Tag: Human Rights

  • Pham Doan Trang’s Trial Postponed While UN Working Group On Arbitrary Detention Called For Her Immediate Release

    Pham Doan Trang’s Trial Postponed While UN Working Group On Arbitrary Detention Called For Her Immediate Release

    Vietnam arrested Pham Doan Trang on October 7, 2020, and charged her under Article 88 of its 1999 Penal Code for allegedly “making, storing, distributing or disseminating information, documents, and items against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.” Her trial was originally scheduled to take place on November 4, 2021, but the court postponed her trial due to the prosecutors having come into contact with COVID-19.

    However, on October 25, 2021, the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD), a team of five independent experts tasked with investigating “cases of deprivation of liberty imposed arbitrarily or inconsistently with the international standards set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” released their opinions regarding the arrest, detention, and treatment by the Vietnamese state of internationally recognized independent journalist and human rights defender Pham Doan Trang.

    In this document, WGAD scrutinizes the formal statements given by the side of Doan Trang and that of the Vietnamese government in order to verify the authenticity of the claims regarding her situation in custody and to provide recommendations for the Vietnamese government.

    WGAD also stated that even though the Vietnamese government vehemently rejects the accusations alleged by the side of Doan Trang and that “[the Vietnamese government] cannot provide detailed information regarding this case to the press and other irrelevant parties,” WGAD will still continue with its investigation as part of its mandate “to serve the needs of victims of arbitrary arrest and detention worldwide.”

    WGAD concluded that “the deprivation of liberty of Pham Doan Trang, being in contravention of articles 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 19, 20 and 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 2, 9, 14, 15, 16, 19, 21, 22, 25 and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is arbitrary and falls within categories I, II, III, and V.”

    Regarding Doan Trang’s arrest by state forces, WGAD believes that the Vietnamese authorities failed to present a warrant for her arrest and that Doan Trang was not informed of the charges lodged against her. She was also never brought before an independent judicial authority in order to challenge her detention.

    Likewise, WGAD upholds that Doan Trang was put under Incommunicado Detention which “is an environment conducive to torture and cruel inhumane treatment, as it may be used to coerce the individual to confess to the commission of the alleged crimes and admit guilt.” Furthermore, WGAD states that the initial charge under Article 117 of the Vietnamese Criminal Code is “so vague that it is impossible to invoke a legal basis for her detention.” Hence, WGAD concludes that the Vietnamese government failed to establish a legal basis for Doan Trang’s arrest and detention.

    WGAD also believed that she was detained for “peacefully exercising her rights to freedom of opinion, expression, and association.”. As such, it has referred this case to the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression and to the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association.

    WGAD also stated that because Doan Trang was not allowed to speak to her defense lawyers until recently, and was denied legal counsel, her right to a fair and just trial has been violated.

    Likewise, WGAD found that Doan Trang was “deprived of her liberty on discriminatory grounds” due to her being a vocal human rights defender and because of her political stance and opinions.

    In light of all the information presented, WGAD requests that the Vietnamese government take all the necessary steps needed in order to remedy Doan Trang’s situation in order to “bring it into conformity with the relevant international norms.”

    WGAD believes that the best remedy would be to urgently and immediately release Doan Trang and compensate her in accordance with international law. WGAD also urges the Vietnamese government to ensure a “full and independent investigation” of Doan Trang’s arbitrary detention and to “take appropriate measures against those responsible for the violation of her rights.”


    The UN WGAD’s full statement can be found here

  • Vietnam Briefing: Indictment Against Journalist Pham Doan Trang Made Available; Vietnam Arrests Another Facebook User For Criticizing Its COVID-19 Policy

    Vietnam Briefing: Indictment Against Journalist Pham Doan Trang Made Available; Vietnam Arrests Another Facebook User For Criticizing Its COVID-19 Policy

    The formal indictment against journalist Pham Doan Trang made available for public, reports The Vietnamese Magazine

    Main points:

    • According to the indictment, the investigation was done between September 22, 2016 and October 7, 2020, which was also the day that the authorities arrested Doan Trang.
    • Doan Trang refused to provide the police with her laptop password and so the police could not access its data. She also refused to acknowledge her possession of the Facebook account named “Pham Doan Trang,” and therefore the investigative unit could not charge her in connection with the information posted via that account on social media.
    • Doan Trang acknowledged that she was one of the authors of the “Report Assessment of the 2016 Law on Belief and Religion in Relation to the Exercise of Freedom of Religion and Belief in Vietnam” in both English and Vietnamese. This report was published on the website of Luat Khoa Magazine.
    • As of the conclusion of the investigation into Doan Trang’s case on August 26, 2021, the authorities had not yet found any evidence to reduce her punishment.
    • The indictment stated that both the 1999 Penal Code and the 2015 Penal Code (which took effect on January 1, 2018) could be used to prosecute Doan Trang since she continued her unlawful conduct from 2017 to 2019. However, the government dropped charges under Article 117 and only prosecuted Doan Trang under Article 88 because it stated that Doan Trang did not provide any statement during her interrogations.
    • The 1999 Penal Code would be more beneficial to the defendant since Article 88 of that penal code starts the sentence at 3 years imprisonment versus 5 years imprisonment under Article 117 of the 2015 Penal Code.

    Evidence and final indictment:

    • English documents titled “A brief report on marine life disasters in Vietnam” and “General Assessment of the human rights situation in Vietnam;”
    • English and Vietnamese versions of the “Report Assessment of the 2016 Law on Belief and Religion in Relation to the Exercise of the Right to Freedom of Religion and Belief in Vietnam;”
    • Two interviews with Pham Doan Trang by BBC News Vietnamese and Radio Free Asia – Vietnamese (RFA) in 2018.
    • The Hanoi People’s Procuracy Office prosecuted Doan Trang under Article 88, Section 1, subsections a, b, and c for “propagandizing against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam” of the 1999 Penal Code. The sentencing for this crime will be three to 12 years imprisonment.

    Pham Doan Trang’s lawyers and family raise concerns over the deterioration of her health while in custody

    • On October 19, 2021, Le Van Luan, one of Pham Doan Trang’s defending attorneys, announced on social media that he had a formal meeting with his client and subsequently raised concerns about her deteriorating health conditions after a year of detention while pending trial. However, he said that she still maintains an optimistic and percipient mentality.
    • In his Facebook post, Luan shared that Doan Trang had lost 10 kilograms (around 22 pounds) over the past year due to suffering ovarian cysts and menorrhagia, a condition which has caused her periods to last as long as 15 days. The long periods and her low blood pressure have resulted in constant fatigue. According to Trang, the changing cold weather also made her legs feel painful; her legs were broken when she was attacked by security forces a few years ago. Trang said she had not received proper medical checkups or treatment while in custody.
    • On October 20, 2021, Doan Trang’s lawyers co-wrote a petition that they sent to the Hanoi authorities, requesting that they confirm the state of her declining health conditions and assist her with proper medical checkups and treatment. On October 22, Pham Chinh Truc, Doan Trang’s brother, sent an urgent petition regarding her health issues to the detention facility, demanding the officials in charge provide her with urgent medical care as well as improve her conditions in detention. Truc also requested the Hanoi authorities allow her a family visitation this October, followed by regular visitations every two weeks afterwards.

    Trinh Ba Phuong’s wife could not have visitation with him

    As we have previously published, the trial of two Duong Noi farmers, Trinh Ba Phuong and Nguyen Thi Tam, will be on November 3, 2021. They are both charged under Article 117 of the 2015 Penal Code for “propagandizing against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.” The 88 Project reported on October 25, 2021, that Trinh Ba Phuong’s wife, Thu Do, could not have visitation with him even the Hanoi’s People Court had allowed her.

    Accordingly, Thu Do received a letter from the Hanoi’s People Court informing her that she could visit her husband on October 21. “But when she got to the prison, she was turned away by prison officials who told her she could not see him due to COVID-19. When she asked to see the official paperwork with that decision, they produced an old order from April. They also refused to give her an explanation on paper. She has sent a complaint to the Court and the Ministry of Public Security about this and vowed to return next week,” The 88 Project stated.


    Detained blogger Bui Van Thuan’s family expresses concerns over his possible torture in detention

    RFA reports:

    • On October 15, Trinh Thi Nhung, Bui Van Thuan’s wife, received a notice from Thanh Hoa Province detention center, where Thuan is being held, regarding her husband’s health. The authorities informed Nhung that her husband had been admitted to a hospital for treatment of possible development of gout, liver infection and plantar fasciitis.
    • However, Nhung expressed concerns that Thuan might have been tortured while in custody since her husband has always had good health. The detention center officials declined to provide further information.
    • Bui Van Thuan was arrested on August 30, 2021 by Thanh Hoa Province police, just after U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris’ visit to Vietnam, where she raised concerns about human rights issues in the country. He was charged with “storing publications and materials against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam” under Article 117 of Vietnam’s Penal Code.

    Vietnamese Facebook user arrested for posting “distorted information on COVID-19 policy”

    VOA Vietnamese reports:

    • Vietnamese police in the city of Vung Tau arrested a Facebook user on October 21 for posting and sharing “false information on COVID-19 prevention policy” on his social media account.
    • Nguyen Thien Nghia, 50, was allegedly accused by the local public security department of posting “fabricated, false and distorted information on the government’s COVID-19 prevention policy.” His posts were seen criticizing the Ho Chi Minh City authorities’ coronavirus policies and the activities of Vietnamese Fatherland Front, a state-controlled political mass organization, for its fiscal misconduct and lack of support for the citizens financially affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.
    • He was detained and prosecuted under Article 179 of the Penal Code for “illegally transferring or utilizing information of computer and telecommunications networks.” Nghia is among dozens of people who were fined or prosecuted for criticizing the Vietnamese government regarding its controversial coronavirus policies.

    Bao Sach (Clean Newspaper) group’s trial is expected to begin on October 26

    • Last week, several state-run news outlets, including the military-owned People’s Army Newspaper, reported that the trial against the Bao Sach group, an independent journalism project, was expected to begin on October 26. Previously, the trial was due on October 12, but was subsequently postponed due to Vietnam’s COVID-19 pandemic situation.
    • Bao Sach members, including the former state journalist Truong Chau Huu Danh, were indicted last September by the People’s Procuracy of Can Tho City on charges of “abusing the rights to freedom and democracy to infringe on state interests” under Article 331 of Vietnam’s 2015 Penal Code.

    COVID-19 situation in Vietnam

    • Vietnamese prime minister promises economic revival after the COVID-19 pandemic, reports Reuters. On October 20, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh told the National Assembly that Vietnam’s economy would rebound after the pandemic ended, with exports expected to rise 10.7 percent in 2021 and with annual inflation expected to fall below 4 percent. His statement came as a fast-spreading outbreak of the Delta variant led to mass lockdowns in the country’s key industrial provinces, causing disruptions in supply chains and labor shortages.
    • Vietnam resorts to China’s vaccine diplomacy supplies to ease COVID-19 infections in Ho Chi Minh City, despite reluctance from residents, writes Nikkei Asia: “China has announced donations of 5.7 million doses of its Sinopharm vaccine. The shot is not the preferred one for many Vietnamese, but it is helping to fill local supply gaps and is playing an increasing role in Vietnam’s inoculation campaign, which started later than those in some other countries.”
    • Vietnam’s labor paradox: Manufacturing industry caught in labor shortage problem after COVID-19 restrictions force workers to rush back to their hometowns, writes Nikkei Asia: “The summer brought pandemic-driven lockdowns to much of the country, which had forced workers to sleep at factories and prevented travel between provinces. As soon as officials pulled the barricades and barbed wire off the roads, tens of thousands of migrants rushed back to their hometowns.”
    • The 2021 Southeast Asian Games (SEA Games), which were planned to be held in Vietnam in November, have been postponed until 2022 due to the spread of COVID-19, reports the South China Morning Post. The biennial multi-sport event will be held in Hanoi during an unspecified two-week period in May, 2020.

    Satellite imagery shows Vietnam’s construction and land-filling in disputed Spratly islands

    RFA reports:

    • Commercial satellite imagery shows that Vietnam appears to be doing new construction and land-filling on the remote Pearson Reef, which it has occupied since 1978, and which it had previously reclaimed about six acres of land there.
    • The imagery, which was taken by Planet Labs on Friday, shows new work has been underway at the southern tip of the northern part of the reef when compared with a picture from March. The difference is even clearer when compared with an image from June 2020.
    • Pearson Reef is classified by the Washington D.C.-based Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) as a rock, 300 nautical miles east of Cam Ranh in central Vietnam. In Vietnamese, it bears the name of Phan Vinh, after Nguyen Phan Vinh, a hero soldier who died in 1968 during the Vietnam War.
    • On October 21, state media quoted a Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman as saying that Vietnam adheres to international law and principles of peace, stability and cooperation regarding the South China Sea disputes. The statement came after Chinese state media CGTN publicly released footage on October 19 showing its military exercises in the disputed waters between two countries.

    Vietnam Insight: Learn more about Vietnam

    What’s Next for Indonesia-Vietnam Defense Relations?

    The Diplomat/ Prashanth Parameswaran/ October 20

    “Both countries [Indonesia and Vietnam] also addressed the future issues that they should prioritize in advancing their defense ties. According to the official account of the deliberations, these included areas such as technical cooperation between their coast guards, the development of military medicine amid the continued challenge of COVID-19, and other training exercises and high-level delegation exchanges. Indonesia’s defense ministry also highlighted the participation of defense industry companies in the virtual meeting, spotlighting an aspect that Jakarta has emphasized previously in defense ties.”

    Vietnam’s Economic Reopening: Finding the Right Balance

    Fulcrum/ Tuan Ho/ October 18

    “This presents Vietnam with the challenging task of ‘finding the right balance’ in its economic reopening process. On the one hand, Vietnam needs to ease social distancing measures as much as possible to revitalise the economy, which has been hard hit by the fourth wave of Covid-19 since late April.  Vietnam’s GDP contracted 6.2 percent in the third quarter, the largest quarterly decline recorded since 2000. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has lowered Vietnam’s GDP growth forecast to 3.8 percent in 2021, a drop of 2 percentage points from a previous estimate made in July. Nguyen Kim Anh, the deputy governor of the State Bank of Vietnam, has warned that banks’ non-performing loans could reach between 7.1 and 7.7 percent of total outstanding loans, almost twice the estimate of 3.8 percent at the end of 2020. Further delays to full reopening will impede economic recovery and put further stress on the banking system.”

    Pacific Nations Have an Interest in Challenging China’s Expansive Maritime Claims

    The Diplomat/ Phuong Vu/ October 18

    “This is where small and non-claimant states, which benefit the most from a law-based international order in general and UNCLOS in particular, matter.  If they fail to form a consensus that views the South China Sea disputes and China’s interpretation of the law as a national threat, the repercussions will not stop at the water’s edge of current claimants such as Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia or Brunei. Small coastal and archipelagic states will incur expensive long-term costs for inaction. Through inaction, small states can effectively pave the way for a future where China will interpret the law for them.”

  • Pham Doan Trang’s Indictment Is Public Today; What Do We Know About Her Case?

    Pham Doan Trang’s Indictment Is Public Today; What Do We Know About Her Case?

    The indictment against journalist and democracy activist Pham Doan Trang was made public on October 18, Vietnam time. We are summarizing the main issues from the 15-page indictment, which you can read here in Vietnamese.

    The main points of the indictment are:

    • The indictment stated that the investigation was done between September 22, 2016 and October 7, 2020. October 7, 2020 was also the day that the authorities arrested Doan Trang.
    • The Department of Cyber Security and High Tech Crimes under the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the national police in Vietnam, petitioned the investigation department to pursue legal proceedings against Doan Trang on May 4, 2020 and October 7, 2020 and included its documents and materials against her.
    • The Department of Information and Communications of Hanoi City also submitted two petitions with documents and materials to the MPS on December 26, 2017 and January 7, 2019, requesting legal proceedings against Doan Trang.
    • The Investigation Unit of Hanoi City’s Police formally opened the investigation on September 10, 2020.
    • The decision to initiate criminal proceedings against Doan Trang was issued on September 28, 2020.
    • Doan Trang was arrested under a warrant on October 7, 2020 in Ho Chi Minh City.
    • She refused to provide her laptop’s password to the police and accordingly, the police could not access its data.
    • She also refused to acknowledge the Facebook account of the name “Pham Doan Trang” belonged to her, and the investigative unit could not charge her for the information posted via that account on social media.
    • Doan Trang acknowledged that she was one of the authors of the “Report Assessment of the 2016 Law on Belief and Religion in relation to the exercise to Freedom of Religion and Belief in Vietnam” in both English and Vietnamese. This report was published on the website of Luat Khoa Magazine.
    • On February 19, 2021, the Authority of Information Security (under the Ministry of Information and Communications) submitted a document to the investigative unit which stated that it could not determine who owned and managed the domain name luatkhoa.org to pursue further legal proceedings against it.
    • The indictment stated that Doan Trang repeatedly committed unlawful conduct which can be used to increase her punishment.
    • The indictment also did not find any facts to reduce the punishment against her.
    • The investigation of her case was concluded on August 26, 2021.
    • The indictment stated that Doan Trang continued her unlawful conduct from 2017 to 2019 so both the 1999 Penal Code and the 2015 Penal Code (which took effect on January 1, 2018) could be used to prosecute her.
    • However, the indictment also stated that Doan Trang did not confess to any of these crimes and that the 1999 Penal Code would be more beneficial to the defendant since Article 88 of that penal code starts the sentence at 3 years imprisonment versus 5 years imprisonment under Article 117 of the 2015 Penal Code. Therefore, the government dropped charges under Article 117 and only prosecuted Doan Trang under Article 88.

    The Evidence against Pham Doan Trang under the indictment:

    • English document named “Brief report on the marine life disaster in Vietnam”;
    • English document named “General Assessments of the human rights situation in Vietnam”;
    • English and Vietnamese versions of the “Report Assessment of the 2016 Law on Belief and Religion in relation to the exercise of the right to Freedom of Religion and Belief in Vietnam”;
    • Two interviews with Pham Doan Trang by BBC News  Vietnamese and Radio Free Asia – Vietnamese (RFA) in 2018.

    Formal indictment:

    The Hanoi People’s Procuracy Office prosecuted Doan Trang under Article 88, Section 1, subsections a, b, and c for “propagandizing against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam ” of the 1999 Penal Code. The sentencing for this crime will be 3 to 12 years imprisonment.

    The indictment is dated August 30, 2021. However, it was only made public on October 18, 2021, in Vietnam, just more than two weeks before Pham Doan Trang’s trial. For almost two months, Doan Trang’s family and her attorneys, as well as the public, have been kept in the dark about the case Vietnam has against her.

  • Vietnam Briefing: Pham Doan Trang’s Trial Expected To Begin In November; Vietnam Slowly Reopening Its Economy After Long-Running COVID-19 Lockdowns

    Vietnam Briefing: Pham Doan Trang’s Trial Expected To Begin In November; Vietnam Slowly Reopening Its Economy After Long-Running COVID-19 Lockdowns

    Vietnamese court to try Pham Doan Trang and two farmer activists this November

    The Vietnamese Magazine reports:

    • On October 14, 2021, attorney Dang Dinh Manh, one of Pham Doan Trang’s lawyers, posted on his Facebook that the People’s Court of Hanoi will try the prominent journalist and writer on November 4, 2021. Also, according to Manh, the same court will try two of the Duong Noi land activists, Trinh Ba Phuong and Nguyen Thi Tam, one day earlier, on November 3, 2021.
    • Earlier, on October 6, the Hanoi People’s Procuracy Office notified Doan Trang’s family that they had decided to transfer the case to the People’s Court of Hanoi after recommending her indictment on August 30, 2021.
    • As of October 15, the government has not officially recognized or appointed any of the lawyers to be her legal representatives. As a result, both Doan Trang’s family and her attorneys have not received her indictment and still do not know what evidence the government has or the details of the charges against her. Doan Trang’s attorneys will file a motion to delay her trial so that they can better prepare for her defense
    • Pham Doan Trang marked her first year being held incommunicado last week. She is being charged with “conducting propaganda against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,” which falls under Article 88 of the 1999 Penal Code. She faces the possibility of a 20-year sentence if convicted.

    Jailed Vietnamese land activist tortured to extract a confession

    RFA reports:

    • Jailed Vietnamese land activist Trinh Ba Tu was brutally tortured in detention as part of a bid by authorities to force him to plead guilty to charges of “anti-state activities,” according to his elder sister, Trinh Thi Thao. The alleged action by the Vietnamese authorities has prompted calls by human rights groups for an immediate investigation into his case.
    • On October 14, Thao told RFA Vietnamese that she met with her brother’s lawyers on Monday and learned that he had been badly beaten during an interrogation following his June 24, 2020 arrest. Tu laso reportedly required hospitalization for a kidney inflammation. “My brother Tu said that the prosecutor insulted him during the interrogation—the prosecutor’s name is Minh and he’s a prosecutor from Hoa Binh Province,” Thao said.
    • After receiving treatment, Tu was returned to detention and told to sign a false statement confessing to the crime of “creating, storing, disseminating anti-State materials” under Article 117 of Vietnam’s Criminal Code. The accusation is related to his online posts criticizing the government’s brutal handling of a long-running land dispute with Dong Tam villagers. “During the investigation process, investigators promised Tu that if he pleaded guilty, he would be jailed for only six years, but that otherwise he would have to serve eight,” Thao added.
    • Tu and his mother, Can Thi Theu, who was arrested the same day and similarly charged, were both sentenced on May 5 to eight years in prison and three years on probation. His brother Trinh Ba Phuong and land activist Nguyen Thi Tam were separately arrested on June 24 on the same charges of “propagandizing against the state.” Phuong and Tam remain in detention pending trial, which is expected to begin on November 3.

    A Protestant follower in Vietnam was arrested for “insulting” the Communist leader Ho Chi Minh

    VOA Vietnamese reports:

    • On October 14, Tra Vinh Province police arrested Thach Rine, a Khmer Protestant, for posting an edited portrait of late Communist leader Ho Chi Minh on his Facebook account, which was regarded as “defamatory” by the Vietnamese authorities.
    • However, according to some observers, the alleged arrest of Thach Rine was due to his religious beliefs and his activism for the human rights of indigenous Khmer Krom people. The local police had reportedly been watching Thach’s online political activities and periodically harassed and detained him.
    • On July 1, 2021, the Belgium-based Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) criticized the Vietnamese government for the detention of Thach Rine for wearing a T-shirt with the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals logo advocating for indigenous people’s rights.

    Vietnam arrested and charged another member of the U.S.-based Provisional Government of Vietnam

    RFA reports:

    • On October 15, Vietnamese authorities arrested and charged a man with “carrying out activities to overthrow the government,” making him at least the fourth person this year apprehended for joining the Provisional Government of Vietnam, a U.S.-based exile Vietnamese organization branded by Hanoi as an overseas terrorist group.
    • Nguyen Doan Quang Vien, 39, of Lam Dong Province and Ho Chi Minh City, had asked to join the Provisional Government of Vietnam after learning of its existence on social media in 2017, according to a police investigation.
    • Authorities have this year arrested and convicted at least three people for allegedly joining the political group. In August, the court sentenced Tran Huu Duc of Nghe An Province to three years in prison and Ngo Cong Tru from Phu Yen Province to 10 years. Police detained another member, Le Thi Kim Phi from An Giang Province in September, but she has not yet been sentenced.

    COVID-19 situation in Vietnam

    • Several Vietnamese cities began to relax the months-long strict lockdowns and reopen their economies, while citizens were required to continue to follow pandemic preventive guidelines: Starting from 6 a.m., October 14, Hanoi will allow on-site dining and reopening of parks, hotels and public transportation as companies, offices and businesses resume operations as normal. Meanwhile, from October 6, the city of Da Nang will resume almost all of its production, tourism and service businesses, including indoor activities such as museums, cinemas, sports centers and amusement venues. The slow reopening takes place amid Vietnam switching from its zero-COVID policy to “living with the virus.”
    • Ho Chi Minh City police summoned members of Revival Ekklesia Mission, a Protestant organization, including juveniles aged from 11 to 13 years old, over its alleged accusation of “transmitting dangerous infectious diseases.” According to RFA and VOA Vietnamese, the church founders and its members were summoned on October 14 for further investigations regarding the incident on May 26, when a coronavirus cluster in the religious group was detected and believed to infect a large number of people. The local authorities later indicted the group for failing to follow health guidelines and causing the virus to spread, but its founders said that they had always properly complied with antivirus measures.
    • South Korea to donate over 1.1 million vaccine doses to Vietnam, writes The New York Times: “South Korea plans to ship almost 1.6 million doses of AstraZeneca’s coronavirus vaccine to Vietnam and Thailand this week, the foreign ministry announced Tuesday, as the Southeast Asian nations struggle to contain the spread of the virus. […] About 1.1 million doses will go to Vietnam and 470,000 to Thailand, South Korea’s government said.”
    • Vietnam received nearly another two million Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccines from the United States, bringing the total number of doses that the country received from the United States to 9.5 million. The U.S. Department of Defense also provided Vietnam with 111 ultra-low temperature freezers for vaccine storage, according to a statement by the U.S. Embassy in Hanoi.
    • Vietnamese factory workers hesitate to return to work amid the COVID-19 pandemic, worsening the problem of global supply chains, writes Bloomberg: “Now staff-starved companies are imploring workers like My to return for what would normally be peak production for winter clothing and Christmas gifts. The government is offering transportation back and companies are upping pay and benefits, but little is working.” It was estimated that around 1.3 million migrant workers had returned to their hometowns between July and September due to the COVID-19 pandemic and harsh lockdown mandates.

    Vietnam’s coal-fired electric generation may double by 2030 under draft power plan

    Reuters report:

    “Vietnam may double the amount of coal-fired electric generation it installs by 2030 under a draft power development plan submitted to the prime minister for approval this week.

    The draft plan guarantees that Vietnam will become more reliant on coal to power its fast-growing economy at a time when financiers and insurers are refusing to back new projects because of fuel’s large climate change impact.

    Coal-fired power plants will account for up to 31.4% of as much as 143.8 gigawatts (GW) of installed generation capacity planned in 2030, according to a copy of the so-called Power Development Plan 8 (PDP 8) reviewed by Reuters.”


    Vietnam Insight: Learn more about Vietnam

    COVID-19 Made Life Even Worse for Japan’s Foreign Trainees

    The Diplomat/ Moeka Iida/ October 15

    “The trainee program depends upon the recruitment of young people from less developed economies who are desperate to work in advanced environments and eager to earn Japanese yen. However, there is a risk of exploitation even before these young recruits leave for Japan. Vietnamese trainees must pay a slew of pre-departure fees to brokers and sending organizations that push many to secure loans and mortgage assets. Although this amount varies, trainees can pay up to 1 million yen (around $9,000), plunging them into substantial debt.”

    How Asia’s Rice Producers Can Help Limit Global Warming

    The Diplomat/ Oliver Frith, Reiner Wassmann, Bjoern Ole Sander/ October 13

    “There are already several validated management options to mitigate methane emissions in rice, which maintain or improve yields, enhance profitability, and increase climate resilience. For example, integrating locally adapted best management practices with water-saving techniques, such as Alternate Wetting and Drying (AWD), reduces methane emissions by 30-70 percent. In Vietnam, this has also improved farm profitability by up to 13 percent (around $100 per hectare).”

    Time is right for Vietnam’s digital transformation

    Asia Times/ Minh Ha Truong/ October 7

    “The timing couldn’t be better. With a population of 97 million, the Internet penetration in Vietnam is high, standing at 70% and increasing by 6.2 million in a single year. The nation is set to see its mobile transactions increase by 300% between 2021 and 2025 due to the strong growth anticipated in mobile payments.”

    Vietnam and Economic Reopening: Roadmap Needed

    Fulcrum/ Tuan Ho/ September 16

    “Facing economic slowdown pressures while still unable to control the pandemic, Vietnam is currently at a crossroads regarding its pandemic fighting strategy. While Prime Minister Chinh has suggested that Vietnam is shifting away from a ‘zero Covid’ strategy and preparing to ‘live with it’, the delay in reopening Ho Chi Minh City implies that some Vietnamese leaders are still embracing the idea of completely suppressing the pandemic, out of both public health concerns and possibly considerations about their political prospects. Their decision was also based on concerns that reopening the economy prematurely may be counter-productive.”

  • October 9, 2009: Six Peaceful Activists Sentenced For Pro-Democracy Activities

    October 9, 2009: Six Peaceful Activists Sentenced For Pro-Democracy Activities

    What happened?

    On this day, 12 years ago, a group of six democracy activists was sentenced to prison, with sentences ranging from two years to six years in prison, in addition to various months or years of house arrest. Their sentences prompted criticism from many international organizations, such as Human Rights Watch and Reporters Without Borders.

    These activists were arrested earlier in 2008 for hanging pro-democracy banners on a bridge along the Hanoi-Hai Phong Highway. The government accused them of “spreading propaganda against the government and Communist leaders” under Article 88 of the 1999 Penal Code. Article 88 was one of the most frequently used charges to silence political dissent in Vietnam during the last decades.

    The group of six activists includes well-known activist and novelist Nguyen Xuan Nghia, activist Nguyen Van Tinh, land rights activist Nguyen Kim Nhan and Nguyen Van Tuc, ex-Communist member Nguyen Manh Son, and Ngo Quynh, a university student. Nghia and Tuc are alleged to be members of Bloc 8406, a pro-democracy organization that used to be prominent but was violently suppressed during the early 2010s. At the time of the arrests, most of the activists were already in their 60s, but Ngo Quynh was only 25 years old.

    Following the trial of these activists, other democracy activists were also sentenced in 2010, including teacher Vu Hung, blogger Pham Thanh Nghien, and activist Pham Van Troi. According to the BBC Vietnamese, the intensified crackdown of pro-democracy activities was due to the approaching Communist Party Congress in 2011.

    While it has been more than a decade since the sentencing of the above activists, it is essential to remember that the Vietnamese government continues to crack down on peaceful pro-democracy activists and give them unjust sentences for their political longevity.

    Where are these activists now?

    The six activists detained in 2009 were all subsequently released when their prison terms ended between 2011-2014.

    However, Nguyen Kim Nhan was arrested again in 2011, almost immediately after he was released from prison upon completing his 2-year sentence; he received another nearly six years in prison.

    Nguyen Van Tuc, released in 2012, is currently in prison after being accused of “aiming to overthrow the government” in 2018 under Article 79 of the 1999 Penal Code. Tuc received a sentence of imprisonment for 13 years, and his family members have spoken out about his deteriorating health behind bars.

    Nguyen Xuan Nghia, the activist who received the longest sentence of six years in 2009, was again harassed by the police in 2018 for “storing banned books.”

    Examining the life of the democratic activists who have served years in prison shows us that the government has never treated them with respect despite how peaceful, intellectual or patient. It is as if the government is sending a clear political message: you have to be on our side, or we will eliminate you.

    While the article today is about the sentencing of activists from twelve years ago, we keep seeing similar treatment patterns with democracy activists or writers throughout recent years.

    Citations:

    1. BBC News Tiếng Việt. (2011, June 8). Ông Nguyễn Kim Nhàn bị bắt. https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/vietnam/2011/06/110608_nguyenkimnhan_arrest
    2. BBC News Tiếng Việt. (2012, September 10). Nhà bất đồng chính kiến ra tù. https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/vietnam/2012/09/120910_dissident_released
    3. BBC News Tiếng Việt. (2018b, April 10). 13 năm tù cho nhà hoạt động Nguyễn Văn Túc. https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/43710106
    4. B.T. (2009, September 7). Tổ chức Phóng Viên Không Biên Giới (RSF) kêu gọi Việt Nam trả tự do cho các blogger. RFI Tiếng Việt. http://www1.rfi.fr/actuvi/articles/118/article_5213.asp
    5. Human Rights Watch. (2009, August 19). Vietnam: Release Peaceful Democracy Advocates. https://www.hrw.org/node/237562/printable/print
    6. Human Rights Watch. (2020, October 28). Vietnam: Free Political and Religious Detainees. https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/04/07/vietnam-free-political-and-religious-detainees#
    7. Nhân Dân. (2012, November 2). Y án sơ thẩm đối với bị cáo Nguyễn Kim Nhàn và đồng bọn trong vụ án tuyên truyền chống Nhà nước. https://nhandan.vn/thoi-su-phap-luat/y-an-so-tham-doi-voi-bi-cao-nguyen-kim-nhan-va-dong-bon-trong-vu-an-tuyen-truyen-chong-nha-nuoc-387812/
    8. Pham, N. (2009, October 9). Six Vietnamese activists jailed. BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8299406.stm
    9. Radio Free Asia. (2020a, October 11). Cựu tù chính trị-nhà văn Nguyễn Xuân Nghĩa bị bắt đi làm việc. https://www.rfa.org/vietnamese/news/vietnamnews/Former-political-prisoner-summoned-05232018100346.html
    10. Radio Free Asia. (2020b, October 11). Sức khỏe tù chính trị Nguyễn Văn Túc tồi tệ thêm. https://www.rfa.org/vietnamese/news/vietnamnews/ailing-political-prisoner-nguyen-van-tuc-health-worsened-in-prison-03152019083039.html
    11. Radio Free Asia. (2020c, October 11). Tù nhân lương tâm Nguyễn Kim Nhàn được trả tự do. https://www.rfa.org/vietnamese/news/vietnamnews/conscience-prisoner-nknhan-get-early-release-2-months-10072016085459.html
  • Biden’s Emphasis On Soft Power And What It Means For Vietnam’s Democracy Movement

    Biden’s Emphasis On Soft Power And What It Means For Vietnam’s Democracy Movement

    President Joe Biden has repeatedly emphasised “soft power” in his foreign policy speeches. Will this policy work in Vietnam? And how will it affect Vietnam’s democracy movement?

    Biden’s emphasis on soft power: what’s in store for Vietnam and should one believe it?

    It’s almost a year into Joe Biden’s presidency. Throughout his tenure, two keywords, “relentless diplomacy” and “soft power,” have echoed in every corner where US foreign policy is concerned: from the ending of the “forever war” in Afghanistan to the reorganisation of trans-Atlantic relations, and to engagement with Asia. The challenges for which President Biden will implement his “relentless diplomacy” and “soft power” approach are, in short, the covid pandemic, climate change, and China[1].

    Vietnamese readers can be assured of Biden’s serious interest in Asia by, amongst others, the appointment of a competent expert Kurt Campbell [2] as the White House coordinator for the Indo-Pacific region, US support for Taiwan and its alliance with Japan, vaccine donations, and, most recently, Vice President Kamala Harris’ visit to the region and Vietnam specifically.

    Regarding China, Biden’s promise [3] of “fighting corruption, defending against authoritarianism, and advancing human rights” will be arguably the most effective tool for the United States in the realm of soft power. Economic and military strength notwithstanding, the Chinese regime is infamous for its authoritarian governance and long record of human rights violations. Ironically, China’s military strength, as observed in its actions in the South China Sea, makes its draconian image even more despicable.

    By contrast, the era of Pax Americana, despite criticisms of US imperialism, has built an overall image of the United States as a promoter of human rights and democracy. Although the recent Afghanistan debacle has damaged the reputation of the United States, Biden has been quick to assert [4] that the new era of US foreign policy will be about “lifting people up around the world” and “renewing and defending democracy”.

    Speaking of Pax Americana, Biden’s emphasis on “soft power” and “relentless diplomacy” happens in a context different than that of American leaders of the past who boasted about a US “moral imperative” and “doing the right thing” only to turn a cold shoulder to their allies when the tide of geopolitics turned. In the post-Americana era, despite Biden’s denial/rejection [5] of the imminent “China-US Cold War”,  it is widely recognised (as indicated by the US “pivot to Asia”[6]) that US national interests depend on whether or not the United States can counter China’s plays in Asia. As such, one can expect Biden’s words to have substance rather than just simply paying lip service.

    Biden’s “soft power” in Vietnam: the state-versus-people conundrum

    When it comes to China and human rights, there is a clear distinction between the perspectives of the Vietnamese state and the Vietnamese people. At the most basic level, Vietnamese leaders have little to no concern for the interests of their people because their positions are not determined by voters. Vietnam’s election is well known for being a farce [7].

    The divergence between the Vietnamese public and the Vietnamese government on China could not be clearer. When the government approved a bauxite project related to China in 2009, the Vietnamese people signed a petition to oppose it. When the people took to the streets in the early years of the 2010s to oppose China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea, the government cracked down on these protests and detained several protesters. When the Special Economic Zone bill was announced, it was perceived by the Vietnamese public as giving questionable privileges to China and also was seen as a threat to Vietnam’s national security. As a result, massive protests broke out in the streets in 2018 and the bill was shelved as a result.

    Most recently, the use of China’s COVID vaccines in Vietnam has been met with public resistance and fierce criticism of the government. Anti-China protesters’ shouts of, “Coward to the enemy, cruel to the people!” (“Hèn với giặc, ác với dân!”), is precisely the Vietnamese people’s attitude towards their government on China.

    At this point, one may argue: “But the Vietnamese government has also spoken up against China many times, so it cannot be as pro-China as the above-mentioned events indicate.” This is true and quite a few analyses [8] have highlighted the stake for the Vietnamese government in playing US-China politics wisely instead of simply bowing to China. However, it is important to understand that when Vietnamese leaders do stand up to China, it is often “all bark and no bite.”[9] More importantly, whether Vietnamese leaders shake hands with Biden or with Xi, or play the superpowers off against each other, they do so first and foremost based on their, or the Communist Party’s, own interest [10], rather than on the interests of the country and the people.

    Thus, it is highly unlikely that the United States will find a true ally in the Vietnamese government in its state-to-state diplomacy against China. Because of this, the US will also find it difficult to tap into the Vietnamese public’s anti-China sentiment. Hanoi has shown little to no concern about how Vietnamese citizens feel or about what they want, and it has unreservedly deployed force to quell anti-China protests and online dissent in the past.

    The road to promoting human rights in Vietnam does not seem promising either, especially the rights to free speech, peaceful assembly, association, and fair trial. The promise of US leaders to “respect Vietnam’s political system” [11] seems rather odd because the very existence and stability of Vietnam’s political system rest on the suppression of exactly those rights. The relentless arrests of people who speak critically of the government on their Facebook pages and of those who ran as independent candidates in the lead-up to the May 2021 national election are just some examples.

    What has played out so far in the field of human rights does not show much innovation. State-to-state talks about the situation of human rights in the country, assistance for specific high-profile activists who have been arrested and who are on trial, and US leaders holding meetings with local activists are all par for the course. It remains to be seen if Biden’s administration will open a new chapter of human rights promotion through public diplomacy or if it will lead to more of the same: the worsening of human rights and democratic freedoms in Vietnam.

    Public diplomacy and soft power: a look into the books

    The term “public diplomacy” was first coined in 1965 by Edmund Gullion, founder of the Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy at Tufts University (Cull, 2009) [12]. Definitions vary but all agree that public diplomacy is a foreign policy practice entailing nation A engaging with the public of nation B in order to influence B’s foreign policy through bottom-up pressure to A’s advantage (Bettie, 2014) [13]. In short, it is about image projection and national branding, which is distinctly different from traditional diplomacy which consists of state-to-state engagement.

    In the work of historian Nicholas J. Cull (2008) [14], activities that count as public diplomacy include (1) presenting new policy ideas to the foreign public (i.e., advocacy), (2) exportation of culture to foreign countries as well as two-way cultural exchanges, and (3) international broadcasting (i.e., reaching a foreign public through mass media).

    While public diplomacy can be understood as a channel of persuasion, soft power is the content that gives a nation the power to persuade the foreign public. Prominent soft power scholar, Joseph S. Nye Jr., defines soft power as the attractiveness of a nation that lies in its culture, including its language, arts, cuisine, institutions, brands, and moral values (Nye, 2008) [15]. Soft power goes hand-in-hand with public diplomacy, as “public diplomacy tries to attract by drawing attention to these potential resources through broadcasting, subsidizing cultural exports, arranging exchanges, and so forth” (Nye, 2008, p. 95) [16].

    Soft power may also be drawn from hard power. The presence of US military forces in the South China Sea to aid countries bullied by China communicates certain moral values to the people of those countries. However, underlying such a presence in the more complex and pragmatic interests of the United States than simply a normative or moral stance.

    Using the above discussion on public diplomacy and soft power, how would President Biden’s plans for Vietnam measure up? What would his roadmap navigating the state-versus-people conundrum in the country look like?

    Evaluating Biden’s diplomacy and navigating Vietnam’s state-versus-people conundrum

    Biden’s words promise a new era of US diplomacy, but his actions so far still seem to be following classic state-to-state diplomacy and militaristic intervention more than what is prescribed for public diplomacy and soft power.

    Furthermore, public diplomacy has always been a component in US foreign policy in previous administrations through supporting local registered civil society organisations and non-formal oppositional actors. Thus, with Biden’s emphasis on “soft power,” his administration will disappoint if over the next few years it rehashes many or most of the previous administrations’ actions; this old approach is effectively circumscribed by the state-versus-people conundrum mentioned earlier.

    However, the good news for the United States is that despite the disastrous presidency of Donald Trump and the many upheavals in US politics and society, public opinion [17] in Vietnam is still in favour of the United States, especially when compared to China. The soft power is already there.

    As Vietnamese people have grown increasingly more concerned about Hong Kong and Taiwan, their opinion will also be shaped by how the United States intervenes in the Taiwan – China situation. The collapse of Hong Kong has done serious damage to the image of the West, but it is still looking good on the Taiwan front. In addition, the story of Taiwan is not just about standing up to China; it is also about nation-building and the nationalistic pride of a people who chose democracy over dictatorship.

    In summary, US soft power in/over Vietnam will come from the stories of human rights, democracy of the US itself, and its defence of Taiwan against China. This soft power will come across even stronger if US public diplomacy also promotes Taiwan as the protagonist in the region, as a counter to Chinese politics, and as an inspiring story of Asian democratisation. These narratives will further widen the gap between Vietnamese hearts and minds and China, while simultaneously raising aspirations for democratisation amongst the Vietnamese people. In doing so, the United States will also not give a reason for the Vietnamese state-owned media to be hostile towards democratisation and the Vietnamese democracy movement. State propaganda cannot accuse America of imposing Western political ideas and values, nor of hypocrisy and one-upmanship if the US approaches the issue in this way.

    Having said earlier that the Vietnamese government has shown little to no concern about the Vietnamese people’s anti-China sentiments and that it uses brute force against human rights and democracy activists, what is the point of raising aspirations for democratisation and being critical of China? The point to be made is precisely about the kind of mass awareness and feeling of efficacy that will translate into the political agency and oppositional collective action. Old school public diplomacy has come short of this task and has failed to help the Vietnam democracy movement gain strength in numbers.

    My conversations with prominent activists in Vietnam’s human rights and democracy movement show that the seemingly invincible power of the Vietnamese government to repress dissent, the crackdown on protests, and carry on with unpopular policies, comes from the fact that the human rights and democracy movement is small in number and that the majority of the public lack the theoretical scaffolding to help them translate their discontent with the government and nationalistic sentiment into coherent and organised demand for democratisation.

    This article, written from my perspective as a Vietnamese, a scholar, and a supporter of collective action towards democracy for Vietnam, has suggested a few ways for American diplomats and foreign policy experts to walk President Biden’s talk.

    Meanwhile, Luat Khoa Tap Chi, a well-respected independent news outlet that serves Vietnamese readers, has already beefed up its column on Taiwan as an inspiring example of democracy for the Vietnamese. The comrades of Luat Khoa are also planning their next step, with Taiwan and mass awareness at the core of their strategy. The Biden administration, with the aim of utilizing soft power, should not miss this opportunity to work with them.

    Bibliography:

    1. Ash, T., G. (2020, 7 Nov). What will President Biden’s United States look like to the rest of the world? The Guardian.
    2. Green, M., J. (2021, 13 Jan). Biden makes his first bold move on Asia. The Guardian.
    3. Tran, B., T. (2021, 3 Jun). No Trade-off: Biden can both Deepen US-Vietnam Ties and Promote Human Rights. United States: Center for Strategic and International Studies.
    4. Borger, J. (2021, 21 Sep). Biden promises end to ‘relentless war’ and start of ‘relentless diplomacy’. The Guardian.
    5. ibid.
    6. ibid.
    7. Vu, A. & Gerin, R. (2021, 21 May). Vietnam goes to the polls with state-approved candidates offering little choice. Radio Free Asia.
    8. Nguyen, T., T., Q. (2021, 30 Sep). Trans-Pacific partner membership and the love triangle of Vietnam – Taiwan – China. The Vietnamese.
    9. Reed, A. (2021, 14 Mar). The enemy of my enemy: tensions between the US, China, and Vietnam. The Vietnamese.
    10. ibid.
    11. Tran, B., T. (2021, 3 Jun). No Trade-off: Biden can both Deepen US-Vietnam Ties and Promote Human Rights. United States: Center for Strategic and International Studies.
    12. Cull, N. (2009). Public Diplomacy Before Gullion: the Evolution of a Phrase. In: Snow, N. and Taylor, P. (eds). Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy (pp. 19-23). Tayler & Francis.
    13. Bettie, M., L. (2014). The Fulbright program and American public diplomacy (unpublished doctoral thesis). The University of Leeds, Leeds, United Kingdom.
    14. Cull, N. (2008). The Cold War and the United States Information Agency. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
    15. Nye, J. (2008). Public diplomacy and soft power. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616, pp. 94-109.
    16. ibid.
    17. Seah, S. et al., (2021). The state of Southeast Asia: 2021. Singapore: ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute.
  • Tightening The Noose: The Latest Developments In Vietnam’s Assault On Internet Freedom

    Tightening The Noose: The Latest Developments In Vietnam’s Assault On Internet Freedom

    On August 25, 2021, U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris met with several of Vietnam’s top leaders. According to a report by Reuters, while the focus of their dialogue centered on the South China Sea dispute and the strengthening of U.S presence in the region, she also brought up several human rights concerns with the Vietnamese government. Although Harris did not provide details about what they had discussed, the vice president assured the press that “[the United States] was “not going to shy away” from difficult conversations with countries the United States has partnerships with.

    Prior to her arrival, Vietnam was already dealing with a surge in Covid-19 infections, which resulted in lockdowns and travel restrictions in several places in the country, including Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi. As of September 26, Vietnam has tallied over 476,000 confirmed cases with 18,000 deaths. The Vietnamese government’s approach to containing the spread of the virus has been questionable at best with its use of state media and propaganda to control the narrative and deployment of the military to enforce lockdown measures.

    Yet, despite the ongoing health crisis and the dialogue with the U.S. vice president, Vietnam continues its crackdown, detention, and imprisonment of several online critics, journalists, and activists.

    Freedom on the Net 2021

    Freedom House, a US-based organization founded to support and defend democracy worldwide, released its annual Freedom on the Net report on September 21, 2021. This report analyzes the state of accessibility and censorship of a country’s cyber domain, alongside violations of internet users’ rights, and ranks each nation as being Free, Partly Free, or Not Free. It comes as no surprise that Vietnam continues to fare poorly in this regard; it has been classified as Not Free for three consecutive years and has been performing terribly under the standards set by Freedom House.

    This research highlights several aspects of the state of internet freedom in Vietnam. Regarding accessibility, Freedom House states that smartphone and internet penetration in the country has been good with internet prices becoming more affordable. However, connectivity continues to remain an issue for those living in extreme poverty and for ethnic minorities who live in the remote mountainous areas of Vietnam. Censorship also continues to be practiced by the Vietnamese government as it blocks or filters content coming from individuals and organizations that are critical of the regime. Predictably, Vietnam’s violation of internet-user rights is just as rampant compared to prior years with “police routinely [flouting] due process, arresting bloggers and online activists without a warrant or retaining them in custody beyond the maximum period allowed by law.”

    CIVICUS: Latest Developments in Vietnam

    On September 27, 2021, CIVICUS, an international alliance of various organizations that aim to strengthen citizen action and civil society worldwide, released its own report that details more recent events regarding the state of internet freedom in Vietnam. Similar to Freedom House, CIVICUS classifies Vietnam as Closed according to its own standards; a country with this rating exhibits “a complete closure of civic space” where “an atmosphere of fear and violence prevails, where state and powerful non-state actors are routinely allowed to imprison, seriously injure and kill people with impunity.” Criticism of those in power is also severely punished. Likewise, media freedom is virtually non-existent and the internet is heavily censored.

    The CIVICUS report begins by highlighting the cases of several Facebook users who were arrested or imprisoned under Articles 117 and 331 of Vietnam’s Criminal Code. Nguyen Van Lam and Tran Hoang Minh were both found guilty by Vietnamese courts of violating these statutes on July 20, 2021. Lam was sentenced to nine years in prison for “posting anti-state writings and sharing videos and other content, including broadcasts considered politically subversive,” and for “creating, storing, disseminating information and materials against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.” Minh was given five years of jail time for “abusing democratic freedom” and for his objections to the Dong Tam land dispute incident.

    The report continues with the arrests of Facebookers Tran Hoang Huan and Bui Van Thuan, on August 10, 2021, and August 30, 2021, respectively. Huan’s recent posts voiced his objections and concerns regarding Vietnam’s use of Chinese-made COVID-19 vaccines. He was charged by the Tien Giang People’s Procuracy for “making, storing and spreading or propagandizing information or documents against the state under Article 117 of the Penal Code.”  Bui Van Thuan was arrested in his home by policemen who pretended to be medical workers. Bui Van Thuan’s wife, Trinh Nhung, stated with The 88 Project that Thuan had previously posted “biting commentaries against the government’s handling of COVID-19 and other political issues.”

    The more recent cases of Nguyen Thuy Duong and Nguyen Duy Linh are also mentioned in the report. CIVICUS states that Amnesty International had reported on September 2, 2021, that Duong had been fined 5 million dong (US$220) for sharing a Facebook post that accused Vietnamese authorities of neglect during the COVID-19 lockdown. This post blamed the government for the rampant spread of hunger among city residents during this time. Nguyen Duy Linh was arrested on September 14 and charged by state authorities with “conducting anti-state propaganda” under Article 117 of the country’s Criminal Code.

    Updates regarding the case of detained human rights defender, journalist, and co-founder of The Vietnamese and the Luat Khoa online magazines, Pham Doan Trang, are also included in the CIVICUS report. On September 6, 2021, the government informed Doan Trang’s lawyer, Luan Le, that his client would be “formally indicted with ‘conducting propaganda against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam under Article 88 of the 1999 Penal Code.” Despite her case being brought to the attention of the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD), she still faces the very real possibility of being sentenced to 20 years imprisonment.

    Radio Free Asia’s coverage regarding the arrest of five journalists from the Facebook-based news outlet, Bao Sach (Clean Newspaper) is also mentioned in the report. Truong Chau Huu Danh, Nguyen Thanh Nha, Doan Kien Giang, Nguyen Phuong Trung Bao, and Le The Thang were charged with violating Article 331 of Vietnam’s Criminal Code for posting “anti-state and reactionary information” which delved into information that was “inappropriate, distorting, against the country’s interests, and slanderous of the people’s administration.” Thang is currently released on bail while the other four journalists are still in detention. Truong Chau Huu Danh, the founder of Bao Sach, also faces the additional charge of posting stories that “generated bad interactions between internet users in the cyber environment” which “propagandized, distorted, defamed and seriously slandered Party organizations and local Party committees.”

    Tran Huu Duc and Le Thi Kim Phi were accused by the authorities of using Facebook to connect with members of the U.S.-based Provisional Government of Vietnam, an organization founded in 1991 by former soldiers and refugees who remained loyal to the South Vietnamese government after the war. Than Huu Duc was arrested in January 2021 and charged under Article 109 of Vietnam’s Penal Code for “gathering information on Nghe An residents … for a referendum on naming [Provisional Government of Vietnam] member, Dao Minh Quan, as president of Vietnam.” Duc was also accused of “posting political content online” that opposed government policies and “slandering leaders of Vietnam’s ruling Communist Party.” In September 2021, Le Thi Kim Phi was arrested and charged under the vague clause of “carrying out activities to overthrow the government.”

    In January 2018, the Provisional Government of Vietnam was labeled a “terrorist organization” by the Vietnamese authorities.

    Additional Restrictions on Internet Freedom

    Following the passage of the controversial Cybersecurity Law in 2018, the CIVICUS report further mentions a draft of a government decree which further restricts internet freedom by limiting live-streaming on popular social media sites. CIVICUS states that, “under the terms of the decree, any account that operates on a social media platform in Vietnam and has more than 10,000 followers must provide contact information to authorities” and that “only registered accounts will be allowed to live-stream.” The draft also imposes additional responsibilities on social media providers, requiring them to block or remove content within 24 hours if they receive a “justified complaint” from an individual or organization.

    When passed this decree, coupled with the already draconian Cybersecurity Law, will serve to further cement the Vietnamese Communist Party’s (VCP) rule over the country’s already restrictive cyberspace, putting social media users more at risk of the government’s retribution and reducing social media platforms to tools of government surveillance.

    Freedom on the Net 2021 provides an overall look at the state of internet freedom in Vietnam while the CIVICUS report presents recent, documented, and specific events that support Freedom House’s outlook on the country. Both illustrate a very grim and depressing reality about Vietnam: that despite international pressure, in the form of U.S Vice-President Harris’ visit, and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the VCP is more concerned about maintaining power and control over its people than prioritizing their welfare and safety during these difficult times; the Party would rather control the narrative than work to give actual aid to much of its struggling populace.

    In the end, the actions of the Vietnamese government serve only as a reminder of its ineptitude during times of crisis and its callousness to the plight of everyday Vietnamese; in its relentless attack against internet freedom and freedom of speech, the more pressing and immediate threats to the welfare of the Vietnamese people remain half-heartedly addressed.

    Citations:

    1. Bose, N. (2021, August 25). U.S. VP Harris offers Vietnam support to counter Beijing in the South China Sea. Reuters. Retrieved September 28, 2021, from https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-vp-harris-offers-vietnam-support-counter-beijing-south-china-sea-2021-08-25/
    2. Jaffe, A. (2021, August 26). Harris says she urged Vietnam to free political dissidents. – The Diplomat. Retrieved September 29, 2021, from https://thediplomat.com/2021/08/harris-says-she-urged-vietnam-to-free-political-dissidents/
    3. Nguyen, J. (2021, August 19). State media and social media during the COVID-19 pandemic: A tale of two cities in Vietnam. The Vietnamese. Retrieved September 29, 2021, from https://www.thevietnamese.org/2021/08/state-media-and-social-media-during-the-covid-19-pandemic-a-tale-of-two-cities-in-vietnam/
    4. Nguyen, J. (2021, September 12). Why did the Vietnamese Communist Party militarize its fight against COVID-19? The Vietnamese. Retrieved September 29, 2021, from https://www.thevietnamese.org/2021/09/why-did-the-vietnamese-communist-party-militarize-its-fight-against-covid-19/
    5. Shahbaz, A., & Funk, A. (n.d.). Freedom on the net 2021: The global drive to control Big Tech. Freedom House. Retrieved September 30, 2021, from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2021/global-drive-control-big-tech
    6. Reed, A. (2021, September 21). New research: Vietnam remains “not free” on internet freedom, Freedom House says. The Vietnamese. Retrieved Sept 30, 2021, from https://www.thevietnamese.org/2021/09/new-research-vietnam-remains-not-free-on-internet-freedom-freedom-house-says/
    7. Huu Long, T. (2021, September 21). Vietnam: Freedom on the net 2021 country report. Freedom House. Retrieved October 1, 2021, from https://freedomhouse.org/country/vietnam/freedom-net/2021
    8. C. I. V. I. C. U. S. (2021, September 27). CRACKDOWN ON ONLINE CRITICS PERSISTS IN VIETNAM AS NEW DECREE CONTROLLING LIVESTREAMING PROPOSED. Civicus. Retrieved September 29, 2021, from https://monitor.civicus.org/updates/2021/09/27/crackdown-online-critics-persists-vietnam-new-decree-controlling-livestreaming-proposed/
    9. Civicus. (2020, April 7). ONLINE DEBATE ON DONG TAM INCIDENT FOLLOWED BY PANDEMIC SILENCED BY VIETNAM AUTHORITIES. Civicus. Retrieved October 1, 2021, from https://monitor.civicus.org/updates/2020/04/07/online-debate-dong-tam-incident-followed-pandemic-silenced-vietnam-authorities/
    10. The 88 Project (2021, September 6). Vietnam free expression newsletter no. 34/2021 – week of August 30-September 5. The 88 Project. Retrieved September 29, 2021, from https://the88project.org/newsletter-no-34-2021/
    11. Finney, R. (2021, September 3). Vietnamese facebook user fined for ‘fake news’ as criticism grows of government’s handling of pandemic. Radio Free Asia. Retrieved September 30, 2021, from https://www.rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/fine-09032021182640.html
    12. Whong, E. (2021, September 10). Vietnam indicts five journalists from Facebook-based outlet. Radio Free Asia. Retrieved September 30, 2021, from https://www.rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/baosach-09092021174755.html
    13. Finney, R. (2021, September 14). Vietnam court sentences member of ‘Provisional Government’ to three-year prison term. Radio Free Asia. Retrieved October 29, 2021, from https://www.rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/court-08182021185109.html
    14. Gerin, R. (2021, September 14). Third Vietnamese charged for Facebook connections with US-based Exile Group. Radio Free Asia. Retrieved September 30, 2021, from https://www.rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/le-thi-kim-phi-09102021183034.html
  • Vietnam Says It Is Promoting And Defending Human Rights, But The Reality Proves Otherwise

    Vietnam Says It Is Promoting And Defending Human Rights, But The Reality Proves Otherwise

    In Vietnam, the beginning of this October marks two significant events that challenge and reflect upon the country’s actual circumstance over its commitment to uphold human rights values: the one year anniversary of the arrest of journalist Pham Doan Trang and the mass exodus of migrant workers who have had to use all sorts of means to return to their hometowns due to the lack of help from the government.

    Earlier, in March, Vietnam also announced its candidacy for the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) for the agency’s 2023-2025 term. This announcement has astonished many local pro-democracy activists and critics, who have expressed their opposition to such a move.

    According to the UNHRC’s membership requirements [1], member states running for the seats need to fulfill their “contribution to the promotion and protection of human rights,” and once they gain the council’s membership, the members must bear the responsibility to “uphold high human rights standards.”

    However, given the one-party Communist state’s poor human rights record and its consistently oppressive policies and actions in curtailing the people’s fundamental civil and political rights, Vietnam’s legitimacy to become a member of the UNHRC should remain out of the question [2].

    On the one hand, Vietnam’s state-controlled media has been seen praising [3] the country’s efforts in securing a seat at the United Nations body, betting on its early successful containment of COVID-19 and the donations of masks and medical equipment to other countries. From the government’s reasoning, keeping people safe and protecting their daily livelihoods are crucial to the promotion of human rights. “The country has tackled the pandemic head-on, putting the people at the center of all its efforts,” state media quoted Vietnamese Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh as saying at the UNHRC’s 46th Regular Session.

    On the other hand, the apprehension of journalist Pham Doan Trang and the dire situation of Vietnamese migrant workers during the fourth wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in the country provide us with a contrasting narrative. Those unparalleled stories vividly portray an authoritarian government that shows virtually no tolerance for dissenting opinions, in addition to highlighting its disregard for the most basic human rights, which are recognized in the U.N.’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the country’s own Constitution.

    Pham Doan Trang and her freedom of speech

    Pham Doan Trang was arrested by the Vietnamese authorities at around midnight on October 6, 2020, and she has been held incommunicado since her detainment. Her arrest came only hours after officials from Vietnam and the United States held a video conference for the two countries’ 24th annual Human Rights Dialogue. However, Doan Trang, her friends and colleagues, and also the readers of her books, had long been anticipating her arrest.

    As a dedicated journalist and a prominent writer, Pham Doan Trang has devoted her career to documenting and writing about controversial social issues and human rights violations committed by the Vietnamese government. She also publishes books popularizing general knowledge about politics, laws, and human rights for the Vietnamese people.

    Pham Doan Trang and her book “Politics for The Masses.” Photo: Luat Khoa Magazine.

    In theory, the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) has consistently trumpeted[4] its respect for the people’s right to freedom of speech, right to access to information, and press freedom, which were promised to its citizens under the Constitution. But in reality, the VCP has systematically harassed and detained independent journalists and activists [5], restricted access [6] to critical online newspapers and blogs, including The Vietnamese Magazine and Luat Khoa Magazine, and tracked down and intimidated [7] anyone who disagrees with its political doctrine.

    To the international community and admirers of her work, Doan Trang has only done what a journalist should be doing: report truthfully and inform the global audience about alleged human rights abuses by the VCP. What the Vietnamese government has been doing to silence opposition critics and dissidents like her only exposes the country’s serious violations of basic human rights and its lack of commitment to steadfastly protect those fundamental rights of its citizens.

    The homebound journeys of Vietnamese migrant workers

    Also at the beginning of October, heartrending photos and video footage of thousands of migrant workers rushing to return to their hometowns were widely shared on Vietnamese social media. These migrant workers decided to flee big cities en masse due to financial difficulties that affected them as a result of COVID control measures and the lack of help from the government. “We are tired,” one migrant worker said [8].

    On their way home, many of the laborers were seen breaking through the barricades at checkpoints set up by local authorities, with many beaten by security forces and some even seen begging the officers to let them through. According to the government, these methods were to prevent the wave of mass migrations that resulted from concerns about the transmission of the coronavirus. Despite facing many hurdles and uncertainty during their homebound journeys, those migrant workers hardly had any other choice.

    Police and security forces guard a checkpoint in Ho Chi Minh City as people, who are mostly migrant workers, attempt to return to their hometowns. The photo was taken on September 30, 2021, by Reuters/ Stringer.

    This abrupt and large-scale migration wave was a result of Vietnam’s months-long abusive lockdown mandates [9], which largely excluded human rights matters from its protocols, and the negligence of the government regarding the well-being, and more importantly, the dignity of workers.

    As written in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Vietnamese people in general, and migrant laborers in particular, have the right to freedom of movement and residence within their own country; they also have the right to be treated with dignity and to seek their own security of life. Those allegedly unlawful actions by the Vietnamese government are clearly blatant violations of universal human rights, which are ironically the key conditions that the VCP must meet to gain its seat at the UNHRC.

    Steward Rees, an advocacy associate with The 88 Project, a non-profit organization that promotes free speech in Vietnam, suggests [10] that if Vietnam is genuinely serious about contributing to the development of global human rights, unconditionally releasing Pham Doan Trang would be a good place to start.

    References:

    1. Membership of the Human Rights Council. (2020). United Nations Human Rights Council. https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/pages/membership.aspx
    2. Jamal, U. (2021, March 17). Should Vietnam become a member of the UN Human Rights Council? ASEAN Today. https://www.aseantoday.com/2021/03/should-vietnam-become-a-member-of-the-un-human-rights-council/
    3. VNA. (2021, March 15). Vietnam stands for election to UNHRC in 2023–2025 tenure. VietnamPlus. https://en.vietnamplus.vn/vietnam-stands-for-election-to-unhrc-in-20232025-tenure/197570.vnp
    4. VNA. (2021b, July 8). Press freedom in Vietnam – Undeniable objective reality. VietnamPlus. https://en.vietnamplus.vn/press-freedom-in-vietnam-undeniable-objective-reality/204350.vnp
    5. Database of persecuted activists in Vietnam. (n.d.). The 88 Project. Retrieved October 6, 2021, from https://the88project.org/database/
    6. Freedom House. (2021, September). Freedom on The Net 2021 (Vietnam). https://freedomhouse.org/country/vietnam/freedom-net/2021
    7. Human Rights Watch. (2021). World Report 2021: Vietnam. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/vietnam
    8. Reuters. (2021, October 4). “We are tired”: Workers flee Vietnam’s largest city as long lockdown eases. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/the-great-reboot/we-are-tired-workers-flee-vietnams-largest-city-long-lockdown-eases-2021-10-04/
    9. Nguyen, J. (2021, July 21). How The Latest Outbreak Reveals The Darker Side Of Vietnam’s Anti-Coronavirus Strategy. The Vietnamese Magazine. https://www.thevietnamese.org/2021/07/how-the-latest-outbreak-reveals-the-darker-side-of-vietnams-anti-coronavirus-strategy/
    10. Rees, S. (2021, October 5). Vietnamese rights activist marks first year in jail. Asia Times. https://asiatimes.com/2021/10/vietnamese-rights-activist-marks-first-year-in-jail/
  • Pham Doan Trang Is A Journalist, Her Profession Is Not A Crime

    Pham Doan Trang Is A Journalist, Her Profession Is Not A Crime

    As I am writing this beginning line, my mind is flooded with memories of Pham Doan Trang. I also realize that it has been almost seven years since I said goodbye to her before she left the United States to return to Vietnam. We had become friends and spent seven months together in the United States, and I have not seen her since December 2014. I also have not been able to contact her or speak with her on the phone since October 6, 2020. Vietnamese police arrested her near midnight that day in Saigon. My last text message to her was “Trang, answer me,” which I sent the night she was detained.

    Doan Trang can be classified as many things, depending on the person you speak with. She is a journalist, an activist, a teacher, a political person who opposes the Vietnamese Communist Party, a prominent figure of the democracy movement in Vietnam, and more. Yet, for me, Doan Trang is a friend, a very close friend, and that’s it. My only hope is to help set my friend free because she has not done anything wrong. She deserves to be free so that she can continue to write.

    And yet, sadly, her writing is precisely the reason that has put her in prison in Vietnam.

    In Vietnam, writing or producing verbal speech (YouTube, TikTok, etc.) can be a severe crime when you refuse to obey the government’s censorship system or self-censor on your own. If you look at the details of any political case in Vietnam, I guarantee that you will only find the alleged wrongdoings to be the uncensored writings and speeches produced by these defendants. It does not matter how the Vietnam government classifies their crimes as “abusing democratic rights” or “propagandizing against the state,” their crimes are always their writing and speech.

    For Doan Trang, I can also think of another aspect in which she has irritated the Vietnamese authorities even more. She was not just a journalist; she was also trying to encourage more people to write and be more aware of politics in Vietnam. I was one of the people she inspired to take writing as a profession and focus more on Vietnam’s human rights and political affairs.

    In my writing career, I have two people to be grateful for: my two co-founders of Legal Initiatives for Vietnam (LIV), Trinh Huu Long and Pham Doan Trang. If I had not met them in life, I don’t think I would have been confident enough to write in either Vietnamese or English, especially as a journalist.

    I left Vietnam and came to the United States when I was 12-years-old. I was not too young to think of myself as a native speaker in English, but I was not too old to be confident in my ability to write in Vietnamese either. However, after meeting Trinh Huu Long and Pham Doan Trang in 2014, they changed my life as I believed in their cause and decided to co-found LIV. Starting from that point, I began to promote human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in Vietnam through journalism. Trinh Huu Long may be the first teacher in journalism for me, but Doan Trang is the inspiration for my decision to change my career from law to journalism.

    Many people have asked me why I decided to quit my legal profession and started working for a non-profit organization that focuses on Vietnam. Maybe this career change was not advantageous for them and could be stepping down in life. But Doan Trang’s last words before she left the United States stuck with me throughout these years: “Every country needs a generation of young people who will sacrifice their lives to build a better society for others. If our generation refuses to take up this job for Vietnam, then who else will? Do we wait for the next generation to sacrifice for our country and choose an easier life now?”

    Doan Trang chose to take up this task to promote human rights in Vietnam, and she left America to go back to Vietnam, knowing that she would be imprisoned in the future. Then, for me, the decision of giving up my life as a litigation lawyer to write about human rights and political issues in Vietnam seemed to be a much easier job when I compared myself with Doan Trang.

    She’s inspired me, and we both have the same goal: to put Vietnam on the map for international audiences and encourage more Vietnamese people to care about human rights and democracy. To write about these issues should not be a crime in any nation because we only want to educate the public. What did we do so wrong that my friend Pham Doan Trang has spent one year incommunicado in Vietnam?

    The Vietnamese government cannot explain away Pham Doan Trang’s case or any political cases that have sent hundreds of dissidents to decades in jail. However, I hope the international community and foreign governments can speak up louder and be more explicit against this injustice.

    Journalism is not a crime; writing about politics and human rights is not a crime. Vietnam continues to suppress the free press and the freedom of speech much harder now, which is not an action the international community should condone. Please speak up for those imprisoned by the Vietnam government, such as Pham Doan Trang, because we are on the right side of history.