Tag: Vietnam Communist Party

  • Panorama of Flags, Panorama of Lies

    Panorama of Flags, Panorama of Lies

    The panorama of flags

    Foreigners visiting Vietnam can hardly miss the abundance of flags, posters, statues, and slogans that remind them of who is leading Vietnam and of the Communists’ “glorious” struggle against the French, Americans, and the South Vietnam regime throughout the last century.

    However, isn’t it a bit too archaic to still flash the symbol of the hammer and sickle these days, when the means of production and the economy no longer rely on these tools? Farmers and factory workers neither drive nor fuel modern-day politics as well. Likewise, what is the point of having the statues of Ho Chi Minh, Karl Marx, and Lenin in public parks and in the meeting rooms of schools, universities, and governmental departments? Do ordinary people who showcase the red and yellow flag in front of their houses every April 30 cherish the fact that the country was “reunited” in 1975?[1] Do police officers–who check and remind households that fail to do so–love the flag so much and wholeheartedly believe in the cause? In essence, what is the significance of this panorama of symbols?

    Vaclav Havel, the dissident intellectual of communist Czechoslovakia and later president of post-communist Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic,[2] can point us to the answer.

    The panorama of lies

    Following the end of World War II, Czechoslovakia was ruled by the Communists. The iron fist of Communist rule drove dissidents out of the country and clamped down on those who remained. Other than the Prague Spring of 1968, an unsuccessful effort to steer Czechoslovakia back towards democracy, there was hardly any resistance.

    However, communist Czechoslovakia was not just about who held the government; life itself had to adjust in a way that fit the current political climate. Vaclav Havel (1936-2011), who is arguably one of the most respected dissidents in the history of Czechoslovakia, lived most of his life under Communist rule. He grew up to become a playwright, and at the same time, he established himself as a prominent and well-loved politician. A high point of Havel’s dissident writing, The Power of the Powerless, [3] does not concern itself with formal politics; rather, it deals with the “hearts and minds” of the people.

    A significant character in The Power of the Powerless is the greengrocer who puts the slogan “Workers of the World Unite!” in his front window every day, along with his vegetables. He is neither passionate nor concerned about whether or not the workers of the world unite, but he does this anyway. This irony reminds me of my family who obediently and diligently displays the Vietnamese flag at times in the year when they should, but remains so apathetic that they do not even care if the flag is hanging upside down. There also seems to be other households quite similar to my own which led to the government’s legal guidelines (3420/HD-BVHTTDL) that specifically address this violation.[4]

    The greengrocer’s act is the observable tip of the iceberg of how the hearts and minds of the people work in communist Czechoslovakia; they want to avoid trouble with those who have power. By displaying the slogan, the greengrocer implies:

    I, greengrocer XY, live here and I know what I must do. I behave in the manner expected of me. I can be depended upon and am beyond reproach. I am obedient and therefore I have the right to be left in peace.  (Havel, 1978, p. 6)

    I am once again reminded of my family. I recall that every time my father was late in hanging the flag, my mother would berate him. She would constantly tell him to do it now because she didn’t want the hassle of dealing with the police. When I asked my parents about this, they said that they just wanted to be “left in peace” (yên thân). Likewise, if you ask teachers, students, or employees of governmental departments about the statues of Ho Chi Minh and Karl Marx in their buildings, they would probably tell you something similar.

    But, why do the authorities punish such a trivial thing? Whether or not the greengrocer displays the slogan would certainly have little to no effect on the workers’ movement, nor does it pose any tangible threat to the existence of a government that possesses the hard power of the courts, the military, and the police. The greengrocer does not even replace the slogan with another one that is critical about the regime.

    To address this question, Havel points out that, in fact, people would ignore the greengrocer’s slogan, but they do so precisely because such sayings are everywhere – in other shop windows, on lampposts, bulletins, and buildings. The key here is that while they ignore individual slogans, the people are well aware of the panorama of these slogans as a whole. The existence of this panorama tells people that dishonesty goes hand-in-hand with obedience here; this is normal, everyone does it, and so must you. In the same vein, transgressions must be punished because “anything which leads people to overstep their predetermined roles is regarded by the system as an attack upon itself” (Havel, 1978, p. 8).

    Therefore, if a Vietnamese policeman, school administrator, or government official reproaches someone who questions the phrase: “Live, fight, work, and study like our great Uncle Ho” (Sống, chiến đấu, lao động, và học tập theo gương bác Hồ vĩ đại), it is extremely likely that this policeman/school administrator/government official himself has also questioned, albeit in private, the very same slogan! Yet, they also believe that nobody should disrupt the rules of the game and that everyone should blindly follow what the system demands.

    My next question is, how do people live with themselves when their existence is surrounded by so many lies, ironies, contradictions, and hypocrisies, including those of their own making? Would they feel embarrassed and ashamed of themselves for being so afraid and thus becoming unquestionably obedient? These questions, Havel argues, boil down to man’s dignity and authentic identity. To be able to live in lies, the greengrocer deludes himself into believing that there is nothing wrong with the workers of the world unite; he separates the part of himself that questions the slogan from the other half that accepts the excuse. Living in a world of lies and deceit for so long warps our perspective and this bastardized reality becomes our “new normal;” the greengrocer becomes accustomed to the state of his compromised dignity and comes to accept the deception and inauthenticity of the system as part and parcel of life. In effect, he loses his authentic self.

    On the question of dignity and identity, it is interesting that the slogan “Sacrifice for the country and serve the people” (Vì nước quên thân, vì dân phục vụ) is hung in every police station, in a country where police, alongside tax officials, are seen as the most corrupt group (Towards Transparency and Transparency International, 2017). A few years ago, when I passed by one of Vietnam’s border checkpoints, I was baffled by the contradiction between the arrogance of the border control officer and the fact that he was sitting right under a “serve the people” banner. My subsequent conversations with poor Vietnamese migrants who often cross the border for work revealed that this was how they were always treated; they often bribed these arrogant officers and kept their heads down to avoid trouble.

    As I listened to these migrants and recalled my own experience, I wondered how these officers could look at themselves in the mirror. They see the “serve the people” banner in their office every day but shamelessly extend their hand through the small window of the checkpoint to receive bribes from the people they look at with disdain – the “lowly” people they are supposed to serve. On the other hand, the migrants are left with little choice but to comply and are forced to accept being treated with less than half the dignity they should be afforded by the simple virtue of being alive.

    Furthermore, Havel argues that the panorama of lies is internally solid, for there is a “metaphysical order binding all its components together,” thus “guarantee[ing] the inner coherence of the totalitarian power structure” (Havel, 1978, p. 10). Through all the examples I have provided, isn’t there a sense of such order emanating from Vietnam’s panorama of (pseudo) symbols? The checkpoint officers and those who bribe them, my parents’ disinterested flag-hanging, the equally disinterested policeman who checks the flags, and the people who put the statues of Ho and Marx in their meeting rooms are all parts of a system that everyone who lives or has lived in Vietnam knows all too well; it is a system where “the working class is enslaved in the name of the working class, [where] the complete degradation of the individual is presented as his ultimate liberation, […] [and where] the arbitrary abuse of power is called observing the legal code” (Havel, 1978, p. 10).

    In fact, one of my interviewees [5] told me that before he left Vietnam and started to look at the country from a distance, life there was quite “smooth” for him, because “things hung together…everything I heard in school, in the newspaper, in the street etc. was in harmony with each other…I didn’t feel the urge to question things.” This “harmony” is the glue that holds the panorama of lies together. Secondly, as my interviewee’s response also points out, this panorama is solid because those who lack the individual will and instead excel in the use of empty phrases are the ones who thrive (Havel, 1978, p. 13).

    Havel thus concludes that “individuals confirm the system, fulfill the system, make the system, are the system” (Havel, 1978, p. 9). This conclusion runs contrary to what many intellectuals and laymen alike often think about authoritarianism as entailing an evil ruler and people who are controlled against their will, or a class that oppresses all other classes, and where the line of struggle is between the oppressor and the oppressed. The concept of “the panorama of lies” goes beyond such binary definitions and shows that the line of struggle “runs de facto through each person, for everyone in his own way is both a victim and a supporter of the system” (Havel, 1978, p. 16-17).

    Conclusion

    I work with and observe a wide range of activists who work tirelessly and voice their opinions hoping to one day make Vietnam a liveable country for ALL and not just for those with unearned privileges and unchecked power. They pursue different paths of change; some try to run for seats in the National Assembly, others focus on analysing the actions of the government, and there are those who try to nurture a different kind of Vietnamese. For them, a different kind of Vietnamese means Vietnamese citizens who feel anger when their own dignity, or the dignity of others,’ is negated; they are those who strive for “what should be,” instead of settling for “what is.” They are those who are honest with themselves about right versus wrong, instead of surrendering their own judgement, mindlessly obeying the state and condemning those who do not conform.

    Vaclav Havel and his people saw the end of Communist rule in Czechoslovakia in 1989, but the democratic miracle did not immediately follow. Havel, then in the position of president, argued that democratic politics and the market economy, both carrying the promise of a good life, cannot happen in the face of “post-communist morass” (Havel, 1997). The ghost that kept haunting post-communist Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic was called out in Havel’s speech before Parliament in 1997:

    Many people believe that democracy or no democracy, the people in power are again people who cannot be trusted and who are more concerned about helping themselves than about the greater good….The prevalent opinion is that it pays off in this country to lie and to steal; that many politicians and civil servants are corruptible; that political parties – though they all declare honest intentions in lofty words – are covertly manipulated by suspicious financial groupings.(Havel, 1997)

    I understand that the different paths of change I mentioned above ultimately feed into each other. However, with the lesson from Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic and Havel’s thoughts, I cannot help but wonder how best to prioritise these tasks and decide when to pursue which.

    I would also like to believe that Havel’s thoughts give Vietnamese activists hope, especially during the present time when a relentless crackdown makes revolutionary change seem like an utterly unreachable dream. After reading Havel’s work, I see the sparks of our own “Vietnam Spring” starting not in the places representing the power of the system – the National Assembly, the election, state-owned media, or the police – but in the very hearts and minds of ordinary Vietnamese people. The revolutionary Vietnamese of the present day are those who dare to live in truth.

    Bibliography:

    1. On April 30, 1975, North Vietnam forces entered Saigon and officially ended the existence of the Republic of Vietnam as a nation. North Vietnam and South Vietnam were then joined and ruled by the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), and Hanoi became the capital of the whole of Vietnam. In the narrative of the VCP, April 30 is called reunification day and a cause to celebrate, whereas people who sided with South Vietnam call it ‘Black April,’ amongst other names that convey pain and sadness for the loss of their country.
    2. Czechoslovakia split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1992-1993. Vaclav Havel’s presidency was from 1989 to 2003, with some intervals in between.
    3. To be fair to this great work of Havel, I should be clear that the panorama of lies is only a small part of it. I focus particularly on this concept in order to unpack the omnipresence of (pseudo-) symbols in Vietnam.
    4. I am not saying that all Vietnamese display the red and yellow flag in the same disinterested way as Havel’s greengrocer. We will not know unless we ask every single Vietnamese. However, we can always make an educated guess. In Vietnam, there are pockets of the population who resent or distrust the regime for many good reasons, from the historic 1975 event and family members lost at sea during the Boat People exodus to forced evictions and rampant corruption. Growing inequality and poverty drive young people from rural areas to cities or overseas, and also expose even more the lies about the socialist utopia which the VCP claims it pursues and which it trumpets with slogans and posters in public places.
    5. This interview is part of my PhD research on activism under authoritarian rule in the 2010-2019 period in Vietnam.

    References

    Havel, V. (1979). The Power of the Powerless. Available at: https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/resource/the-power-of-the-powerless/

    Havel, V. (1997). Address to the Czech Parliament. Available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/1087560.html

    Towards Transparency & Transparency International (2017). 2017 Global Corruption Barometer: Vietnam. Hong Duc Publishing House.

  • Everything You Need To Know About Vietnam’s Central Committee Of The VCP

    Everything You Need To Know About Vietnam’s Central Committee Of The VCP

    This article is based on Tran Ha Linh’s “Mọi điều bạn cần biết về Ban Chấp hành Trung ương Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam,” published in Luật Khoa Magazine, a sister publication of The Vietnamese, on January 28, 2021. The translation is done by Karie Nguyen.

    ***

    The Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) is a very powerful governing body of the VCP and it seems to be gaining more influence within the Party day by day.

    What is the Central Committee?

    In a previous article, we explained  that the Party Congress is the highest governing body of the VCP according to its own charter. However, these congresses only happen every five years, and at some times in the past, they could actually be held at longer intervals. Then during the five years between the two congresses, which body will lead the VCP’s activities?

    That body would be the Central Committee. In other words, the Central Committee is the second most important body of the VCP.

    Who are the members of the Central Committee?

    The Central Committee gathers together all of the most powerful members of the VCP. There are about 180 official members (who have the right to cast votes) and approximately 20 alternative members (who do not have the right to vote). This is an approximation because these numbers fluctuate when some members are disciplined (as in the cases of Dinh La Thang, Nguyen Bac Son, and Truong Minh Tuan), or when some pass away (Tran Dai Quang). There are also some members  who resign during their terms for various reasons.

    Almost all of the secretaries of the provincial committees, some of the deputy secretaries of the major cities (such as Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City), and the secretaries of significant departments (such as the central departments and state enterprises) get selected to the Party Congress to be members of the Central Committee (both of the official and alternative members).

    We also see the prime minister, deputy prime ministers, ministers, and some deputy ministers of the major ministries (such as the Ministry of Public Security or the Ministry of Defense) and directors join the Central Committee.

    Vietnam Television (VTV), the Voice of Vietnam (VOV), the Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, and the Vietnam Academy of Science and Technology all belong to the central government and have equal standing as the ministries. Therefore, the heads of these organizations can also become members of the Central Committee.

    The National Assembly chairperson, vice-chairperson, and the commissioners of all committees are all included on the Central Committee. There may even be deputy commissioners of some committees participating in the Central Committee.

    The prosecutor general and deputy prosecutor general of the People’s Supreme Procuracy along with the chief justice and deputy justice of the People’s Supreme Court also participate as members of the Central Committee. The leaders of the Vietnamese Fatherland Front, the Vietnam Farmer’s Union, and the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union, etc. are also members of the Central Committee.

    Of course, the members of the Politburo (including the VCP general secretary), and the Secretariat, the heads and deputies of the VCP departments, are all members of the Central Committee.

    Who elects the members of the Central Committee?

    New members of the Central Committee are elected during the Party Congress. Almost all of the new members will be nominated before the congress by the former Central Committee. It is very rare to see any members of the Central Committee get elected if they are not nominated in advance by the Central Committee. Being nominated at the Party Congress or by their self-nomination would not help them get elected.

    In the time period between the two Party Congresses, the Central Committee may also elect more official members from its own alternative members group.

    What are the roles of the Central Committee?

    Because it is acting as the VCP’s main stage, the Central Committee can do the following:

    • Elect the members of the Politburo, the general secretary, the members and the Standing Secretary of the Secretariat, and the members and the commissioner of the Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection. These are the most important and powerful departments of the VCP.
    • Organize to implement the political platforms of the VCP, the VCP’s charter, the resolutions of the Party congresses, and decisions regarding both foreign and internal affairs. It also focuses on the VCP’s mass mobilization and constructing the VCP’s organizational development, as well as summoning the Party Congress.

    How often does the Central Committee hold its plenary sessions?

    According to the VCP’s charter, the Central Committee will meet every six months, but it can meet more often if it is necessary. The meetings are officially called plenary sessions. If these sessions are held twice a year, then during the five years between the VCP congresses there will have been 10 meetings. However, in recent history, the Central Committee has held between 12-15 sessions, and there were years when they met four times a year, as in 2011, 2015, and 2016.

    It is not a coincidence that the plenary sessions always met before the National Assembly had its sessions. Before the National Assembly conducts its session, there must be a Central Committee plenary session. In that plenary session, the Central Committee, together with Politburo meetings, will not only decide the National Assembly’s agenda, but also the decisions that the National Assembly will make during its session. Of course, the sessions of the National Assembly will not always be conducted as planned by the Central Committee’s original decision. In 2018, the National Assembly was pressured by the public to halt the law on the creation of the three Special Economic Zones. That halt has continued to date and that decision was not something the Central Committee could have expected.

    The first plenary session of a new term of the Central Committee begins during the Party Congress to elect the members of the Politburo, the general secretary, and a few other positions. The Party Congress will end on the next day after the Central Committee finishes its first plenary session and the new leaders of the VCP will be introduced during that final day.

    Are the plenary sessions of the Central Committee open to the public?

    No.

    Even at the National Assembly, which is the nation’s elected legislative body, the Vietnamese people are prevented from attending and observing its sessions. Thus, the plenary sessions of the Central Committee – one of the top governing bodies of the VCP – are not open to the public.

    The plenary sessions are conducted in the conference hall of the Office of the Party Central Committee located at No. 1, Hung Vuong Street, Hanoi, at Ba Dinh Square, the site of many historical events, and where Ho Chi Minh read the Proclamation of Independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on September 2, 1945.

    Only representatives of a few of the special mouthpieces of the government – such as Vietnam Television, the Voice of Vietnam, the Vietnam News Agency, Nhan Dan (The People) newspaper, the VCP online newspaper, and the government’s online newspaper, are allowed to attend. However, these organizations only report on the commencement and the conclusion of these sessions. Everything else is kept secret.

    After the plenary session concludes, the Office of the Central Committee will announce the results of the meeting at a news conference.

    Does the Central Committee have actual power?

    Yes.

    Before Party Congress V (in 1982), the Central Committee had an insignificant role when compared to the Politburo. For example, the third Central Committee was active from 1960 to 1976 for a total of 16 years. Nevertheless, it only conducted 19 plenary sessions. All of the major decisions during those years came from the Politburo and the Party’s Central Military Commission.

    However, starting with its fifth term, and especially the sixth term, the Central Committee conducted more plenary sessions, having at least two sessions per year. During these sessions, the Committee decided and implemented more important policies with regards to the operation of the VCP.

    One reasonable explanation for this was the decentralization of the VCP’s power over the years.

    Before, people like Ho Chi Minh, Le Duan, Le Duc Tho, Truong Chinh, all had extensive influence within the VCP. Perhaps, that was mainly because Vietnam was in a state of war. At that time, the Politburo and the Central Military Commission, and even just a few top leaders, would have enough authority and power to execute their decisions on their own.

    However, beginning in the early 1980’s, the group of the heroic individuals who specifically contributed to the VCP development got older and died and so the group lost its influence in the Party.

    More than that, when Vietnam began to live in a peaceful period, each local province came to have its own individual and unique problems. Therefore, the authority in the VCP had to be shared among the members of the Politburo and also with the local governments, and with other governmental enterprises as well. The decentralization of power in the VCP and also in the government meant that more authority was disbursed to local governments.

    At the same time, there were issues that the Politburo could not decide, and it passed those on to the Central Committee. During the XI term, we had the example of two Politburo members, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung and General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, who conflicted with each other a lot during their terms. Their conflict couldn’t be resolved within the Politburo, so they brought it to the Central Committee’s floor. At the 2012 Central Committee’s 6th plenary session, there was a plan to review the prime minister’s responsibilities during his term. The prime minister ended up not being disciplined and was able to retain his position.

    Even though the Central Committee possesses such significant power and has been gaining more control over the years, its agenda can still be dictated by the Politburo. In 2006, Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet penned his letter to the Politburo, asking it to respect the decisions that came from the Central Committee and to quit acting as the higher-level, supervising department of the Committee.

    Based on the VCP’s charter, the agenda and the nomination and election of all the positions in the Central Committee’s plenary sessions should be organized by the Politburo. However, it is still unclear which department has more power between these two most potent governing bodies of the VCP.

    We can only hope that with more research and analysis that we can better understand the organizational power of the VCP.