Tag: Publications

  • Report: ‘Censorship in Vietnam – State Media Under Unprecedented Attack’

    Report: ‘Censorship in Vietnam – State Media Under Unprecedented Attack’

    The state of press freedom in Vietnam, particularly within state media, has been widely discussed over the past few decades. Although there is little debate that the environment has remained highly repressive, gaps and misconceptions persist in the existing literature.

    To this day, many public statements and analyses still assert that private media is nonexistent in Vietnam and that state media functions solely as a mouthpiece for the Communist Party. Furthermore, the scope and impact of the party’s Press Plan 2025 have yet to receive the attention they warrant.

    Today, Legal Initiatives for Vietnam (LIV) is pleased to release a new report that offers fresh insights into the nuances and recent developments surrounding press freedom in Vietnam. Titled “Censorship in Vietnam – State Media Under Unprecedented Attack,” the report explores how state media has come under increasing pressure and control by the market-Leninist regime following what was considered a heyday for Vietnamese journalism, spanning from the early 2000s to the mid-2010s.

    This report, authored by our partner Vietnam Media Project (VMP) and reviewed by The 88 Project, represents LIV’s inaugural effort to document and analyze the state of press freedom in Vietnam, with financial support from the East-West Management Institute (EWMI). We welcome any feedback and are committed to continuing this work in the coming year.


    For more information, please contact:

    Trịnh Hữu Long
    Editor-in-Chief, Luật Khoa Magazine, a project of LIV
    Email: long.trinh@liv.ngo


    Executive Summary

    • Although Vietnam is often recognized as a country lacking press freedom, the first two decades of the 2000s saw a vibrant period in media development brought about by the rise of the Internet and increasing commercialization. This period recently came to an end when the party-state tightened their control over the entire media system.
    • Independent media in Vietnam has nearly been eradicated due to government crackdown. As of October 2024, the Vietnamese government holds 17 independent journalists in prison. All of them were arrested during the past five years. Three new significant cases were recorded in the first half of 2024.
    • Domestically registered news outlets, often referred to as state media, also face increased hardship due to the government’s weaponization of laws and regulations. The most affected are those registered under public associations or heavily involved with private companies. They are labeled as part of the “privatization of the press” and subjected to punishment or demotion. Instances of punishment and fines have significantly increased in recent years.
    • Half of the registered state press organizations have been banned from producing political news from 2019 to May 2024, due to the implementation of Press Plan 2025 — a reallocation strategy designed to centralize state media.  This move closely mirrors China’s approach of monopolizing political news through party-state entities.
    • The Vietnamese government is focusing its resources towards creating six powerful party-state media conglomerates, encompassing the party’s mouthpiece, the police, the army, national news agencies, TV, and radio. These conglomerates are being positioned to spearhead the transformation of Vietnam’s digital media landscape, a development celebrated by tech giants.
    • The Vietnamese government has become more sophisticated in utilizing technology to monitor news coverage and conduct surveillance on newsrooms. Evidence indicates that certain tools are being used to track removed articles and monitor media coverage by keywords and sentiments.
    • The increasingly hostile media environment in Vietnam creates a climate of fear that pushes newsrooms into survival mode, erodes journalists’ will to resist, and encourages self-censorship. This situation is characterized by silence on “sensitive” events and uniform news coverage.

    Table of Content

    ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    List of Tables and Figures
    Glossary
    List of Newspapers & Other Media Sources

    INTRODUCTION

    CHAPTER I: MECHANISM LIMITING PRESS FREEDOM
    System of Control
    Limited Space for Non-State Media
    Foreign media: Difficulties in license acquisition
    Crackdown on Independent Media
    Main Policies Targeting the Press
    Speech Crimes: The Penal Code
    Press Law: Prohibited Acts
    Sanctions for Misconduct: Decree 119/2020/NĐ-CP
    Internet Regulations

    CHAPTER II: HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND CHANGES
    The Phase of Critical Journalism: 2000s – mid 2010s
    The Phase of Heavy Crackdown (2019 – present)
    Press Plan 2025: Press Quotas
    Similarities to China
    Effect on the media landscape

    CHAPTER III: CENSORSHIP 2.0
    No One is Safe: The Increasing Complexity of State Censorship
    No Place to Hide: Tech-embedded Surveillance Over the Media
    No Money No Talk: Big Corporations as “Another Propaganda Commission”
    No More Resistance: The Toll of Self-censorship
    “I did not feel like it was worth it anymore.”
    “More Classified Stamps”: Professional Barriers Erected
    A Blanket of Silence

    DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

    SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHIES

    ANNEXES
    Annex 1: Cases of Censorship
    Annex 2: List of Imprisoned Journalists & Bloggers (as of October 2024)
    Annex 3: Profiles of Prominent Independent Media
    Annex 4: Prohibited acts – 2016 Press Law

  • New report: How foreign tech companies have failed to uphold human rights in Vietnam

    New report: How foreign tech companies have failed to uphold human rights in Vietnam

    Once upon a time, foreign social networks like Facebook and YouTube were channels where independent news and information flowed relatively freely into Vietnam’s highly repressive society. Activists used them to mobilize the public and organize social movements, journalists thrived on them to disseminate uncensored content, and ordinary citizens leveraged them to hold government officials accountable.

    Those days are long gone.

    Today, Legal Initiatives for Vietnam releases a new report, “Foreign Tech Companies in Vietnam: Challenges and Failures in Upholding Human Rights,” to shed light on how foreign tech companies have faced increasing pressure from the Vietnamese government regarding content moderation, user data access, and online discussion manipulation. The report also highlights these companies’ failures to address these issues in line with international human rights standards, effectively contributing to the development of digital authoritarianism in Vietnam.

    ​​In this report, LIV investigates the operations of major foreign tech companies in Vietnam to assess their human rights policies and practices regarding freedom of expression and the right to privacy. The report aims to contribute to the broader discussion on the tech sector’s human rights responsibilities in authoritarian contexts, identifying challenges and recommending policies and practices aligned with international human rights law.

    The report begins by introducing the political and legal context of Vietnam, a market-Leninist regime where the authoritarian government, led by the Vietnamese Communist Party, embraces an open and competitive market economy. While this political regime, governing a population of 100 million, offers attractive business opportunities, it also poses significant risks to businesses, including the tech sector.

    Readers will find a detailed account of the laws and regulations impacting foreign tech companies, including the Law on Information Technology, the Law on Cybersecurity, Decree 72/2013/NĐ-CP, Decree 15/2020/NĐ-CP, Decree 53/2022/NĐ-CP, and Decree 13/2023/NĐ-CP. These laws not only heavily restrict Vietnamese citizens from exercising free speech online by criminalizing online speech but also compel tech companies to cooperate extensively with the government in moderating content and providing access to users’ data. As the report demonstrates, Vietnam’s Internet governance is based on a legal system intentionally designed to be vague and overbroad, allowing for arbitrary interpretation and actions by the state. Often, these regulations and actions do not meet the Three-Part Test under the United Nations’ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

    Additionally, the report examines a draft decree on Internet governance expected to be issued in 2024, which will play a central role in controlling the Internet in Vietnam. The drafters explicitly aim to force social networks, regardless of the platforms’ nationality, to verify users’ identities if they wish to continue operating in Vietnam. Combined with other regulations, this draft decree puts Vietnamese users at risk of having their real identities exposed to the authorities.

    The core part of the report provides a detailed account of how major foreign tech companies such as Meta/Facebook, Google, Netflix, TikTok, and Apple handle legal requirements and government requests on online speech and users’ data.

    Our findings show a concerning situation where these companies almost always comply with an increasing number of content moderation requests from the Vietnamese government, with the compliance rate consistently above 90% over the years, including geographical restrictions and content removals. At the same time, the government and some tech companies acknowledge that a significant portion of the restricted or removed content is government criticism, which is protected speech under international human rights law. Notably, Meta even maintains a secret list of Vietnamese Communist Party’s officials who are immune from criticism on their platform, Facebook.

    Regarding users’ data, our findings demonstrate a positive practice by the companies, with a very low number of government requests being complied with. Additionally, these companies—with the exception of TikTok, for which we lack evidence on the location of Vietnamese users’ data—consistently store users’ sensitive data outside the country while maintaining cache servers in Vietnam where non-sensitive users’ data is processed.

    The report also highlights an alarming trend of the Vietnamese government deploying cyber troops and trolls to manipulate online discussions, spread disinformation, and make false reports on platforms such as Facebook and YouTube. The government-backed Force 47’s and Task Force 35’s operations have been overwhelmingly effective in manipulating Facebook and YouTube, targeting government critics, including human rights defenders and marginalized communities, while these platforms have taken almost no concrete actions to prevent them.

    However, the report also shows instances of foreign tech companies clashing with the government, indicating both a significant resistance to the government’s illegitimate requests and their inability to fully comply with these requests. Facebook notably suffered a severe traffic slowdown in early 2020 due to government intervention and could only restore normal operations after agreeing to censor more political content. Other tech companies have faced major pressure from the government to open local offices and allow government inspectors access.

    Although the report focuses on foreign tech companies’ operations, it also provides examples of how Vietnamese users are punished criminally and administratively by the government. These examples should inform the companies about the costs their users must pay to exercise basic human rights.

    Finally, the report offers a list of recommendations for both foreign tech companies and governments to improve human rights policies and practices in the tech sector. Recommendations for tech companies include resisting the government’s illegitimate requests for content moderation and user data, implementing end-to-end encryption to protect user data, removing government-backed forces that manipulate platforms, being more transparent in handling government requests, and supporting nonprofits and human rights defenders. For governments, the recommendations include enforcing existing treaties with the Vietnamese government to ensure a free and open Internet, introducing more human rights-friendly legislation, and holding tech companies accountable for their overseas human rights practices.


    Thank you for your attention.

    We hope you will find the report useful, and we appreciate any feedback.

    Contacts:

    • Trần Quỳnh Vi, Executive Director, vi.tran@liv.ngo.
    • Trịnh Hữu Long, Editor-in-Chief, author, long.trinh@liv.ngo.

    Learn more about LIV:

    About us
    Legal Initiatives for Vietnam’s (LIV) mission is to build a democratic society in Vietnam through independent journalism, research, and education. LIV was founded by Trịnh Hữu Long, Trần Quỳnh-Vi, Phạm Đoan Trang and Trương Tự Minh in 2014 as a small legal publication, which has now become its core project

  • Freedom on the Net 2022 – Vietnam Chapter

    Freedom on the Net 2022 – Vietnam Chapter

    Legal Initiatives for Vietnam (LIV) contributes for the Vietnam Chapter of Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net report for 2022.

    English


    Overall Score: 22/100 | NOT FREE

    Obstacles to Access: 12/25

    Limits on Content: 6/35

    Violations on User Rights: 4/40


    Overview

    Internet freedom remained restricted in Vietnam, as the government enforced stringent controls over the country’s online environment. Though the government did not disrupt connectivity or throttle Facebook servers as it had done previously, the state continued mandating that companies remove content and imposed draconian criminal sentences for online expression. A COVID-19 surge in late 2021 propelled government surveillance, and authorities have also sought to expand control over content on social media platforms.

    Vietnam is a one-party state, dominated for decades by the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV). Although some independent candidates are technically allowed to run in legislative elections, most are banned in practice. Freedom of expression, religious freedom, and civil society activism are tightly restricted. Judicial independence is absent.


    Key Developments, June 1, 2021 – May 31, 2022

    • Government officials ordered international social media companies to remove thousands of pieces of content, particularly targeting criticism of the authorities (see B2).
    • New regulations tightened content restrictions on websites that host advertisements and increased administrative fines on companies found to be hosting online speech that authorities deem illegal (see B3, B6, and C2).
    • Authorities imposed prison sentences on human rights defenders and everyday internet users for their online activities, including a ten-year sentence issued to activist Trịnh Bá Phương (see C3).
    • The expansion of government-run COVID-19 apps and the creation of a central database for new identification cards have raised privacy concerns (see C5).
  • Freedom on the Net 2021 – Vietnam Chapter

    Freedom on the Net 2021 – Vietnam Chapter

    Legal Initiatives for Vietnam develops the Vietnam Chapter of Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net 2021 report.

    English
    Tiếng Việt


    Overall score: 22/100 | NOT FREE
    Obstacles to Access: 12/25
    Limits on Content: 6/35
    Violations of User Rights: 4/40


    Overview

    Internet freedom remained restricted in Vietnam, as the government enforced stringent controls over the country’s online environment. Though previously imposed connectivity disruptions and throttling of Facebook servers did not recur, the state continued mandating that companies remove content and imposed draconian criminal sentences for online expression. Online political organizing was sharply restricted ahead of the May 2021 legislative elections.

    Vietnam is a one-party state, dominated for decades by the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV). Although some independent candidates are technically allowed to run in legislative elections, most are banned in practice. Freedom of expression, religious freedom, and civil society activism are tightly restricted. Judicial independence is absent.

    Key Developments, June 1, 2020 – May 31, 2021

    • Unlike during the previous coverage period, there were no temporary disruptions to connectivity or restrictions on Facebook’s country-based servers (see A3 and B1).
    • Facebook revealed that the government had threatened to shut down its services in Vietnam should the company refuse to comply with requests for broader restrictions on critical content in November 2020. Subsequently, government requests for content removals reached record highs (see B2).
    • The government restricted independent candidates from campaigning on social media in the May 2021 legislative elections, arresting some who announced their candidacy online and targeting others with smear campaigns (see B8).
    • A draft decree on personal data protection was released in February 2021. If passed, it would require platforms to store data on Vietnamese users in the country and to provide that data to the government upon request (see C6).
    • Several activists, bloggers, and individuals were handed severe prison sentences for their online speech, including three online journalists whose sentences ranged between 11 and 15 years imprisonment (see C7).
  • Legal research: Analysis of Vietnam’s Internet Freedom Situation Following the Adoption of the 2018 Cybersecurity Law

    Legal research: Analysis of Vietnam’s Internet Freedom Situation Following the Adoption of the 2018 Cybersecurity Law

    The “Analysis of Vietnam’s Internet Freedom Situation Following the Adoption of the 2018 Cybersecurity Law” report was jointly conducted by Legal Initiatives for Vietnam and Boat People SOS in late 2020 and was released on January 12, 2021.

    Download from BPSOS’s website.


    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

    This research is a follow-up on a comprehensive research of Vietnam’s Internet regulations conducted by Boat People SOS in 2018 with a grant from International Center for Non-Profit Law (ICNL). It provides the updated information on Vietnam’s new Internet regulations and the central and local governments’ practices of implementing the regulations.

    The research’s findings show that after passing the controversial Cybersecurity  Law in June 2018, the Vietnamese government has failed to issue a decree to provide guidance of how to implement the law, a routine that usually is conducted by the executive branch shortly after the passage of a piece of legislation at the National Assembly. Due to the government’s arbitrary use of national secrets regulations, it is uncertain whether or not there is already a decree.

    Another major finding is that the government has been trying to indirectly provide guidance of implementation of the Cybersecurity Law by issuing decrees that are, on the surface, meant to be detailing other laws. This can be interpreted as a way of avoiding domestic and international criticism since the Cybersecurity Law and its initial drafted decree have received widespread condemnation.

    In the meantime, both the central and local governments are not waiting for the detailed guidance of the Cybersecurity Law to start implementing what the law  says because the Cybersecurity Law is, in fact, only a part of many laws and regulations that govern online expression. By conducting administrative, criminal and economic measures, the government has been actively forcing citizens and technology companies (mainly foreign enterprises) to accept a significantly more  repressive Internet environment and a much narrower range of doing businesses  in Vietnam.

  • Legal research: Vietnam’s legal framework on religion

    Legal research: Vietnam’s legal framework on religion

    The legal research “Vietnam’s legal framework on religion” was conducted by Legal Initiatives for Vietnam to understand the existing laws and regulations relating to religion, especially how the Vietnamese government views and deals with religious affairs and communities.

    The research was reviewed and finalized in September 2020.