Author: Son Nguyen

  • The Socialist Irony: Vietnamese Companies Exploit Labor And Damage The Environment In Cameroon

    The Socialist Irony: Vietnamese Companies Exploit Labor And Damage The Environment In Cameroon

    “…it is like destroying forest in other people’s backyards, not in ours.” – A quote from an informant working for a Vietnamese timber logging company, according to EIA.

    Various Vietnamese companies are damaging Cameroon’s forests and its economy through logging activities in the country, according to a new report by the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA), an international non-profit organization aiming to protect the global climate.

    In an investigative report, the EIA said that these companies extracting timber to export back to Vietnam were violating export laws and were engaging in labor exploitation and discrimination, tax evasion, illegal logging, and other things.

    The Vietnamese socialist government has consistently condemned the imperialism and economic exploitation that has resulted from capitalism. In a recent article about socialism, Nguyen Phu Trong, the Secretary General of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), declared that the country should strive for “sustainable development… instead of usurping natural resources and destroying the environment.” A socialist government is regarded as the alternative to capitalist countries which have failed to address the problems of environmental damage and labor exploitation.

    However, this issue highlights that companies coming from a government of such ideology are perfectly capable of environmental, economic, and labor abuses – especially when it concerns less developed countries.

    Timber is largely used as the architectural materials for Buddhist temples and private houses in Vietnam. Previously, the market was dominated by timber extracted and exported from Laos and Cambodia; but the companies have moved to Cameroon due to its relaxed laws surrounding logging.

    Vietnam is now the second-largest timber processing hub in Asia, only after China.

    The total value of timber imports and exports from the prominent timber processing countries in Asia. Graphic: EIA. 

    The private companies named in the report include Dai Loi Trading Co. Ltd., Xuan Hanh Wood Company, Thang Long Import-Export Company Ltd., Hai Duong Wood Import-Export Company Ltd., and an unregistered Vietnamese company represented by someone known as Le Jessan Tan. All of these companies are reportedly private companies, meaning no links with the government have been found.

    The EIA reportedly conducted this independent investigation for three years before releasing the report in late 2020. The report is titled “Tainted Timber, Tarnished Temples: How the Cameroon-Vietnam Timber Trade Hurts the Cameroonian People and Forests.”

    Environmental and labor abuses in Vietnam

    In its ideological doctrine, the VCP consistently claims that the socialist government is “of the people, by the people, and for the people.” Land in Vietnam is also constitutionally “owned by the people,” and the private ownership of land is theoretically unconstitutional. The VCP’s socialism is understood as a way to uplift the common people by limiting the power of private businesses and corporations.

    Despite Vietnam’s commitment to socialism, stories about environmental and labor exploitation are not new in the country’s private sector. With various sources of natural resources and a large population providing cheap laborers, the country is ripe for exploitation.

    The case of Formosa in 2016 is an example. During this time, Hung Nghiep Formosa Ha Tinh, Ltd., a Vietnamese private company, was heavily polluting the seas in central Vietnam, leading to massive fish and other marine life deaths. The primary investor of Hung Nghiep Formosa Ha Tinh, Ltd. is the Taiwanese Formosa Plastics Group.

    Human lives have also been a loss. As the results of such massive fish deaths, some people died or became seriously ill, with others even believed to have developed cancer, from either diving in the sea, eating poisonous fish, or as the result of exposure to the company’s chemicals.

    For years, various cases of illegal timber trade in Vietnam have been reported. There have been 30,000-50,000 cases of forest violations per year, according to statistics provided by the international non-profit organization Preferred by Nature. The organization also regards Vietnam as one of the most high-risk countries regarding the illegal timber trade.

    Even state-controlled media outlets in Vietnam sometimes publish opinion articles criticizing the Vietnamese government’s handling of environmental issues.

    According to this graph, Vietnam is among the most high-risk countries in terms of the illegal timber trade. Graphic: Preferred by Nature. 

    Workers in Vietnam also face tremendous hardships and, in many cases, outrageous exploitation.

    For example, cases of forced labor in drug detention centers have been reported, in which people struggling with drug addiction were not only forced to provide free labor but were also tortured. In the garment industry, child labor is among the common practices. Even among the “normal” workers – those who are non-criminal adults and are able-bodied-mistreatment, underpayment and lack of social security were also frequently reported.

    Because of this, it is not surprising that there are similar and even worse cases committed by Vietnamese companies abroad.

    Unethical activities in Cameroon

    Vietnamese companies are accused of various unethical activities in Cameroon, including violation of export laws, tax evasion, illegal harvesting, disregarding the illegal origin of timber, and abuse of workers.

    In the name of profit, the companies casually commit these illegal activities. According to the report, to maximize profits, the companies hired workers for years without a proper contract or social security guarantees. They frequently discriminated against, underpaid, and abused Cameroon workers.

    The companies also avoided paying taxes in Cameroon by mostly conducting transactions with cash. From 2014 to 2017, around $300 million went unreported when timber was being exported to Vietnam, according to the EIA investigation.

    Alongside these violations, the companies also turn a blind eye to illegal timber, even if such timber originated from terrorist organizations. In fact, according to EIA, the company Dai Loi was reportedly buying timber that originated from Hezbollah.

    One informant from one of the Vietnamese private companies compared the way Vietnamese and French companies inspect timber in Cameroon. According to the informant in the report, the French asked many questions regarding the origin of the timber, such as whether child labor was involved. But the Vietnamese only care about whether there is documentation to bypass the Vietnamese customs, even if the timber was harvested illegally. The informant said:

    “We wouldn’t care less about your wrongdoings. Just give me whatever papers that the customs require…”

    Vietnamese customs also do not care about illegal logging because “it is like destroying forest in other people’s backyards, not in ours.”

    Imports of logs from Cameroon to China, Vietnam, and the EU during the period of 1992-2018. A lot of Vietnamese timber companies moved from Laos and Cambodia to Cameroon due to its relaxed laws governing logging. Graphic: EIA.

    Policy recommendations for Vietnam

    The EIA report recommends the Vietnamese government do the bare minimum: official acknowledgments of the loopholes in importing timber, followed by more effective regulations regarding fraudulent paperwork and financial transactions of private timber companies.

    So far, half a year after the report’s release, no state-controlled media in Vietnam has reported on the situation. There have been no official statements and no apologies.

    Based on his article on socialism, Nguyen Phu Trong would argue that these flaws exist because the country is in the “transition period” to socialism. This means that existing exploitation is not the government’s ideology but rather the inevitable reality of the global capitalist, market-oriented economy. Furthermore, these companies are private and not government-affiliated, so it is not the system’s fault.

    Let us assume that this argument is true. If so, however, it is even more important and urgent for Vietnamese leaders and policymakers to acknowledge the unethical activities of these companies and come up with more effective regulations to demonstrate their commitment to socialism – which, according to their own arguments, is supposed to be healthier for the environment, the economy and workers.

    Or are we supposed to wait endlessly for an unambiguous date of a successful transition to socialism?

  • Vietnam Briefing: The Election Is Over. But The Fate Of Party Critics Is Still Grim.

    Vietnam Briefing: The Election Is Over. But The Fate Of Party Critics Is Still Grim.

    The Vietnam Briefing, which is released every Monday morning Vietnam time, is a look at Vietnam’s political developments of the past week.


    The 2021 National Assembly election is over. Rumors are spreading.

    It is reported that almost 70 million people were expected to cast their ballots yesterday, Sunday, May 23. The election witnessed the nominations of 866 candidates, with 500 seats up for grabs in the parliament.

    The number of non-party candidates this year is lower than the last election in 2016, falling from 97 to only 74 candidates. Recently, the National Assembly includes just around 8 percent of independent members, while Party members account for 92 percent of the parliamentary seats.

    How does the National Assembly election work in Vietnam? Is it democratic? Could non-party members run for election? These questions are answered by The Vietnamese’s recently published articles: “The Odds Against Your Favor: How Does The National Assembly Election In Vietnam Work?” and “An Authoritarian Nightmare: The Self-Nomination Movement In 2016.”

    Surprise at the last minute: Published articles about independent candidate Luong The Huy on state media have disappeared since Saturday evening, as reported by BBC News Vietnamese service.

    Rumors are spreading on social media. This was expected. It happens as usual.

    • Some voters went on Facebook to report that they saw some voters holding several ballots in hand and election officers did nothing, suspectedly committing electoral fraud. This is probably the most common rumor about elections in Vietnam for decades now.
    • Some other voters said there were election officers instructing them who to vote for.
    • Those who had a chance to witness vote counting in previous elections said there was very suspicious and unexplainable conduct behind closed doors that didn’t follow official guidelines, such as the transfer of invalid ballots into valid boxes.
    • As the media in Vietnam is controlled by the government, there has been no known investigation by journalists to verify these rumors with concrete evidence. The existence of rumors in Vietnam’s politics, and how many ordinary people believe in them, say a lot about how intransparent the system is.

    Activist Pham Doan Trang recognized as an honorary member of German writer-activist organization

    Last Wednesday, the German branch of Poets, Essayists, and Novelists (PEN) recognized activist and prisoner of conscience Pham Doan Trang as an honorary member. PEN is an international organization aimed at defending “persecuted and suppressed writers” as well as advocating for freedom of speech.

    Using its announcement in German, PEN advocated for Trang’s immediate and unconditional release and condemned the Vietnamese authority’s brutal treatment of her. PEN also recognized Trang’s work as a co-founder and editor for The Vietnamese and Luat Khoa Magazine, as well as her human rights report on the Dong Tam land dispute, co-authored with activist Will Nguyen.

    Trang is a co-founder of Legal Initiatives for Vietnam (LIV), which publishes The Vietnamese and Luat Khoa. She is the author of many books focused  on educating the Vietnamese people about politics, such as “Politics for the Common People” and “Nonviolent Resistance.” In 2019, Trang was awarded the Prize for Impact from Reporters Without Borders.

    In 2020, Trang was imprisoned by the Vietnamese authorities and charged with “conducting propaganda” against the state. Up until now, after more than seven months in prison, she is still being held incommunicado. Her family and her lawyer have not been allowed to meet with her.


    Independent journalists face persecution

    The investigation of the Báo Sạch (Clean Newspaper) case has been finalized with Can Tho Police formally recommending the city’s People’s Procuracy to prosecute four journalists of the group: Truong Chau Huu Danh, Nguyen Phuoc Trung Bao, Doan Kien Giang, and Nguyen Thanh Nha.

    They now face up to seven years in prison, on the charge of “abusing democratic freedom” under Article 331 of the Penal Code.

    The investigative agency said it would continue to investigate other suspected activities of the group. They did not rule out the possibility of filing new charges against the group’s members under Article 337 of the Penal Code, which is “deliberate disclosure of classified information; appropriation, trading, destruction of classified documents.”


    COVID-19 in Vietnam: Panic, panic, and panic.

    Panic took over Vietnam as the country witnessed new surges of COVID-19 cases. Even though the number of cases in Vietnam has been low compared to other countries, only around 1 percent of the population has been vaccinated. The Vietnamese government has promised to distribute the COVID-19 vaccines for free, but those who have gotten the shot so far are mostly front-line workers, diplomats, and military officers.

    At the moment, only AstraZeneca is available in Vietnam.

    The desperation for COVID-19 vaccines has manifested itself in the form of tourism. According to Tuoi Tre News, a travel company in Ho Chi Minh City recently launched a new “vaccination tour” for their customers. This “tour” would take customers to the United States to get vaccinated with one of the three options: Pfizer/BioNTech, Moderna, and Johnson & Johnson. Pricing starts at almost $2,000. The travel package is said to target “business people, high-income earners, and white-collar workers.”

    The government has said it will buy and deliver 31 million doses of the Pfizer vaccine by the end of this year. Vietnam currently has three domestically produced vaccines, but none of them have been approved. Although Vietnam is producing the Russian Sputnik V vaccine, the country has not considered Chinese vaccines. Public opinion in Vietnam, filled with anti-China sentiment, has shown much distrust of China’s vaccine diplomacy.


    Vietnam’s stance on the Israel-Palstinian conflict

    Despite the VCP’s historical connection to Palestine as fellow anti-imperialist revolutionaries, the country has taken a moderate stance on the Israel-Palestinian conflict. While state-controlled media outlets dramatically state that Vietnam condemns violence in the conflict, the country actually has not taken a side in the conflict, only condemning general “attacks targeting civilians.” Dang Dinh Quy, Vietnam’s ambassador to the United Nations, only suggested that “both sides, especially Israel” should “respect international humanitarian law.”

    Why doesn’t Vietnam side with Palestine? Even though siding with Palestine would provide a chance for the VCP to demonstrate its commitment to anti-imperialist ideology, which is ideal for communist propaganda, Vietnam’s long-standing defense policy prohibits it from “siding with one country against another.” Although the defense policy does have some room for flexible consideration on a case-by-case basis, it seems that playing the ideological game is not Vietnam’s priority anymore.


    Learn more about Vietnam:

    Vietnam’s National Assembly Vote: A Futile Gesture

    The Diplomat/Mu Sochua/May 19, 2021

    “As in previous elections, the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), which runs one of the few remaining single-party states in the world, is expected to dominate the polls and extend its rule for the next five years. Voter turnout on polling day is also expected to be high, if previous elections are anything to go by, despite an intensified crackdown on human rights over the last few years.”

    Vietnam may not want China’s Covid-19 vaccines, but how long can it stay immune to them?

    South China Morning Post/Dien Nguyen An Luong/May 20, 2021

    “Leaving China-developed jabs off the table altogether risks derailing efforts to expedite a much-needed vaccination drive, which could dent extraordinarily high public approval ratings of the government’s handling of the pandemic. But a nod to Chinese shots is likely to force the authorities to grapple with an even more daunting challenge: how to talk an increasingly anti-China audience at home into taking them.”

    Full steam ahead on Vietnam’s anti-corruption campaign

    East Asia Forum/Hai Hong Nguyen, UQ/May 20, 2021

    “Public attention is being drawn to how Trong and the new 18-member Politburo will decide on the fate of the ‘three big fish’ and former members of the Politburo: former party boss of Hanoi Hoang Trung Hai, former party boss of Ho Chi Minh City Le Thanh Hai and former governor of the State Bank of Vietnam Nguyen Van Binh. All three men were disciplined last year.”

    Do China and Vietnam Have Similar Alliance Policies?

    The Diplomat/Khang Vu/May 18, 2021

    “Similar to China, Vietnam also has a formal alliance commitment to Laos that survived the end of the Cold War. Vietnam is famous for its “Three Nos” defense policy – no military alliances, no foreign military bases on Vietnamese territory, and no reliance on any country to combat others – but its alliance with Laos is the exception to its alliance policies the same way North Korea is to China. Scholars often consider the Sino-Korean alliance to be a deviant case that goes beyond the scope of existing alliance theories. However, the existence of another deviant Vietnam-Laos case implies that there is a pattern that is worth further research, especially so when Vietnam and China are communist countries that once fought a common U.S. enemy. Deviant cases are significant in the sense that they can be the exceptions that prove the rule. Ignoring them can risk selecting on the dependent variable, which could lead to biased results in studies of Chinese and Vietnamese alliance policies.”

    China and the US: Who Has More Influence in Vietnam?

    The Diplomat/Mengzhen Xia and Dingding Chen/May 21, 2021

    “As soon as the Biden administration came into power in the United States, Washington decided to strengthen its Indo-Pacific strategy, intending to highlight its presence in Asia and to deter the rise of China. Vietnam, fresh off a year of serving as the ASEAN chair and currently a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council through 2021, is becoming increasingly important in this effort. Washington seeks to upgrade U.S.-Vietnam ties and deepen their “comprehensive partnership” with an eye toward balancing and confining China. Both China and the United States are competing to exert a positive – and bigger – influence on Vietnam through various economic and political policies, such as the Belt and Road Initiative from China and maritime security cooperation from the United States.”


    Events to watch this week:

    Seminar: Responsiveness in the Shadow of Repression: Vietnam and China Compared

    Date: May 27
    Organizer: Southeast Asia Program, Stanford University

  • An Authoritarian Nightmare: The Self-Nomination Movement In 2016

    An Authoritarian Nightmare: The Self-Nomination Movement In 2016

    “The dream for authoritarian regimes is to reap the fruits of electoral legitimacy without running the risks of democratic uncertainty.”
    Andreas Schedler, professor of political science.

    Despite being a one-party state, the Vietnamese Constitution does allow non-party members and self-nominated candidates to compete for the National Assembly election. Because of this, the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) often claims that elections in Vietnam are democratic and represent the true will of the people.

    However, the story is not that simple.

    Self-nominated candidates, especially those who are independent and without affiliation with the VCP, experience extreme hardships in their election races, as the VCP deploys multiple tactics to barricade truly independent candidates from winning elections.

    In 2016, a group of activists, dissidents, and non-party members decided to nominate themselves en masse to run in the National Assembly election. Their objective? Not to win. Instead, they hoped to shed light on the unfairness of Vietnamese elections and the VCP’s treatment of genuinely independent candidates.

    Some media outlets called the phenomenon a “democratic experience.” Some researchers considered it as Vietnam’s one-of-a-kind social movement, in which participants collectively mobilized and presented unprecedented coordination.

    Stanford University post-doctoral fellow Nhu Truong examines the self-nomination movement in her article “Opposition Repertoires under Authoritarian Rule: Vietnam’s 2016 Self-Nomination Movement.” She documents the movement and argues that it happened due to the combination of two factors: the right timing and the common activist interests of the participants. Her research focuses on those who exclusively identified themselves with the movement.

    Nhu Truong is a scholar of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University, specializing in authoritarianism and communist regimes. Her article appeared in Cambridge University’s academic publication Journal of East Asian Studies.

    The Movement

    How did the movement happen? If Vietnam allows non-party and self-nominated candidates, did any similar movements happen before?

    Self-nominated candidates are actually not a new phenomenon in Vietnam because it has been allowed since 1992. State officials have also repeatedly affirmed that discrimination against independent candidates is illegal.

    However, genuinely independent candidates remain incredibly underrepresented. This is because not all self-nominated candidates are non-party members or without VCP affiliations. The VCP might even back some self-nominated party members to win to appear more democratic.

    Even if we assume all self-nominated candidates are independent and present opposition to the VCP, the number is awfully inadequate. Over the years, less than 1 percent of self-nominees eventually won their election. Non-party delegates in the National Assembly have never exceeded 15 percent.

    Why? Because, like its Chinese counterpart, the VCP has many tactics to manipulate elections to its own benefit.

    The number of self-nominees with valid applications, those who got on the ballot, and those who won the election. Data by Paul Schuler. Graphic by Son Nguyen/The Vietnamese. 

    Aware of the severe lack of political diversity, a group of activists, dissidents, and non-party members collectively nominated themselves to prove that the electoral system in Vietnam is rigged and discriminatory.

    Unlike self-nominees before and after them, these self-nominees stood out because of their planned collective mobilization. The movement started as the result of a famous civil society activist Nguyen Quang A, who issued a rallying call on Facebook. Nguyen Quang A laid out a rational action plan, including adhering to current legal frameworks despite its shortcomings and establishing collective support groups online for self-nominees to help each other.

    A list of over 30 self-nominated, non-party candidates was then presented on the movement’s Facebook page. These candidates publicly aligned with the movement as well as its slogan “My rights, I exercise”(Quyền ta, ta cứ làm), which stresses the movement’s adherence to the law in Vietnam.

    The list of candidates included many prominent activists and dissidents other than Nguyen Quang A, such as human rights lawyer Vo An Don, who defended exile blogger Mother Mushroom, journalist Nguyen Tuong Thuy, who led an association of independent journalists and recently jailed activist Nguyen Thuy Hanh.

    Unfortunately, all self-nominated candidates who aligned themselves with the movement were eliminated before getting their names on the ballot. Despite getting 100 percent of approval from his meeting with local constituents (one of the steps in the election procedure), Tran Dang Tuan, the former director-general of the state-controlled Vietnam National Television, was later disqualified by the National Election Council.

    The Council did not cite any particular reasons for eliminating him.

    In the 2016 election, only two self-nominated candidates were elected. Both of them were VCP members.

    This movement, as Dr. Truong pointed out, might not strictly qualify as a “social movement” in its scientific definition as a “sustained campaign of claim-making” that uses “repeated performance” to advertise the cause, and has a common identity based on “networks, tradition, and solidarities.” It is because the movement lacked a cohesive common identity despite massive coordination and a shared social circle.

    However, this self-nominated movement is still useful to understand the collective political mobilization in Vietnam.

    The Right Timing

    All politicians need good timing in order to broaden their chance of getting elected, especially for non-party candidates running in an election in an authoritarian state. And indeed, the 2016 election presented a lot of opportunities for independent party critics to rise.

    The period leading up to the 2016 election was a particularly bad time for the VCP with a prominent corruption scandal of former Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung that resulted in party elites infighting, and the first-ever vote of no confidence in the National Assembly. The years 2011-2016 also witnessed numerous incidents causing massive outrage, such as the Formosa environmental disaster case, which caused serious environmental consequences and cost human lives.

    This period of time witnessed an “expansion of public criticism,” according to scholar Benedict Kerkvliet. There were protests all over the country, not only because of the Formosa case but also because of the  Hanoi local government’s decision to replace and/or cut down around 6,700 trees for an urban project. There were also nationalist protests, which condemned China’s sovereign claims in the South China Sea and called out the government’s dependence on China.

    At the same time, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement between the United States and Vietnam, which was signed in early 2016, pressured Vietnam to entertain domestic reforms as a part of the deal. TPP also advocated the government to let civil societies participate in policymaking. Activists viewed this as a golden opportunity.

    But good timing and a favorable political climate were not enough to form such a collective mobilization, even though they were indeed important, argued Nhu Truong. The movement was made possible also by the struggles shared between the activists, which motivated them to mobilize together.

    The Common Struggle

    Nationalism, environmentalism, and democratization are the three common activist spheres of those participating in the movement. According to Nhu Truong, those who were concerned with all three spheres of social contention were most likely to join the self-nomination movement.

    This is because those who participated in all three activist spheres were more likely to form a relationship with each other. No one initially thought that they would participate in such a movement, but common advocacy activities allowed them to meet both online and offline, resulting in common social circles that are valuable for collective mobilization.

    This linkage was also intensified by the intense usage of social media in Vietnam and later proved to be useful through Nguyen Quang A’s rallying call on Facebook.

    Therefore, the self-nomination movement in 2016 should not be viewed as a separate and impulsive movement, but rather the consequence of years of activism and shared frustration with the VCP.

    Those whose interests intersected were more likely to participate in the movement. Original image: Nhu Truong. Design by Son Nguyen/The Vietnamese. 

    The Regime’s Response

    Without a doubt, the regime was not happy with such a movement. There were typical efforts to discredit the movement’s participants via the state-controlled media, by accusing them of “distorting and smearing” the regime and the election, “preparing a coup,” and “being backed by the reactionary press and terrorists.”

    There was only some rare and minimum support from government officials. For example, Vu Trong Kim, the secretary-general of Vietnam Fatherland Front, an organization aligned with the VCP, said that “No one is allowed to create difficulties for the self-nominees, that is against the law.”

    All candidates in the movement were still eliminated before getting their names on the ballot, if not by the VCP-controlled local voters then by the VCP-influenced National Election Council.

    But the regime did not stop at simply disqualifying the candidates. Although it did not forcefully suppress the movement, it still monitored and harassed important figures, such as Nguyen Quang A. Notably, he was arrested on his way to a meeting with then U.S President Barack Obama.

    Only two self-nominated candidates won in the 2016 election. Both of them were Party members. Statistics: Nhu Truong. Design: Son Nguyen/The Vietnamese 

    In the end, the regime still consistently claimed that elections in Vietnam are democratic because everyone could run for election, regardless of party membership. The self-nomination movement in 2016 proves otherwise.

  • The Odds Against Your Favor: How Does The National Assembly Election In Vietnam Work?

    The Odds Against Your Favor: How Does The National Assembly Election In Vietnam Work?

    Vietnam has been consistently categorized as “not free” and “authoritarian” by many organizations, such as Freedom House and The Economist. The Economist went so far as to rank Vietnam at the bottom of its Democracy Index in Asia – only ahead of Afghanistan, China, Laos, and North Korea. Annual human rights reports of various human rights organizations, such as The 88 Project, also document the government’s continuous blatant and brutal suppression of political dissent.

    One of the most prominent reasons attributed to the country’s abuse of power and authoritarianism? Undemocratic elections.

    Authoritarian regimes around the world often conduct elections to appear more legitimate and democratic. Elections in authoritarian countries such as Russia, China, or Cambodia are often performative, as they mostly result in the same people or party holding on to power. Similarly, Vietnam also has elections, but it is hard to call the elections democratic given its methodology and context as a one-party state – which only recognizes the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP).

    But how do elections work in Vietnam? Are there non-Party candidates and how do they get nominated? Is the election effective in forming political competition and avoiding the VCP’s monopoly on power? As the 2021 National Assembly election approaches, this article answers these questions using Professor Paul Schuler’s scholarly writing on Vietnamese politics.

    Paul Schuler, assistant professor at the University of Arizona, is a scholar studying authoritarian regimes in East and Southeast Asia, with a particular focus on contemporary Vietnamese politics. His book, “United Front: Projecting Solidarity through Deliberation in Vietnam’s Single-Party Legislature,” was published earlier this year by Stanford University Press. This article is based on Chapter Two, “How Elections Work in Vietnam.”

    What is the electoral system in Vietnam?

    The electoral system in Vietnam is a bloc voting system, in which each district is distributed two or three seats in the National Assembly. Each voter can vote for as many candidates as he or she wishes, as long as they do not exceed the number of seats available for their district.

    How do candidate numbers get determined?

    The National Election Council and provincial boards are tasked with overseeing details of the elections, such as the number of candidates and the candidates who appear on the ballot. The Council determines the number per province, while the provincial boards determine the number per district. However, this premature election process is ripe for manipulation.

    Up until 2015, there were no regulations regarding the competitiveness of district elections, meaning there were no laws surrounding the number of candidates competing for a seat. As a result, there were cases of districts with three slots, but only four candidates competing. The 2015 Election Law regulates that the number of candidates per district must be at least two more than the number of seats up for grabs. For example, if a district has two seats available, there have to be four candidates at the minimum.

    The Vietnam National Assembly Standing Committee (VNASC), a combination of those leading the National Assembly, such as the chairperson and his/her deputies, also greatly influences this process. The law allows VNASC to rewrite or amend election law as it sees fit. In fact, Vietnam’s election law has been changed before every election. This gives the VNASC the power to potentially manipulate the election right before it even begins.

    Can people run for election without being a Communist Party member?

    If Vietnam is a one-party state that only recognizes the VCP, could people run for elections without being a member of the VCP? If they can, does that mean there is effective political opposition to the VCP?

    The short answer to the first question is yes. And indeed, the VCP has been using this fact as proof of democratic credibility, claiming anyone could become a delegate. But the story is much more complicated than that because the answer to the second question is no.

    There are two types of candidates that, theoretically, would introduce political diversity: non-party members and self-nominated candidates. While the two categories often overlap (independent candidates who self-nominated such as activist Nguyen Thuy Hanh), they are not the same. The case of Duong Trung Quoc is an example. He was a non-party candidate, but he was nominated by the Vietnam Historians Association, an organization related to the Fatherland Front (an umbrella group of organizations aligned with the VCP).

    Here is where the story gets complicated. There is no guarantee that all non-party members and self-nominees will be able to present meaningful challenges to the VCP. This is because there are non-party members who get nominated by organizations related to the Fatherland Front, such as Duong Trung Quoc. There are also VCP members who nominate themselves. Candidates falling under these categories are still counted as non-party and self-nominated members, despite links to the VCP.

    Even if we assume that all non-party members will be able to effectively compete with the VCP, the VCP still retains a great degree of monopoly on power. The percentage of non-party delegates has never exceeded 15 percent. In 2016, despite the surge of independent candidates, the percentage of non-party members in the legislature dropped to 5 percent – the lowest percentage since 1976. And the number of self-nominees is always very small.

    Why is the number of non-party and self-nominated candidates so compromised? This is because of the design of the vetting process.

    How does the candidate vetting process work?

    There are five “gates” in the process of narrowing down the number of candidates. These steps, however, allow possibilities for the VNASC to determine election results as it sees fit – perhaps even before the election starts.

    Participating in the elections, there are two modes of nominations: central nominees and local/provincial nominees. Those nominated by the central government are more influenced by the VCP, and hence, enjoy a more favorable procedure.

    Gate 1: Quota determination for the next National Assembly

    This is the initial stage of the election in which the VNASC determines the demographic quota for the next National Assembly – the desired structure of the subsequent National Assembly.

    In 2007, for example, the National Assembly was to include “150 women, 50 non-party members, 70 delegates under forty years old, and 160 incumbents,” according to Paul Schuler. The determination goes as far as imposing quotas on “how many members of the Fatherland Front, the government, and the local party apparatus should be selected.” During this step, the VNASC tasks the provinces with choosing certain provincial candidates to fulfill the quota.

    Hence, this predetermined structure of the National Assembly is criticized for hurting self-nominated candidates, who were not considered for when the VNASC drew up the quota. How do the self-nominees – who might not satisfy the determined structure – fit in?

    Gate 2: Candidate introduction

    This is the step in which people submit their self-nomination, followed by an announcement of self-nominees who have successfully completed their applications. In this announcement, candidates nominated by the province in step 1 are called “introduced” (được giới thiệu) candidates, distinguishing from “self-nominated” candidates (tự ứng cử).

    Gates 3 and 4: Meeting constituent and the candidates’ co-workers

    This is the step that is considered the “red line” for self-nominated candidates, as it disqualifies many unfavored candidates from competition due to manipulation of the process as well as the underhanded persuasion of public opinion.

    After the introduction of nominees, two meetings are held between the candidates and the local constituents to assess and vote on the candidates. While both types of nominees are required to meet with the voters in their neighborhood, central nominees simply meet with their co-workers in one of the meetings – increasing their chance of passing the round.

    The odds are also stacked against self-nominated candidates as the Party has the power to determine who could present at the meetings, as well as exerting pressure on others not to vote for their unfavored candidate. Indeed, Schuler’s research shows that people with an affiliation to the VCP are 14-22 percent more likely to be chosen for these meetings than those without an affiliation with the VCP. Local officials also conduct door-to-door campaigns to discredit self-nominated candidates if they are not favored by the VCP.

    In other words, the meetings which were supposed to represent the constituent’s democratic will, are actually just occasions and excuses to exclude unfavored candidates.

    Meetings with predominantly VCP supporting voters are considered the ‘red line’ for self-nominated candidates. Table & Data by Paul Schuler. Design by Son Nguyen/The Vietnamese. 

    Gate 5: The final ballot

    At this stage, reports from the vetting rounds are submitted to the National Election Council, which determines the final list of candidates appearing on the ballot in each province. The list is then sent to the provinces to produce the final ballot.

    Over the years, the number of self-nominated candidates who have gotten on the ballot and won the election has been alarmingly low. Those who got their names on the ballot account for just around 6 to 11 percent of the valid applications. Only less than 1 percent of valid self-nominated candidates eventually were elected (see illustration below).

    Numbers of self-nominees with valid applications, those who got on the ballot, and those who won the election. Data by Paul Schuler. Design by Son Nguyen/The Vietnamese. 

    (More information about the vetting process and election milestones can be found here.)

    Are there possibilities for manipulation?

    Yes. As explained above, the VNASC has many ways to interfere in the election, perhaps even before the election itself starts. The vetting process, while being presented to ensure the candidates’ qualifications, actually is a way for the VCP to identify dissidents and eliminate them from the competition, paving the way for favorable and conforming candidates.

    Other than manipulating the election to eliminate dissidents, the VCP also manipulates it to safeguard the victory of the people it wants to win. Additionally, for the VCP high-ranking “star” candidates, the election is also a chance for them to fabricate that these officials have the overwhelming support of the people.

    There are several ways this can be done. For example, “sacrificial lambs” could be introduced into the election as candidates. Then, they are placed into competition with the high-ranking candidate, as the provincial authority could decide on the candidates’ placement into different voting blocs. As these “sacrificial lambs” are supposed to lose, the star candidate with name recognition easily wins with overwhelming support.

    This is evident in the 2021 election. Nguyen Phu Trong, the secretary-general of the VCP, and one of the most important figures in the government is placed into competition with a vice-principal of a high school, the head of a Hanoi local government agency specializing in architecture, a researcher in rural development, and a commander of local forces in Hanoi.

    Another way to ensure the star candidate wins is simply to avoid the placement of star candidates into the same race. This is easily arranged, considering the fact that the provincial authorities have the power to arrange bloc placements.

    Is the electoral system in Vietnam democratic?

    This piece has presented the many ways in which the electoral process in Vietnam is  manipulated to the benefit and desires of the VCP. However, there are still rules not mentioned above that restrict the ability of the candidates to campaign and the people’s ability to choose.

    There are some rules about campaigning that are debatably beneficial, such as forbidding candidates to raise funds or use personal wealth to run for office to prevent the monopoly of the rich in politics. However, there are various other restrictions that mostly aim to retain the power of the VCP. For example, candidates are not allowed to organize campaign rallies, and they can only campaign through the state-controlled mass media. They may also meet their voters, but only through meetings organized by the Fatherland Front.

    Even with all of the restrictions, voters only have around a month to get to know the candidates before voting.

    At this point in the article, perhaps you have already formed an opinion or two about whether the system is democratic or not.