Tag: democracy

  • October 9, 2009: Six Peaceful Activists Sentenced For Pro-Democracy Activities

    October 9, 2009: Six Peaceful Activists Sentenced For Pro-Democracy Activities

    What happened?

    On this day, 12 years ago, a group of six democracy activists was sentenced to prison, with sentences ranging from two years to six years in prison, in addition to various months or years of house arrest. Their sentences prompted criticism from many international organizations, such as Human Rights Watch and Reporters Without Borders.

    These activists were arrested earlier in 2008 for hanging pro-democracy banners on a bridge along the Hanoi-Hai Phong Highway. The government accused them of “spreading propaganda against the government and Communist leaders” under Article 88 of the 1999 Penal Code. Article 88 was one of the most frequently used charges to silence political dissent in Vietnam during the last decades.

    The group of six activists includes well-known activist and novelist Nguyen Xuan Nghia, activist Nguyen Van Tinh, land rights activist Nguyen Kim Nhan and Nguyen Van Tuc, ex-Communist member Nguyen Manh Son, and Ngo Quynh, a university student. Nghia and Tuc are alleged to be members of Bloc 8406, a pro-democracy organization that used to be prominent but was violently suppressed during the early 2010s. At the time of the arrests, most of the activists were already in their 60s, but Ngo Quynh was only 25 years old.

    Following the trial of these activists, other democracy activists were also sentenced in 2010, including teacher Vu Hung, blogger Pham Thanh Nghien, and activist Pham Van Troi. According to the BBC Vietnamese, the intensified crackdown of pro-democracy activities was due to the approaching Communist Party Congress in 2011.

    While it has been more than a decade since the sentencing of the above activists, it is essential to remember that the Vietnamese government continues to crack down on peaceful pro-democracy activists and give them unjust sentences for their political longevity.

    Where are these activists now?

    The six activists detained in 2009 were all subsequently released when their prison terms ended between 2011-2014.

    However, Nguyen Kim Nhan was arrested again in 2011, almost immediately after he was released from prison upon completing his 2-year sentence; he received another nearly six years in prison.

    Nguyen Van Tuc, released in 2012, is currently in prison after being accused of “aiming to overthrow the government” in 2018 under Article 79 of the 1999 Penal Code. Tuc received a sentence of imprisonment for 13 years, and his family members have spoken out about his deteriorating health behind bars.

    Nguyen Xuan Nghia, the activist who received the longest sentence of six years in 2009, was again harassed by the police in 2018 for “storing banned books.”

    Examining the life of the democratic activists who have served years in prison shows us that the government has never treated them with respect despite how peaceful, intellectual or patient. It is as if the government is sending a clear political message: you have to be on our side, or we will eliminate you.

    While the article today is about the sentencing of activists from twelve years ago, we keep seeing similar treatment patterns with democracy activists or writers throughout recent years.

    Citations:

    1. BBC News Tiếng Việt. (2011, June 8). Ông Nguyễn Kim Nhàn bị bắt. https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/vietnam/2011/06/110608_nguyenkimnhan_arrest
    2. BBC News Tiếng Việt. (2012, September 10). Nhà bất đồng chính kiến ra tù. https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/vietnam/2012/09/120910_dissident_released
    3. BBC News Tiếng Việt. (2018b, April 10). 13 năm tù cho nhà hoạt động Nguyễn Văn Túc. https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/43710106
    4. B.T. (2009, September 7). Tổ chức Phóng Viên Không Biên Giới (RSF) kêu gọi Việt Nam trả tự do cho các blogger. RFI Tiếng Việt. http://www1.rfi.fr/actuvi/articles/118/article_5213.asp
    5. Human Rights Watch. (2009, August 19). Vietnam: Release Peaceful Democracy Advocates. https://www.hrw.org/node/237562/printable/print
    6. Human Rights Watch. (2020, October 28). Vietnam: Free Political and Religious Detainees. https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/04/07/vietnam-free-political-and-religious-detainees#
    7. Nhân Dân. (2012, November 2). Y án sơ thẩm đối với bị cáo Nguyễn Kim Nhàn và đồng bọn trong vụ án tuyên truyền chống Nhà nước. https://nhandan.vn/thoi-su-phap-luat/y-an-so-tham-doi-voi-bi-cao-nguyen-kim-nhan-va-dong-bon-trong-vu-an-tuyen-truyen-chong-nha-nuoc-387812/
    8. Pham, N. (2009, October 9). Six Vietnamese activists jailed. BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8299406.stm
    9. Radio Free Asia. (2020a, October 11). Cựu tù chính trị-nhà văn Nguyễn Xuân Nghĩa bị bắt đi làm việc. https://www.rfa.org/vietnamese/news/vietnamnews/Former-political-prisoner-summoned-05232018100346.html
    10. Radio Free Asia. (2020b, October 11). Sức khỏe tù chính trị Nguyễn Văn Túc tồi tệ thêm. https://www.rfa.org/vietnamese/news/vietnamnews/ailing-political-prisoner-nguyen-van-tuc-health-worsened-in-prison-03152019083039.html
    11. Radio Free Asia. (2020c, October 11). Tù nhân lương tâm Nguyễn Kim Nhàn được trả tự do. https://www.rfa.org/vietnamese/news/vietnamnews/conscience-prisoner-nknhan-get-early-release-2-months-10072016085459.html
  • Biden’s Emphasis On Soft Power And What It Means For Vietnam’s Democracy Movement

    Biden’s Emphasis On Soft Power And What It Means For Vietnam’s Democracy Movement

    President Joe Biden has repeatedly emphasised “soft power” in his foreign policy speeches. Will this policy work in Vietnam? And how will it affect Vietnam’s democracy movement?

    Biden’s emphasis on soft power: what’s in store for Vietnam and should one believe it?

    It’s almost a year into Joe Biden’s presidency. Throughout his tenure, two keywords, “relentless diplomacy” and “soft power,” have echoed in every corner where US foreign policy is concerned: from the ending of the “forever war” in Afghanistan to the reorganisation of trans-Atlantic relations, and to engagement with Asia. The challenges for which President Biden will implement his “relentless diplomacy” and “soft power” approach are, in short, the covid pandemic, climate change, and China[1].

    Vietnamese readers can be assured of Biden’s serious interest in Asia by, amongst others, the appointment of a competent expert Kurt Campbell [2] as the White House coordinator for the Indo-Pacific region, US support for Taiwan and its alliance with Japan, vaccine donations, and, most recently, Vice President Kamala Harris’ visit to the region and Vietnam specifically.

    Regarding China, Biden’s promise [3] of “fighting corruption, defending against authoritarianism, and advancing human rights” will be arguably the most effective tool for the United States in the realm of soft power. Economic and military strength notwithstanding, the Chinese regime is infamous for its authoritarian governance and long record of human rights violations. Ironically, China’s military strength, as observed in its actions in the South China Sea, makes its draconian image even more despicable.

    By contrast, the era of Pax Americana, despite criticisms of US imperialism, has built an overall image of the United States as a promoter of human rights and democracy. Although the recent Afghanistan debacle has damaged the reputation of the United States, Biden has been quick to assert [4] that the new era of US foreign policy will be about “lifting people up around the world” and “renewing and defending democracy”.

    Speaking of Pax Americana, Biden’s emphasis on “soft power” and “relentless diplomacy” happens in a context different than that of American leaders of the past who boasted about a US “moral imperative” and “doing the right thing” only to turn a cold shoulder to their allies when the tide of geopolitics turned. In the post-Americana era, despite Biden’s denial/rejection [5] of the imminent “China-US Cold War”,  it is widely recognised (as indicated by the US “pivot to Asia”[6]) that US national interests depend on whether or not the United States can counter China’s plays in Asia. As such, one can expect Biden’s words to have substance rather than just simply paying lip service.

    Biden’s “soft power” in Vietnam: the state-versus-people conundrum

    When it comes to China and human rights, there is a clear distinction between the perspectives of the Vietnamese state and the Vietnamese people. At the most basic level, Vietnamese leaders have little to no concern for the interests of their people because their positions are not determined by voters. Vietnam’s election is well known for being a farce [7].

    The divergence between the Vietnamese public and the Vietnamese government on China could not be clearer. When the government approved a bauxite project related to China in 2009, the Vietnamese people signed a petition to oppose it. When the people took to the streets in the early years of the 2010s to oppose China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea, the government cracked down on these protests and detained several protesters. When the Special Economic Zone bill was announced, it was perceived by the Vietnamese public as giving questionable privileges to China and also was seen as a threat to Vietnam’s national security. As a result, massive protests broke out in the streets in 2018 and the bill was shelved as a result.

    Most recently, the use of China’s COVID vaccines in Vietnam has been met with public resistance and fierce criticism of the government. Anti-China protesters’ shouts of, “Coward to the enemy, cruel to the people!” (“Hèn với giặc, ác với dân!”), is precisely the Vietnamese people’s attitude towards their government on China.

    At this point, one may argue: “But the Vietnamese government has also spoken up against China many times, so it cannot be as pro-China as the above-mentioned events indicate.” This is true and quite a few analyses [8] have highlighted the stake for the Vietnamese government in playing US-China politics wisely instead of simply bowing to China. However, it is important to understand that when Vietnamese leaders do stand up to China, it is often “all bark and no bite.”[9] More importantly, whether Vietnamese leaders shake hands with Biden or with Xi, or play the superpowers off against each other, they do so first and foremost based on their, or the Communist Party’s, own interest [10], rather than on the interests of the country and the people.

    Thus, it is highly unlikely that the United States will find a true ally in the Vietnamese government in its state-to-state diplomacy against China. Because of this, the US will also find it difficult to tap into the Vietnamese public’s anti-China sentiment. Hanoi has shown little to no concern about how Vietnamese citizens feel or about what they want, and it has unreservedly deployed force to quell anti-China protests and online dissent in the past.

    The road to promoting human rights in Vietnam does not seem promising either, especially the rights to free speech, peaceful assembly, association, and fair trial. The promise of US leaders to “respect Vietnam’s political system” [11] seems rather odd because the very existence and stability of Vietnam’s political system rest on the suppression of exactly those rights. The relentless arrests of people who speak critically of the government on their Facebook pages and of those who ran as independent candidates in the lead-up to the May 2021 national election are just some examples.

    What has played out so far in the field of human rights does not show much innovation. State-to-state talks about the situation of human rights in the country, assistance for specific high-profile activists who have been arrested and who are on trial, and US leaders holding meetings with local activists are all par for the course. It remains to be seen if Biden’s administration will open a new chapter of human rights promotion through public diplomacy or if it will lead to more of the same: the worsening of human rights and democratic freedoms in Vietnam.

    Public diplomacy and soft power: a look into the books

    The term “public diplomacy” was first coined in 1965 by Edmund Gullion, founder of the Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy at Tufts University (Cull, 2009) [12]. Definitions vary but all agree that public diplomacy is a foreign policy practice entailing nation A engaging with the public of nation B in order to influence B’s foreign policy through bottom-up pressure to A’s advantage (Bettie, 2014) [13]. In short, it is about image projection and national branding, which is distinctly different from traditional diplomacy which consists of state-to-state engagement.

    In the work of historian Nicholas J. Cull (2008) [14], activities that count as public diplomacy include (1) presenting new policy ideas to the foreign public (i.e., advocacy), (2) exportation of culture to foreign countries as well as two-way cultural exchanges, and (3) international broadcasting (i.e., reaching a foreign public through mass media).

    While public diplomacy can be understood as a channel of persuasion, soft power is the content that gives a nation the power to persuade the foreign public. Prominent soft power scholar, Joseph S. Nye Jr., defines soft power as the attractiveness of a nation that lies in its culture, including its language, arts, cuisine, institutions, brands, and moral values (Nye, 2008) [15]. Soft power goes hand-in-hand with public diplomacy, as “public diplomacy tries to attract by drawing attention to these potential resources through broadcasting, subsidizing cultural exports, arranging exchanges, and so forth” (Nye, 2008, p. 95) [16].

    Soft power may also be drawn from hard power. The presence of US military forces in the South China Sea to aid countries bullied by China communicates certain moral values to the people of those countries. However, underlying such a presence in the more complex and pragmatic interests of the United States than simply a normative or moral stance.

    Using the above discussion on public diplomacy and soft power, how would President Biden’s plans for Vietnam measure up? What would his roadmap navigating the state-versus-people conundrum in the country look like?

    Evaluating Biden’s diplomacy and navigating Vietnam’s state-versus-people conundrum

    Biden’s words promise a new era of US diplomacy, but his actions so far still seem to be following classic state-to-state diplomacy and militaristic intervention more than what is prescribed for public diplomacy and soft power.

    Furthermore, public diplomacy has always been a component in US foreign policy in previous administrations through supporting local registered civil society organisations and non-formal oppositional actors. Thus, with Biden’s emphasis on “soft power,” his administration will disappoint if over the next few years it rehashes many or most of the previous administrations’ actions; this old approach is effectively circumscribed by the state-versus-people conundrum mentioned earlier.

    However, the good news for the United States is that despite the disastrous presidency of Donald Trump and the many upheavals in US politics and society, public opinion [17] in Vietnam is still in favour of the United States, especially when compared to China. The soft power is already there.

    As Vietnamese people have grown increasingly more concerned about Hong Kong and Taiwan, their opinion will also be shaped by how the United States intervenes in the Taiwan – China situation. The collapse of Hong Kong has done serious damage to the image of the West, but it is still looking good on the Taiwan front. In addition, the story of Taiwan is not just about standing up to China; it is also about nation-building and the nationalistic pride of a people who chose democracy over dictatorship.

    In summary, US soft power in/over Vietnam will come from the stories of human rights, democracy of the US itself, and its defence of Taiwan against China. This soft power will come across even stronger if US public diplomacy also promotes Taiwan as the protagonist in the region, as a counter to Chinese politics, and as an inspiring story of Asian democratisation. These narratives will further widen the gap between Vietnamese hearts and minds and China, while simultaneously raising aspirations for democratisation amongst the Vietnamese people. In doing so, the United States will also not give a reason for the Vietnamese state-owned media to be hostile towards democratisation and the Vietnamese democracy movement. State propaganda cannot accuse America of imposing Western political ideas and values, nor of hypocrisy and one-upmanship if the US approaches the issue in this way.

    Having said earlier that the Vietnamese government has shown little to no concern about the Vietnamese people’s anti-China sentiments and that it uses brute force against human rights and democracy activists, what is the point of raising aspirations for democratisation and being critical of China? The point to be made is precisely about the kind of mass awareness and feeling of efficacy that will translate into the political agency and oppositional collective action. Old school public diplomacy has come short of this task and has failed to help the Vietnam democracy movement gain strength in numbers.

    My conversations with prominent activists in Vietnam’s human rights and democracy movement show that the seemingly invincible power of the Vietnamese government to repress dissent, the crackdown on protests, and carry on with unpopular policies, comes from the fact that the human rights and democracy movement is small in number and that the majority of the public lack the theoretical scaffolding to help them translate their discontent with the government and nationalistic sentiment into coherent and organised demand for democratisation.

    This article, written from my perspective as a Vietnamese, a scholar, and a supporter of collective action towards democracy for Vietnam, has suggested a few ways for American diplomats and foreign policy experts to walk President Biden’s talk.

    Meanwhile, Luat Khoa Tap Chi, a well-respected independent news outlet that serves Vietnamese readers, has already beefed up its column on Taiwan as an inspiring example of democracy for the Vietnamese. The comrades of Luat Khoa are also planning their next step, with Taiwan and mass awareness at the core of their strategy. The Biden administration, with the aim of utilizing soft power, should not miss this opportunity to work with them.

    Bibliography:

    1. Ash, T., G. (2020, 7 Nov). What will President Biden’s United States look like to the rest of the world? The Guardian.
    2. Green, M., J. (2021, 13 Jan). Biden makes his first bold move on Asia. The Guardian.
    3. Tran, B., T. (2021, 3 Jun). No Trade-off: Biden can both Deepen US-Vietnam Ties and Promote Human Rights. United States: Center for Strategic and International Studies.
    4. Borger, J. (2021, 21 Sep). Biden promises end to ‘relentless war’ and start of ‘relentless diplomacy’. The Guardian.
    5. ibid.
    6. ibid.
    7. Vu, A. & Gerin, R. (2021, 21 May). Vietnam goes to the polls with state-approved candidates offering little choice. Radio Free Asia.
    8. Nguyen, T., T., Q. (2021, 30 Sep). Trans-Pacific partner membership and the love triangle of Vietnam – Taiwan – China. The Vietnamese.
    9. Reed, A. (2021, 14 Mar). The enemy of my enemy: tensions between the US, China, and Vietnam. The Vietnamese.
    10. ibid.
    11. Tran, B., T. (2021, 3 Jun). No Trade-off: Biden can both Deepen US-Vietnam Ties and Promote Human Rights. United States: Center for Strategic and International Studies.
    12. Cull, N. (2009). Public Diplomacy Before Gullion: the Evolution of a Phrase. In: Snow, N. and Taylor, P. (eds). Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy (pp. 19-23). Tayler & Francis.
    13. Bettie, M., L. (2014). The Fulbright program and American public diplomacy (unpublished doctoral thesis). The University of Leeds, Leeds, United Kingdom.
    14. Cull, N. (2008). The Cold War and the United States Information Agency. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
    15. Nye, J. (2008). Public diplomacy and soft power. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616, pp. 94-109.
    16. ibid.
    17. Seah, S. et al., (2021). The state of Southeast Asia: 2021. Singapore: ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute.
  • Venerable Thich Quang Do: A Lifetime Of Struggle

    Venerable Thich Quang Do: A Lifetime Of Struggle

    Thich Quang Do

    Thich Quang Do’s birth name is Dang Phuc Tue. He was born in Thanh Chau Commune, Tien Hai Suburban District, Thai Binh Province, on November 27, 1928, into a family with three other siblings.

    He left his home in 1942 at 14 years of age to become a monk at Thanh Lam Village Pagoda in Ha Dong Province, which is today a part of Hanoi.

    He passed away on the night of February 22, 2020, at Tu Hieu Pagoda in Ho Chi Minh City.

    An undated portrait of Thich Quang Do. Photo: Phattuvietnam.net
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    In the beginning months of 1945, famine swept across the northern part of Vietnam, killing two million people. At the time, 18-year-old Thich Quang Do was in training in Ha Dong Province, as a disciple of the Venerable Thich Duc Hai.

    Much later, in 1992, he would recall his early days of entering the monkhood in his memoir:

    “In the year of the rooster (1945), the people were very hungry, especially in the two provinces of Thai Binh and Nam Dinh. Those who had starved to death littered the streets. […] At the time, my master at Thanh Lam Village Pagoda […] heard from people heartbreaking stories, so he travelled out to Ha Dong Township and established a relief group to help the hungry. That was March 1945. My master opened up a food camp to help sustain the hungry. He relied on Ho Dac Diem, who was the Ha Dong Province chief, to intervene with the Japanese and request some rice to rescue the starving. The group was able to carry many people through the famine.” [2]

    A young woman (left) and three siblings of another family in Thai Binh during the 1945 famine. The northern famine was caused by the Japanese and the French and led to approximately two million deaths. Photo: Vo An Ninh.

    Right after that disaster, the August Revolution broke out, and seeing that the people were still incensed at the famine caused by foreign countries, the Viet Minh hunted down Vietnamese traitors and those who worked for the Japanese or the French, executing them. The executions were seen – by some – as a way for the Viet Minh to flaunt their prestige. Thich Quang Do’s master was allegedly a Vietnamese traitor.

    He recalled in an open letter sent to the general secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party, Do Muoi, in 1994:

    ”At 10 AM, on the morning of August 18, 1945 […] as I looked at my master, his two hands bound behind his back by zinc wire, on his neck hung two signs scrawled with the words ‘Vietnamese traitor, national sellout’ […] On both sides, a group of people holding sticks, spears, and scythes, stood guard. A group calling themselves the magistrates of the People’s Tribunal stood on a platform […] forcing my master to kneel down in the courtyard and listen to the court convicted him. They immediately sentenced him to death, carrying him out to the field of grass in front of the courtyard, blood continuing to flow from his mouth [as he had been punched]. Upon reaching the field of grass, they wrestled him down onto his side, shooting him through the ears three times with a pistol. Another stream of bright red blood sprayed straight up, and my master died instantly.” [3]

    Spurred by the exceedingly painful image of his master being executed, Thich Quang Do wrote: “I swore to fight fanaticism and mercilessness, and to devote my entire life to pursuing justice through Buddhism’s teachings on non-violence, tolerance, and mercy”. [4]

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    In 1947, Thich Quang Do was ordained as a monk while studying at the Quan Su Buddhist Institute in Hanoi. During this time, he wrote for the magazine Phuong Tien [Means], where Venerable Thich To Lien was editor-in-chief. In 1951, Venerable To Lien dispatched Do to study abroad in Sri Lanka [5]. In that same year, Buddhist temples throughout the country were unified under the leadership of the Vietnamese Buddhist Federation, headquartered at Tu Dam Pagoda in Hue. [6]

    After Sri Lanka, Thich Quang Do travelled to India in 1953 to continue his studies. The year after, Vietnam was divided in two, and the Vietnamese Buddhist Federation splintered. Buddhist sects and associations continued to operate independently, and a number of northern Buddhist temples moved south.

    https://2xjs7y10oiyz26vqxu2hok6y-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Screen-Shot-2020-02-27-at-9-compressed-1024x675.jpg
    While Vietnam awaited a free general election, the Geneva Accords split the country at the 17th parallel into two separate militarized zones; residents on each side were free to move to the other side. Approximately 800,000 northerners moved to the south, according to data from the South Vietnamese government. This photo depicts northerners preparing to move to the south. Photo: LIFE.

    In 1958, Thich Quang Do, 30 and fluent in English and Chinese, returned to Saigon to teach and translate scriptures. [7] During this time, the Vietnamese Buddhist Federation moved its headquarters to An Quang Pagoda in Saigon, and Buddhist sects and associations continued to operate independently. [8]

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    At the end of 1961, Buddhists and monks were increasingly subjected to excessive religious persecution by the Saigon government. There were reports that many areas banned Buddhists from practising and forced them to give up their religion. By April 1963, as Vesak Day (Buddha Day) approached, monks in Hue were no longer able to tolerate the repression, declaring that they were at odds with the government and commencing a period of impassioned struggle for Buddhism. [9]

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    Nuns, monks, and Buddhists scuffle with police in Saigon, protesting against government repression. Buddhist leaders demanded that the government respect the Buddhist flag, cease the repression of Buddhists, treat them equally, grant them the freedom to proselytize and practice, and make reparations for those killed. Photo: HORST FAAS/AP.

    To weather the religious crisis, the Inter-sectarian Committee to Protect Buddhism was established in May 1963. It comprised 11 sects and associations and was headquartered at Xa Loi Pagoda in Saigon. The committee included 19 individuals, of whom Venerable Thich Tinh Khiet was the highest leader and Thich Quang Do was an assistant to the diplomatic corps. [10]

    The committee organized large-scale protests and hunger strikes. Thich Quang Do hit the streets with thousands of monks, nuns, and Buddhists to fight for the religion. The government cracked down. Many monks self-immolated to demand a resolution to Buddhism’s five aspirations. Dozens of people lost their lives in clashes with police. The tumult lasted for many months, stirring world opinion.

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    Thich Quang Do, 35, elaborating on the Buddhist struggle in front of monks, nuns, Buddhists, students, and police. Photo: Buddhist Struggles (Quoc Oai)

    On August 20, 1963, the government arrested Thich Quang Do in its “floodwater campaign,” in which pagodas were raided simultaneously to capture Buddhist leaders. He was tortured in prison. While behind bars, he secretly received English articles, translating them into Vietnamese and then sending them out, where they were reprinted in Buddhist newspapers to encourage the fighting spirit of monks, nuns, and Buddhists. [11]

    The conflict between Buddhists and the government led the United Nations to send a fact-finding mission to Vietnam on October 24, 1963. A week later, President Ngo Dinh Diem was assassinated, and Buddhism was able to gain the upper hand. Thich Quang Do was released but remained seriously ill due to the torture he suffered while in prison. [12]

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    Immediately after the 1963 Buddhist crisis and with the flames of solidarity burning bright in the hearts of monks and nuns, a number of well-respected monks reiterated calls to unify Buddhism.

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    A scene from the opening of the Buddhist Unity Congress at Xa Loi Pagoda on December 31, 1963; outside the pagoda, thousands of Buddhists gathered to support Buddhist solidarity. Photo: Buddhism’s Historic Struggle.

    At the beginning of 1964, the Buddhist Unity Congress concluded. Eleven sects and associations were merged into a single Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCVN), headquartered at the National Pagoda of Vietnam (which was just starting construction). The UBCVN ratified a charter edited by Thich Tri Quang [13] and sat under the supervision of the Supreme Patriarch Institute and the Hoa Dao Institute.

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    In 1966, a little over two years after unification, the church began to fracture under pressure. A conflict arose between two groups. On one side was the An Quang bloc, led by Thich Tri Quang, which advocated a fierce struggle to interfere in politics, with its overwhelming force and superior organizational ability. On the other side were the moderated at the National Pagoda of Vietnam, led by Thich Tam Chau, who only fought for religious freedom.

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    Thich Tri Quang (left) and Thich Tam Chau(right) sit in a Saigon monastery on April 9, 1966, to announce to the press their demand for the establishment of a Constitutional Committee for the general election of a civilian government. Photo: AP.

    In October 1966, the An Quang bloc established its own and separate Hoa Dao Institute with three sects and associations. [14]

    By 1967, the National Pagoda of Vietnam bloc convened a congress with eight sects and associations to amend its charter, asserting that the 1964 charter sought to eliminate the autonomy of sects and associations. From here, the conflict deepened when the government recognized the National Pagoda of Vietnam bloc’s amendments.

    Also in 1967, the An Quang bloc organized a series of large-scale protests, carrying the Buddhist altars down to the streets to oppose both the government and the National Pagoda bloc. The government accused the An Quang bloc of “sowing chaos” and accordingly cracked down against them. The government later broadly apologized to all Vietnamese Buddhists and monks that it had to maintain social order and there were no other methods except for cracking down against the monks of the An Quang bloc.

    https://2xjs7y10oiyz26vqxu2hok6y-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Bieu-tinh-chong-chinh-phu-1967-1024x684.jpg
    Not only did the An Quang bloc organize protests, but it also organized other noteworthy activities, such as carrying the Buddhist altars into the streets, hunger strikes, and a number of acts that are still considered controversial to this day for their perceived un-Buddhist spirit. Photo: LIFE.

    According to the Sangha of the United Southern Buddhist Church, Thich Quang Do served both as the spokesperson for and inspector of the UBCVN’s Hoa Dao Institute in 1972; two years later, he was appointed general secretary.

    The conflict between the An Quang and National Pagoda of Vietnam blocs, with their different approaches, continued until April 30, 1975.

    From when he returned to Saigon until 1975, Thich Quang Do taught at Van Hanh University, the Saigon University of Literature, Hoa Hao University (An Giang), even the Pontifical Academy of Pius X (Da Lat), and other Buddhist academies. [15] He also edited numerous scriptures and books on Buddhism.

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    After taking control of the south, the victors immediately cracked down on all religions, sending dignitaries to re-education camps, destroying Buddhist statues, and confiscating the property of sects and associations.

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    General Tran Van Tra, head of the Saigon-Gia Dinh Military Management Committee, organizes an international press conference on May 8, 1975. Photo: Herve GLOAGUEN/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images.

    Thich Quang Do witnessed what the victors did to Buddhism. He recounts in an interview with Radio Free Asia in 2015:

    “On April 30, 1975, the Communists forcibly conquered South Vietnam. All the Vietnamese people were enslaved to an inhumane, cruel, hateful policy that was unmerciful towards religion. Our Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam was also stripped of its more than 2000 years of legal status, Buddhist leaders were fiercely repressed, and 12 monks and nuns of Duoc Su Pagoda self-immolated.” [16]

    “During the investigation in Can Tho Province into the 12 self-immolations against repressive communist policies [one individual was only 14 years of age], the Communist authorities accused Venerable Thich Hau Hien of being an informant for the Americans and South Vietnamese, committing lewdness against other nuns in their attempt to invalidate 12 immolations. That plot, however, failed because I didn’t sign the final forms legitimizing their scheme.

    […] Things hit a fever pitch on March 3, 1977, when the Communists came to appropriate the Quang Thi Trang convent […], tearing down the “UBCVN” sign and tossing it to the ground. At exactly 11 AM that day, as general secretary of the Hoa Dao Institute, I signed circular urging monks and nuns to prepare to sacrifice to protect the religion and the honor of the Church.”

    On April 6, 1977, Venerable Master Huyen Quang and I, along with a number of others, were imprisoned in Phan Dang Luu Prison in Ba Chieu, Gia Dinh. Later, I would find out that former Venerable Master Thich Thien Minh was also captured and had died of unknown causes at the Saigon police headquarters.” [17]

    According to Amnesty International, Venerable Thich Thien Minh had died in a temporary detention camp in October 1978. [18] To this day, the Vietnamese state has yet to make an announcement about his death in Detention Camp #4 on Phan Dang Luu Rd., Ho Chi Minh City.

    A portrait of the Venerable Thich Thien Minh. He was born in 1921 in Quang Tri and entered the monkhood as a child. After the Buddhist Unity Congress in 1964, he was selected as general director of the Unified Buddhist Church’s youth affairs. Minh stood shoulder-to-shoulder with Venerable Thich Tri Quang during the Buddhist political struggles in the south. Photo: Hoavouu.com.

    Seven members of the An Quang bloc and Thich Quang Do were eventually tried in December 1978. [19]

    The seven were accused of numerous crimes: taking advantage of religion to disrupt national security, disrupting national unity, and acting to oppose the revolution. Under international pressure, Venerable Thich Quang Do and Venerable Thich Thanh The were acquitted. [20] In that same year, Thich Quang Do and Venerable Thich Huyen Quang were nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. [21]

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    From 1980 – 1981, Do, Venerable Thich Huyen Quang, Thich Duc Nhuan, and a number of others disagreed with the remaining An Quang bloc members, who advocated cooperating with the state to establish the Buddhist Church of Vietnam, which would allow the Communist Party to tightly control church activities.

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    In just one day, the government united all monks, nuns, and Buddhists across the country during the Conference of Representatives to Unify Vietnamese Buddhism, which took place on November 7, 1981, at Quan Su Pagoda. Photo: Buddhist Church of Vietnam. 

    With the establishment of the Buddhist Church of Vietnam, the UBCVN, with its history since 1951, became illegal and remains so to this day. Venerable Thich Quang Do recalls:

    “From the day former Venerable Master Tri Thu was elected head of the state church [that is, today’s Buddhist Church of Vietnam], the UBCVN no longer had a director leading the Hoa Dao Institute. Without a director, the vice-director stepped up until another congress could be convened to elect officials […]. Because of that, Venerable Master Huyen Quang was the first vice-director to become institute director, and we continued to conduct business with the church [UBCVN] as usual”.

    “At four in the afternoon on February 24, 1982, I received a letter from the municipal police headquarters, with the word ‘express’ written on it. When I opened it, I saw that I had been ‘invited’ down to their office.

    At exactly 8 AM [the next day], I arrived at police headquarters and was led to a waiting room, where two uniformed officers stood guard with pistols. After approximately an hour, I guess when they figured that was enough psychological torture, I was taken in to see Quang Minh. He said: ‘You’re being involved in religion also means you’re involved in politics (!), we’re going to have to handle you accordingly.’ After about five minutes, Quang stood up and read out the decision, […] expelling me from the city.” [22]

    In the ten years after, Thich Quang Do lived alone under the watchful eyes of Thai Binh police: “The Communists […] exiled me to Vu Doai Commune, Vu Thu Suburban District, Thai Binh Province from February 25, 1982, for the crime of ‘being involved in religion and thus being involved in politics.” [23]

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    Thich Quang Do and Thich Huyen Quang in an undated photo, possibly during the time Thich Huyen Quang was exiled in Binh Dinh. Venerable Thich Huyen Quang was born in 1919 and left home to become a monk in Binh Dinh when he was 13 years old. According to the UBCVN, he was detained in the pagoda until his passing in 2008. Photo source: unknown. 
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    In the late 1980s, Vietnam entered the era of Doi Moi when the country’s economy changed into the market economy of capitalism. At that time, some monks saw that as the opportunity to fight for religious freedom.

    At the end of 1991, Venerable Thich Don Hau, nearing death, left in his will a call to restore the UBCVN and reactivate the 1964 church charter, amended in 1973. [24] He reminded the dignitaries, among them Venerable Thich Huyen Quang and Thich Quang Do, that they respectively held the positions of director and general secretary of the Hoa Dao Institute.

    Religious repression continued to intensify in 1992 and 1993, and the self-immolation of monks in the Mekong River Delta demanding religious freedom led to enormous protests in Hue, which the authorities cracked down upon and suppressed information about. [25]

    On May 21, 1992, a man self-immolated at Thien Mu Pagoda, leading to the temporary detention of Thich Tri Tuu, a Buddhist nun. Immediately after that, thousands of monks and nuns took to the streets in protests that shook the city, and a government car was set on fire. Photo: Nicolas Cornet.

    After living in exile in Thai Binh for 10 years, in 1992, Thich Quang Do decided to return to the south a month after notifying the authorities of his plans:

    “On February 10, 1982, the Communists also inexplicably exiled my mother to Vu Doai Commune with me, where she died a tragic death […] in January of 1985 from cold and deprivation.  Left all on my own, I decided that I could no longer allow myself to be hemmed in so senselessly, interminably, and unscrupulously. On March 22, 1992 (after 10 years and 27 days of exile), I returned to Saigon after letting Hanoi police know, arriving on March 25, 1992. [26]

    I returned to the south in 1992 and continued to work on the [Phat Quang] dictionary series; in 1994, I sent to Do Muoi [a former senior leader] a series of assessments regarding the Vietnamese Communist Party’s mistakes towards the nation and Vietnamese Buddhism. After that, I went out into the community to provide aid.” [27]

    In November 1994, the Mekong River Delta suffered an unexpected flood, killing approximately 400 people. Representing the UBCVN, Venerable Thich Quang Do, along with a number of monks and retired scholars, went out to render aid to their compatriots, only to be arrested afterwards.

    “On January 4, 1995, they arrested me and imprisoned me at the temporary detention center on Nguyen Van Cu St. in the middle of Saigon. Venerable Khong Tanh and I each received five years in prison and five years probation”. [28]

    Thich Quang Do, together with Thich Khong Tanh, Thich Nhat Ban, Thich Tri Luc, and two retired scholars Dong Ngoc and Nhat Thuong, at their August 1995 trial in Ho Chi Minh City. Photo: Vietnamese Buddhists.

    “My time in jail wasn’t too bad; it was fairly leisurely […]. You eat and you go about your work, just like anywhere else […]. Before I was imprisoned, I had requested […] that they give me the Phat Quang dictionary set that I was working on.

    I completed [the dictionary series] while in prison; when I received special amnesty and was released on September 2, 1998, they refused to return the nearly 100 volumes that I had already translated […]. They required I fill out a request form.

    Unreasonable! This having-to-request business. If it’s going to be that way, then I’m not going to request anything. They can just keep it and use it however they like; I’ll just redo everything again at home. So I did, and it took me two years. I redid everything, without having to make a request of anyone. Please be reasonable. Let’s think about this. For example, if you’re hungry, then you go and ask people for food. When people give it to you, you thank them. But in this situation, the government simply kept my work, I didn’t give it to them”. [29]

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    At the beginning of 1999, Thich Quang Do went out to Quang Ngai to visit Venerable Thich Huyen Quang, who had just been exiled three days before. Also in the same year, Do became the director of the UBCVN’s Hoa Dao Institute.

    After his trip to Quang Ngai, he was interrogated by police. In February 2001, he was formally put under house arrest for violating the terms of his probation. [30]

    After that trip, Thich Quang Do stated to the press that: “I will continue to speak loudly, strongly, and firmly for freedom, democracy, human rights, and freedom of religion, so that those in and outside the country hear the church’s calls and its support for human rights and democracy.” [31]

    In 2001, Thich Quang Do issued a call for democracy in Vietnam to his domestic and overseas compatriots, as well as to the Vietnamese government:

    “But today, as other countries around the world develop, growing more prosperous, free, and democratic by the day, our country is becoming increasingly paralyzed and impoverished, our people oppressed and trampled on. […]

    This catastrophe persists, nurtured by three factors: the government thinks too highly of itself and refuses to accept the opinions of others, resulting in a single-party dictatorship; the government has broken away from the people and refuses the most basic calls for human rights and citizens’ rights, resulting in an abominable authoritarian regime; the government is too dependent on foreign countries, from ideology to the structure of the state apparatus, causing social and civilizational upheaval [,..] moral decay and national stagnation.” [32]

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    In October 2003, after the state lifted its probation order, Quang Do risked his life to bring Thich Huyen Quang from Binh Dinh to HCMC for medical treatment. While on the road, the two were stopped by police and held on National Highway 1A, accused of keeping some state secrets with them [33], resulting in approximately 200 monks and nuns, and more than 1,000 Buddhists from nearby pagodas protesting to protect the two. [34]

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    Venerable Thich Quang Do visits Venerable Thich Huyen Quang (laying down) in 2006. Venerable Thich Huyen Quang passed away on July 5, 2008, at Nguyen Thieu Monastery in Binh Dinh Province. Photo: Vietnamese Buddhists.
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    In 2006, Thich Quang Do received two awards for his human rights work, Norway’s Thorolf Rafto Memorial Prize and the World Movement for Democracy’s Democracy Courage Tribute. However, the Vietnamese government prevented Do from travelling overseas to accept the awards.

    In 2007, the UBCVN began mutually supporting disenfranchised citizens through the Disenfranchised Relief Fund, helping those who had long petitioned the government on land issues.

    And in order to eradicate what it does not approve of, the government began a well-worn campaign of using the press to cast aspersions on Do and the UBCVN.

    Newspapers from Nhan Dan [The People] to Tuoi Tre [Youth] called Do “a religious exploiter” accusing him of “political opportunism,” “inciting the people,” being “on a mission of vengeance,”  and behaving like “an old dog who can’t learn new tricks.”

    In the same year, during which he was banned from talking to the press, Thich Quang Do responded to Al-Jazeera through video: [35]

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    “We are prisoners in our own homeland, where the government decides who has the right to speak and who has to keep their mouths shut. Even at this very moment, I’m being held at the Thanh Minh Monastery in Saigon. Secret police tail me day and night, preventing me from moving freely.

    I’ve been continuously repressed by the Communist regime since 1975. But I myself am not afraid of anything because I am fighting for what is right.

    Today, we lack an opposition party and freedom of the press, independent religions are being cracked down upon, and anyone demanding political reform, democracy, or human rights could be subject to immediate arrest.

    We must have political pluralism, the right to free elections, and the right to decide our political system […]. In sum, we must have the right to determine our future and our fate.”

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    From 2001, Venerable Thich Quang Do was held under house arrest at Thanh Minh Monastery, where he was closely monitored by police and isolated from church activities and the outside world. Politicians from the world over regularly tried to find ways to visit him. Photo: Clochers & Lieux de culte.

    In 2012, while he was meeting with the Australian ambassador in Vietnam, Thich Quang Do had expressed his views regarding the East Sea [South China Sea] problem:

    “Vietnam has already lost a portion, an island in Hoang Sa [the Paracels], eight islands in Truong Sa [the Spratleys]. China just established the Tam Sa [Sansha] district center, setting up administrative and military bodies to control that region. […] For now, I only wish for Vietnam to democratize and then ally itself with the world’s democratic nations. […] As it stands right now, I don’t have any hope for Vietnam.” [36]

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    In 2011, Thich Quang Do became the fifth patriarch of the UBCVN but met with many difficulties in developing the UBCVN due to his house arrest at Thanh Minh Monastery:

    “They [the government] have yet to cease discrimination and repression of the UBCVN. Thus, the church has struggled to conduct activities over the past 30 years. We can’t preach, we can’t open schools to teach. […] If they had an opportunity to completely do away with the church, they absolutely would.

    For several decades, [I have been restricted to] a single room upstairs that I inhabit. […] Every two months, I go to the hospital, and that’s it. No one is allowed to come and go, and I can’t move freely either. When I go to the hospital, they [the police] follow.”

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    A photo of Venerable Thich Quang Do in his room at Thanh Minh Monastery on September 3, 2018. Photo: International Buddhist Information Office. 

    “As of now, I eat only one meal a day, which is brought up to me in the morning. There’s a chair outside my door that I leave my plates on after I finish eating. The kitchen will come up to take them away, and then they lock the metal gate. The stairs up to my room have a metal gate, just like a prison cell. It’s been like this for more than 20 years since I returned from the north.

    I owe my residence here to Venerable Thich Thanh Minh’s pagoda […]. Since I left to join the monkhood some sixty years ago, I have lived thanks to the generosity of others. […] As of now, I only recite Buddhist scriptures to myself. I’m not allowed to pray for or preach to others; I can only recite to myself. They have stipulated this very clearly.” [37]

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    In mid-September 2018, exactly three months after American Ambassador Daniel Kritenbrink came to visit him, Thich Quang Do was evicted from Thien Minh Monastery, staying at a number of pagodas before heading home to Thai Binh at 90 years of age:

    “I returned to my hometown as an ostensible retreat, but if there were any small pagodas, I would recite Buddhist scriptures there. No matter what happens to the church, even if I die, I could never give it up.”

    American ambassador Daniel Kritenbrink (left) and a colleague visit Venerable Thich Quang Do on June 14, 2018. Photo: International Buddhist Information Office.

    Not long after, Venerable Thich Quang Do, the fifth patriarch of the UBCVN, returned to HCMC at age 90 to continue his obstacle-plagued work of the church.

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    Two years later, at 9:30 PM on February 22, 2020, Venerable Thich Quang Do, the fifth patriarch of the UBCVN, took his last breath at Tu Hieu Pagoda; his painful endeavor for the Vietnamese homeland finally came to an end.

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    On February 25, 2020, three days after his funeral, monks, nuns, and Buddhists escort Venerable Thich Quang Do to his cremation site; his ashes were scattered at sea 49 days later. Photo: Giac Ngo [Enlightenment].

    This article was written in Vietnamese by Tran Phuong and was previously published in Luat Khoa Magazine on March 1, 2020. The English translation was done by Will Nguyen.

    *** In our previous version of this article, we have cited the 1979 report of Amnesty International on the death of Venerable Thich Thien Minh. However, upon our recent re-checking of the cited link, it is unfortunate that the link is no longer accessible. Therefore, we have changed the link to the copy of Amnesty International’s January 1979 newsletter. We apologize for this inconvenience.***

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    References:

    [1] Thich Quang Do, Defiant Rights Champion in Vietnam.
    [2] Assessments regarding the Vietnamese Communist Party’s mistakes towards the Nation and Vietnamese Buddhism, Thich Quang Do, written in 1992.
    [3] Letter written to Do Muoi, Thich Quang Do, written in 1994.
    [4] Thich Quang Do is appointed the new leader of the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam.
    [5] Brief biography of Elder Venerable Thich Quang Do (1928 – 2020), Sangha of the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam.
    [6] Vietnamese Buddhism Monthly Review #1, published by the Vietnamese Buddhist Federation.

    [7] Brief biography of Elder Venerable Thich Quang Do (1928 – 2020), cited material.
    [8] Vietnamese Buddhism Monthly Review #27 and #28, published by the Vietnamese Buddhist Federation.
    [9] Vietnamese Buddhism’s Historic Struggle, Nam Thanh, published by the UBCVN Hoa Dao Institute in 1964. [10] Vietnamese Buddhism’s Historic Struggle cited material.
    [11] Thich Quang Do is appointed the new leader of the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam, cited material.
    [12] Brief biography of Elder Venerable Thich Quang Do (1928 – 2020), cited material.
    [13] White paper on the divide between An Quang and the National Pagoda of Vietnam, written by Thich Tam Chau in 1993.
    [14] White paper on the divide between An Quang and the National Pagoda of Vietnam cited material.
    [15] Brief biography of Elder Venerable Thich Quang Do (1928 – 2020), cited material.
    [16] Interview of Elder Venerable Thich Quang Do regarding the UBCVN over the past 40 years.
    [17] Assessments regarding the Vietnamese Communist Party’s mistakes towards the Nation and Vietnamese Buddhism, Thich Quang Do, written in 1992.
    [18] Amnesty International Newsletter January 1979. (1979, January 1). Amnesty International. https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/nws210011979en.pdf.
    [19] Thich Quang Do is appointed the new leader of the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam, cited material.
    [20] Amnesty International Report 1979, p.117, cited material.
    [21] Thich Quang Do is appointed the new leader of the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam, cited material.
    [22] Assessments regarding the Vietnamese Communist Party’s mistakes towards the Nation and Vietnamese Buddhism, Thich Quang Do, written in 1992.
    [23] Letter written to Do Muoi, Thich Quang Do, written in 1994.
    [24] Venerable Thich Don Hau’s will.
    [25] In Vietnam, Monks Lead Protest to Repression.
    [26] Letter written to Do Muoi, Thich Quang Do, written in 1994.

    [27] Letter of truth Venerable Thich Quang Do sent to HCMC police.
    [28] RFA interviews Venerable Thich Quang Do.
    [29] Letter of truth Venerable Thich Quang Do sent to HCMC police.
    [30] In the News Summer 2001, Tricycle.
    [31] Venerable Thich Quang Do publicizes his call for democracy.
    [32] Venerable Thich Quang Do’s call for democracy in Vietnam.
    [33] Vietnam denounces Venerable Thich Huyen Quang.
    [34] Vietnam backs down over monks.
    [35] In My Review: Vietnam’s Buddhist Monk.
    [36, 37] Australian ambassador visits Venerable Thich Quang Do.

  • Panorama of Flags, Panorama of Lies

    Panorama of Flags, Panorama of Lies

    The panorama of flags

    Foreigners visiting Vietnam can hardly miss the abundance of flags, posters, statues, and slogans that remind them of who is leading Vietnam and of the Communists’ “glorious” struggle against the French, Americans, and the South Vietnam regime throughout the last century.

    However, isn’t it a bit too archaic to still flash the symbol of the hammer and sickle these days, when the means of production and the economy no longer rely on these tools? Farmers and factory workers neither drive nor fuel modern-day politics as well. Likewise, what is the point of having the statues of Ho Chi Minh, Karl Marx, and Lenin in public parks and in the meeting rooms of schools, universities, and governmental departments? Do ordinary people who showcase the red and yellow flag in front of their houses every April 30 cherish the fact that the country was “reunited” in 1975?[1] Do police officers–who check and remind households that fail to do so–love the flag so much and wholeheartedly believe in the cause? In essence, what is the significance of this panorama of symbols?

    Vaclav Havel, the dissident intellectual of communist Czechoslovakia and later president of post-communist Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic,[2] can point us to the answer.

    The panorama of lies

    Following the end of World War II, Czechoslovakia was ruled by the Communists. The iron fist of Communist rule drove dissidents out of the country and clamped down on those who remained. Other than the Prague Spring of 1968, an unsuccessful effort to steer Czechoslovakia back towards democracy, there was hardly any resistance.

    However, communist Czechoslovakia was not just about who held the government; life itself had to adjust in a way that fit the current political climate. Vaclav Havel (1936-2011), who is arguably one of the most respected dissidents in the history of Czechoslovakia, lived most of his life under Communist rule. He grew up to become a playwright, and at the same time, he established himself as a prominent and well-loved politician. A high point of Havel’s dissident writing, The Power of the Powerless, [3] does not concern itself with formal politics; rather, it deals with the “hearts and minds” of the people.

    A significant character in The Power of the Powerless is the greengrocer who puts the slogan “Workers of the World Unite!” in his front window every day, along with his vegetables. He is neither passionate nor concerned about whether or not the workers of the world unite, but he does this anyway. This irony reminds me of my family who obediently and diligently displays the Vietnamese flag at times in the year when they should, but remains so apathetic that they do not even care if the flag is hanging upside down. There also seems to be other households quite similar to my own which led to the government’s legal guidelines (3420/HD-BVHTTDL) that specifically address this violation.[4]

    The greengrocer’s act is the observable tip of the iceberg of how the hearts and minds of the people work in communist Czechoslovakia; they want to avoid trouble with those who have power. By displaying the slogan, the greengrocer implies:

    I, greengrocer XY, live here and I know what I must do. I behave in the manner expected of me. I can be depended upon and am beyond reproach. I am obedient and therefore I have the right to be left in peace.  (Havel, 1978, p. 6)

    I am once again reminded of my family. I recall that every time my father was late in hanging the flag, my mother would berate him. She would constantly tell him to do it now because she didn’t want the hassle of dealing with the police. When I asked my parents about this, they said that they just wanted to be “left in peace” (yên thân). Likewise, if you ask teachers, students, or employees of governmental departments about the statues of Ho Chi Minh and Karl Marx in their buildings, they would probably tell you something similar.

    But, why do the authorities punish such a trivial thing? Whether or not the greengrocer displays the slogan would certainly have little to no effect on the workers’ movement, nor does it pose any tangible threat to the existence of a government that possesses the hard power of the courts, the military, and the police. The greengrocer does not even replace the slogan with another one that is critical about the regime.

    To address this question, Havel points out that, in fact, people would ignore the greengrocer’s slogan, but they do so precisely because such sayings are everywhere – in other shop windows, on lampposts, bulletins, and buildings. The key here is that while they ignore individual slogans, the people are well aware of the panorama of these slogans as a whole. The existence of this panorama tells people that dishonesty goes hand-in-hand with obedience here; this is normal, everyone does it, and so must you. In the same vein, transgressions must be punished because “anything which leads people to overstep their predetermined roles is regarded by the system as an attack upon itself” (Havel, 1978, p. 8).

    Therefore, if a Vietnamese policeman, school administrator, or government official reproaches someone who questions the phrase: “Live, fight, work, and study like our great Uncle Ho” (Sống, chiến đấu, lao động, và học tập theo gương bác Hồ vĩ đại), it is extremely likely that this policeman/school administrator/government official himself has also questioned, albeit in private, the very same slogan! Yet, they also believe that nobody should disrupt the rules of the game and that everyone should blindly follow what the system demands.

    My next question is, how do people live with themselves when their existence is surrounded by so many lies, ironies, contradictions, and hypocrisies, including those of their own making? Would they feel embarrassed and ashamed of themselves for being so afraid and thus becoming unquestionably obedient? These questions, Havel argues, boil down to man’s dignity and authentic identity. To be able to live in lies, the greengrocer deludes himself into believing that there is nothing wrong with the workers of the world unite; he separates the part of himself that questions the slogan from the other half that accepts the excuse. Living in a world of lies and deceit for so long warps our perspective and this bastardized reality becomes our “new normal;” the greengrocer becomes accustomed to the state of his compromised dignity and comes to accept the deception and inauthenticity of the system as part and parcel of life. In effect, he loses his authentic self.

    On the question of dignity and identity, it is interesting that the slogan “Sacrifice for the country and serve the people” (Vì nước quên thân, vì dân phục vụ) is hung in every police station, in a country where police, alongside tax officials, are seen as the most corrupt group (Towards Transparency and Transparency International, 2017). A few years ago, when I passed by one of Vietnam’s border checkpoints, I was baffled by the contradiction between the arrogance of the border control officer and the fact that he was sitting right under a “serve the people” banner. My subsequent conversations with poor Vietnamese migrants who often cross the border for work revealed that this was how they were always treated; they often bribed these arrogant officers and kept their heads down to avoid trouble.

    As I listened to these migrants and recalled my own experience, I wondered how these officers could look at themselves in the mirror. They see the “serve the people” banner in their office every day but shamelessly extend their hand through the small window of the checkpoint to receive bribes from the people they look at with disdain – the “lowly” people they are supposed to serve. On the other hand, the migrants are left with little choice but to comply and are forced to accept being treated with less than half the dignity they should be afforded by the simple virtue of being alive.

    Furthermore, Havel argues that the panorama of lies is internally solid, for there is a “metaphysical order binding all its components together,” thus “guarantee[ing] the inner coherence of the totalitarian power structure” (Havel, 1978, p. 10). Through all the examples I have provided, isn’t there a sense of such order emanating from Vietnam’s panorama of (pseudo) symbols? The checkpoint officers and those who bribe them, my parents’ disinterested flag-hanging, the equally disinterested policeman who checks the flags, and the people who put the statues of Ho and Marx in their meeting rooms are all parts of a system that everyone who lives or has lived in Vietnam knows all too well; it is a system where “the working class is enslaved in the name of the working class, [where] the complete degradation of the individual is presented as his ultimate liberation, […] [and where] the arbitrary abuse of power is called observing the legal code” (Havel, 1978, p. 10).

    In fact, one of my interviewees [5] told me that before he left Vietnam and started to look at the country from a distance, life there was quite “smooth” for him, because “things hung together…everything I heard in school, in the newspaper, in the street etc. was in harmony with each other…I didn’t feel the urge to question things.” This “harmony” is the glue that holds the panorama of lies together. Secondly, as my interviewee’s response also points out, this panorama is solid because those who lack the individual will and instead excel in the use of empty phrases are the ones who thrive (Havel, 1978, p. 13).

    Havel thus concludes that “individuals confirm the system, fulfill the system, make the system, are the system” (Havel, 1978, p. 9). This conclusion runs contrary to what many intellectuals and laymen alike often think about authoritarianism as entailing an evil ruler and people who are controlled against their will, or a class that oppresses all other classes, and where the line of struggle is between the oppressor and the oppressed. The concept of “the panorama of lies” goes beyond such binary definitions and shows that the line of struggle “runs de facto through each person, for everyone in his own way is both a victim and a supporter of the system” (Havel, 1978, p. 16-17).

    Conclusion

    I work with and observe a wide range of activists who work tirelessly and voice their opinions hoping to one day make Vietnam a liveable country for ALL and not just for those with unearned privileges and unchecked power. They pursue different paths of change; some try to run for seats in the National Assembly, others focus on analysing the actions of the government, and there are those who try to nurture a different kind of Vietnamese. For them, a different kind of Vietnamese means Vietnamese citizens who feel anger when their own dignity, or the dignity of others,’ is negated; they are those who strive for “what should be,” instead of settling for “what is.” They are those who are honest with themselves about right versus wrong, instead of surrendering their own judgement, mindlessly obeying the state and condemning those who do not conform.

    Vaclav Havel and his people saw the end of Communist rule in Czechoslovakia in 1989, but the democratic miracle did not immediately follow. Havel, then in the position of president, argued that democratic politics and the market economy, both carrying the promise of a good life, cannot happen in the face of “post-communist morass” (Havel, 1997). The ghost that kept haunting post-communist Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic was called out in Havel’s speech before Parliament in 1997:

    Many people believe that democracy or no democracy, the people in power are again people who cannot be trusted and who are more concerned about helping themselves than about the greater good….The prevalent opinion is that it pays off in this country to lie and to steal; that many politicians and civil servants are corruptible; that political parties – though they all declare honest intentions in lofty words – are covertly manipulated by suspicious financial groupings.(Havel, 1997)

    I understand that the different paths of change I mentioned above ultimately feed into each other. However, with the lesson from Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic and Havel’s thoughts, I cannot help but wonder how best to prioritise these tasks and decide when to pursue which.

    I would also like to believe that Havel’s thoughts give Vietnamese activists hope, especially during the present time when a relentless crackdown makes revolutionary change seem like an utterly unreachable dream. After reading Havel’s work, I see the sparks of our own “Vietnam Spring” starting not in the places representing the power of the system – the National Assembly, the election, state-owned media, or the police – but in the very hearts and minds of ordinary Vietnamese people. The revolutionary Vietnamese of the present day are those who dare to live in truth.

    Bibliography:

    1. On April 30, 1975, North Vietnam forces entered Saigon and officially ended the existence of the Republic of Vietnam as a nation. North Vietnam and South Vietnam were then joined and ruled by the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), and Hanoi became the capital of the whole of Vietnam. In the narrative of the VCP, April 30 is called reunification day and a cause to celebrate, whereas people who sided with South Vietnam call it ‘Black April,’ amongst other names that convey pain and sadness for the loss of their country.
    2. Czechoslovakia split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1992-1993. Vaclav Havel’s presidency was from 1989 to 2003, with some intervals in between.
    3. To be fair to this great work of Havel, I should be clear that the panorama of lies is only a small part of it. I focus particularly on this concept in order to unpack the omnipresence of (pseudo-) symbols in Vietnam.
    4. I am not saying that all Vietnamese display the red and yellow flag in the same disinterested way as Havel’s greengrocer. We will not know unless we ask every single Vietnamese. However, we can always make an educated guess. In Vietnam, there are pockets of the population who resent or distrust the regime for many good reasons, from the historic 1975 event and family members lost at sea during the Boat People exodus to forced evictions and rampant corruption. Growing inequality and poverty drive young people from rural areas to cities or overseas, and also expose even more the lies about the socialist utopia which the VCP claims it pursues and which it trumpets with slogans and posters in public places.
    5. This interview is part of my PhD research on activism under authoritarian rule in the 2010-2019 period in Vietnam.

    References

    Havel, V. (1979). The Power of the Powerless. Available at: https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/resource/the-power-of-the-powerless/

    Havel, V. (1997). Address to the Czech Parliament. Available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/1087560.html

    Towards Transparency & Transparency International (2017). 2017 Global Corruption Barometer: Vietnam. Hong Duc Publishing House.

  • Hong Kong’s Next-door Ally

    Hong Kong’s Next-door Ally

    The Vietnamese Magazine would like to thank the Asia Democracy Chronicles under the Asia Democracy Network for kindly giving us the permission to re-publish this article.

    Why Vietnam strongly supports the former British colony’s fight for freedom

    Many Vietnamese citizens hold Hong Kong freedom fighters Joshua Wong, Nathan Law, and Agnes Chow Ting in high regard. The Vietnamese cheer when a government expresses support for the former British colony’s fight for freedom. And they mourn whenever there is a crackdown—or a pro-democracy activist gets arrested or dies.

    Many Vietnamese consider Hong Kong’s young activists (from left to right) Nathan Law, Joshua Wong, and Agnes Chow Ting as icons of democracy.

    One might ask, why does Vietnam support Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement? The answer lies in the two country’s shared history and similar political movements.

    Bloody battles

    Vietnam’s long history of battling China spans more than 2,000 years. It’s fair to say that the country’s history is basically one of surviving next to China. After all, Vietnam was colonized by China for about 1,000 years before it finally gained its independence in 938 AD. Most national heroes worshipped as gods in Vietnam today are those who fought China over the past 200 decades, such as Hai Ba Trung (1st century, fought the Han dynasty), Ba Trieu (3rd century, fought the Eastern Wu dynasty), Ly Nam De (6th century, fought the Liang administration), Phung Hung (8th century, fought the Tang dynasty), Ngo Quyen (10th century, fought the Southern Han dynasty, ended China’s 1,000-year domination over Vietnam), Ly Thuong Kiet (11th century, fought the Song dynasty), Tran Hung Dao (13th century, fought the Yuan dynasty), Le Loi and Nguyen Trai (15th century, fought the Ming empire, ended a 20-year domination over Vietnam), Nguyen Hue and Bui Thi Xuan (18th century, fought the Qing dynasty).

    Today, some of the most central and important avenues in major cities of Vietnam are named after these national heroes.

    In 1979,  Chinese troops invaded Vietnam, waging a two-month bloody strike along the 600-kilometer border that the two nations share. This was followed by battles along the borders for another 10 years. Not many countries in the world have had such a long and complicated history with China as Vietnam does. As a result, the anti-Chinese sentiment seems to be deeply rooted in Vietnam’s culture.

    Fast forward to today: The territorial dispute over the South China Sea—which also involves Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei—is also a factor behind this sentiment. China claims almost all of the area bounded by its nine-dash line. Vietnam claims sovereignty over islands in the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands, as well as an exclusive economic zone that overlaps with China’s claims.

    In 1988, China and Vietnam clashed in the South China Sea when China’s warships attacked and killed 64 Vietnamese soldiers and seized the Johnson Reef. Another battle in recent history was in 1974, when South Vietnam’s navy lost some islands in the Paracel Islands to China’s hands after a bloody battle that left 74 casualties and dozens of others injured. Skirmishes still break out between the two countries, something the Vietnamese frown on.

    Vietnam’s long history of battling China spans more than 2,000 years. Its ongoing territorial dispute with the latter over the South China Sea also explains the Southeast Asian nation’s anti-China sentiment and partly accounts for its support for Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement.

    Amid territorial disputes over these islands, Vietnamese people bear the brunt of China’s economic activity in their country. Poor-quality products from China (electronics, clothes, food, etc.) are being sold in Vietnam, and while people complain about shoddy goods from the mainland, they have not found a way to stop the sales of these goods within their borders. More than 91,500 Chinese workers were also living across the country as of January 2020, sometimes making up China towns and clashing with local people.

    A Chinese-built section of Hanoi’s new urban railway “has come under fire after reports of deferred deadlines, cost overruns, and dangers to passers-by from falling materials,” reports the Financial Times. Given these trouble at sea, some people even suspect China of wanting to destroy Vietnam’s economy.

    Pro-democracy sentiment

    Although Vietnam is no longer a communist country and has a market-driven economy, the Communist Party remains the only legal political party. The party requires all Vietnamese to study communism and to worship communist leaders such as Ho Chi Minh, Karl Marx, and Vladimir Lenin.

    The society created by the communist regime is marked by corruption and inequality. Yet by an ironic twist of fate, it saved the Vietnamese people from the starvation that the party itself created before it began an economic reform program called Doi Moi in 1986. It abandoned the centrally planned economy model to open up the country to private businesses and foreign investments – a system which it eventually called the “socialist-oriented market economy”. Although Vietnamese people acknowledge that the country has improved significantly economically, severe corruption and deep inequality are among the biggest threats to the regime’s legitimacy. Vietnamese people are well aware that bad governance is the root cause of a slew of major challenges afflicting their lives such as unsafe food, land disputes, low wages, heavy pollution, low-quality education and healthcare, poor infrastructure, wrongful convictions, and a wide range of other human rights abuses.

    The state of public governance in Vietnam is similar to China’s – a combination of a communist one-party rule that suppresses human rights and a party-controlled market economy that favors members and sympathizers of the party. It is a system that puts a premium on economic development at the expense of fundamental freedoms.

    But while the pro-democracy bias may seem to overlap with the anti-communist sentiment, these are not exactly the same for Vietnamese people. Some of them oppose the communist regime but embrace other authoritarians at the same time. Many Vietnamese admire South Korean dictator Park Chung-hee, Chinese nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek, and Singapore’s founding father Lee Kuan Yew, who was known for his authoritarian leadership style. This, while they lean toward democratization and support democratic movements such as the ones in Hong Kong, Burma, and Venezuela.

    Mass movements

    Mass protests introduced a radical change in a repressive regime like Vietnam. More than 30 years after the Vietnam War, joining a mass protest had been taboo in Vietnam, with the attendant risk of going to jail for decades. Few people dared to gather in the streets. Society had been frozen by fear.”

    However, reports that China established administrative units in disputed areas in the South China Sea in late 2007 angered the Vietnamese public. Suddenly, mass protests against the Chinese government broke out in the capital city, Hanoi. More protests followed in Ho Chi Minh City in early 2008.

    This confused the Communist Party. They had dealt with protests before, but those involved economic issues. These protests were about protecting the country’s territorial integrity, which was at the core of the nationalism that the party had spent its whole history building. Decades of fighting—from the independence struggle with the French before 1945, the Dien Bien Phu victory in 1954, the Vietnam war with the United States, and 10 years of conflict with China starting in 1979—helped build the communist party’s legitimacy.

    Eventually, the party cracked down on the protests. Party members could not tolerate any form of social mobilization that could potentially challenge their power.

    However, the lamp of freedom had already been lit in the hearts of many Vietnamese. They realized that they must have the right to demonstrate, the right to speech, the right to participate in politics to protect their country, all of which are being suppressed by the Communist Party. For the first time in the country’s history since 1975, Vietnam saw a protest movement in 2011, which lasted for almost three months, from June to August.

    In 2014, more anti-China protests flared up across the country, involving not only activists but also workers, farmers, and students, due to China’s deployment of the Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig to Vietnamese waters. A similar mass movement happened in June 2018 when the Parliament attempted to pass a special economic zones bill that were seen to open up three strategic areas in Vietnam for China.

    In 2014, Vietnamese people took to the streets to protest China’s deployment of an oil rig in the disputed South China Sea.

    It is significant to note that most of the mass protests in Vietnam for at least the last decade have been anti-China. All protests have been severely suppressed by the government.

    Movie magic

    The silver screen has also influenced Vietnam’s perspective on Hong Kong. Hong Kong films have been overwhelmingly popular in Vietnam for decades. These include “The Legend of Condor Heroes” (1994), “Detective Investigation” (1995), “Demi-Gods and Semi-Devils” (1997), “Triumph in the Skies” (2003), among others. It’s not easy to find a Vietnamese over 30 years old that has never watched a Hong Kong film or is unfamiliar with Hong Kong film stars.

    Beyond movies, Hong Kong is also a popular tourist destination among Vietnamese, especially during summer and New Year’s holiday.

    Until the late 1980s, Hong Kong played the role of a “port of first refuge” for Vietnamese people fleeing political persecutions and abject poverty in their country following the end of the Vietnam War.  In 1989 alone, more than 300 Vietnamese boat people landed in Hong Kong daily. The peak of the migration wave was when Hong Kong became home to 200,000 Vietnamese asylum seekers.

    Supporting the democratic movement in Hong Kong came naturally to these refugees, who feel forever indebted to the now beleaguered city.

    Hong Kong served as the “port of first refuge” for Vietnamese people fleeing political persecutions after the Vietnam War.

    There’s no doubt that Hong Kong pro-democracy movement fits perfectly into the Vietnamese people’s worldview, which has been shaped by the latter’s long and complicated history of dealing with China and communism, as well as nationalist and anti-government fervor.

  • The Pleasant Lies Told About the Vietnam War, in Place of Unpleasant Truths

    The Pleasant Lies Told About the Vietnam War, in Place of Unpleasant Truths

    By Magdalena Slezáková

    Will Nguyen (age 34) is a Vietnamese-American public policy specialist and an activist for the Vietnamese democracy movement. He was born in Houston, Texas to a refugee family from South Vietnam. He graduated with a Bachelor in East Asian Studies from Yale University and a Master in Public Public Policy from the National University of Singapore. Last June, for participating in an anti- government protest, he was imprisoned in Vietnam; after international pressure, he was released one month later and deported from the country. Photo: Gabriel Kuchta, Deník N.

    Wikipedia says the Vietnam War started November 1st, 1955. Of course, that’s according to the Americans. The Vietnamese know well that the long, hellish days lasted much longer than the 20 years before Saigon fell (1975). How could it be otherwise – after all, the vast majority of lives lost in this war were Vietnamese. “In America, the Vietnam War is seen as a strictly American affair. I’d like to remedy that,” Will Nguyen, activist and descendent of South Vietnamese refugees, says in an extended interview with Deník N.

    A passage in Michael Herr’s Dispatches reads: “We took a huge collective nervous breakdown, it was the compression and heat of heavy contact generated out until every American in Vietnam got a taste. Vietnam was a dark room full of deadly objects, the VC were everywhere all at once like spider cancer, and instead of losing the war in little pieces over years we lost it fast in under a week. After that, we were like the character in pop grunt mythology, dead but too dumb to lie down. Our worst dread of yellow peril became realized; we saw them now dying by the thousands all over the country, yet they didn’t seem depleted…”

    The book written by Herr, an American military reporter, has become symbolic. It cuts like a knife, and it is hard to come by another work that describes as sharply what the Americans experienced in the Vietnam War.

    But what did the Vietnamese experience? After all, it was their country. Unfortunately, for nearly its entirety, few saw the war as belonging to the Vietnamese, to their loss. And to this day, the wounds have not healed.

    Will Nguyen knows this all too well. He was born in the United States to a woman who fled the communists—a South Vietnamese woman, to be more precise. Except Will doesn’t agree with black-and-white divides, even in his direct experiences with the Vietnamese Communist Party: last year, he was arrested for participating in protests in Ho Chi Minh City. Or is it Saigon? They’re the same city, with two different names; one was used before the communists took over, the other is the name used today. Current maps clearly label the city Ho Chi Minh City, but try using that name with South Vietnamese refugees!

    So which is it: Ho Chi Minh City or Saigon?

    Nguyen: (Laughs) You tell me. I grew up with Saigon; it wasn’t until later that I found out on-paper, it was Ho Chi Minh City. I currently use both, depending on whom I’m talking to. With southern Vietnamese, I’ll use Saigon; in other contexts, Ho Chi Minh City is more appropriate. For me, either name is fine; I let the person across from me decide.

    Yellow star, red stripes

    You were born in Houston, as part of the South Vietnamese diaspora – you didn’t spend your childhood in Saigon, right?

    When I was young, I didn’t really pay attention to politics. The first time politics hit me in the face, however, when I was doing a school report on my country of origin. I didn’t know what the flag of Vietnam looked like, so I opened up an encyclopedia and drew a pretty red flag with a yellow star. My mother saw it and immediately told me that flag wasn’t the “correct” one! I had to then draw the yellow flag with three red stripes, the one that Vietnamese in the US still use, the flag of South Vietnam.

    A combination of the flags of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam, left) and the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). Photos: Wikimedia Commons, image created by Deník N.

    It was until later that I began slowly putting together the pieces of the puzzle. I learned how my aunt fled Saigon on April 29th, 1975, a day before the city fell to the communists; how after she arrived in the States, she helped my mother escape when war broke out between China and Vietnam in 1979. During that time, Vietnam was expelling all those of Chinese origin, so my aunt was able to sponsor my mother and helped her find forged papers claiming Chinese ancestry. My mother reached a refugee camp in Indonesia and from there, traveled to Houston.

    In Texas, how did you put together the fragments of war? Americans, and the West by way of the Americans, tend to see the war as a nightmare for themselves. Oftentimes, the Vietnamese are seen as mere accessories, like decoration on military garb, or puppets in the hands of their masters.

    I read whatever I could find around me. And the more I read, the more I understood that the majority of books I could find were written by Americans, about Americans; regarding South Vietnamese and the difficulties they faced during the war, you’d be hard pressed to find anything. So I began searching for books written by South Vietnamese. There aren’t very many [in English] and they aren’t very easy to find.

    Luckily, I was fortunate enough to study at Yale, with its excellent libraries–whatever books they didn’t have, you could request by order. I read at least 20 or so books written by South Vietnamese authors – government figures, refugees, memoirs of life in South Vietnam before and after the revolution (1975). Similarly, I began researching sources of information from North Vietnam. Generals, spies, and figures in the North Vietnamese politburo.

    Because you hit the nail on the head. In America, the Vietnam War is seen strictly as an American affair. Whatever the Americans carried out…

    … would have to be suffered.

    Exactly! Americans lost about 60,000 lives in Vietnam, a terrible number, but on the Vietnamese side, deaths numbered several million, and this disproportionality is never mentioned. American lives lost is still center-stage. I would like to remedy this. And I believe the first step is researching the war thoroughly from all sides, in order to shed this problematic “black-and-white” framework.

    “After Saigon fell, my mother escaped to America. By good fortune, I was born in the States, where I was provided better opportunities. I recognize that my upbringing was ultimately a privilege—one which I want to pay forward by helping native Vietnamese fight for their own freedom and independence of thought. This doesn’t necessarily mean slandering communists.” Photo: Gabriel Kuchta, Deník N.

    You know, it’s not just the Americans who are guilty of black-and-white thinking. We Vietnamese have a similar tendency. It’s north or south—nothing in between. But its hard to be surprised at such an ideological divide, solidified as it was by a devastating civil war. It’s still a sensitive topic. Moreover, this north-south division has historical roots. Hanoi, in the north, is seen as the cradle of Vienamese culture; as you go further south, its influence weakens. This is still true today; the Vietnamese Communist Party has a stronger base and more faithful party members in the north.

    It’s like with the two Koreas, especially in the older generations. The division between right and wrong, good and bad. And sometimes even in the Czech Republic: in the north the evil communists; the

    south, the righteous democrats. But South Korea had a period of authoritarianism, and in Vietnam, communism went hand-in-hand with the anti-colonial struggle for independence.

    The interesting thing is the communists weren’t always the only players in Vietnam. Especially in the south, there was a strong nationalist movement spearheaded by non-communists. And in the 1940s, they worked with the communists for the sake of a common goal (Under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh and the Indochinese Communist Party, the Viet Minh – a coalition of northern and southern nationalists formed during the second half of the 1930s in Nanjing, China, was officially re-established in Vietnam in 1941).

    Only, the communists had their own vision of an independent Vietnam. They had greater numbers, were better organized, and were more ruthless, so in the end, they swallowed whole the other nationalists, completely obliterated them. Vietnam in the 40s and early 50s was a tumultuous time. French rule followed by the Japanese invasion, famine, then the First Indochina War, then the Viet Minh defeated France in 1954 and the French withdrew. The struggle between Vietnamese communists and Vietnamese non-communists played out against this backdrop and continued through the Cold War era—and it would be this civil struggle that would ultimately determine Vietnam’s fate.

    A heavy-handed government

    When peace talks began in Geneva in April 1954, Vietnam was de-facto divided: the Democratic Republic of Vietnam declared by Ho Chi Minh in September 1945 ruled the north; the State of Vietnam, aligned with the French, ruled the south. Both Vietnamese states saw themselves as the only legitimate government; the Geneva Accords de-jure recognized this division, establishing a border at the 17th parallel.

    Yes, with a plan for nationwide elections in 1956 to determine Vietnam’s fate and unify the country. But the south, led by prime minister Ngo Dinh Diem, knew that they could not win the election. And because the south technically did not sign the Geneva Accords, they refused to hold the elections, claiming that the elections would be rigged by the communists. Instead of the general election, the south held a referendum declaring the establishment of the Republic of Vietnam, with Diem elected president (with a spectacular 98.2% of the vote. In Saigon, President Diem received 600,000 votes out of a total 450,000 registered, according to reports). In Geneva, the US also refrained from signing the accords, which Ngo Dinh Diem counted on.

    November 1955: President Diem speaks with standard-bearing members of the Civil Guard during a ceremony marking a denunciation of communism. On November 1st, 1955, America officially begins participating in the conflict in Vietnam by establishing the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG). Photo: PhotoQuest / Getty Images, Flickr, CB BY 2.0.

    In the north during that time, the Chinese had convinced Ho Chi Minh to abandon plans for military action in the south and to wait for the election to resolve the big questions. The communists conducted a land reform campaign that killed thousands, while the south pursued its own brutal anti-communist campaign. The CIA embarked on a psychological war, sowing fear and panic among Catholics in the north, convincing perhaps more than a million to flee south.

    The Americans encountered the South Vietnamese at the right time. They helped the South Vietnamese in many respects, most obvious of all, financially. I would assert that despite all this assistance, there was one decisive factor: the South Vietnamese had no idea what it meant to be a good citizen in a functioning democracy. To the majority of Vietnamese, the ideals of democracy were in reality, something completely unfamiliar, and as the Vietnamese tried to advance towards democracy…

    In short, it was like a circus. Corruption was endemic, clientelism, and on top of that, war with the north. Imagine trying to build a healthy democracy in that environment! The South Vietnamese government was quite heavy-handed and far from resembling any kind of democracy; it was closer to autocracy. During the second republic at the end of the 1960s, after several coup d’etats, things calmed down a bit, elections were conducted properly, and prospects for democracy were looking up. If there was no war, who knows how far it would have progressed. You mentioned South Korea – the path to democracy for them took several decades. Same with Taiwan.

    But in South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem’s heavy-handed government only lasted until 1963, when the opposition assassinated him. How were the Americans involved?

    Formally, Ngo Dinh Diem was President, but in actuality, he was a dictator. He was a symbol of everything we discussed earlier: authoritarianism, corruption, and nepotism. He came from a well-known family, and his relatives held many high positions of power in a type of oligarchy. There was nothing surprising about him facing powerful opposition.

    In the end, a group of South Vietnamese generals decided to test the waters with the Americans. If we wanted to get rid of Diem’s government, the generals probed in a meeting with the CIA, would you support us? Kennedy’s administration gave the green light. But my god! The generals got rid of President Diem in such an awful manner. The Americans didn’t imagine it that way. They thought Diem would live a life in exile, and the government would proceed to reform.

    On the Saigon River, Viet Cong take turns on the lookout, October 1966. Photo: Manhai, Flickr, CB BY 2.0.

    Instead, President Diem’s assassination opened up Pandora’s box. The ironic thing is some of Kennedy’s advisors warned about this very outcome: while Diem was a dictator and corruption was rampant, there existed no viable alternative to him. And it was true; the country was wracked with one coup d’etat after another. South Vietnam not only became enfeebled, but it endured continuous pressure from North Vietnam and communist insurgents in its own territory. The country’s ability to deliver its people from northern communism weakened by the day.

    Up until April 30th, 1975, when Saigon was taken over by the communists. To North Vietnamese, that event was a “liberation”, but for Southerners, it was a “fall”. Is this still true?

    Definitely. In the memoirs of South Vietnamese diaspora, they remember April 30th, 1975 and the “Fall of Saigon” with anguish, and not just figures from the older generations, but the majority of the diaspora’s descendents also see the event as an invasion.

    And in Vietnam, where the communists have ruled for 45 years now?

    The current propaganda is powerful. I believe many Vietnamese see April 30th in a positive way, a victory over colonialism, a liberation, a unification of the country. But the interesting thing is, in the south, when you speak with older people—and obviously this doesn’t happen right away because there are dangers in doing so—but when they trust you enough… my mother and I would often encounter more “sensitive” views when we were traveling around southern Vietnam. For example, taxi drivers would often reminisce positively about what life was like before 1975, as they drove us around the city.

    Rosy history

    In your travels around Vietnam, you were able to absorb a lot of literature and messaging, especially propaganda posters. These displays tap a lot into the past, right?

    Most of them do. But that’s logical because the Vietnamese Communist Party derives its legitimacy from history and regularly reminds the people what it has achieved—1945 and the [August] Revolution, the defeat of the French, Ho Chi Minh, and of course, the greatest achievement of all: the liberation and unification of the country in 1975 [the latter technically occurring in 1976]. It’s like a broken record-player, stuck repeating myths.

    A propaganda poster marking 60 years since Hanoi threw off the yoke of French colonialism. Photo: Vuong Tri Binh, Wikimedia CC BY-SA 4.0

    And because these pages of history bear the hallmarks of the communist party, most people don’t pay it any heed. Is it a heroic story with a fortunate ending, or is it a happy lie? For some, either case is better than the sad truth. More easily stated, one way or another, many people realize the history is suspiciously rosy. But to find the truth, one must put in the work. It takes effort, and most people simply don’t feel the need.

    Why?

    Because they’ve directly experienced in their daily lives that the regime they live under doesn’t give them a voice. So the result is political apathy. This is especially true with young people, who have their whole lives ahead of them. They have no desire to rehash the past; they desire a comfortable future, with a high standard of living.

    But of course, not all young people are like this; I’ve gotten to know quite a few young activists from Vietnam who feel the truth is worth pursuing. A lot of it has to do with the fact that it’s easier now to find information online. It only takes a little research to reveal why the yellow flag with three red stripes is banned in Vietnam. And why the Vietnamese diaspora numbers millions across the world.

    To search for truth, to absorb information and then decide for oneself – that is true independence. Not the propaganda that the regime mouth-feeds the people to maintain its grip on power. Protecting the regime is the government’s number one goal. The Party has to make sure the boat doesn’t rock too much under its feet, and along with propaganda, it must also ensure that the economy develops while it conducts a balancing act between opposing China and allowing Chinese influence.

    How are relations between the Vietnamese Communist Party and the Chinese Communist Party?

    Very close, in an existential way. Vietnamese communists owe much to their Chinese counterparts, but at the same time, they have to be extremely careful not to be seen as Chinese puppets. This demands sufficiently independent behavior, opposing China in moderation, and at the same time, making sure not to offend their Chinese patrons.

    Are they really patrons?

    You know, Vietnamese leaders are slowly realizing they’re skating on the thinnest of ice. While I was imprisoned in Saigon, I spoke with police investigators about the situation in the South China Sea, and it was hard to miss the frustration written on their faces. They have to oppose China because that’s part of the Vietnamese national mythology: China is our hereditary enemy, and it’s forever finding ways to swallow Vietnam. If they don’t oppose China, then they face the danger of public opposition. That’s why Hanoi tries to find international support in their case against Chinese aggression. But it’s all one big act. No vociferous pronouncements will change the fact that China currently has the upper-hand in the South China Sea. China is several times larger and stronger than Vietnam, and Hanoi is fully cognizant of this, as well as the fact that Vietnam is economically dependent on China. And besides, the Vietnamese Communist Party imitates the Chinese Communist Party on a fundamental level. Their historic consolidation of power, their land reforms, and more recently, the cybersecurity laws.

    And the general secretary? The similarities between Xi Jinping and Nguyen Phu Trong, the head of the Vietnamese Communist Party, can’t be ignored: a strong, hard-line leader, pursuing an anti-corruption campaign.

    Of course; if you observe down to a minute-enough level, you’ll always find differences, but the truth is the Vietnamese and Chinese models of rule are quite similar – including the issue of Trong becoming both General Secretary and President. Though for most of its history, the Vietnamese Communist Party has followed the path of collective leadership, Trong has spearheaded an anti-corruption campaign very similar to that of Xi: sure, you’re cleaning up the ranks, but you’re also inserting your own allies into positions of power.

    The two parties [and their historical trajectories] are not exact replicas. But there are more than enough similarities to remind us of Mark Twain’s observation: “history doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme.”

    Prison bars and television screens

    You actually mentioned something I wanted to ask you about: last year, you were incarcerated in Vietnam. You went straight to prison after an anti-government protest in Saigon, right?

    I had graduated [from my master’s program] in May and after that, had flown to Vietnam. When I found out [a few days prior] that there would be protests, I decided to attend because I also believed the two proposed laws were harmful to the Vietnamese people.

    I walked the streets with protestors, cell phone in hand, recording as much as I could and uploading it immediately onto social media. It wasn’t an easy thing to do because the internet was slowed. The government often finds ways to prevent the spread of information. After a couple of hours, we ran up against a formation of police officers who stopped us and tried to get us to turn away from the city center. But I could tell that the officers were ill-at-ease; they were young, and looked just as worried and fearful as the protestors. It seemed like all it would take was one person to push through to break the line.

    So I did it, and they ultimately let us through. But after a few intersections, the police parked a row of pick-up trucks across the road to block it. I wanted to help the people cross the barrier – I knew I could take on a little more risk because I wasn’t a Vietnamese citizen and I didn’t face as serious of punishment as they did. I knew I could be arrested, but to be beaten in the middle of the streets was definitely something I did not expect.

    How many people were there around you?

    Hard to say, but the streets were impassable, surging with people. They charged me not only with “disturbing public order” but added on the aggravating factor “causing serious traffic congestion”. They blamed me for making 14 people miss their flights.

    And what were you facing?

    Up to 7 years in prison.

    At least you confessed on TV! And that’s yet another similarity between China and Vietnam: a recorded confession broadcast on national television…

    It was all for show. In order to maintain their hold on power, the Party choreographs one performance after another and forced televised confessions are just one part of it. I had known about this “song-and-dance” prior to being captured, so I wasn’t surprised when they made me participate. But mostly, nobody was particularly enthusiastic about doing it. It was all pretty tiring: the security officers and I didn’t want to do it, but because the orders were coming from above, we wanted to just get it out of the way.

    And you participated?

    If I didn’t, it would only complicate things. Not just for me, but also for the investigators, the people who were in charge of (processing) my case. They treated me well enough, though obviously I knew it was related to the fact that I was American and that my case was receiving widespread international attention.

    Moreover, I refused to lie. When they wanted me to apologize for causing traffic congestion or for making my friends and family worry, that wasn’t a big deal. But there was a part where they said I tried to flip a police truck and other things. I refused to read that. They accepted it and moved on.

    As in there was a script?

    The whole thing was so surreal. First, I wasn’t wearing the appropriate clothing, because I was a prisoner, so one of the police officers gave me the button-down shirt off his back to wear. Then, they styled my hair and had me sit down in front of the camera – we did around 5 takes, until I read the script convincingly enough.

    The banality of evil

    It all sounds like a joke, but in actuality, it’s nothing to laugh at right? Especially those with Vietnamese and not American citizenship.

    Exactly. Suddenly, I had fallen into the belly of this oppressive regime I had researched for so many years; it was there that I was able to fully realize that the system ran on fear. It doesn’t have to be the kind of fear that stops your heart or takes your breath away. But as long as that fear becomes an abided part of your life, like an old coat, mundane and commonplace, then the system remains in place.

    Like Hannah Arendt has written of, it’s all about the diffusion of responsibility: “I was just following orders!” You’re sitting behind bars, observing how police officers observe you. And you realize that they’re just cogs in the machine. But it’s precisely all of these small cogs that keep the machine going. If they weren’t there, the entire system would collapse. At the same time, they’re all just normal people. Outside of work hours, when they weren’t interrogating me, we would talking to one another like normal people.

    With the small detail that you were behind bars and the police officers were in front.

    Of course. You know, dehumanizing the other side doesn’t help anyone; don’t even get me started on caricaturing them as demons. I grew up in an environment where people spoke of communists as man-eating devils, and dissident propaganda often depicts Ho Chi Minh with horns. What is this good for? The more you put pressure on them in this way, the more they will dig in their heels in siege mentality. And that mentality leads to an increasingly oppressive regime. I believe in doing the opposite. Jettison the black-and-white paradigm and fracture an otherwise monolithic ideology.

    How?

    By treating these individuals like human beings. By convincing them that those who want to reform the system are not their enemies. As long as overseas Vietnamese communities across the world continue to demonize the communists as they do, then nothing will change. The banality of evil works both ways: people mold the system, but the system also molds the people. We have to work to fill the gap between the two sides, or at the very least, build some kind of bridge. I’m purposefully avoiding the word “reconciliation” because the communists used it after 1975, and then ultimately sent southerners to re-education camps.

    This reminds me of the situation in the Czech Republic after the Velvet Revolution. It’s a shame how the party and corruption went hand-in-hand, but enough people were able to “change outfits” after the transition [to continue their behavior]; some didn’t even bother to change. What’s going to happen if the same people are able to survive reform efforts in Vietnam?

    I believe the Vietnamese Communist Party has a right to exist – this is something anti-communists have excluded me for saying, even accusing me of Stockholm Syndrome. But then there are anti-communists who are impressed with Trump and openly support him, and that’s something that’s completely absurd to me.

    But most importantly: the Vietnamese Communist Party has four million party members. Their numbers are decreasing, and the Party itself is purifying in an ideological sense, getting smaller and older. But four million is still a lot. What are we going to do with them? Vietnam has suffered several decades of war. Millions have lost their lives, several more million have had to flee their homeland, and hundreds of thousands have lain their corpses at sea in pursuit of freedom… is this not enough? I understand your question, and I can’t say it doesn’t worry me. But what other way do we have to pursue reform but this?

    I’m not so naïve as to think that we only need dialogue to reform a totalitarian regime. Obviously you can extend your hand across the table, but if the other side is not willing, then there has to be something to push them to the table. The people must speak up for themselves; they have to march if need be. Reform can’t be achieved without it. And in a similar vein, I also hope that young people reconsider joining the Party.

    The economy plays a huge role: Vietnam’s labor productivity is quite low because the regime robs people of their initiative. Those with enough drive, those who can overcome the apathy find happiness overseas, where they go to work or study. But a number return with open eyes. For others, the internet opens their eyes. And people are slowly realizing, it doesn’t pay to be politically apathetic – if you don’t want to decide politics, then someone else will decide for you.

    https://twitter.com/will_nguyen_

    •••

    The above article is an English translation of https://denikn.cz/222401/o-valce-ve-vietnamu-se-siri-stastna-lez-namisto-smutne-pravdy/ and was originally published on October 31st, 2019, in the Czech newspaper Deník N.

  • Not Just Football, Some Vietnamese Do Care About Human Rights, Political Pluralism, and Democracy

    Not Just Football, Some Vietnamese Do Care About Human Rights, Political Pluralism, and Democracy

    Throughout 2018 and up until yesterday, January 24, 2019, the world continued to witness Vietnamese people’s love of football exploded, and the South Korean coach, Park Hang-seo, solidified his status as the country’s new, de-facto national hero.

    Images of people stormed the streets or “đi bão” – literally means “ride the storm” in Vietnamese – across major cities after each team’s win seemed to reaffirm that belief.

    While it may be fair to conclude that the majority of Vietnamese cares more about a football match than the other political issues in the country, we probably should pay attention to a different side of Vietnamese society that a foreigner may not see quite readily in recent days.

    Two nights before the last football match against Japan during the Asia Cup, from 8:30 P.M. to midnight of January 22, 2018, there was another international event concerning Vietnam: its third Universal Periodic Review (UPR) cycle.

    This particular UN mechanism – which only came into play on the world stage during the past decade – is where a state would undergo peer-review put on by other countries regarding its human rights’ records every 4.5 years.

    It is doubtful that the word UPR is popular, even in the West.

    But the January 22, 2019 event had attracted over 90,000 Vietnamese to tune in and watched to date, with over 4,000 comments and over 1,000 reactions on a live-stream posting by the Facebook page UPR Vietnam.

    UPR Vietnam is a collective effort of independent CSO workers in the country who want to bring more awareness of the human rights conditions in Vietnam to its people.

    Of course, comparing the number of people who went online to watch a UN’s human rights event to a football match does not mean much. But it is only fair if we put it within the context of Vietnam’s political background so that we could see why this group of viewers does show a different side of the country.

    Vietnam is probably a mini version of China with more free internet. That is one of the simplest ways – yet quite correct – to envision the country and its political structure.

    For almost 80 years in the North and more than 43 years in the entire country, the Vietnamese Communist Party ruled the state under a dictatorship.

    In Vietnam, there is no other political party. The VCP is the only political force.

    Young children would be indoctrinated at an early age when they joined the Communist Youth League.

    When they grow up, becoming a member of the VCP could also mean being part of a privileged class because the Party is the leading force that runs the country.

    VCP members take the majority in all branches of the government. The decision of the VCP’s Politburo would trump all others.

    Ho Chi Minh was taught to be loved and admired, even worshipped as the one hero who liberated his people from French colonization. History books spent 90% of the time teaching only historical events happened after 1945 and about how the VCP came to absolute power.

    The intent is clear and simple, to ensure that no one should have even the slightest doubt about the perpetuity of the VCP’s leading role in Vietnam.

    Not a single sign of dissent has been tolerated by the regime, especially in recent years.

    During the past two years, the political will of the VCP seemed to have hardened with 97 arrests of political dissidents compares to 43 in 2017, and 18 in 2016.

    The most significant difference between Vietnam and China is probably the fact that the government has failed to build a “Great Firewall” which let the internet and social media became the much needed civic space where people could come together and discuss current affairs and politics.

    That online space is now under threat with the new cybersecurity law that was passed in June 2018 and took effect on January 1, 2019.

    Along with the new law, a more rigid approach by the VCP in dealing with its own members also emerged.

    At the end of 2018, a well-respected intellectual and a long-time VCP member – Professor Chu Hao – was disciplined by the Party in a series of events which some people have dubbed “the VCP’s waging war against intellects.”

    It seemed, however, the Party and its leader, Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong, were only acting in line with their manifesto.

    The hope that the Party would reform itself and be tolerable to the ideas of forming democratic institutions and the rule of law which some people might have carried on throughout the past four decades, seemed to have ended bitterly with the former Deputy Minister Chu Hao’s withdrawing himself from the Party.

    Getting over the status quo is never easy for any given society, not to mention one that has been under decades of authoritarianism.

    The fact that there is still a minority group of people (most of them are under 40-year-old) who – despite being born and grew up in such a political context – still cares about human rights does matter.

    It matters because only five years ago, during the last UPR cycle, not a lot of people in Vietnam know much about human rights and could care less about the UPR process.

    It matters, even more, when the one recommendation from the Czech Republic to Vietnam during this UPR cycle, asking the government to allow political pluralism and democracy in the country, also became one of the most read news of January 2019 on Luat Khoa online magazine just 24 hours after being published.

    Recognizing that there is a small, young sector of the population who is still willing to speak up when faced with harassment and even imprisonment as the government hardened its oppression methods, is, therefore, essential.

    It is the other image of Vietnamese that the world needs to take notice because we are more than just a fun, tropical travel destination with good foods and hard-core football fans.

    Although a new draconian cybersecurity law went into effect earlier this year, there are still people who refuse to censor themselves or curb their online activism in any way.

    Instead, they have continued fighting for what they believe is right.

    They are the drivers protesting against BOT An Suong, the lawyers and activists exposing the government’s wrongdoing in Loc Hung vegetable garden’s forced eviction, the environmentalists trying to save the rainforest in #SaveTamDao campaign, and many more.

  • Vietnamese Government Celebrates National Day By Violating Its Own Constitution

    Vietnamese Government Celebrates National Day By Violating Its Own Constitution

    Today| marks the 73rd year since Ho Chi Minh stood at Ba Dinh Square on September 2, 1945, and proclaimed that all people shall enjoy their natural rights in the pursuit of happiness. Thus, it is quite hard to imagine that the current regime – who is supposedly following Ho Chi Minh’s teachings – has decided to mark such an auspicious occasion with a stern, yet illegal, warning to all citizens: do not go out and protest.

    But that is precisely how the Vietnamese authorities have decided to honor the birth of their nation this year, by loudly ordering the people not to participate in any form of public demonstration on Vietnam’s Independence Day.

    Throughout August, high-ranking officials in the Vietnamese Communist Party have taken turns assaulting the human right to assembly, a right enshrined in Vietnam’s 2013 Constitution.

    First, it was To Lam, head of the Ministry of Public Security (in charge of the national police force). Lam assured the Standing Committee of the National Assembly on August 13, 2018, that the police would take all possible measures to prevent people from participating in protests after he was admonished by Committee members for the mass protests that took place in June.

    A few weeks later, Hanoi city leader and high-ranking police official Nguyen Duc Chung also vowed that he would not allow “any crowds to publicly gather” under his watch during Independence Day weekend.

    Several state-owned media outlets during the past week “coincidentally” published articles condemning both the June 10th protestors and the call on social media accounts for a nationwide protest on September 2nd. The government seems to blame overseas groups, some of which have been declared “terrorist organizations” in recent years by Vietnamese authorities.

    News has also surfaced both on social media and on official news agencies that the police have arrested a small number of individuals disseminating information “against the state”, including one who was caught trying to enter Vietnam through Cambodia with several weapons.

    Minister To Lam has publicly congratulated the police forces of Binh Dinh and Phu Yen provinces for arresting the armed individual whom the government believes to be a member of Viet Tan, one of the aforementioned overseas groups. Viet Tan denied this accusation on the same day the individual was arrested.

    While no protest broke out today, the political sphere remains tense, and Vietnam is not in much of a celebrating mood compared to previous years.

    The Special Economic Zones draft bill is still dangling over citizens’ heads. The people are continuously wary of their country becoming ever more dependent on China.

    The government is not exactly helping, with the national bank announcing last Thursday that the Chinese renminbi could soon be used in trading activities along the country’s northern border, starting in October.

    There were also reports of the internet being down – again – due to cable issues during the last week of August (the fourth time in 2018 thus far). In Vietnam, internet outages often “coincide” with periods of social and political turmoil, as was observed when Vietnamese protested the Taiwanese steel mill, Formosa Ha Tinh, back in May 2016.

    Earlier this month, activists were also brutally assaulted by police officers for simply gathering at a small concert in a Ho Chi Minh City cafe. Many of these activists were also placed under surveillance this holiday weekend.

    Are the reactions from the Vietnamese government in August just overblown paranoia or do they have reason to fear the people?

    It is difficult to say.

    However, we do know from the writings of several state-owned newspapers that the government is extremely wary of anything remotely resembling the “color revolutions” or the Arab Spring in Vietnam. They prefer to take pre-emptive measures, using all means to prevent demonstrations, even if doing so would mean breaking their own laws and constitution.

    Moreover, the Vietnamese government does not distinguish between peaceful dissidents and those who call for a violent overthrow of the government, and the case of one of their most famous political prisoners, Tran Huynh Duy Thuc, is the best example.

    Thuc was sentenced to 16 years imprisonment back in 2009 for “subversion against the state,” and the evidence used to uphold the conviction included his writings pleading with the government to take rapid and immediate action to preserve economic growth and avoid over-dependence on China.

    Before his arrest, Tran Huynh Duy Thuc was one of Vietnam’s most successful entrepreneurs, with the government unable to find any evidence of wrongdoing within his multi-million dollar business after raids. Western countries have offered Thuc political asylum on multiple occasions, but he refuses to leave his country to live in exile.

    His latest defiant act—a hunger strike—protesting what he calls “an unjust judicial system,” again put the Vietnamese government in a predicament: they could not justify his imprisonment to the increasingly informed public. September 2, 2018 marks the 20th day of Thuc’s hunger strike.

    Up until last month, Thuc had received the longest sentence for a political prisoner: 16 years imprisonment, followed by 5 years of house arrest.

    In August, the record was surpassed by Le Dinh Luong, who was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, again for “subversion against the state.” Luong was known by his peers as an activist who campaigned against the environmental destruction caused by corporations and development projects.

    The VCP has managed – especially in recent years – to ensure that its human rights records rival that of its big Communist brother, China, with more suppression and harsher sentences against activists.

    But will more suppression lead to a stable and peaceful society as the VCP hopes for, or will blurring “peaceful dissent” with “subversion against the state” further chip away at the government’s legitimacy? The answer remains unclear.

    What we do know, however, is that history has never been on the side of regimes that refuse to engage in dialogue with dissenters, that refuses to heed the people’s discontent. One need only look at Vietnam’s own history to see this fact in action.

  • Vietnam, A Step Closer to Democracy With The Latest Nationwide Protests?

    Vietnam, A Step Closer to Democracy With The Latest Nationwide Protests?

    June 10, 2018| Nationwide protests broke out in several major cities in Vietnam in the morning and lasted well into the afternoon. As of press time, the demonstrations are still ongoing with reports of several arrests and incidents of police assaulting protestors while observers mostly described the participants as peaceful.

    This time, the protests seemed to have not been organized by any groups, and the more well-known dissidents and activists were not leading the crowd. However, it was the small groups of concerned citizens coming together with substantial knowledge on their right to assemble and protest that made June 10, 2018, both memorable and surprising to people.

    People were gathering and rallying in several cities this morning, Hanoi, Saigon, Nha Trang, Da Nang, and even smaller areas such as My Tho – Tien Giang, Ho Nai – Dong Nai and a few Catholics parishes in Nghe An Province.

    But it may very well be the turn of events in Saigon – Hochiminh City today that has shown a level of political awakening that many observers have not seen before.

    People started to gather at around 8:30 a.m. local time, coming to several areas in Saigon, from the Notre Dame Cathedral Basilica in District One, walking district Nguyen Hue, in front of the U.S. Consulate, to Hoang Van Thu park near Tan Son Nhat airport. From around 500 people at one area to thousands more at another spot.

    The participants have used the Livestream feature on Facebook to record the protests where they showed how knowledgeable the regular persons could be when it comes to their rights as citizens.

    People at one location, while demanding that the police released those who were arrested, have questioned them:

    “Have you read the Constitution. Do you know what Article 25 is? Do you know that arresting protestors is unconstitutional?”

    Even when faced with assaults from police and security forces, the videos showed people were trying to tell each other to remain calm, to document the incidents with photos and videos, and do not fear because: “We did not do anything wrong!”

    In Hanoi, the security forces acted swiftly in rounding up protestors and broke up the rallies. But in Saigon, thousands of people were on the streets, and by the afternoon, it seemed as if the demonstration has become unstoppable even with the police started their crackdown.

    An online call to protest against the draft law creating three Special Economic Zones (SEZ) received over 160,000.00 shares on Facebook this past week. The government acted and postponed the SEZ draft law on early Saturday morning when the probability that the people will take to the streets started looming, but such efforts seemed to be futile.

    The SEZ draft law was not the only bill that the citizens find problematic.

    The people have a major concern regarding the SEZ draft law is because of the China factor. Anti-China rallies are nothing new in Vietnam, and for the past decades, it was the most common reason for the people to let go of their fears and gather on the streets protesting.

    This time, many fear that their government has sold them short to the Chinese investors and that the SEZs will turn into mini China(s) inside Vietnam once the law goes into effect.

    However, there is also the Cybersecurity draft bill pending for a vote on June 12, 2018, where Vietnam attempts to place all of its people under Big Brother’s watch, criminalizing many online activities, from misrepresenting historical facts to merely speaking unfondly of the government.

    Thus, efforts were also made by several civil society groups leading by Hate Change, calling on people to also protest against the Cybersecurity draft law.


    Protestors on motorbikes in Saigon, denouncing the SEZ draft law. Photo Courtesy: Nguyen Nu Phuong Dung’s Facebook.

    One of the groups that showed up early at the Notre Dame Cathedral Basilica in District 1, Saigon, protesting against both draft laws, SEZ and Cybersecurity. Photo Courtesy: Nguyen Nu Phuong Dung’s Facebook.

    The crowd at one spot near Hoang Van Thu park, Saigon. Photo Courtesy: Nguyen Nu Phuong Dung’s Facebook.

    Crowd near Tan Son Nhat airport. Photo Courtesy: Nguyen Nu Phuong Dung’s Facebook.

    People gathered in front of Reunification Palace aka Independence Palace in Saigon. Photo Courtesy: Nguyen Nu Phuong Dung’s Facebook.

    Another group of protestors on motorbikes in Saigon. Photo Courtesy: Nguyen Nu Phuong Dung’s Facebook.

    One protestor being assaulted by the security forces. Photo courtesy: Will Nguyen’s Twitter.

    Security forces arrested people in Hanoi. Photo courtesy: Hien Trinh’s Facebook.

    Security forces arrested people in Hanoi. Photo courtesy: Hien Trinh’s Facebook.

    Protestors against Cybersecurity draft law in Saigon. Photo courtesy: Vi Yen Nguyen

    Young people raised banner against Cybersecurity draft law in Saigon. Photo courtesy: Vi Yen Nguyen

    The pictures above are from today’s protests in Hanoi and Saigon-Hochiminh City. The Vietnamese thanks the owners of these pictures for their courtesy, and please contact us for photo credits because we have received them from a few sources on Facebook and Twitter.

  • From Nguyễn Văn Đài’s April 5, 2018 Trial – What Constitutes “Overthrowing the People’s Government” in Vietnam?

    From Nguyễn Văn Đài’s April 5, 2018 Trial – What Constitutes “Overthrowing the People’s Government” in Vietnam?

    April 5, 2018 | Nguyễn Văn Đài – probably one of the most prominent dissidents in Vietnam for almost two decades – received one of the harshest sentences for political dissent in recent years.

    A court in Hanoi, Vietnam sentenced Nguyễn Văn Đài to 15 years imprisonment and 5 years probation under house arrest. His colleagues tried and convicted in the same case, also received equally harsh sentences. Nguyễn Trung Tôn, 12 years imprisonment and 3 years probation; Trương Minh Đức, 12 years imprisonment and 3 years probation; Nguyễn Bắc Truyển, 11 years imprisonment and 3 years probation; Lê Thu Hà, 9 years imprisonment and 2 years probation; Phạm Văn Trội, 7 years imprisonment and 1 year probation.

    The 48-year old former attorney was among the first group of Vietnamese lawyers who took up political cases in the early 2000’s and defended dissidents, as well as those who were persecuted for exercising religious freedom.

    Đài was the type of lawyer who would defend those accused of the very same crime he is facing today: “conducting activities to overthrow the people’s government.”

    This crime is infamously known among international human rights groups and foreign embassies as the Article 79 of Vietnam’s Penal Code 1999.

    While carrying capital punishment as the maximum sentence, Article 79 however, utterly lacks a clear, well-defined description of conducts which would constitute a person’s criminal liability, and as such, making it impossible for people to cry out mea culpa.

    The law only states that “a person conducting activities to form or participate in any organization to overthrow the people’s government shall be punished as follows,” and then immediately dwells into specifying the sentencing guidelines from twelve years, twenty years, life imprisonment, up to the death sentence for the main perpetrator, and five to fifteen years for those who act as accomplices.

    Because of this ambiguity per se in its language, Article 79 had faced strong criticism from the international community over the years, especially during the last Vietnam’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) in January 2014.

    Critics continue pointing out, that along with Articles 88 and 258 of the Penal Code, the government has used these criminal provisions almost exclusively against political dissidents and pro-democracy activists, taking advantage of the vague language of these codes to criminalize peaceful protests and suppress political dissent.

    Facing such international pressure during the 2014 UPR, Vietnam agreed to amend Article 79, and they did, in 2015.

    However, except for some minor, cosmetic changes such as the number of the code section from 79 to 109, and adding a category for those who are “preparing to commit the crime” with the punishment ranging from one to five years imprisonment, the remaining of the “new” Article 109 is taken verbatim from Article 79.

    In short, we still have to look to actual cases to define which conducts would constitute the crime of “overthrowing the people’s government” in Vietnam, and in Đài’s case today, such conducts would be:

    “Opening an office, having a website to operate, developing a ‘shortening manifesto’, having a structured organization, having internal and external affairs strategy, operating to increase membership, capacity, …; abusing the right to promote ‘democracy, human rights,’ ‘civil society’ to conceal the objectives of the Brotherhood for Democracy … waiting for the appropriate timing to openly operate in opposition of the government through changing the political structure in Vietnam, developing ‘pluralism with multiple parties’ and a government with ‘separation of powers’ to overthrow the people’s government while using a private sector economy as its basis.”

    The above paragraph was an excerpt taken from the Conclusion section at page 10 of the 16-page long indictment issued on December 31, 2017 against Nguyễn Văn Đài and his five colleagues, Lê Thu Hà (who was arrested together with Đài on December 16, 2015), Nguyễn Bắc Truyển, Nguyễn Trung Tôn, Trương Minh Đức, and Phạm Văn Trội.

    The new Penal Code of Vietnam was not taken effective until January 1, 2018. Thus, Đài and his colleagues were charged with Article 79 of the old code.

    Nguyễn Văn Đài has never shied away from his political ambitions and his outspoken criticism of the current regime, especially regarding the political monopoly the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) has over the country.

    In 2006, Đài openly called for the establishment of other political parties and forming political opposition to challenge the VPC’s ruling. According to a research on Vietnam’s democratization advocates conducted by the Australian scholar, Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet, Nguyễn Văn Đài would fall under the category of those who chose to confront the regime head-on.

    He holds a firm personal belief that every Vietnamese people do have the intellectual capacity and enough knowledge to participate in a pluralistic form of governance with multiple parties.

    He previously wrote that Vietnam had had other political parties in the past, during the 1930’s and the early independent days from 1945-1946. Notably, in the South of Vietnam – before the fall of Saigon – political parties were very active. Moreover, Đài always believes that the current Constitution supports the formation of other political parties besides the VPC.

    His direct challenge to the ruling party’s power resulted in a conviction for “propaganda against the state” under Article 88 in 2007, where he served four years in prison and was released in 2011.

    Coincidentally, 2011, the year in which Đài was released, also marked the beginning of an unprecedented rise of the young pro-democracy and pro-human rights movement in Vietnam.

    Starting in the summer of 2011, Vietnamese people – especially youths – swarmed the streets of major cities such as Hanoi and Saigon, protesting against China’s aggression due to the incident involving the cutting of Vietnam’s Binh Minh vessel’s cable cab in the South China Sea.

    People organized protests through Facebook’s pages, and statuses, calling for massive turnouts all over the country like never seen before, at least not anything like that had happened since after the Vietnam War was over in 1975.

    At first, the government allowed the protests, but when faced with thousands of youths on the streets, they quickly decided to change course and started cracking down on peaceful protesters. Yet this very conduct of the government had opened doors to another era of civil disobedience in Vietnam: the birth of the independent civil society organizations (CSO) movement inside the country. Many of the protesters on those streets in Vietnam six years ago are now the prominent faces of the pro-democracy movement.

    The undeterred Nguyễn Văn Đài quickly caught on to this phenomenon and organized his own CSO – the Brotherhood for Democracy (which got named in the indictment) – continuing pushing for political changes through challenging the one-party rule. A person with charisma, Đài again rose to the occasion, becoming the familiar face during those meetings with foreign officials and diplomats from many embassies in Hanoi.

    And that was documented in his December 2017 indictment as well, where it detailed how he was able to connect with foreign institutions and individuals to secure funding for his CSO – activities that are normal for any non-governmental organization around the world. The indictment even named diplomats from the U.S. and Germany as people who acted as his references.

    It also worths noting that almost two years ago, Vietnam’s National Assembly attempted to pass a law on association with restrictions on receiving “foreign funds.” However, such efforts failed when faced with stern opposition from NGOs and CSOs from Vietnam, both registered and non-registered.

    Thus, except for the indictment in Đài’s case making it out to be a crime, Vietnam’s laws have yet to prohibit NGOs to receive foreign financial aids.

    But the reality remains, that as of right now, Vietnam still only has one political party – the Communist Party – and Nguyễn Văn Đài and his colleagues’ latest trial and conviction demonstrate that any efforts aiming at forming a political opposition would constitute conduct punishable by very long and harsh sentences.

    In December 2008, many people gasped as China sentenced Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, Liu Xiaobo, to 11 years for “suspicion of subversion against the state.”

    Now almost ten years later, in April 2018, using an eerily similar charge against Nguyễn Văn Đài and his colleagues, Vietnam has demonstrated that it too, does not yield to international pressure and would even go the extra miles in sending political dissents to prisons for even longer terms than its communist big brother.