Tag: European Union

  • With Economic Development Comes Greater Government Oppression: Why the EU Must Reconsider Its Free Trade Deal with Vietnam

    With Economic Development Comes Greater Government Oppression: Why the EU Must Reconsider Its Free Trade Deal with Vietnam

    On the same day in 2020 that Vietnam chaired its first Security Council meeting in New York, just a few hours earlier and some 8000 miles away near its capital, Hanoi, the Communist Party of Vietnam directly attacked Dong Tam village for refusing to give up its land.

    The result? Police shot dead Dong Tam’s beloved leader and former Party village chief, Le Dinh Kinh, an 84-year-old veteran who had been a Party member for 57 years; three police officers also died after falling down a sky-light, ostensibly pursuing “suspects” who resisted the authorities. Twenty two villagers have subsequently been arrested, with twenty being charged with murder. If convicted, these villagers could face the death penalty.

    The Dong Tam land seizure event of last week is therefore a watershed moment in Vietnam’s post-war history for many reasons. First, it marks for the first time in the age of social media an open and deadly clash between the Party and its once loyal support base: villagers in northern Vietnam. According to a 2015 Bloomberg finding, almost 70% of Party members live in the north, even though the north is home to less than half of the country’s population of 96 million.

    Second, it shows the Party’s determination in ending the dispute, no matter the costs, and the great lengths it will go to muzzle public outcry afterwards, both on- and offline.

    Just two days after the incident, the Ministry of Information, which controls and censors all media content in Vietnam, called for Facebook – by far the most popular social media platform in Vietnam, used by some 55 million netizens – to be punished for ‘not following Vietnamese laws’ in allowing ‘distortion and fake news’ to be spread on its platform.

    Following official warnings and thanks to a large cyber-troop force the government employs, some users reporting on Dong Tam have been locked out of their accounts or had content taken down by Facebook, a fact Amnesty International has confirmed in recent days.

    Offline, the Party’s determination couldn’t be more clear. Less than 24 hours after the incident, the most senior member of the Politburo and Vietnam’s top leader, Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, posthumously awarded the officers killed the title of “martyr”, designating them as first-class heroes.

    A week later, in an elaborate ceremony held at the State Funeral House, the Prime Minister himself along with other Politburo members, including the powerful Minister of Public Security, attended the funeral, noting that the officers ‘sacrificed their lives to protect national security’.

    It is, indeed, not surprising that the Party views the incident as a matter of significant national security. After all, though land disputes are common in Vietnam because the government does not recognize private land ownership, never before has an entire village dared to resist government seizure of its land at all costs and announce its intentions accordingly on Youtube and Facebook.

    With Vietnam’s economy expected to grow faster in the next decade, land designated for development purposes and seized by the government will likely exacerbate the security situation on the ground if not dealt with decisively. In the case of Dong Tam, the land seizure was for Viettel Group, Vietnam’s military-run communications company. They had to act.

    But the timing could not have been worse. In the coming days, the EU Parliament’s Trade Committee is expected to vote on the EU – Vietnam Free Trade Agreement, worth 42 billion dollars annually and described by the EU as ‘the most ambitious free trade deal ever concluded with a developing country’. If passed, it will go to Parliament for a final vote on February 10.

    According to Human Rights Watch, already there is significant concern among some EU MEPs regarding Vietnam’s worsening human rights record. Just last month, they also discovered that the trade deal rapporteur, MEP Jan Zahradil, has institutional links with the Party, leading to his immediate resignation.

    With the latest incident in Dong Tam, it is also important for the 751 MEPs to realize that while the deal will bring more economic benefits to Vietnam, without clear and concrete human rights benchmarks, the deal will likely provide more incentives for the Party loyal and powerful to grab more land from the poor for developments without proper compensation and recourse.

    As a result, if passed in its present form, expect more land losses and tragic deaths in villages across Vietnam, not less. After all, 65% of Vietnam’s population still lives in rural areas.

    As for the Security Council of which Vietnam is the President this month, expect no resolutions on the matter. Dang Dinh Quy, head of Vietnam’s permanent mission in New York, is a Communist Party member himself.

  • Facilitator in EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement Fails to Disclose Links to Vietnamese Communist Party, Possibly Violating Code of Conduct

    Facilitator in EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement Fails to Disclose Links to Vietnamese Communist Party, Possibly Violating Code of Conduct

    Member of European Parliament (MEP) Jan Zahradil, who is currently the rapporteur (or facilitator) for a free trade agreement (EVFTA) and an investment protection agreement (IPA) between the European Union and Communist Vietnam, has failed to disclose his links to the Vietnamese Communist Party, in possible violation of the European Parliament Code of Conduct, a letter to the President of the European Parliament (EP) has revealed.

    The letter, sent by Philippe Lamberts, one of the co-presidents of the Greens/European Free Alliance Group, cites a recently published article by the EU Observer which accuses Zahradil of a “conflict of interest” after it was revealed that Zahradil failed to disclose that he was chairman of the Advisory Council to the Federation of Overseas Vietnamese Associations in Europe (FOVAE).

    The FOVAE is itself set up under the guidance of the Vietnamese Fatherland Front (VFF), a broad-based political organization controlled by the Vietnamese Communist Party. The Vietnamese Fatherland Front has been comparedto China’s United Front in its influence operations, and a 2016 official report from the Czech government confirmsthat the VCP uses the FOVAE as a means to control overseas Vietnamese communities.

    The EU Observer reports that Zahradil is also chair of a parliamentary “friendship group” to Vietnam, which is “[o]ften billed as a means to increase cultural understanding, promote values, and better inform the public […but is] in fact often backdoor entries for pariah governments seeking greater access to the European Parliament.”

    In response, Zahradil sought to downplay the FOVAE and friendship group’s significance, citing the former’s inactivity and the latter’s informality.  Ample evidence found by the EU Observer calls both of these assertions into question.

    In particular, the EU Observer cites examples from Vietnam’s own state-run media which show a healthy relationship between Zahradil and active FOVAE chairman Hoang Dinh Thang (who is also on the Presidential Committee of the VFF). Another articlefrom the Vietnam People’s Army website touts the efficacy of the parliamentary “friendship group” in advocating for the EVFTA.

    Regardless of these two groups’ relevance, Zahradil’s failure to disclose his links may directly violate Article 3 of the European Parliament’s Code of Conduct, which requires that “Members shall disclose, before speaking or voting in plenary or in one of Parliament’s bodies, or if proposed as a rapporteur, any actual or potential conflict of interest in relation to the matter under consideration”.

    Jan Zahradil is of Czech origin and has been an MEP since 2004. He is a member of the Civic Democratic Party and part of the rightwing Eurosceptic group “European Conservatives and Reformists” (ECR) in the EP. In addition to rapporteur for the EVFTA and IPA, he is also vice-chair of the EP’s International Trade Committee (INTA).

    Although the EVFTA and IPA have both been signed by Vietnam and their EU counterparts, the agreements (and their amendments) must be formally ratified by the European Parliament at its plenary session in February 2020 in order to take effect. NGOs and democracy groups insist Vietnam’s deteriorating human rights record must be improved before the EU proceeds with these agreements.

    Update: Jan Zahradil has resigned from his position as rapporteur for the EVFTA, effective December 10th.

  • Has Vietnam Already Violated the To-Be-Ratified Free Trade Agreement with the EU?

    Has Vietnam Already Violated the To-Be-Ratified Free Trade Agreement with the EU?

    After Hoàng Đức Bình’s 14-year sentence was affirmed by an appellate court in Vietnam on April 24, 2018, one of the state-owned newspapers, Người Lao Động (NLD), published a story about Bình’s case on the same day, explaining the government’s reasons behind his harsh sentence.

    In one paragraph, NLD wrote:

    “Taking advantage of the marine life environmental incident in the Central, and as the Vice-Chairman of Viet Labor Movement, Hoàng Đức Bình began to organize The Association of Fishermen in the Central with the intent to form an external organization, mobilizing forces, attracting Catholics, fishermen in the Central to join that organization; selecting ‘nucleus’ who could incite demonstration to disturb the peace and security.”

    Not only international human rights laws protect the right of the people to form associations and organize protests, Vietnam repeatedly acknowledges and agrees to not infringe on these rights of its people in various international treaties and agreements. One of the more recent ones is the free trade agreement (FTA) with the European Union (EU).

    About two and a half years before Bình’s trial, in October 2015, Vietnam and the EU have agreed on the text concerning the terms of the FTA between them.

    At the same time, EU and its member countries have repeatedly maintained, that they are “fully committed to implementing the 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals into EU policies.”

    One of EU’s commitments to implementing the 2030 Agenda is to include in their free trade agreements, rules on trade and sustainable development as well as a human rights clause.

    In the case of the Vietnam-EU FTA, that language is under Chapter 15 of the agreement, entitles Trade and Sustainable Development.

     

    Article 3, Paragraph 2, Sub-paragraph (a) of Chapter 15 states:

    “Each Party reaffirms its commitments, in accordance with its obligations deriving from the membership of the ILO and the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up, adopted by the International Labour Conference at its 86th Session in 1998, to respect, promote and effectively implement the principles concerning the fundamental rights at work, namely:

    a) the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining;”

    The importance of this chapter and the human rights clause are also highlighted by the Chair of the European Parliament’s Committee for International Trade, Bernd Lange, during his visit to Hanoi in September 2017. That human rights and labor rights are at the center of the continued discussions about the FTA between Vietnam and EU.

    Many could imply that the criminalization of Hoàng Đức Bình’s conduct for organizing people and forming an association of fishermen in the Central of Vietnam appears to be in direct violation of the Trade and Sustainable Development Chapter and the human rights clause of the Vietnam-EU FTA.

    The European Parliament Think Tank assessed in February 2018, that the FTA with Vietnam “has been described as the most ambitious deal of its type ever concluded between the EU and a developing country. Not only will it eliminate over 99 % of customs duties on goods, but it will also open up Vietnamese services markets to EU companies and strengthen protection of EU investments in the country.”

    They also opined that the Vietnam-EU FTA is estimated to boost Vietnam’s economy as much as 15 % of GDP, with Vietnamese exports to Europe growing by over one third.

    The parties are hopeful that the FTA will be ratified by EU Parliament (and also by its member-states on issues involving investment) by the end of this year, or by 2019 at the latest.

    However, the recent affirmation of Vietnam’s court regarding Hoàng Đức Bình’s 14-year sentence for organizing and participating in protests against Taiwan’s Formosa Hà Tĩnh Steel Corporation raises questions over the good faith of Hanoi in keeping up their end of the bargain when it comes to human rights and labor rights.

    If Vietnamese government is sending people to prison with a very harsh sentence for exercising their freedom of association before the FTA is ratified, then what and how does EU plan to keep them in check once the dust is all settled?

    Perhaps, this is a legitimate question for the EU-Vietnam Human Rights Dialogue to provide the public with a more definitive answer later this year?