 22, 2020, at Tu Hieu Pagoda in Ho Chi Minh City.

    An undated portrait of Thich Quang Do. Photo: Phattuvietnam.net
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    In the beginning months of 1945, famine swept across the northern part of Vietnam, killing two million people. At the time, 18-year-old Thich Quang Do was in training in Ha Dong Province, as a disciple of the Venerable Thich Duc Hai.

    Much later, in 1992, he would recall his early days of entering the monkhood in his memoir:

    “In the year of the rooster (1945), the people were very hungry, especially in the two provinces of Thai Binh and Nam Dinh. Those who had starved to death littered the streets. […] At the time, my master at Thanh Lam Village Pagoda […] heard from people heartbreaking stories, so he travelled out to Ha Dong Township and established a relief group to help the hungry. That was March 1945. My master opened up a food camp to help sustain the hungry. He relied on Ho Dac Diem, who was the Ha Dong Province chief, to intervene with the Japanese and request some rice to rescue the starving. The group was able to carry many people through the famine.” [2]

    A young woman (left) and three siblings of another family in Thai Binh during the 1945 famine. The northern famine was caused by the Japanese and the French and led to approximately two million deaths. Photo: Vo An Ninh.

    Right after that disaster, the August Revolution broke out, and seeing that the people were still incensed at the famine caused by foreign countries, the Viet Minh hunted down Vietnamese traitors and those who worked for the Japanese or the French, executing them. The executions were seen – by some – as a way for the Viet Minh to flaunt their prestige. Thich Quang Do’s master was allegedly a Vietnamese traitor.

    He recalled in an open letter sent to the general secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party, Do Muoi, in 1994:

    ”At 10 AM, on the morning of August 18, 1945 […] as I looked at my master, his two hands bound behind his back by zinc wire, on his neck hung two signs scrawled with the words ‘Vietnamese traitor, national sellout’ […] On both sides, a group of people holding sticks, spears, and scythes, stood guard. A group calling themselves the magistrates of the People’s Tribunal stood on a platform […] forcing my master to kneel down in the courtyard and listen to the court convicted him. They immediately sentenced him to death, carrying him out to the field of grass in front of the courtyard, blood continuing to flow from his mouth [as he had been punched]. Upon reaching the field of grass, they wrestled him down onto his side, shooting him through the ears three times with a pistol. Another stream of bright red blood sprayed straight up, and my master died instantly.” [3]

    Spurred by the exceedingly painful image of his master being executed, Thich Quang Do wrote: “I swore to fight fanaticism and mercilessness, and to devote my entire life to pursuing justice through Buddhism’s teachings on non-violence, tolerance, and mercy”. [4]

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    In 1947, Thich Quang Do was ordained as a monk while studying at the Quan Su Buddhist Institute in Hanoi. During this time, he wrote for the magazine Phuong Tien [Means], where Venerable Thich To Lien was editor-in-chief. In 1951, Venerable To Lien dispatched Do to study abroad in Sri Lanka [5]. In that same year, Buddhist temples throughout the country were unified under the leadership of the Vietnamese Buddhist Federation, headquartered at Tu Dam Pagoda in Hue. [6]

    After Sri Lanka, Thich Quang Do travelled to India in 1953 to continue his studies. The year after, Vietnam was divided in two, and the Vietnamese Buddhist Federation splintered. Buddhist sects and associations continued to operate independently, and a number of northern Buddhist temples moved south.

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    While Vietnam awaited a free general election, the Geneva Accords split the country at the 17th parallel into two separate militarized zones; residents on each side were free to move to the other side. Approximately 800,000 northerners moved to the south, according to data from the South Vietnamese government. This photo depicts northerners preparing to move to the south. Photo: LIFE.

    In 1958, Thich Quang Do, 30 and fluent in English and Chinese, returned to Saigon to teach and translate scriptures. [7] During this time, the Vietnamese Buddhist Federation moved its headquarters to An Quang Pagoda in Saigon, and Buddhist sects and associations continued to operate independently. [8]

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    At the end of 1961, Buddhists and monks were increasingly subjected to excessive religious persecution by the Saigon government. There were reports that many areas banned Buddhists from practising and forced them to give up their religion. By April 1963, as Vesak Day (Buddha Day) approached, monks in Hue were no longer able to tolerate the repression, declaring that they were at odds with the government and commencing a period of impassioned struggle for Buddhism. [9]

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    Nuns, monks, and Buddhists scuffle with police in Saigon, protesting against government repression. Buddhist leaders demanded that the government respect the Buddhist flag, cease the repression of Buddhists, treat them equally, grant them the freedom to proselytize and practice, and make reparations for those killed. Photo: HORST FAAS/AP.

    To weather the religious crisis, the Inter-sectarian Committee to Protect Buddhism was established in May 1963. It comprised 11 sects and associations and was headquartered at Xa Loi Pagoda in Saigon. The committee included 19 individuals, of whom Venerable Thich Tinh Khiet was the highest leader and Thich Quang Do was an assistant to the diplomatic corps. [10]

    The committee organized large-scale protests and hunger strikes. Thich Quang Do hit the streets with thousands of monks, nuns, and Buddhists to fight for the religion. The government cracked down. Many monks self-immolated to demand a resolution to Buddhism’s five aspirations. Dozens of people lost their lives in clashes with police. The tumult lasted for many months, stirring world opinion.

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    Thich Quang Do, 35, elaborating on the Buddhist struggle in front of monks, nuns, Buddhists, students, and police. Photo: Buddhist Struggles (Quoc Oai)

    On August 20, 1963, the government arrested Thich Quang Do in its “floodwater campaign,” in which pagodas were raided simultaneously to capture Buddhist leaders. He was tortured in prison. While behind bars, he secretly received English articles, translating them into Vietnamese and then sending them out, where they were reprinted in Buddhist newspapers to encourage the fighting spirit of monks, nuns, and Buddhists. [11]

    The conflict between Buddhists and the government led the United Nations to send a fact-finding mission to Vietnam on October 24, 1963. A week later, President Ngo Dinh Diem was assassinated, and Buddhism was able to gain the upper hand. Thich Quang Do was released but remained seriously ill due to the torture he suffered while in prison. [12]

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    Immediately after the 1963 Buddhist crisis and with the flames of solidarity burning bright in the hearts of monks and nuns, a number of well-respected monks reiterated calls to unify Buddhism.

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    A scene from the opening of the Buddhist Unity Congress at Xa Loi Pagoda on December 31, 1963; outside the pagoda, thousands of Buddhists gathered to support Buddhist solidarity. Photo: Buddhism’s Historic Struggle.

    At the beginning of 1964, the Buddhist Unity Congress concluded. Eleven sects and associations were merged into a single Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCVN), headquartered at the National Pagoda of Vietnam (which was just starting construction). The UBCVN ratified a charter edited by Thich Tri Quang [13] and sat under the supervision of the Supreme Patriarch Institute and the Hoa Dao Institute.

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    In 1966, a little over two years after unification, the church began to fracture under pressure. A conflict arose between two groups. On one side was the An Quang bloc, led by Thich Tri Quang, which advocated a fierce struggle to interfere in politics, with its overwhelming force and superior organizational ability. On the other side were the moderated at the National Pagoda of Vietnam, led by Thich Tam Chau, who only fought for religious freedom.

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    Thich Tri Quang (left) and Thich Tam Chau(right) sit in a Saigon monastery on April 9, 1966, to announce to the press their demand for the establishment of a Constitutional Committee for the general election of a civilian government. Photo: AP.

    In October 1966, the An Quang bloc established its own and separate Hoa Dao Institute with three sects and associations. [14]

    By 1967, the National Pagoda of Vietnam bloc convened a congress with eight sects and associations to amend its charter, asserting that the 1964 charter sought to eliminate the autonomy of sects and associations. From here, the conflict deepened when the government recognized the National Pagoda of Vietnam bloc’s amendments.

    Also in 1967, the An Quang bloc organized a series of large-scale protests, carrying the Buddhist altars down to the streets to oppose both the government and the National Pagoda bloc. The government accused the An Quang bloc of “sowing chaos” and accordingly cracked down against them. The government later broadly apologized to all Vietnamese Buddhists and monks that it had to maintain social order and there were no other methods except for cracking down against the monks of the An Quang bloc.

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    Not only did the An Quang bloc organize protests, but it also organized other noteworthy activities, such as carrying the Buddhist altars into the streets, hunger strikes, and a number of acts that are still considered controversial to this day for their perceived un-Buddhist spirit. Photo: LIFE.

    According to the Sangha of the United Southern Buddhist Church, Thich Quang Do served both as the spokesperson for and inspector of the UBCVN’s Hoa Dao Institute in 1972; two years later, he was appointed general secretary.

    The conflict between the An Quang and National Pagoda of Vietnam blocs, with their different approaches, continued until April 30, 1975.

    From when he returned to Saigon until 1975, Thich Quang Do taught at Van Hanh University, the Saigon University of Literature, Hoa Hao University (An Giang), even the Pontifical Academy of Pius X (Da Lat), and other Buddhist academies. [15] He also edited numerous scriptures and books on Buddhism.

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    After taking control of the south, the victors immediately cracked down on all religions, sending dignitaries to re-education camps, destroying Buddhist statues, and confiscating the property of sects and associations.

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    General Tran Van Tra, head of the Saigon-Gia Dinh Military Management Committee, organizes an international press conference on May 8, 1975. Photo: Herve GLOAGUEN/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images.

    Thich Quang Do witnessed what the victors did to Buddhism. He recounts in an interview with Radio Free Asia in 2015:

    “On April 30, 1975, the Communists forcibly conquered South Vietnam. All the Vietnamese people were enslaved to an inhumane, cruel, hateful policy that was unmerciful towards religion. Our Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam was also stripped of its more than 2000 years of legal status, Buddhist leaders were fiercely repressed, and 12 monks and nuns of Duoc Su Pagoda self-immolated.” [16]

    “During the investigation in Can Tho Province into the 12 self-immolations against repressive communist policies [one individual was only 14 years of age], the Communist authorities accused Venerable Thich Hau Hien of being an informant for the Americans and South Vietnamese, committing lewdness against other nuns in their attempt to invalidate 12 immolations. That plot, however, failed because I didn’t sign the final forms legitimizing their scheme.

    […] Things hit a fever pitch on March 3, 1977, when the Communists came to appropriate the Quang Thi Trang convent […], tearing down the “UBCVN” sign and tossing it to the ground. At exactly 11 AM that day, as general secretary of the Hoa Dao Institute, I signed circular urging monks and nuns to prepare to sacrifice to protect the religion and the honor of the Church.”

    On April 6, 1977, Venerable Master Huyen Quang and I, along with a number of others, were imprisoned in Phan Dang Luu Prison in Ba Chieu, Gia Dinh. Later, I would find out that former Venerable Master Thich Thien Minh was also captured and had died of unknown causes at the Saigon police headquarters.” [17]

    According to Amnesty International, Venerable Thich Thien Minh had died in a temporary detention camp in October 1978. [18] To this day, the Vietnamese state has yet to make an announcement about his death in Detention Camp #4 on Phan Dang Luu Rd., Ho Chi Minh City.

    A portrait of the Venerable Thich Thien Minh. He was born in 1921 in Quang Tri and entered the monkhood as a child. After the Buddhist Unity Congress in 1964, he was selected as general director of the Unified Buddhist Church’s youth affairs. Minh stood shoulder-to-shoulder with Venerable Thich Tri Quang during the Buddhist political struggles in the south. Photo: Hoavouu.com.

    Seven members of the An Quang bloc and Thich Quang Do were eventually tried in December 1978. [19]

    The seven were accused of numerous crimes: taking advantage of religion to disrupt national security, disrupting national unity, and acting to oppose the revolution. Under international pressure, Venerable Thich Quang Do and Venerable Thich Thanh The were acquitted. [20] In that same year, Thich Quang Do and Venerable Thich Huyen Quang were nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. [21]

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    From 1980 – 1981, Do, Venerable Thich Huyen Quang, Thich Duc Nhuan, and a number of others disagreed with the remaining An Quang bloc members, who advocated cooperating with the state to establish the Buddhist Church of Vietnam, which would allow the Communist Party to tightly control church activities.

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    In just one day, the government united all monks, nuns, and Buddhists across the country during the Conference of Representatives to Unify Vietnamese Buddhism, which took place on November 7, 1981, at Quan Su Pagoda. Photo: Buddhist Church of Vietnam. 

    With the establishment of the Buddhist Church of Vietnam, the UBCVN, with its history since 1951, became illegal and remains so to this day. Venerable Thich Quang Do recalls:

    “From the day former Venerable Master Tri Thu was elected head of the state church [that is, today’s Buddhist Church of Vietnam], the UBCVN no longer had a director leading the Hoa Dao Institute. Without a director, the vice-director stepped up until another congress could be convened to elect officials […]. Because of that, Venerable Master Huyen Quang was the first vice-director to become institute director, and we continued to conduct business with the church [UBCVN] as usual”.

    “At four in the afternoon on February 24, 1982, I received a letter from the municipal police headquarters, with the word ‘express’ written on it. When I opened it, I saw that I had been ‘invited’ down to their office.

    At exactly 8 AM [the next day], I arrived at police headquarters and was led to a waiting room, where two uniformed officers stood guard with pistols. After approximately an hour, I guess when they figured that was enough psychological torture, I was taken in to see Quang Minh. He said: ‘You’re being involved in religion also means you’re involved in politics (!), we’re going to have to handle you accordingly.’ After about five minutes, Quang stood up and read out the decision, […] expelling me from the city.” [22]

    In the ten years after, Thich Quang Do lived alone under the watchful eyes of Thai Binh police: “The Communists […] exiled me to Vu Doai Commune, Vu Thu Suburban District, Thai Binh Province from February 25, 1982, for the crime of ‘being involved in religion and thus being involved in politics.” [23]

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    Thich Quang Do and Thich Huyen Quang in an undated photo, possibly during the time Thich Huyen Quang was exiled in Binh Dinh. Venerable Thich Huyen Quang was born in 1919 and left home to become a monk in Binh Dinh when he was 13 years old. According to the UBCVN, he was detained in the pagoda until his passing in 2008. Photo source: unknown. 
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    In the late 1980s, Vietnam entered the era of Doi Moi when the country’s economy changed into the market economy of capitalism. At that time, some monks saw that as the opportunity to fight for religious freedom.

    At the end of 1991, Venerable Thich Don Hau, nearing death, left in his will a call to restore the UBCVN and reactivate the 1964 church charter, amended in 1973. [24] He reminded the dignitaries, among them Venerable Thich Huyen Quang and Thich Quang Do, that they respectively held the positions of director and general secretary of the Hoa Dao Institute.

    Religious repression continued to intensify in 1992 and 1993, and the self-immolation of monks in the Mekong River Delta demanding religious freedom led to enormous protests in Hue, which the authorities cracked down upon and suppressed information about. [25]

    On May 21, 1992, a man self-immolated at Thien Mu Pagoda, leading to the temporary detention of Thich Tri Tuu, a Buddhist nun. Immediately after that, thousands of monks and nuns took to the streets in protests that shook the city, and a government car was set on fire. Photo: Nicolas Cornet.

    After living in exile in Thai Binh for 10 years, in 1992, Thich Quang Do decided to return to the south a month after notifying the authorities of his plans:

    “On February 10, 1982, the Communists also inexplicably exiled my mother to Vu Doai Commune with me, where she died a tragic death […] in January of 1985 from cold and deprivation.  Left all on my own, I decided that I could no longer allow myself to be hemmed in so senselessly, interminably, and unscrupulously. On March 22, 1992 (after 10 years and 27 days of exile), I returned to Saigon after letting Hanoi police know, arriving on March 25, 1992. [26]

    I returned to the south in 1992 and continued to work on the [Phat Quang] dictionary series; in 1994, I sent to Do Muoi [a former senior leader] a series of assessments regarding the Vietnamese Communist Party’s mistakes towards the nation and Vietnamese Buddhism. After that, I went out into the community to provide aid.” [27]

    In November 1994, the Mekong River Delta suffered an unexpected flood, killing approximately 400 people. Representing the UBCVN, Venerable Thich Quang Do, along with a number of monks and retired scholars, went out to render aid to their compatriots, only to be arrested afterwards.

    “On January 4, 1995, they arrested me and imprisoned me at the temporary detention center on Nguyen Van Cu St. in the middle of Saigon. Venerable Khong Tanh and I each received five years in prison and five years probation”. [28]

    Thich Quang Do, together with Thich Khong Tanh, Thich Nhat Ban, Thich Tri Luc, and two retired scholars Dong Ngoc and Nhat Thuong, at their August 1995 trial in Ho Chi Minh City. Photo: Vietnamese Buddhists.

    “My time in jail wasn’t too bad; it was fairly leisurely […]. You eat and you go about your work, just like anywhere else […]. Before I was imprisoned, I had requested […] that they give me the Phat Quang dictionary set that I was working on.

    I completed [the dictionary series] while in prison; when I received special amnesty and was released on September 2, 1998, they refused to return the nearly 100 volumes that I had already translated […]. They required I fill out a request form.

    Unreasonable! This having-to-request business. If it’s going to be that way, then I’m not going to request anything. They can just keep it and use it however they like; I’ll just redo everything again at home. So I did, and it took me two years. I redid everything, without having to make a request of anyone. Please be reasonable. Let’s think about this. For example, if you’re hungry, then you go and ask people for food. When people give it to you, you thank them. But in this situation, the government simply kept my work, I didn’t give it to them”. [29]

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    At the beginning of 1999, Thich Quang Do went out to Quang Ngai to visit Venerable Thich Huyen Quang, who had just been exiled three days before. Also in the same year, Do became the director of the UBCVN’s Hoa Dao Institute.

    After his trip to Quang Ngai, he was interrogated by police. In February 2001, he was formally put under house arrest for violating the terms of his probation. [30]

    After that trip, Thich Quang Do stated to the press that: “I will continue to speak loudly, strongly, and firmly for freedom, democracy, human rights, and freedom of religion, so that those in and outside the country hear the church’s calls and its support for human rights and democracy.” [31]

    In 2001, Thich Quang Do issued a call for democracy in Vietnam to his domestic and overseas compatriots, as well as to the Vietnamese government:

    “But today, as other countries around the world develop, growing more prosperous, free, and democratic by the day, our country is becoming increasingly paralyzed and impoverished, our people oppressed and trampled on. […]

    This catastrophe persists, nurtured by three factors: the government thinks too highly of itself and refuses to accept the opinions of others, resulting in a single-party dictatorship; the government has broken away from the people and refuses the most basic calls for human rights and citizens’ rights, resulting in an abominable authoritarian regime; the government is too dependent on foreign countries, from ideology to the structure of the state apparatus, causing social and civilizational upheaval [,..] moral decay and national stagnation.” [32]

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    In October 2003, after the state lifted its probation order, Quang Do risked his life to bring Thich Huyen Quang from Binh Dinh to HCMC for medical treatment. While on the road, the two were stopped by police and held on National Highway 1A, accused of keeping some state secrets with them [33], resulting in approximately 200 monks and nuns, and more than 1,000 Buddhists from nearby pagodas protesting to protect the two. [34]

    https://2xjs7y10oiyz26vqxu2hok6y-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/q30d-1-compressed-1024x659.jpg
    Venerable Thich Quang Do visits Venerable Thich Huyen Quang (laying down) in 2006. Venerable Thich Huyen Quang passed away on July 5, 2008, at Nguyen Thieu Monastery in Binh Dinh Province. Photo: Vietnamese Buddhists.
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    In 2006, Thich Quang Do received two awards for his human rights work, Norway’s Thorolf Rafto Memorial Prize and the World Movement for Democracy’s Democracy Courage Tribute. However, the Vietnamese government prevented Do from travelling overseas to accept the awards.

    In 2007, the UBCVN began mutually supporting disenfranchised citizens through the Disenfranchised Relief Fund, helping those who had long petitioned the government on land issues.

    And in order to eradicate what it does not approve of, the government began a well-worn campaign of using the press to cast aspersions on Do and the UBCVN.

    Newspapers from Nhan Dan [The People] to Tuoi Tre [Youth] called Do “a religious exploiter” accusing him of “political opportunism,” “inciting the people,” being “on a mission of vengeance,”  and behaving like “an old dog who can’t learn new tricks.”

    In the same year, during which he was banned from talking to the press, Thich Quang Do responded to Al-Jazeera through video: [35]

    https://i.ytimg.com/vi/fPlL3ngQraQ/hqdefault.jpg

    “We are prisoners in our own homeland, where the government decides who has the right to speak and who has to keep their mouths shut. Even at this very moment, I’m being held at the Thanh Minh Monastery in Saigon. Secret police tail me day and night, preventing me from moving freely.

    I’ve been continuously repressed by the Communist regime since 1975. But I myself am not afraid of anything because I am fighting for what is right.

    Today, we lack an opposition party and freedom of the press, independent religions are being cracked down upon, and anyone demanding political reform, democracy, or human rights could be subject to immediate arrest.

    We must have political pluralism, the right to free elections, and the right to decide our political system […]. In sum, we must have the right to determine our future and our fate.”

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    https://2xjs7y10oiyz26vqxu2hok6y-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/P6090026.jpg
    From 2001, Venerable Thich Quang Do was held under house arrest at Thanh Minh Monastery, where he was closely monitored by police and isolated from church activities and the outside world. Politicians from the world over regularly tried to find ways to visit him. Photo: Clochers & Lieux de culte.

    In 2012, while he was meeting with the Australian ambassador in Vietnam, Thich Quang Do had expressed his views regarding the East Sea [South China Sea] problem:

    “Vietnam has already lost a portion, an island in Hoang Sa [the Paracels], eight islands in Truong Sa [the Spratleys]. China just established the Tam Sa [Sansha] district center, setting up administrative and military bodies to control that region. […] For now, I only wish for Vietnam to democratize and then ally itself with the world’s democratic nations. […] As it stands right now, I don’t have any hope for Vietnam.” [36]

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    In 2011, Thich Quang Do became the fifth patriarch of the UBCVN but met with many difficulties in developing the UBCVN due to his house arrest at Thanh Minh Monastery:

    “They [the government] have yet to cease discrimination and repression of the UBCVN. Thus, the church has struggled to conduct activities over the past 30 years. We can’t preach, we can’t open schools to teach. […] If they had an opportunity to completely do away with the church, they absolutely would.

    For several decades, [I have been restricted to] a single room upstairs that I inhabit. […] Every two months, I go to the hospital, and that’s it. No one is allowed to come and go, and I can’t move freely either. When I go to the hospital, they [the police] follow.”

    https://2xjs7y10oiyz26vqxu2hok6y-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/efc4965a-ac88-4015-a079-dfa535665125.jpeg
    A photo of Venerable Thich Quang Do in his room at Thanh Minh Monastery on September 3, 2018. Photo: International Buddhist Information Office. 

    “As of now, I eat only one meal a day, which is brought up to me in the morning. There’s a chair outside my door that I leave my plates on after I finish eating. The kitchen will come up to take them away, and then they lock the metal gate. The stairs up to my room have a metal gate, just like a prison cell. It’s been like this for more than 20 years since I returned from the north.

    I owe my residence here to Venerable Thich Thanh Minh’s pagoda […]. Since I left to join the monkhood some sixty years ago, I have lived thanks to the generosity of others. […] As of now, I only recite Buddhist scriptures to myself. I’m not allowed to pray for or preach to others; I can only recite to myself. They have stipulated this very clearly.” [37]

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    In mid-September 2018, exactly three months after American Ambassador Daniel Kritenbrink came to visit him, Thich Quang Do was evicted from Thien Minh Monastery, staying at a number of pagodas before heading home to Thai Binh at 90 years of age:

    “I returned to my hometown as an ostensible retreat, but if there were any small pagodas, I would recite Buddhist scriptures there. No matter what happens to the church, even if I die, I could never give it up.”

    American ambassador Daniel Kritenbrink (left) and a colleague visit Venerable Thich Quang Do on June 14, 2018. Photo: International Buddhist Information Office.

    Not long after, Venerable Thich Quang Do, the fifth patriarch of the UBCVN, returned to HCMC at age 90 to continue his obstacle-plagued work of the church.

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    Two years later, at 9:30 PM on February 22, 2020, Venerable Thich Quang Do, the fifth patriarch of the UBCVN, took his last breath at Tu Hieu Pagoda; his painful endeavor for the Vietnamese homeland finally came to an end.

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    On February 25, 2020, three days after his funeral, monks, nuns, and Buddhists escort Venerable Thich Quang Do to his cremation site; his ashes were scattered at sea 49 days later. Photo: Giac Ngo [Enlightenment].

    This article was written in Vietnamese by Tran Phuong and was previously published in Luat Khoa Magazine on March 1, 2020. The English translation was done by Will Nguyen.

    *** In our previous version of this article, we have cited the 1979 report of Amnesty International on the death of Venerable Thich Thien Minh. However, upon our recent re-checking of the cited link, it is unfortunate that the link is no longer accessible. Therefore, we have changed the link to the copy of Amnesty International’s January 1979 newsletter. We apologize for this inconvenience.***

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    References:

    [1] Thich Quang Do, Defiant Rights Champion in Vietnam.
    [2] Assessments regarding the Vietnamese Communist Party’s mistakes towards the Nation and Vietnamese Buddhism, Thich Quang Do, written in 1992.
    [3] Letter written to Do Muoi, Thich Quang Do, written in 1994.
    [4] Thich Quang Do is appointed the new leader of the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam.
    [5] Brief biography of Elder Venerable Thich Quang Do (1928 – 2020), Sangha of the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam.
    [6] Vietnamese Buddhism Monthly Review #1, published by the Vietnamese Buddhist Federation.

    [7] Brief biography of Elder Venerable Thich Quang Do (1928 – 2020), cited material.
    [8] Vietnamese Buddhism Monthly Review #27 and #28, published by the Vietnamese Buddhist Federation.
    [9] Vietnamese Buddhism’s Historic Struggle, Nam Thanh, published by the UBCVN Hoa Dao Institute in 1964. [10] Vietnamese Buddhism’s Historic Struggle cited material.
    [11] Thich Quang Do is appointed the new leader of the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam, cited material.
    [12] Brief biography of Elder Venerable Thich Quang Do (1928 – 2020), cited material.
    [13] White paper on the divide between An Quang and the National Pagoda of Vietnam, written by Thich Tam Chau in 1993.
    [14] White paper on the divide between An Quang and the National Pagoda of Vietnam cited material.
    [15] Brief biography of Elder Venerable Thich Quang Do (1928 – 2020), cited material.
    [16] Interview of Elder Venerable Thich Quang Do regarding the UBCVN over the past 40 years.
    [17] Assessments regarding the Vietnamese Communist Party’s mistakes towards the Nation and Vietnamese Buddhism, Thich Quang Do, written in 1992.
    [18] Amnesty International Newsletter January 1979. (1979, January 1). Amnesty International. https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/nws210011979en.pdf.
    [19] Thich Quang Do is appointed the new leader of the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam, cited material.
    [20] Amnesty International Report 1979, p.117, cited material.
    [21] Thich Quang Do is appointed the new leader of the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam, cited material.
    [22] Assessments regarding the Vietnamese Communist Party’s mistakes towards the Nation and Vietnamese Buddhism, Thich Quang Do, written in 1992.
    [23] Letter written to Do Muoi, Thich Quang Do, written in 1994.
    [24] Venerable Thich Don Hau’s will.
    [25] In Vietnam, Monks Lead Protest to Repression.
    [26] Letter written to Do Muoi, Thich Quang Do, written in 1994.

    [27] Letter of truth Venerable Thich Quang Do sent to HCMC police.
    [28] RFA interviews Venerable Thich Quang Do.
    [29] Letter of truth Venerable Thich Quang Do sent to HCMC police.
    [30] In the News Summer 2001, Tricycle.
    [31] Venerable Thich Quang Do publicizes his call for democracy.
    [32] Venerable Thich Quang Do’s call for democracy in Vietnam.
    [33] Vietnam denounces Venerable Thich Huyen Quang.
    [34] Vietnam backs down over monks.
    [35] In My Review: Vietnam’s Buddhist Monk.
    [36, 37] Australian ambassador visits Venerable Thich Quang Do.

  • Q&A: What You Should Know About The Human Trafficking Situation In Vietnam

    Q&A: What You Should Know About The Human Trafficking Situation In Vietnam

    On July 1, 2021, the U.S. Department of State released its annual global report on human trafficking. The 2021 Trafficking in Persons report ranked Vietnam as a “Tier 2 Watch List” [1] for the third consecutive year.

    According to the placement guiding [2], governments that fully meet the Trafficking Victims Protection Act’s (TVPA) minimum standards to eliminate human trafficking are placed on “Tier 1.” In contrast, countries that fail to meet minimum standards but make a significant effort to comply are ranked as “Tier 2.”

    However, these Tier 2 countries also risk being placed on a “Tier 3 Watch List” if they do not take “concrete actions” to combat the increasing number of human trafficking victims or if they fail “to provide evidence of increasing efforts to combat severe forms of trafficking in persons from the previous year.”

    Without a further genuine effort to improve the current situation, Vietnam could be downgraded to “Tier 3,” which might lead [3] to restrictions on financial assistance from the United States, the freezing of officials’ assets, and restrictions on immigration.

    Human trafficking map, East Asia & Pacific region. Source: U.S. Department of State.

    What is Vietnam’s current situation?

    In Vietnam’s case, the State Department declares that the Vietnamese government “does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so.”

    The report acknowledges considerable efforts taken by Vietnam to eliminate human trafficking, including ramping up prosecutions against human traffickers, passing legal revisions to terminate hefty brokerage fees. Brokerage fees will make workers fall victim to debt bondage, and later they would be susceptible to forced labor.

    It also notices that Vietnam has enhanced worker protections, strengthened law enforcement, increased financial budgets to assist victims of trafficking, provided protection services for identified victims, and implemented extensive awareness programs in vulnerable ethnic communities.

    Nevertheless, the country has not demonstrated sufficient effort regarding its anti-trafficking protocols, given the impact of Covid-19 on the overall capacity to combat illegal human trading activities, compared to the previous period. Furthermore, the report states that Vietnam has also fallen short on systematically identifying victims of trafficking, which results in “some victims [being] penalized for unlawful acts [that] traffickers [compel] them to commit.”

    Who are the primary victims and offenders of trafficking activities?

    The Blue Dragon Children’s Foundation, a non-profit charity that rescues and helps the victims of human trafficking in Vietnam, stated in a study [4] that over 60 percent of victims and traffickers come from ethnic minority groups, such as Hmong or Thai. Some of Vietnam’s northern border provinces, in which diverse groups of ethnic people dominate, witness the highest rates of illegal trafficking and border crossings.

    According to the charity’s latest analysis [5], between 2012 and 2020, Hmong people accounted for over 32 percent of the total victims and 33 percent of the total traffickers, while only making up 1.4 percent of the country’s population.

    Also, the traffickers, as well as their victims, share poor economic and educational backgrounds. Most of the prosecuted traffickers, around 80 percent, are illiterate or did not finish high school.

    The lack of general knowledge about laws and human rights, coupled with grinding poverty, proves to be the main reason these people take up [6] trafficking or recruitment to generate extra income and “escaping” poverty.

    At the same time, people between 19 to 25 years old are the most vulnerable to these illicit activities, while children under 16 account for 42 percent of the total number of trafficked victims. Based on gender, all of the 199 trafficked victims recorded by Blue Dragon were females. Meanwhile, male traffickers comprise nearly 60 percent of total prosecuted offenders.

    In a majority of cases, the traffickers have close relationships with the victims. They could be their friends, family members, relatives, neighbors, or acquaintances.

    Source: Blue Dragon Children’s Foundation. Graphic by South China Morning Post.

    What are the common forms of trafficking?

    Following the data compiled by the Blue Dragon Foundation, forced marriage and domestic servitude accounted for the majority of all prosecuted cases. The victims, mostly women, are often lured and misled by false promises of well-paid job opportunities in foreign countries, but they are eventually forced into marriage with Chinese men.

    Other forms of human trafficking, which include [7] forced labor and commercial sex, are also ubiquitous.

    Vietnamese workers, especially under labor export programs, are subject to forced labor when they cannot pay off their debts to their recruitment company. Meanwhile, some Vietnamese female workers travel to other Asian countries for brokered jobs [8] as hostesses in massage parlors, karaoke bars, or restaurants.

    What are Vietnam’s prosecution laws against trafficking?

    Overall, the Vietnamese government has displayed visible efforts in reinforcing its existing legal framework against human trafficking. The current anti-trafficking legislation [9] of Vietnam includes:

    • Article 150 of the Penal Code, which criminalizes labor trafficking and sex trafficking of adults. Offenders face up to 10 years of imprisonment and up to 100 million dong (US$4,330) in fines.
    • Article 151 of the Penal Code, which criminalizes labor trafficking and sex trafficking of children under 16. Offenders face up to 12 years of imprisonment and up to 200 million dong fines.

    Despite being regarded as “sufficiently stringent” in the State Department’s report, current prosecution laws against trafficking in Vietnam still contain certain loopholes.

    For example, the application of Article 150 to cases involving children between the ages of 16 and 17 remains ambiguous, leading them to be treated as adults. Therefore, the article does not fully constitute all forms of child trafficking.

    Other notable shortcomings include the lack of law enforcement regarding domestic trafficking and forced labor, especially with male victims, and the insufficient training of law enforcement officers in handling such cases. These are some limitations that could hinder the country’s progress towards eliminating labor exploitation and the illegal activities of human trafficking.

    What improvements could be made by Vietnam?

    The State Department’s report proposed prioritized recommendations that the Vietnamese government could implement to improve the situation.

    These recommendations focus on:

    1. Bolstering collaboration with NGOs and civil society;
    2. Amending existing loopholes;
    3. Training law enforcement officials in domestic trafficking cases;
    4. Implementing policies;
    5. Increasing national funding for provincial-level authorities to assist victims of trafficking; and
    6. Inviting independent bodies to verify the government has terminated forced labor in rehabilitation centers.

    Bibliography:

    1. Office To Monitor And Combat Trafficking In Persons. (2021, July 1). 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report: Vietnam. United States Department of State. https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-trafficking-in-persons-report/vietnam/
    2. Office To Monitor And Combat Trafficking In Persons. (2021a, July 1). 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report. United States Department of State. https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-trafficking-in-persons-report/
    3. Nguyen Dinh Thang. (2021, July 4). Buôn người: Việt Nam ở sát bờ vực chế tài theo luật Hoa Kỳ. Mach Song Media. https://machsongmedia.org/vietnam/chong-buon-nguoi/1727-buon-nguoi-viet-nam-o-sat-bo-vuc-che-tai-theo-luat-hoa-ky.html
    4. Sen, N. (2021, July 8). Young members of ethnic minority groups most at risk in Vietnam-China human trafficking trade: report. SCMP. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3140227/young-members-ethnic-minority-groups-most-risk-vietnam-china
    5. Blue Dragon Children’s Foundation. (2021, July). Human Trafficking & Traffickers in Vietnam. Blue Dragon Children’s Foundation. https://www.bluedragon.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Profile-of-trafficking-in-Vietnam.pdf
    6. Ibid., [4]
    7. Ibid., [1]
    8. RFA. (2021b, July 1). Việt Nam tiếp tục nằm trong danh sách cần phải theo dõi về tình trạng buôn người trong báo cáo của Bộ Ngoại giao Mỹ. Đài Á Châu Tự Do. https://www.rfa.org/vietnamese/news/vietnamnews/human-trafficking-report-vn-stay-in-watch-list-tier-2-07012021203901.html
    9. Ibid., [1]