Tag: 39 Vietnamese

  • Vietnamese Vision Of A “Clean Newspaper” And The Government’s Intolerance To Press Freedom

    Vietnamese Vision Of A “Clean Newspaper” And The Government’s Intolerance To Press Freedom

    This year as the world triumphs the importance of free speech with the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to two journalists, Maria Ressa and Dmitry Muratov, for their “efforts to safeguard freedom of expression,” Vietnam has taken a step backward in its respect for press freedom by arresting and imprisoning independent journalists.

    On October 26, the local Court of Can Tho City began to try five members of the Bao Sach (Clean Newspaper) group, a Facebook-based journalism project, for allegedly “abusing the rights to freedom and democracy” that the government deemed “threatening” to state interests and security. Two days later, on October 28, five members of Bao Sach were sentenced to a total of 14 years and six months in prison.

    Meanwhile, the Court of Hanoi City is also expected to try prominent journalist Pham Doan Trang for “propagandizing against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam;” the evidence used to prosecute Doan Trang includes her written reports and assessment regarding environmental issues, the human rights situation, and religious freedom in Vietnam.

    In some ways, when we congratulate the two journalists who were awarded the prestigious Nobel Peace Prize in 2021, Maria Ressa of the Philippines and Dmitry Muratov of Russia, we also feel saddened to think about the Bao Sach members and Pham Doan Trang. These Vietnamese journalists have been facing never-ending hurdles reporting the truth under the repressive hands of authoritarian leaders.

    Vision for a better journalistic environment in Vietnam

    Established in 2019, Bao Sach started off as a Facebook-based project which investigated and reported on the alleged corruption and misconduct of Vietnamese government officials and state-owned companies. Corruption and mismanagement are ubiquitous in Vietnam’s governance system. The project quickly attracted a substantial number of followers in its fan page on Facebook, as the role of the social network in Vietnam is similar to its neighbor, the Philippines, where it is essentially viewed as the Internet.[1]

    The journalistic group’s name, Clean Newspaper, refers to its commitment to journalism ethics by truth and impartiality rather than becoming another mouthpiece of the Communist government. Bao Sach gained popularity through its fact-based and accurate reporting that helped expose and provide insights into the many social issues to which the Vietnamese public pay attention, most notably the case of Ho Duy Hai, who was given the death penalty in an unfair trial.

    However, being a vocal critic in a tightly controlled media environment comes with a cost. Not much different from what Rappler Founder Maria Ressa [2] faced as a journalist in the Philippines, independent journalists, and human rights activists in Vietnam also live in constant fear of harassment by government-funded online trolls and arbitrary arrests and charges under vague laws, which have no purpose other than to curb freedom of expression.

    Bao Sach’s (Clean Newspaper) members. Photo: RFA.

    Late last year, Truong Chau Huu Danh, one of the co-founders of Bao Sach, was arrested by the police, which marked the end of one of the promising independent media projects in Vietnam. Bao Sach’s Facebook page was shortly suspended after Danh’s apprehension; three members were arrested earlier in April this year.

    Subsequently, they were charged with “abusing the rights to freedom and democracy to infringe on state interests” under Article 331 of Vietnam’s 2015 Penal Code, which has been strongly criticized [3] by the international community and legal authorities for its vagueness and lack of clear definitions of the actual conduct.

    Similarly, Doan Trang’s vision [4] of a journalism project to provide Vietnamese people with an understanding of law, politics, and human rights also led to her arrest and detention. She was charged with “propagandizing against the State,” another criminal charge commonly used by the Vietnamese government to suppress dissenting opinions in the country.

    The Vietnamese government’s intolerance to press freedom

    Nevertheless, the Bao Sach members and Doan Trang are among dozens of independent reporters, journalists, and broadcasters constantly harassed or detained by the Communist authorities. Critical reporting of online bloggers and live-streamers also meets with increasing censorship as Facebook, Vietnam’s most popular social media site has in recent years reportedly complied with the government to remove “anti-state” posts. According to local activists and free-speech advocates, [5] the tech giant’s compliance is giving the Vietnamese authorities “near-total control over the platform.”

    Despite the Vietnamese Communist Party trying to boast and propagandize [6] about its state of press freedom and its respect for human rights, Vietnam scores poorly on almost every international ranking regarding press freedom and fundamental civil rights.

    Vietnam ranks [7] at 175th out of 180 countries on the 2021 World Press Freedom Index from Reporters Without Borders in terms of free press. It is also among those countries with the highest number of detained journalists, according to figures [8] compiled by the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) in 2020.

    Vietnam ranks 175th out of 180 countries in terms of press freedom. Photo: screenshot/ Reporters Without Borders.

    On civil rights, Freedom House, a non-partisan organization working to promote freedom and democracy, declared that Vietnam was “not free” when it comes to internet freedom. The Vietnamese government later criticized the results, allegedly requesting Freedom House to “stop making groundless assessments” [9] on the situation of internet freedom in the country. However, the government failed to provide concrete evidence to explain its alleged repression of internet users’ rights, other than a few fragmented pieces of information bragging about the country’s growth in internet users and its Human Development Index.

    The journey to a truly free, progressive, and independent media environment in Vietnam is still long and arduous, given the arbitrary arrests of independent journalists in recent years and an increasingly restricted social media space. However, if Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh wants to realize his pledge [10] to “listen to dissenting opinions [and] debates,” then Vietnam must respect freedom of the press and allow journalists to express their viewpoints freely. It would also contribute to the long-term development of both Vietnam as a country and its journalistic environment.

    References:

    1. Vick, K. (2021, October 8). “It Is a Battle for Facts.” What Nobel Peace Prize Winner Maria Ressa Understands About Why She Was Chosen. Time. https://time.com/6105407/maria-ressa-nobel-prize-interview/
    2. Andrew Yeo, Enrico Gloria. (2021, October 21). In a first, the Nobel Peace Prize went to a Filipina. Her government isn’t happy. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/10/21/first-nobel-peace-prize-went-filipina-her-government-isnt-happy/
    3. The Vietnamese Magazine. (2021, October 26). Statement On The Upcoming Trial Of Bao Sach (Clean Newspaper). The Vietnamese Magazine. https://www.thevietnamese.org/2021/10/statement-on-the-upcoming-trial-of-bao-sach-clean-newspaper/
    4. Tran Phuong, Will Nguyen. (2021, February 14). Who Is Pham Doan Trang? The Vietnamese Magazine. https://www.thevietnamese.org/2021/02/who-is-pham-doan-trang/
    5. Elizabeth Dwoskin, Tory Newmyer, Shibani Mahtani. (2021, October 25). The case against Mark Zuckerberg: Insiders say Facebook’s CEO chose growth over safety. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/10/25/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-whistleblower/
    6. Đối diện: Nhân quyền. (2021, October 27). VTV. https://vtv.vn/video/doi-dien-nhan-quyen-527961.htm
    7. Vietnam – Reporters Without Borders. (n.d.). Reporters Without Borders. Retrieved October 28, 2021, from https://rsf.org/en/vietnam
    8. Record number of journalists jailed worldwide. (2020, December 15). Committee to Protect Journalists. https://cpj.org/reports/2020/12/record-number-journalists-jailed-imprisoned/
    9. VNA, (2021, September 29). Freedom House should stop making groundless assessments on internet freedom in Vietnam. VietnamPlus. https://en.vietnamplus.vn/freedom-house-should-stop-making-groundless-assessments-on-internet-freedom-in-vietnam/208842.vnp
    10. Tuan, V. (2021, April 15). Thủ tướng Phạm Minh Chính: “Chính phủ phải lắng nghe ý kiến phản biện.” VnExpress. https://vnexpress.net/thu-tuong-pham-minh-chinh-chinh-phu-phai-lang-nghe-y-kien-phan-bien-4263570.html
  • Pham Doan Trang’s Trial Postponed While UN Working Group On Arbitrary Detention Called For Her Immediate Release

    Pham Doan Trang’s Trial Postponed While UN Working Group On Arbitrary Detention Called For Her Immediate Release

    Vietnam arrested Pham Doan Trang on October 7, 2020, and charged her under Article 88 of its 1999 Penal Code for allegedly “making, storing, distributing or disseminating information, documents, and items against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.” Her trial was originally scheduled to take place on November 4, 2021, but the court postponed her trial due to the prosecutors having come into contact with COVID-19.

    However, on October 25, 2021, the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD), a team of five independent experts tasked with investigating “cases of deprivation of liberty imposed arbitrarily or inconsistently with the international standards set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” released their opinions regarding the arrest, detention, and treatment by the Vietnamese state of internationally recognized independent journalist and human rights defender Pham Doan Trang.

    In this document, WGAD scrutinizes the formal statements given by the side of Doan Trang and that of the Vietnamese government in order to verify the authenticity of the claims regarding her situation in custody and to provide recommendations for the Vietnamese government.

    WGAD also stated that even though the Vietnamese government vehemently rejects the accusations alleged by the side of Doan Trang and that “[the Vietnamese government] cannot provide detailed information regarding this case to the press and other irrelevant parties,” WGAD will still continue with its investigation as part of its mandate “to serve the needs of victims of arbitrary arrest and detention worldwide.”

    WGAD concluded that “the deprivation of liberty of Pham Doan Trang, being in contravention of articles 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 19, 20 and 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 2, 9, 14, 15, 16, 19, 21, 22, 25 and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is arbitrary and falls within categories I, II, III, and V.”

    Regarding Doan Trang’s arrest by state forces, WGAD believes that the Vietnamese authorities failed to present a warrant for her arrest and that Doan Trang was not informed of the charges lodged against her. She was also never brought before an independent judicial authority in order to challenge her detention.

    Likewise, WGAD upholds that Doan Trang was put under Incommunicado Detention which “is an environment conducive to torture and cruel inhumane treatment, as it may be used to coerce the individual to confess to the commission of the alleged crimes and admit guilt.” Furthermore, WGAD states that the initial charge under Article 117 of the Vietnamese Criminal Code is “so vague that it is impossible to invoke a legal basis for her detention.” Hence, WGAD concludes that the Vietnamese government failed to establish a legal basis for Doan Trang’s arrest and detention.

    WGAD also believed that she was detained for “peacefully exercising her rights to freedom of opinion, expression, and association.”. As such, it has referred this case to the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression and to the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association.

    WGAD also stated that because Doan Trang was not allowed to speak to her defense lawyers until recently, and was denied legal counsel, her right to a fair and just trial has been violated.

    Likewise, WGAD found that Doan Trang was “deprived of her liberty on discriminatory grounds” due to her being a vocal human rights defender and because of her political stance and opinions.

    In light of all the information presented, WGAD requests that the Vietnamese government take all the necessary steps needed in order to remedy Doan Trang’s situation in order to “bring it into conformity with the relevant international norms.”

    WGAD believes that the best remedy would be to urgently and immediately release Doan Trang and compensate her in accordance with international law. WGAD also urges the Vietnamese government to ensure a “full and independent investigation” of Doan Trang’s arbitrary detention and to “take appropriate measures against those responsible for the violation of her rights.”


    The UN WGAD’s full statement can be found here

  • The Yin And Yang Of Vietnamese Nationalism: Phan Chau Trinh And Phan Boi Chau’s Thoughts On Vietnam’s Independence

    The Yin And Yang Of Vietnamese Nationalism: Phan Chau Trinh And Phan Boi Chau’s Thoughts On Vietnam’s Independence

    Why Should We Care About Non-Communist Discourse of Vietnamese Nationhood?

    While issues on Vietnamese nationalism have been widely discussed in academia, the English scholarship on Vietnam’s politics and political history since the 1950s has remained ambivalent toward what constitutes the authenticity of modern Vietnamese nationalism.

    The old historiography of the Vietnam War has mistakenly represented Marxist-Leninism as the authentic discourse of Vietnamese nationhood. Prominent Vietnam War historian William Duiker criticized the republican nationalism of Phan Boi Chau as theoretically immature and inherently gullible [1]. As a leading scholar of the new generation of Vietnam War historians, Tuong Vu notes that there was the tendency to allow “the Cần Vương, Đông Du and Việt Minh (the front organization for the Indochinese during the war years) to be lumped together.”[2]

    Under the pervasive influence of party propaganda, the local historiography of Vietnamese nationhood has been dominated by the Marxist dialectical materialist interpretation of history in which republican nationalists are tainted by “bourgeois mentality.”[3]

    For the past two decades, a small number of regime critics and democracy activists have turned to the republican thoughts for new ideas on the future model of Vietnam’s democratization and development.

    In Ha Si Phu’s sophisticated critique of Marxism, Chia Tay Y Thuc He[Abandoning Ideology], the author argues that one crucial precondition for Vietnam transition to democracy is the “People’s Enlightenment” [Dan Tri], which as I will discuss later, is central to Phan Chau Trinh’s discourse of Vietnamese nationhood.

    The idea has been echoed and elaborated in Nguyen Quang A’s Phan Chau Trinh va Thuyet Hien Dai Moi [Phan Chau Trinh and the New Modernization Theory] and Mai Thai Linh’s commentary on the meaning of the 2009’s Vietnamese Bauxite Mining Opposition, Tu Dan Tri Den Dan Khi [From the People’s Enlightenment to the People’s Will]. In contributing to the English and Vietnamese scholarships in Republican Nationalism, I will discuss and compare the political thoughts of Phan Boi Chau and Phan Chau Trinh in great depth.

    French colonial rule was the reality of every Vietnamese person between the late 19th and early 20th centuries, regardless of who they were, what they did, and where they lived. It is more significant to uncover how the experience of living in such a colonial context inspired the development of Vietnamese nationalist thought. Related to this was the increasing access to books and other print materials in the second half of the 19th century.

    During the pre-colonial period, Confucian literati did not have any reason to print their texts for mass consumption. Hence, their writings were only made accessible to a small number of people from the elite class. However, the spread of these writings, alongside many other newer texts, was crucial for the rise of modern Vietnamese nationalism.[4]

    By the end of 1935, about 15 or 20 percent of all children between six and twelve were enrolled in public and private schools. Somewhere between 10 to 20 percent of the population were literate; these figures continued to increase.[5] Likewise, French censorship did not stop the influx of Western, Chinese, and Japanese ideas to Vietnam through the ports of Hai Phong, Hue, Saigon, and Hanoi.

    It was through the translations of propaganda pamphlets, open letters to government officials, textbooks, political manifestos, newspaper columns, public proclamations, petitions to international agencies, translated philosophical and political works, and poems that local people and young Confucian intellectuals started to imagine what the Vietnamese nation could be.[6]

    Inspired by the idea of reforming colonial Vietnam, the young Confucian literati played a vital role in the emergence of modern nationalism through their writings on colonial policies and social reforms. They were a small group of young intellectuals who, after receiving French education at home or studying overseas in Japan or France, became disillusioned with the corrupt and decadent Vietnamese monarchy. They were also enraged by the pervasive socioeconomic inequality between the wealthy landowners and the peasants, the power asymmetry between the mandarins and the people, and the French colonizers’ brutal exploitation of the indigenous people.

    Understanding Republican Nationalism in Phan Boi Chau and Phan Chau Trinh’s Political Theory

    The writings of Phan Boi Chau and Phan Chau Trinh can be seen as the “Yin and Yang” of early Vietnamese nationalism. They can be divided into two distinct discourses: conservative and radical nationalist. [7] Chau was a prominent champion of radical nationalism, while Trinh was a staunch proponent of the Franco-Vietnam alliance.

    Chau and Trinh were the leaders of the Dong Du and the Duy Tan movements respectively and enjoyed several years of friendship. [8] However, Chau’s fixation on taking back the country from the French via borrowing Japanese military support and Trinh’s desire for building a free Vietnam through education and peaceful diplomacy led to much tension between them, and eventually, their friendship ended.

    Some of the significant contributions of their discourse are pointing out the distinction between the king and the nation and the moral decay of the Vietnamese monarchical system, which had been perpetuating false Confucian teachings by the old generation of Vietnamese literati. Vietnamese people had been taught to blindly revere their king without questioning his qualities and policies.[9]

    In the History of Vietnam’s Loss [Vietnam Vong Quoc Su], Phan Boi Chau attributes the loss of Vietnam partially to the corruption and puppetry of the Nguyen Dynasty. He asserts that the “monarchy is a poisonous autocratic regime that sucks the blood of all the Vietnamese people…[and] the people are so ignorant,  [that] they fail to seize their own rights [dan quyen] and the fate of the nation [quoc menh] … [from] these poisonous men.” [10] The corrupt monarchy is the reason why popular rights and patriotism have never been realized in Vietnam because the king’s personal desires often go against the public interest.[11]

    Phan Chau Trinh links popular rights with the ethics of a nation, which was non-existent in Vietnamese society at that time since the people’s love for their nation and their duty to protect it were dwarfed by their love for their king and their duty to serve him as his subjects. Trinh continues, “the people are therefore not aware of the distinction between king and country” and of the legacy their ancestors had left behind.[12]

    Chau’s critique of the monarchical system is a combination of the Confucian (Mencius) vision of democracy, which centers on the idea that the government is responsible for the physical and moral well-being of its people, and the Republican concept of popular sovereignty in which the government is established to serve the interests of the people. [13] In his conception of the nation, the monarch must be treated as part of the government or state rather than above it, and patriotism means being loyal to the people rather than the king.

    Both radical and conservative variants of the discourse on Vietnamese nationhood share the pessimistic view that Vietnamese people were born into a culture that perpetuated this vicious asymmetrical relationship. [14] The social ethics of the nation were lost under the monarchy. Vietnamese people lost their sense of solidarity and the public interest because the mandarins, who were “thirsty for glory bestowed by imperial dynasties,” created “laws that broke down the solidarity among the people” to protect their wealth and power. In other words, the selfishness of the king and mandarins led to their neglect of the public good.

    Conservative and radical nationalists differ in their modus operandi of freeing the nation from French colonialism. The conservatives proposed a non-violent approach towards building an independent Vietnam; they believed that deepening Franco-Vietnam collaboration and peaceful diplomatic relations could salvage the country from its socioeconomic regression and the decay of traditional education and cultural practices.

    They maintained that social, economic, cultural, and political reform require Vietnamese people to learn from Western (particularly French) education, philosophy, and modernization. This idea is predicated upon the belief that the French would, at some point, give Vietnam autonomy and that after a period of modernization, the Vietnamese people would develop intellectually and would have enough material resources for self-rule.

    The “people’s enlightenment [intellectual understanding],” the “improvement of their resources,” and the establishment of modern socio-economic institutions (e.g., academia, public spheres, and commercial enterprises) take precedence over the right to self-determination given the social, economic, political and cultural backwardness of the Vietnamese people.

    The conservatives believed that emphasis on social and economic rights did not come at the expense of failing to protect other civil and political rights. Rather, they held that Vietnamese society’s intellectual and socio-economic modernization was necessary for the development of political freedom. Violence would not be able to achieve true independence without the participation of well-informed and well-educated people. Pushing for immediate self-rule without these preconditions was seen as precarious and futile to Vietnam’s long-term survival. They believed that the genuine independence of the Vietnamese people would not only stem from their freedom to exercise their popular rights but from their capacity to understand how to use these rights to serve both their interests and those of the nation.

    The radical nationalists, by contrast, sought to convince their compatriots of the humiliating situation Vietnam found itself in. Their plan for nation-building involved leading the whole native population to expel the “evil French” out of Vietnam through military means, followed by building a new republican state governed by the people. This “penchant” for raising an armed revolution against the French to achieve national independence rested on Chau’s political doctrine on national independence, which held that a nation was made up of three parts: people, land, and sovereignty. Out of these three, Chau viewed the people as being the most important and the “soul” of the nation. For Phan Boi Chau, a nation is free only if its people are free:

    According to the established national law, a nation [nuoc] must be constituted by three elements: people [nhan dan], land [dat dai], and sovereignty [chu quyen]. Any nation lacking these three components is not considered a nation. Of those three, the people are the most important. Without the people, the land will be left uncultivated and national sovereignty will be lost. The nation survives when the people survive; the nation collapses when the people perish. [15]

    Yet how does one know if a person is free? For Chau, the Vietnamese people are free only if they are free to exercise “dân quyền,” or popular rights:

    In order to determine whether the people exist, one must see whether the rights of the people exist. If these rights are honored, then the people will be respected, and the nation will get strong. If such rights are violated, then people will be held in contempt and the nation will become weak. If such rights are completely lost, then we lose the people and the nation too.[16]

    When the Vietnamese people’s ability to exercise their popular rights was taken away by the French, Vietnam was no longer a free nation, even if territorial sovereignty and the people’s ownership of the land were kept intact.

    Among these popular rights, Chau heavily emphasized the right to non-interference and non-domination from the French and the right to establish a government elected by Vietnamese people under the rule of law. He associated national liberty with the survival of the Vietnamese people and with their freedom to exercise the right to self-rule.

    Specifically, Chau argued that the right to self-determination consisted of the right to be free from the domination and exploitation of the oppressor — the French. An independent Vietnam existed only if the Vietnamese people were free of the master-slave relationship with the French.[17]

    To this end, Chau believed that the demise of the French government in Vietnam marked the birth of a Vietnamese sovereign, whose primary responsibility was to serve the interests of the citizens and to guarantee their freedom to exercise their rights. Each citizen, in return, had the obligation to serve the interests of the national community. The interests of the sovereign and its people were intertwined.

    Phan Boi Chau and Phan Chu Trinh were the Yin and Yang of Vietnamese nationalist discourse. From a cursory look, their ideas may stand in contrast to each other. Nonetheless, a close comparison of their political thought has shown that their visions for Vietnamese nation-building were complementary; one was incomplete without the other.

    Trinh criticized Chau for being impetuous and irrational in his solution for securing the country’s independence, arguing that relying on the French did not necessarily mean that Vietnam would regain its autonomy. Chau may also have been naïve in his belief that Japan would have been willing to help Vietnam defeat France with little political costs, since by the turn of the 20thcentury, Japan had turned into another hungry and ruthless colonizer.

    However, Chau’s writings on popular rights reflected the horrid conditions of France’s brutal exploitation of the native population, something which is understated in Trinh’s own discourse. Chau may have been an avid proponent for human rights protection in colonial Vietnam, yet these rights may not have been respected nor protected if the people failed to understand the significance of these rights in the context of the nation. Trinh maintained that the comprehension of human rights can only happen if the people are educated in Western science and philosophy.

    Trinh could also be said to have been too idealistic in his belief that it would be rational for the French not to have helped in building a strong Vietnam, for doing so would have threatened its colonial rule. Trinh’s conceptions of morality and ethics needed further theorizing and conceptual clarification since he never explained how Confucian teaching could be made compatible with Western theories on national and social ethics. In other words, Trinh had not examined the extent to which the five basic human virtues of Confucianism could be applied to Western philosophical thought.

    In the early 1900s, Vietnamese anti-colonial theory was still in its infancy partly because local scholars still lacked access to the original texts of Western political philosophers. Nevertheless, the writings of Phan Chau Trinh and Phan Boi Chau had a substantial impact on the crystallization of the early Vietnamese national consciousness by elaborating on the concepts of patriotism and popular rights, which were nonexistent in a monarchical Vietnam where the people’s love and duty for their nation were second to their public reverence for the emperor and his family. However, it may be that their thoughts, once again, will find their ways to be beneficial to the democratization and nation-building of Vietnam in this century.

    Bibliography:

    1. William Duiker, The Rise of Vietnamese Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 9
    2. Tuong Vu, “Vietnamese Political Studies and Debates on Vietnamese Nationalism,” Journal of Vietnamese Studies,Vol. 2, Issue 1 (2007): 191-192.
    3. Patricia Pelley, Postcolonial Vietnam: New Histories of the National Past (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002).
    4. Shawn Frederick McHale, Print and Power: Confucianism, Communism, and Buddhism in the Making of Modern Vietnam, New edition (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2008), 33.
    5. David G. Marr, Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, 1920-1945 (Univ of California Press, 1981), 34.
    6. Truong Buu Lam, Colonialism Experienced: Vietnamese Writings on Colonialism, 1900-1931 (University of Michigan Press, 2000).
    7. The labeling is used for the purpose of categorization and based on Hue-Tam Ho Tai, Radicalism and the Origins of the Vietnamese Revolution (Harvard University Press, 1996), in which the author labels the anti-colonial activists in the early 1900s who advocated military means of resistance as “radical nationalist.” Thus, the terms “radical” and “conservative” refer to the strategy of resistance rather than their traditional meaning that is often understood as a person’s ideological position. The term “republican” is based on the labeling in Christopher Goscha, The Penguin History of Modern Vietnam: A History (Penguin UK, 2016). For this paper, my interpretations of these discourses are mostly based on their most influential and well-developed representatives, Phan Boi Chau and Phan Chu Trinh for two reasons. First, their texts have influenced Marxist-Leninist discourse and other nationalist discourses. Phan Boi Chau’s militant ideas and his model of democracy influenced Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (VNQDD) organizational and revolutionary theory.
    8. In Western tradition, it is the norm to reference authors by their last name. Nonetheless, in Vietnamese culture it is considered formal and polite to address professors, writers, and authors by their first name. Moreover, because the thinkers’ last names are identical, referencing their last name would confuse readers. For the rest of the article, when referencing Phan Chau Trinh and Phan Boi Chau in their full name, I will simply write Trinh and Chau respectively.
    9. Phan, Phan Chau Trinh And His Political Writings, 108. For more criticisms of the monarchy, see Phan Chau Trinh, “Viet Nam Quoc Dan Phan Chau Trinh ky thu Viet Nam Duong Kim Hoang De” in Chuong Thau et. al, ed., Phan Chau Trinh Toan Tap[Complete Works by Phan Chau Trinh], v.3, 135-155.
    10. Phan Boi Chau, “Tan Viet Nam” in Chuong Thau, ed., Phan Boi Chau Toan Tap[Complete Works by Phan Boi Chau], v. 2, 255
    11. For a detailed argument, see Phan Chau Trinh, “Quan Tri Chu Nghia va Dan Tri Chu Nghia” in Chuong Thau et. al, ed., Phan Chau Trinh Toan Tap [Complete Works by Phan Chau Trinh], v.3, 266-283.
    12. Chu Trinh Phan, Phan Châu Trinh and His Political Writings, vol. 49 (SEAP Publications, 2009), 110.
    13. Chau states that: “In this life, without Mencius the notion that “the people as the most important element” [in a nation] would not be realized; without Rosseau, the flag of “popular rights” would not be raised…Those who love themselves definitely love their compatriots, those who love their compatriots love their country, and those who love their country are willing to sacrifice their individual interests to protect their country. This is the true meaning of patriotism. See Phan Chau Trinh, Complete Works, vol .4, (Hue: Thuan Hoa Publishing House, 1990), 32-55.
    14. In Quan Tri Chu Nghia va Dan Tri Chu Nghia, Phan Chau Trinh used the sentence “lot long me da chiu cai nghia vua toi” (p274).
    15. Phan Boi Chau, Complete Works by Phan Boi Chau, v.2, 386
    16. Ibid.
    17. It is difficult to trace the philosophical root of Chau’s conception of liberty, but the following quote shows that that his proposition is a combination of Mencius’s limited version of democracy, which centers on the ideas of the responsibility of government for the physical and moral well-being of the people, and Rosseau’s conception of popular sovereignty in which a government is established from a social contract to serve the interests of the people.
  • Biden’s Emphasis On Soft Power And What It Means For Vietnam’s Democracy Movement

    Biden’s Emphasis On Soft Power And What It Means For Vietnam’s Democracy Movement

    President Joe Biden has repeatedly emphasised “soft power” in his foreign policy speeches. Will this policy work in Vietnam? And how will it affect Vietnam’s democracy movement?

    Biden’s emphasis on soft power: what’s in store for Vietnam and should one believe it?

    It’s almost a year into Joe Biden’s presidency. Throughout his tenure, two keywords, “relentless diplomacy” and “soft power,” have echoed in every corner where US foreign policy is concerned: from the ending of the “forever war” in Afghanistan to the reorganisation of trans-Atlantic relations, and to engagement with Asia. The challenges for which President Biden will implement his “relentless diplomacy” and “soft power” approach are, in short, the covid pandemic, climate change, and China[1].

    Vietnamese readers can be assured of Biden’s serious interest in Asia by, amongst others, the appointment of a competent expert Kurt Campbell [2] as the White House coordinator for the Indo-Pacific region, US support for Taiwan and its alliance with Japan, vaccine donations, and, most recently, Vice President Kamala Harris’ visit to the region and Vietnam specifically.

    Regarding China, Biden’s promise [3] of “fighting corruption, defending against authoritarianism, and advancing human rights” will be arguably the most effective tool for the United States in the realm of soft power. Economic and military strength notwithstanding, the Chinese regime is infamous for its authoritarian governance and long record of human rights violations. Ironically, China’s military strength, as observed in its actions in the South China Sea, makes its draconian image even more despicable.

    By contrast, the era of Pax Americana, despite criticisms of US imperialism, has built an overall image of the United States as a promoter of human rights and democracy. Although the recent Afghanistan debacle has damaged the reputation of the United States, Biden has been quick to assert [4] that the new era of US foreign policy will be about “lifting people up around the world” and “renewing and defending democracy”.

    Speaking of Pax Americana, Biden’s emphasis on “soft power” and “relentless diplomacy” happens in a context different than that of American leaders of the past who boasted about a US “moral imperative” and “doing the right thing” only to turn a cold shoulder to their allies when the tide of geopolitics turned. In the post-Americana era, despite Biden’s denial/rejection [5] of the imminent “China-US Cold War”,  it is widely recognised (as indicated by the US “pivot to Asia”[6]) that US national interests depend on whether or not the United States can counter China’s plays in Asia. As such, one can expect Biden’s words to have substance rather than just simply paying lip service.

    Biden’s “soft power” in Vietnam: the state-versus-people conundrum

    When it comes to China and human rights, there is a clear distinction between the perspectives of the Vietnamese state and the Vietnamese people. At the most basic level, Vietnamese leaders have little to no concern for the interests of their people because their positions are not determined by voters. Vietnam’s election is well known for being a farce [7].

    The divergence between the Vietnamese public and the Vietnamese government on China could not be clearer. When the government approved a bauxite project related to China in 2009, the Vietnamese people signed a petition to oppose it. When the people took to the streets in the early years of the 2010s to oppose China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea, the government cracked down on these protests and detained several protesters. When the Special Economic Zone bill was announced, it was perceived by the Vietnamese public as giving questionable privileges to China and also was seen as a threat to Vietnam’s national security. As a result, massive protests broke out in the streets in 2018 and the bill was shelved as a result.

    Most recently, the use of China’s COVID vaccines in Vietnam has been met with public resistance and fierce criticism of the government. Anti-China protesters’ shouts of, “Coward to the enemy, cruel to the people!” (“Hèn với giặc, ác với dân!”), is precisely the Vietnamese people’s attitude towards their government on China.

    At this point, one may argue: “But the Vietnamese government has also spoken up against China many times, so it cannot be as pro-China as the above-mentioned events indicate.” This is true and quite a few analyses [8] have highlighted the stake for the Vietnamese government in playing US-China politics wisely instead of simply bowing to China. However, it is important to understand that when Vietnamese leaders do stand up to China, it is often “all bark and no bite.”[9] More importantly, whether Vietnamese leaders shake hands with Biden or with Xi, or play the superpowers off against each other, they do so first and foremost based on their, or the Communist Party’s, own interest [10], rather than on the interests of the country and the people.

    Thus, it is highly unlikely that the United States will find a true ally in the Vietnamese government in its state-to-state diplomacy against China. Because of this, the US will also find it difficult to tap into the Vietnamese public’s anti-China sentiment. Hanoi has shown little to no concern about how Vietnamese citizens feel or about what they want, and it has unreservedly deployed force to quell anti-China protests and online dissent in the past.

    The road to promoting human rights in Vietnam does not seem promising either, especially the rights to free speech, peaceful assembly, association, and fair trial. The promise of US leaders to “respect Vietnam’s political system” [11] seems rather odd because the very existence and stability of Vietnam’s political system rest on the suppression of exactly those rights. The relentless arrests of people who speak critically of the government on their Facebook pages and of those who ran as independent candidates in the lead-up to the May 2021 national election are just some examples.

    What has played out so far in the field of human rights does not show much innovation. State-to-state talks about the situation of human rights in the country, assistance for specific high-profile activists who have been arrested and who are on trial, and US leaders holding meetings with local activists are all par for the course. It remains to be seen if Biden’s administration will open a new chapter of human rights promotion through public diplomacy or if it will lead to more of the same: the worsening of human rights and democratic freedoms in Vietnam.

    Public diplomacy and soft power: a look into the books

    The term “public diplomacy” was first coined in 1965 by Edmund Gullion, founder of the Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy at Tufts University (Cull, 2009) [12]. Definitions vary but all agree that public diplomacy is a foreign policy practice entailing nation A engaging with the public of nation B in order to influence B’s foreign policy through bottom-up pressure to A’s advantage (Bettie, 2014) [13]. In short, it is about image projection and national branding, which is distinctly different from traditional diplomacy which consists of state-to-state engagement.

    In the work of historian Nicholas J. Cull (2008) [14], activities that count as public diplomacy include (1) presenting new policy ideas to the foreign public (i.e., advocacy), (2) exportation of culture to foreign countries as well as two-way cultural exchanges, and (3) international broadcasting (i.e., reaching a foreign public through mass media).

    While public diplomacy can be understood as a channel of persuasion, soft power is the content that gives a nation the power to persuade the foreign public. Prominent soft power scholar, Joseph S. Nye Jr., defines soft power as the attractiveness of a nation that lies in its culture, including its language, arts, cuisine, institutions, brands, and moral values (Nye, 2008) [15]. Soft power goes hand-in-hand with public diplomacy, as “public diplomacy tries to attract by drawing attention to these potential resources through broadcasting, subsidizing cultural exports, arranging exchanges, and so forth” (Nye, 2008, p. 95) [16].

    Soft power may also be drawn from hard power. The presence of US military forces in the South China Sea to aid countries bullied by China communicates certain moral values to the people of those countries. However, underlying such a presence in the more complex and pragmatic interests of the United States than simply a normative or moral stance.

    Using the above discussion on public diplomacy and soft power, how would President Biden’s plans for Vietnam measure up? What would his roadmap navigating the state-versus-people conundrum in the country look like?

    Evaluating Biden’s diplomacy and navigating Vietnam’s state-versus-people conundrum

    Biden’s words promise a new era of US diplomacy, but his actions so far still seem to be following classic state-to-state diplomacy and militaristic intervention more than what is prescribed for public diplomacy and soft power.

    Furthermore, public diplomacy has always been a component in US foreign policy in previous administrations through supporting local registered civil society organisations and non-formal oppositional actors. Thus, with Biden’s emphasis on “soft power,” his administration will disappoint if over the next few years it rehashes many or most of the previous administrations’ actions; this old approach is effectively circumscribed by the state-versus-people conundrum mentioned earlier.

    However, the good news for the United States is that despite the disastrous presidency of Donald Trump and the many upheavals in US politics and society, public opinion [17] in Vietnam is still in favour of the United States, especially when compared to China. The soft power is already there.

    As Vietnamese people have grown increasingly more concerned about Hong Kong and Taiwan, their opinion will also be shaped by how the United States intervenes in the Taiwan – China situation. The collapse of Hong Kong has done serious damage to the image of the West, but it is still looking good on the Taiwan front. In addition, the story of Taiwan is not just about standing up to China; it is also about nation-building and the nationalistic pride of a people who chose democracy over dictatorship.

    In summary, US soft power in/over Vietnam will come from the stories of human rights, democracy of the US itself, and its defence of Taiwan against China. This soft power will come across even stronger if US public diplomacy also promotes Taiwan as the protagonist in the region, as a counter to Chinese politics, and as an inspiring story of Asian democratisation. These narratives will further widen the gap between Vietnamese hearts and minds and China, while simultaneously raising aspirations for democratisation amongst the Vietnamese people. In doing so, the United States will also not give a reason for the Vietnamese state-owned media to be hostile towards democratisation and the Vietnamese democracy movement. State propaganda cannot accuse America of imposing Western political ideas and values, nor of hypocrisy and one-upmanship if the US approaches the issue in this way.

    Having said earlier that the Vietnamese government has shown little to no concern about the Vietnamese people’s anti-China sentiments and that it uses brute force against human rights and democracy activists, what is the point of raising aspirations for democratisation and being critical of China? The point to be made is precisely about the kind of mass awareness and feeling of efficacy that will translate into the political agency and oppositional collective action. Old school public diplomacy has come short of this task and has failed to help the Vietnam democracy movement gain strength in numbers.

    My conversations with prominent activists in Vietnam’s human rights and democracy movement show that the seemingly invincible power of the Vietnamese government to repress dissent, the crackdown on protests, and carry on with unpopular policies, comes from the fact that the human rights and democracy movement is small in number and that the majority of the public lack the theoretical scaffolding to help them translate their discontent with the government and nationalistic sentiment into coherent and organised demand for democratisation.

    This article, written from my perspective as a Vietnamese, a scholar, and a supporter of collective action towards democracy for Vietnam, has suggested a few ways for American diplomats and foreign policy experts to walk President Biden’s talk.

    Meanwhile, Luat Khoa Tap Chi, a well-respected independent news outlet that serves Vietnamese readers, has already beefed up its column on Taiwan as an inspiring example of democracy for the Vietnamese. The comrades of Luat Khoa are also planning their next step, with Taiwan and mass awareness at the core of their strategy. The Biden administration, with the aim of utilizing soft power, should not miss this opportunity to work with them.

    Bibliography:

    1. Ash, T., G. (2020, 7 Nov). What will President Biden’s United States look like to the rest of the world? The Guardian.
    2. Green, M., J. (2021, 13 Jan). Biden makes his first bold move on Asia. The Guardian.
    3. Tran, B., T. (2021, 3 Jun). No Trade-off: Biden can both Deepen US-Vietnam Ties and Promote Human Rights. United States: Center for Strategic and International Studies.
    4. Borger, J. (2021, 21 Sep). Biden promises end to ‘relentless war’ and start of ‘relentless diplomacy’. The Guardian.
    5. ibid.
    6. ibid.
    7. Vu, A. & Gerin, R. (2021, 21 May). Vietnam goes to the polls with state-approved candidates offering little choice. Radio Free Asia.
    8. Nguyen, T., T., Q. (2021, 30 Sep). Trans-Pacific partner membership and the love triangle of Vietnam – Taiwan – China. The Vietnamese.
    9. Reed, A. (2021, 14 Mar). The enemy of my enemy: tensions between the US, China, and Vietnam. The Vietnamese.
    10. ibid.
    11. Tran, B., T. (2021, 3 Jun). No Trade-off: Biden can both Deepen US-Vietnam Ties and Promote Human Rights. United States: Center for Strategic and International Studies.
    12. Cull, N. (2009). Public Diplomacy Before Gullion: the Evolution of a Phrase. In: Snow, N. and Taylor, P. (eds). Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy (pp. 19-23). Tayler & Francis.
    13. Bettie, M., L. (2014). The Fulbright program and American public diplomacy (unpublished doctoral thesis). The University of Leeds, Leeds, United Kingdom.
    14. Cull, N. (2008). The Cold War and the United States Information Agency. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
    15. Nye, J. (2008). Public diplomacy and soft power. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616, pp. 94-109.
    16. ibid.
    17. Seah, S. et al., (2021). The state of Southeast Asia: 2021. Singapore: ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute.
  • Tightening The Noose: The Latest Developments In Vietnam’s Assault On Internet Freedom

    Tightening The Noose: The Latest Developments In Vietnam’s Assault On Internet Freedom

    On August 25, 2021, U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris met with several of Vietnam’s top leaders. According to a report by Reuters, while the focus of their dialogue centered on the South China Sea dispute and the strengthening of U.S presence in the region, she also brought up several human rights concerns with the Vietnamese government. Although Harris did not provide details about what they had discussed, the vice president assured the press that “[the United States] was “not going to shy away” from difficult conversations with countries the United States has partnerships with.

    Prior to her arrival, Vietnam was already dealing with a surge in Covid-19 infections, which resulted in lockdowns and travel restrictions in several places in the country, including Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi. As of September 26, Vietnam has tallied over 476,000 confirmed cases with 18,000 deaths. The Vietnamese government’s approach to containing the spread of the virus has been questionable at best with its use of state media and propaganda to control the narrative and deployment of the military to enforce lockdown measures.

    Yet, despite the ongoing health crisis and the dialogue with the U.S. vice president, Vietnam continues its crackdown, detention, and imprisonment of several online critics, journalists, and activists.

    Freedom on the Net 2021

    Freedom House, a US-based organization founded to support and defend democracy worldwide, released its annual Freedom on the Net report on September 21, 2021. This report analyzes the state of accessibility and censorship of a country’s cyber domain, alongside violations of internet users’ rights, and ranks each nation as being Free, Partly Free, or Not Free. It comes as no surprise that Vietnam continues to fare poorly in this regard; it has been classified as Not Free for three consecutive years and has been performing terribly under the standards set by Freedom House.

    This research highlights several aspects of the state of internet freedom in Vietnam. Regarding accessibility, Freedom House states that smartphone and internet penetration in the country has been good with internet prices becoming more affordable. However, connectivity continues to remain an issue for those living in extreme poverty and for ethnic minorities who live in the remote mountainous areas of Vietnam. Censorship also continues to be practiced by the Vietnamese government as it blocks or filters content coming from individuals and organizations that are critical of the regime. Predictably, Vietnam’s violation of internet-user rights is just as rampant compared to prior years with “police routinely [flouting] due process, arresting bloggers and online activists without a warrant or retaining them in custody beyond the maximum period allowed by law.”

    CIVICUS: Latest Developments in Vietnam

    On September 27, 2021, CIVICUS, an international alliance of various organizations that aim to strengthen citizen action and civil society worldwide, released its own report that details more recent events regarding the state of internet freedom in Vietnam. Similar to Freedom House, CIVICUS classifies Vietnam as Closed according to its own standards; a country with this rating exhibits “a complete closure of civic space” where “an atmosphere of fear and violence prevails, where state and powerful non-state actors are routinely allowed to imprison, seriously injure and kill people with impunity.” Criticism of those in power is also severely punished. Likewise, media freedom is virtually non-existent and the internet is heavily censored.

    The CIVICUS report begins by highlighting the cases of several Facebook users who were arrested or imprisoned under Articles 117 and 331 of Vietnam’s Criminal Code. Nguyen Van Lam and Tran Hoang Minh were both found guilty by Vietnamese courts of violating these statutes on July 20, 2021. Lam was sentenced to nine years in prison for “posting anti-state writings and sharing videos and other content, including broadcasts considered politically subversive,” and for “creating, storing, disseminating information and materials against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.” Minh was given five years of jail time for “abusing democratic freedom” and for his objections to the Dong Tam land dispute incident.

    The report continues with the arrests of Facebookers Tran Hoang Huan and Bui Van Thuan, on August 10, 2021, and August 30, 2021, respectively. Huan’s recent posts voiced his objections and concerns regarding Vietnam’s use of Chinese-made COVID-19 vaccines. He was charged by the Tien Giang People’s Procuracy for “making, storing and spreading or propagandizing information or documents against the state under Article 117 of the Penal Code.”  Bui Van Thuan was arrested in his home by policemen who pretended to be medical workers. Bui Van Thuan’s wife, Trinh Nhung, stated with The 88 Project that Thuan had previously posted “biting commentaries against the government’s handling of COVID-19 and other political issues.”

    The more recent cases of Nguyen Thuy Duong and Nguyen Duy Linh are also mentioned in the report. CIVICUS states that Amnesty International had reported on September 2, 2021, that Duong had been fined 5 million dong (US$220) for sharing a Facebook post that accused Vietnamese authorities of neglect during the COVID-19 lockdown. This post blamed the government for the rampant spread of hunger among city residents during this time. Nguyen Duy Linh was arrested on September 14 and charged by state authorities with “conducting anti-state propaganda” under Article 117 of the country’s Criminal Code.

    Updates regarding the case of detained human rights defender, journalist, and co-founder of The Vietnamese and the Luat Khoa online magazines, Pham Doan Trang, are also included in the CIVICUS report. On September 6, 2021, the government informed Doan Trang’s lawyer, Luan Le, that his client would be “formally indicted with ‘conducting propaganda against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam under Article 88 of the 1999 Penal Code.” Despite her case being brought to the attention of the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD), she still faces the very real possibility of being sentenced to 20 years imprisonment.

    Radio Free Asia’s coverage regarding the arrest of five journalists from the Facebook-based news outlet, Bao Sach (Clean Newspaper) is also mentioned in the report. Truong Chau Huu Danh, Nguyen Thanh Nha, Doan Kien Giang, Nguyen Phuong Trung Bao, and Le The Thang were charged with violating Article 331 of Vietnam’s Criminal Code for posting “anti-state and reactionary information” which delved into information that was “inappropriate, distorting, against the country’s interests, and slanderous of the people’s administration.” Thang is currently released on bail while the other four journalists are still in detention. Truong Chau Huu Danh, the founder of Bao Sach, also faces the additional charge of posting stories that “generated bad interactions between internet users in the cyber environment” which “propagandized, distorted, defamed and seriously slandered Party organizations and local Party committees.”

    Tran Huu Duc and Le Thi Kim Phi were accused by the authorities of using Facebook to connect with members of the U.S.-based Provisional Government of Vietnam, an organization founded in 1991 by former soldiers and refugees who remained loyal to the South Vietnamese government after the war. Than Huu Duc was arrested in January 2021 and charged under Article 109 of Vietnam’s Penal Code for “gathering information on Nghe An residents … for a referendum on naming [Provisional Government of Vietnam] member, Dao Minh Quan, as president of Vietnam.” Duc was also accused of “posting political content online” that opposed government policies and “slandering leaders of Vietnam’s ruling Communist Party.” In September 2021, Le Thi Kim Phi was arrested and charged under the vague clause of “carrying out activities to overthrow the government.”

    In January 2018, the Provisional Government of Vietnam was labeled a “terrorist organization” by the Vietnamese authorities.

    Additional Restrictions on Internet Freedom

    Following the passage of the controversial Cybersecurity Law in 2018, the CIVICUS report further mentions a draft of a government decree which further restricts internet freedom by limiting live-streaming on popular social media sites. CIVICUS states that, “under the terms of the decree, any account that operates on a social media platform in Vietnam and has more than 10,000 followers must provide contact information to authorities” and that “only registered accounts will be allowed to live-stream.” The draft also imposes additional responsibilities on social media providers, requiring them to block or remove content within 24 hours if they receive a “justified complaint” from an individual or organization.

    When passed this decree, coupled with the already draconian Cybersecurity Law, will serve to further cement the Vietnamese Communist Party’s (VCP) rule over the country’s already restrictive cyberspace, putting social media users more at risk of the government’s retribution and reducing social media platforms to tools of government surveillance.

    Freedom on the Net 2021 provides an overall look at the state of internet freedom in Vietnam while the CIVICUS report presents recent, documented, and specific events that support Freedom House’s outlook on the country. Both illustrate a very grim and depressing reality about Vietnam: that despite international pressure, in the form of U.S Vice-President Harris’ visit, and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the VCP is more concerned about maintaining power and control over its people than prioritizing their welfare and safety during these difficult times; the Party would rather control the narrative than work to give actual aid to much of its struggling populace.

    In the end, the actions of the Vietnamese government serve only as a reminder of its ineptitude during times of crisis and its callousness to the plight of everyday Vietnamese; in its relentless attack against internet freedom and freedom of speech, the more pressing and immediate threats to the welfare of the Vietnamese people remain half-heartedly addressed.

    Citations:

    1. Bose, N. (2021, August 25). U.S. VP Harris offers Vietnam support to counter Beijing in the South China Sea. Reuters. Retrieved September 28, 2021, from https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-vp-harris-offers-vietnam-support-counter-beijing-south-china-sea-2021-08-25/
    2. Jaffe, A. (2021, August 26). Harris says she urged Vietnam to free political dissidents. – The Diplomat. Retrieved September 29, 2021, from https://thediplomat.com/2021/08/harris-says-she-urged-vietnam-to-free-political-dissidents/
    3. Nguyen, J. (2021, August 19). State media and social media during the COVID-19 pandemic: A tale of two cities in Vietnam. The Vietnamese. Retrieved September 29, 2021, from https://www.thevietnamese.org/2021/08/state-media-and-social-media-during-the-covid-19-pandemic-a-tale-of-two-cities-in-vietnam/
    4. Nguyen, J. (2021, September 12). Why did the Vietnamese Communist Party militarize its fight against COVID-19? The Vietnamese. Retrieved September 29, 2021, from https://www.thevietnamese.org/2021/09/why-did-the-vietnamese-communist-party-militarize-its-fight-against-covid-19/
    5. Shahbaz, A., & Funk, A. (n.d.). Freedom on the net 2021: The global drive to control Big Tech. Freedom House. Retrieved September 30, 2021, from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2021/global-drive-control-big-tech
    6. Reed, A. (2021, September 21). New research: Vietnam remains “not free” on internet freedom, Freedom House says. The Vietnamese. Retrieved Sept 30, 2021, from https://www.thevietnamese.org/2021/09/new-research-vietnam-remains-not-free-on-internet-freedom-freedom-house-says/
    7. Huu Long, T. (2021, September 21). Vietnam: Freedom on the net 2021 country report. Freedom House. Retrieved October 1, 2021, from https://freedomhouse.org/country/vietnam/freedom-net/2021
    8. C. I. V. I. C. U. S. (2021, September 27). CRACKDOWN ON ONLINE CRITICS PERSISTS IN VIETNAM AS NEW DECREE CONTROLLING LIVESTREAMING PROPOSED. Civicus. Retrieved September 29, 2021, from https://monitor.civicus.org/updates/2021/09/27/crackdown-online-critics-persists-vietnam-new-decree-controlling-livestreaming-proposed/
    9. Civicus. (2020, April 7). ONLINE DEBATE ON DONG TAM INCIDENT FOLLOWED BY PANDEMIC SILENCED BY VIETNAM AUTHORITIES. Civicus. Retrieved October 1, 2021, from https://monitor.civicus.org/updates/2020/04/07/online-debate-dong-tam-incident-followed-pandemic-silenced-vietnam-authorities/
    10. The 88 Project (2021, September 6). Vietnam free expression newsletter no. 34/2021 – week of August 30-September 5. The 88 Project. Retrieved September 29, 2021, from https://the88project.org/newsletter-no-34-2021/
    11. Finney, R. (2021, September 3). Vietnamese facebook user fined for ‘fake news’ as criticism grows of government’s handling of pandemic. Radio Free Asia. Retrieved September 30, 2021, from https://www.rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/fine-09032021182640.html
    12. Whong, E. (2021, September 10). Vietnam indicts five journalists from Facebook-based outlet. Radio Free Asia. Retrieved September 30, 2021, from https://www.rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/baosach-09092021174755.html
    13. Finney, R. (2021, September 14). Vietnam court sentences member of ‘Provisional Government’ to three-year prison term. Radio Free Asia. Retrieved October 29, 2021, from https://www.rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/court-08182021185109.html
    14. Gerin, R. (2021, September 14). Third Vietnamese charged for Facebook connections with US-based Exile Group. Radio Free Asia. Retrieved September 30, 2021, from https://www.rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/le-thi-kim-phi-09102021183034.html
  • Journey To The West: Vietnamese Top Leaders’ Recent Vaccine Diplomacy

    Journey To The West: Vietnamese Top Leaders’ Recent Vaccine Diplomacy

    In the past month, newly-elected Vietnamese leaders have been seen “touring” Western countries, from Europe to the Americas. From the chairman of the National Assembly Vuong Dinh Hue, who went to Europe, to President Nguyen Xuan Phuc, who went to the United States and Cuba, both are parts of the “four pillars” (tứ trụ) leaders – those at the very top of the Vietnamese political system.

    Not only are they two of the most important leaders of Vietnam; they are also newly-elected: although they have re-sworn their terms in the office about three months ago in July, they have held power since April of this year. But that is a different topic for another day.

    In other words, these trips are important. National leaders who were just elected do not just go to other countries on official trips for no reason at all. Whatever they were doing in Western countries, it must have been calculated to yield significant political impact on their new term in office.

    But what exactly were they doing, or hoping to achieve from these trips?

    Despite what the Vietnamese state media is telling you about “comprehensively promoting economic and international cooperation,” the most important reason is very simple: getting more COVID vaccines for Vietnam. Is it to genuinely help the people back home to access vaccines or rather it is to save face after the government’s poor handling of the crisis in recent months?

    Vuong Dinh Hue in Europe

    On the occasion of the fifth session of the World Conference of Speakers of Parliament in Austria and the ongoing European Union – Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA), Chairman Hue’s six-day trip to Europe in early September seems to serve multiple purposes as he mainly visited Austria, Belgium, and Finland.

    However, upon the conclusion of the trip, the most important highlights according to Vietnam’s state-controlled media were all COVID-related. In an article published by Vietnamnet about Hue’s achievements during the trip, it was all about him successfully bringing back foreign-donated COVID vaccines or equipment, with the exception of buying 50 million COVID vaccine doses HIPRA from Spain (this vaccine is still in trial, so the doses are not being delivered immediately to Vietnam). In an interview with a high-ranking diplomat accompanying Hue on the trip, more than half of Vietnam Plus’ article is about Hue asking the EU to send more vaccines to Vietnam. VTV coverage of his trip reflects similar patterns.

    Nguyen Xuan Phuc in the Americas

    While Vuong Dinh Hue might have had more reasons to go to Europe than Nguyen Xuan Phuc, the COVID vaccine agenda in Phuc’s trip to the Americas – the United States and Cuba – is significantly more obvious. According to the deputy minister of foreign affairs Dang Hoang Giang, President Phuc’s main objective in the United States was to give a speech in the United Nations General Assembly and to meet with pharmaceutical companies to talk about vaccine supplies. Additionally, Phuc’s trip to Cuba also coincided with Vietnam’s very recent approval of Cuba’s Abdala vaccine.

    Questions arise about Vietnam’s plan to battle COVID

    COVID vaccines being the priority of the two leaders’ foreign trips makes even more sense as we take into account the role of Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, another of the four pillars, who at the moment holds direct decision-making power over domestic COVID policy.

    As we know that the COVID pandemic is shaping the “four pillars” priorities during their new terms, I believe that there are two questions that arise.

    First, why did the Vietnamese government have to wait so long to actually conduct vaccine negotiations abroad?

    Vaccine diplomacy is good for a rising middle power like Vietnam, and the country had an advantage last year as it had an extremely low infection and mortality rates. While the mentioned leaders did not hold de-facto power until April 2021, they seemingly inherited little concrete plans from their predecessors about obtaining the vaccines or conducting early vaccine diplomacy. This is why the government’s abrupt fundraising plan for a “COVID vaccine fund” in June seems to reflect a lack of preparation at least and systematic governmental incompetence at most.

    This lack of preparedness eventually resulted in the newly-elected leaders literally begging for vaccines in foreign countries after Vietnam suffered from months of restrictions with the number of total cases approaching 1 million. Though the vaccination rates in Vietnam are getting better, and more vaccine supplies are always better for the people, it is definitely not a good look for these leaders and the government itself, despite what the state-controlled media tries to tell us.

    Second, I believe that we should also ask the question: What is Nguyen Phu Trong, the remaining member of the “four pillars” elite club, and arguably the most powerful, contributing to the government’s COVID plans?

    He is the oldest and longest-serving of the “four pillars” leaders. He also held the Communist Party’s secretary-general position over the past decade. While Chinh is tasked with the heavy-lifting duty of curbing domestic infections and Hue and Phuc are busy abroad, Nguyen Phu Trong seems to remain hidden behind the curtain. His most recent public appearances include an official meeting with leaders from Laos and Cambodia and speeches about corruption.

    While this makes sense because, in theory, the leader of the Communist Party cannot interfere in the executive function of the government, we must ask ourselves if this is really the case, and whether secretary-general Trong is dodging responsibility for the most serious national and legitimacy crisis that the Communist Party and the Vietnamese government have faced in recent years.

    Citations

    Ban Thời Sự. (2021, September 12). Chuyến thăm châu Âu của Chủ tịch Quốc hội – Sự khẳng định về “một Quốc hội hành động, một Việt Nam chủ động, nỗ lực.”Báo Điện Tử VTV. https://vtv.vn/chinh-tri/chuyen-tham-chau-au-cua-chu-tich-quoc-hoi-su-khang-dinh-ve-mot-quoc-hoi-hanh-dong-mot-viet-nam-chu-dong-no-luc-20210912192101944.htm

    Bhatia, G., Dutta, P. K., & McClure, J. (2021, October 3). Vietnam: the latest coronavirus counts, charts and maps. Reuters. https://graphics.reuters.com/world-coronavirus-tracker-and-maps/countries-and-territories/vietnam/

    Hoang T. H. (2021, September 13). Kết quả quan trọng chuyến thăm các nước châu Âu của Chủ tịch Quốc hội. VietnamPlus. https://www.vietnamplus.vn/ket-qua-quan-trong-chuyen-tham-cac-nuoc-chau-au-cua-chu-tich-quoc-hoi/740268.vnp

    M.H. (2021a, September 10). Chuyến thăm châu Âu của Chủ tịch Quốc hội Vương Đình Huệ thể hiện chính sách đa dạng và độc lập của Việt Nam. Thông Tấn Xã Việt Nam. https://baotintuc.vn/thoi-su/chuyen-tham-chau-au-cua-chu-tich-quoc-hoi-vuong-dinh-hue-the-hien-chinh-sach-da-dang-va-doc-lap-cua-viet-nam-20210910194112584.htm

    Ministry of Health Online Portal. (2021, September 25). Thủ tướng chủ trì cuộc họp Ban Chỉ đạo Quốc gia phòng, chống dịch COVID-19. Ministry of Health. https://moh.gov.vn/tin-noi-bat/-/asset_publisher/3Yst7YhbkA5j/content/thu-tuong-chu-tri-cuoc-hop-ban-chi-ao-quoc-gia-phong-chong-dich-covid-19

    N.D. (2021b, September 16). Chủ tịch nước Nguyễn Xuân Phúc sẽ gặp doanh nghiệp sản xuất vắc xin của Mỹ. Tuổi Trẻ Online. https://tuoitre.vn/chu-tich-nuoc-nguyen-xuan-phuc-se-gap-doanh-nghiep-san-xuat-vac-xin-cua-my-20210916123224642.htm

    Nguyen, D. (2021, June 30). Vietnam’s Unprecedented COVID-19 Challenge Compounded By A Deficit Of Trust In The Government. The Vietnamese Magazine. https://www.thevietnamese.org/2021/06/vietnams-unprecedented-covid-19-challenge-compounded-by-a-deficit-of-trust-in-the-government/

    Reuters. (2021, September 18). Vietnam approves Abdala vaccine as president visits Cuba. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/vietnam-approves-cubas-abdala-vaccine-use-against-covid-19-2021-09-18/

    T.H. (2021c, September 22). Ban Chỉ đạo được kiến nghị Bộ Chính trị xử lý cán bộ, đảng viên tham nhũng, tiêu cực. Vietnamnet. https://vietnamnet.vn/vn/thoi-su/chong-tham-nhung/ban-chi-dao-duoc-kien-nghi-bo-chinh-tri-xu-ly-can-bo-dang-vien-tham-nhung-tieu-cuc-777124.html

    T.H., & P.H. (2021d, September 12). 70 hoạt động dày đặc tại 3 nước Châu Âu của Chủ tịch Quốc hội Vương Đình Huệ. Vietnamnet. https://vietnamnet.vn/vn/thoi-su/quoc-hoi/70-hoat-dong-day-dac-tai-3-nuoc-chau-au-cua-chu-tich-quoc-hoi-vuong-dinh-hue-774198.html

    The Vietnamese Magazine. (2021, July 26). Vietnam Briefing: COVID-19 Crisis Deepening While The National Assembly Convened To Elect State Leadership. https://www.thevietnamese.org/2021/07/vietnam-briefing-covid-19-crisis-deepening-while-the-national-assembly-convened-to-elect-state-leadership/

    Thông Tấn Xã Việt Nam. (2021, September 26). Cuộc gặp cấp cao Việt Nam – Campuchia – Lào. Vietnamnet. https://vietnamnet.vn/vn/thoi-su/chinh-tri/cuoc-gap-cap-cao-viet-nam-campuchia-lao-778199.html

  • Vietnam Briefing: Vietnamese Public Outrage Over A Woman Being Coerced Into COVID-19 Testing; Migrant Workers Rush To Flee Ho Chi Minh City After Travel Restrictions Are Lifted

    Vietnam Briefing: Vietnamese Public Outrage Over A Woman Being Coerced Into COVID-19 Testing; Migrant Workers Rush To Flee Ho Chi Minh City After Travel Restrictions Are Lifted

    A Vietnamese woman coerced into COVID-19 testing infuriates the public

    • On September 28 video footage showing Vietnamese police and security forces breaking into a woman’s apartment in Vinh Phu Ward, Binh Duong Province to force her to get tested for COVID-19. As the video began to spread on social media in Vietnam it caused outrage among the public.
    • The woman, Hoang Thi Phuong Lan, was seen being forcibly escorted to the COVID-19 testing venue by two police officers who pinned her arms behind her; her child was heard crying in the background as the police led her away. According to Lan, she was teaching an online class at that time and had already tested negative for COVID-19 at home. Lan added that she did not want to take the test again in a crowded area, expressing concerns about potential virus transmission. Also in the video, an officer was heard criticizing her for her “lack of discipline” and threatening to fine her. She later tested negative for COVID-19.
    • On September 29 at a meeting with Lan, authorities of the ward where she lives made an apology for their inappropriate actions, citing “a sense of urgency” while they were “on a mission.” She rejected the apology, saying that the apprehension “harmed” her health and “offended” her dignity. Previously, Lan had posted the video of her coercion on Facebook, consulting the public for legal procedures to sue the alleged officers.
    • On the same day, an article regarding the incident was posted on Tuoi Tre Online, a state-owned news outlet, quoting a lawyer as saying that the local authorities’ actions were “in violation of human rights.” The article was briefly online before being removed from its webpage, with no official reason given for the removal.

    COVID-19 situation in Vietnam

    • As of October 3, 2021, Vietnam has recorded over 800,000 confirmed COVID-19 cases and more than 19,000 fatalities. Meanwhile, the country has seen a significant drop in coronavirus cases and related deaths with an average number of daily cases standing at around 7,400 for the past week, while the national average daily fatality rate has been 105. More than 10 percent of the Vietnamese population has been fully vaccinated.
    • Vietnam’s COVID-19 hotspot Ho Chi Minh City could have around 40 percent unrecorded cases of its official tally, reports Reuters. In an official report, positive rapid tests of around 150,000 people have not been accounted for in the tally of total confirmed cases in the city. Ho Chi Minh City has so far recorded over 370,000 coronavirus cases; if 150,000 more cases were included in the official number, it would reduce the city’s death rate from over 3.8 percent to 2.75 percent.
    • Ho Chi Minh City ends citywide virus lockdown after 3 months of restrictions on movements, reports Associated Press. Beginning on October 1, the city’s residents will be able to leave their homes, while restaurants will be allowed to offer takeaway services and other essential businesses can reopen. However, social distancing measures will still be enforced, schools and public transport remain closed, and gatherings of more than 10 people outside are banned.
    • At the same time, thousands of migrant workers were seen fleeing Ho Chi Minh City after COVID-19 lockdown in the city was lifted, reports Nikkei Asia. Long and harsh lockdown measures have taken a toll on Vietnamese migrant workers’ health and their livelihoods. Many of the laborers were required to sleep in factories to maintain production output while others were left jobless and forced to live off their savings. Relaxed restrictions allow factories in industrial parks, export processing zones and high-tech parks to resume their operations, on the condition that all workers must be fully vaccinated.
    • As migrant workers rushed to leave Ho Chi Minh City for home, scenes of heavy congestion and clashes between laborers and police had been seen at several checkpoints in the city’s suburbs, reports RFA. Multiple videos circulated on social media showing that many workers broke through barricades and fought with police, while others knelt in the street and pleaded with the police to let them through as they had run out of money to stay in the city. State-run media in Vietnam has largely ignored the disturbing situation of migrant workers; on the other hand, they have been reporting on the local authorities’ timely assistance in helping people return to their hometowns.
    • Vietnam to miss GDP target this year as COVID-19 squeezes its economy, writes Nikkei Asia: “The growth figure for the third quarter, anticipated by the end of this month, is being widely projected at under 2% — worse than the same quarter of 2020. A wave of infections and a strict COVID-19 lockdown squeezed the southern commercial hub of Ho Chi Minh City, and experts warn the impact could weigh on the economy beyond the third quarter unless the country manages to accelerate vaccinations.”
    • Vietnam received an additional 1.5 million COVID-19 vaccine doses from the United States, reports VnExpress: “A batch of 1,499,940 million Pfizer-BioNTech Covid-19 vaccine doses has been delivered to Vietnam by the U.S. through global vaccine access mechanism Covax. The new batch followed three previous vaccine donations from the U.S. to Vietnam through Covax, totalling to 7.5 million doses so far, according to a Saturday press release by the U.S. Embassy in Hanoi.”
    • Vietnam and Russia reached an agreement on COVID-19 Sputnik V vaccine supplies, according to the Vietnamese ambassador to Moscow. Previously, Vietnam had domestically produced a test batch of Russia’s Sputnik V and expected to receive another 20 million doses from Russia this year.
    • On September 29, one million doses of the Chinese-made Hayat-Vax COVID-19 vaccine also arrived in Hanoi, reports VnExpress. The vaccines’ arrival, which marks the first Hayat-Vax doses to land in Vietnam, belongs to a commercial contract of 30 million doses signed by Vietnamese pharmaceutical firm Vimedimex.

    British warship stops in Vietnam after transiting through the Taiwan Strait

    RFA reports:

    • British Royal Navy frigate HMS Richmond has arrived in Vietnam on a four-day friendly visit after transiting through the Taiwan Strait, which angered China. On September 27, China condemned the frigate’s passage through the Taiwan Strait, saying the United Kingdom is “carrying out a meaningless display of presence with an insidious intention.”
    • The British Royal Navy posted a picture of the frigate docked in Cam Ranh Bay on Friday, followed by a video on its Twitter page saying in Vietnamese: “Hello Vietnam! So proud for Richmond to have an opportunity to visit your beautiful country.”
    • A statement from the British Embassy in Hanoi said, “the ship’s presence underlines the U.K.’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific region, at the heart of which lies the U.K.’s partnership with Vietnam.” It also said the HMS Richmond and Vietnamese partners will conduct “bilateral cooperation activities,” without giving further details.

    Sea rises due to human-made climate crisis threaten Vietnam’s low lying areas

    The Guardian reports:

    “Like much of the region, Vietnam is threatened by flooding and sea rises caused by the human-made climate crisis. More than 15% of the country is below five metres above sea level – compared with just 4.2% in the UK. Of the world’s larger mainland nations, only the Netherlands has more low-lying land.”


    Vietnam Insight: Learn more about Vietnam

    Trans-Pacific Partner Membership And The Love Triangle Of Vietnam – Taiwan – China

    The Vietnamese Magazine/ Tan Trung Nguyen Quoc/ September 30

    “A couple of days after China’s and Taiwan’s announcements on the CPTPP, President Xi Jinping had a phone call with General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong. This action raised some questions on whether Vietnam would act as an agent of China inside the CPTPP to prevent the accession effort of Taiwan.

    If it has to, the Vietnamese government is very unlikely to side with Taiwan; no country has ever dared to, including the United States.

    But upon understanding the socioeconomic situation between Vietnam, Taiwan, and China, it is also reasonable to argue that Vietnam gains nothing by explicitly objecting to Taiwan’s membership in the CPTPP. The economic ties between Taiwan and Vietnam are too significant to be sacrificed.”

    In Rare Three-Party Conclave, Vietnam Pushes Back Against Growing Chinese Influence

    The Diplomat/ Sebastian Strangio/ September 28

    “The unusual meeting of party heads speaks to the rising concern in Hanoi that its two erstwhile clients are being drawn slowly into China’s widening orbit. In recent years, Laos and Cambodia have become magnets for Chinese capital and business people of varying degrees of probity, who have established interlocking relationships with the two countries’ respective ruling elites. This has been franked by increasingly close ties with the Chinese government, which have lavished Cambodia and Laos with “no-strings” financing and infrastructure developments.”

    What Vietnam’s President Sought to Achieve at the 76th UNGA

    The Diplomat/ Le Dinh Tinh/ September 28

    “Phuc goes to New York this time to set the stage for the wrapping up of Vietnam’s 2020-2021 tenure as a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. Vietnam’s membership will be remembered for its heightened focus on critical topics such as protection of civilians and essential infrastructure works in conflict areas, the safeguarding of women and children during armed conflicts, the settlement of bombs and mines left by war, U.N. peacekeeping operations, climate change, and peace and security challenges.”

    Vietnam bids to woo Cambodia, Laos from China

    Asia Times/ David Hutt/ September 27

    “Most Southeast Asian countries are now well-rehearsed in the art of geopolitical hedging, particularly by trying to play the United States and China off against one another and never taking sides in order to extract ever greater economic and political benefits from both.

    In a similar fashion, Laos and Cambodia are now also hedging between their historic ally Vietnam and their new superpower partner China.”

    Webinar: Reviewing the First Six Months of Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh

    ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute

    Date: October 06 2021

    Time (GMT+8): 10:00 am – 11:15 am

    Perspectives: Thinking the unthinkable about China’s CPTPP application

    VnExpress/ Pham Quang Vinh/ September 26

    “As for CPTPP members, they need to carefully re-examine their goals and interests in the pact’s original give-and-take package, in return for having accepted the high standards insisted on by the U.S. They should also consider what their likely benefits will be in terms of competitive advantages, market diversification and reducing dependency on one source.

    This is a very critical issue for Vietnam as a member of the CPTPP and RCEP. It requires the nation to be very cautious in reviewing its relationships with all partners to ensure its interest, independence and autonomy.”

    Perspectives: Vietnam should walk the talk in climate actions

    VnExpress/ Nguyen Dang Anh Thi/ September 30

    “The Vietnamese people have already been experiencing pain from climate change impacts. Cutting GHG emissions in the country must be achieved through practical and responsible climate actions using the best available resources.

    There is no hope of international support for Vietnam to deal with climate change if its policymakers don’t walk the talk of sustainability.”

  • Trans-Pacific Partner Membership And The Love Triangle Of Vietnam – Taiwan – China

    Trans-Pacific Partner Membership And The Love Triangle Of Vietnam – Taiwan – China

    A discussion with some students in my Theory on State and Law class back in 2020 led me to a surprising revelation: over 50 percent of them have visited Taiwan. They could remember and name their favourite tourist attractions, either Sun Moon Lake near Taichung, the “Spirited Away” Jiufen to the country’s northwest, or the vibrant streets of Ximending in Taipei. For them, Taiwan seemed to be a lively place – an exemplar of modernity, politeness, and peacefulness.

    Not only that, many of them had paid a visit to the Chiang Kai-Shek Memorial Hall and took pictures with his infamous Lincoln-like statue. Most unexpectedly, they knew that Taiwan was not China, or at least Mainland China. One student mentioned that her Chinese visa was useless for visiting Taiwan, and she suggested that the Taiwanese visa application process was more straightforward. And Chiang Kai-Shek, as they described, could be someone akin to their “Uncle Ho” in Vietnam.

    For a country where the youth hardly know the Vietnamese heads of state – the president, the prime minister, or the general secretary – their knowledge of Taiwan was astonishing.

    ***

    I have come to realize that the depiction of Taiwan in Vietnam has changed dramatically over the past 20 years.

    During the 90s, Taiwan was infamously known in Vietnam for the poor and old Taiwanese farmers who could not get married in their hometowns, wandering the most disenfranchised areas of Vietnam’s rural areas to look for brides.

    Nowadays, Taiwan is considered a cultural, economic, and intellectual hub of the region – a place worth living in, especially in the eyes of Vietnamese youth. What has caused this distinct shift in perspective? Perhaps it is the billions of US dollars worth of investments pouring into Vietnam from Taiwan since the 1990s.

    Dubbed by Professor Samuel C. Y. Ku as the “Southward Policy” of Taiwan, at the beginning of 1993, Taiwanese presidents started to privately visit and form business ties with Southeast Asian countries that had no formal diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (ROC) before.

    The objectives on the surface were clear: (1) expanding two-way economic, trade, and investment relations with these countries; and (2) expanding the production size of Taiwanese enterprises, while at the same time reducing the trade and human resource dependence on mainland China.

    More importantly, Taiwanese leadership hoped that such a close connection between economies would strengthen substantive relations between governments, allowing them to participate in other international and regional commercial and political activities.

    In Vietnam, Taiwan succeeded in certain aspects. Taiwan has a decisive say in the contemporary economic stability of Vietnam. Taiwanese enterprises ownroughly 2,500 projects, and they have invested over US$30 billion in the country. Bilateral trade between Vietnam and Taiwan has just exceeded US$16 billion, and most of Vietnam’s exported labor is directed towards Taiwan. Any political instability or economic issues that are not in favor of this arrangement will impact Vietnam’s performance.

    On the other hand, China continues to be seen as a taboo in Vietnamese cultural and intellectual discussions. The recent promotion of the Chinese propaganda military drama named Ace Troops (Chinese: 王牌部队; Vietnamese: Vương bài) has again sparked debates and serious boycotts in Vietnam. Focusing on stories about the establishment and the development of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Ace Troops glorifies the Sino-Vietnam War of 1979 and the continuous border/maritime skirmishes during the 80s. By praising the conflicts that led to hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese casualties as heroic and patriotic wars, it can be seen why this drama infuriates China’s southern neighbour.

    Even though Taiwan has the same claims as to the People’s Republic of China regarding the South China Sea, it appears to be a much milder, friendlier, and negotiable partner to the Vietnamese public.

    ***

    One week after China expressed its desire to be a part of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), Taiwan also formally applied for a seat in this organisation.

    Taiwan has reasons to hasten its membership in this organization. If it fails to secure a seat in time, it would have to go through the consultation process with all the signatories, which would, at this point, include China, and then protect its interests before a CPTPP Council where Beijing would already hold a seat.

    Taiwan had experienced this kind of stubbornness and tantrum-throwing behaviour of China when it dealt with the WTO. During the 2000s, Beijing had repeatedly refused to attend any dispute resolution proceedings between themselves and Taiwan, justifying this on the grounds that these issues were solely the internal affairs of China.

    A couple of days after China’s and Taiwan’s announcements on the CPTPP, President Xi Jinping had a phone call with General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong. This action raised some questions on whether Vietnam would act as an agent of China inside the CPTPP to prevent the accession effort of Taiwan.

    If it has to, the Vietnamese government is very unlikely to side with Taiwan; no country has ever dared to, including the United States.

    But upon understanding the socioeconomic situation between Vietnam, Taiwan, and China, it is also reasonable to argue that Vietnam gains nothing by explicitly objecting to Taiwan’s membership in the CPTPP. The economic ties between Taiwan and Vietnam are too significant to be sacrificed.

    Moreover, such an effort requires fierce political commitment and diplomatic loyalty to mainland China, and Vietnam rarely exhibits this in the international arena. Recently, at the 48th session of the Human Rights Council, a declaration of 65 countries denounced the interference in China’s internal affairs by several actors under the pretext of human rights. Vietnam, however, did not participate. Vietnam’s action is a bit cold for two socialist neighbouring countries that claim to have a golden friendship.

    Yet, this action illustrates one essential facet of Vietnam’s diplomatic playbook: pragmatism. Taiwan has been a beneficial friend to the Vietnamese government and remains hopeful for the country’s economic recovery and internal stability after the pandemic.